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‘The English have always been more given to peacableness and industry than other people and rather than 
go so far as London and be at so great charges with Attorneys and Lawyers, they will refer their differences 
to the Arbitration of their Parish Priests … or to the Arbitration of honest neighbours’ 
- Angliæ Notitia by Edward Chamberlayne, 1684 
 
‘The two systems (arbitration and litigation) ought indeed to be properly regarded as co-ordinate rather 
than rival’1 
- Lord Parker CJ   
 
1 Lord Parker CJ cited in R. Finch, ‘London: Still the Cornerstone of International Commercial Arbitration and 
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When the Arbitration Act 1996 came into force on 31 January 1997 it had two aims: to 
consolidate the existing laws and codify arbitration practice as it then was in England and Wales.  
The Departmental Advisory Committee (DAC) then charged with drafting the new Act elected 
not to address the issue of confidentiality, preferring the law to develop on a case-by-case basis.  
Appropriate at the time, a quarter of a century on that approach to confidentiality and privacy is 
looking increasingly anachronistic: society demands transparency in all its various branches, not 
least the judicial system.  This thesis argues that the Arbitration Act 1996 should be reformed 
with respect to privacy and confidentiality.  It begins by exploring the differences between privacy 
and confidentiality and tracing the development of those concepts.  A comparative analysis is 
conducted of arbitral confidentiality in jurisdictions outside England and Wales, and the rules and 
terms of selected arbitral institutions worldwide.  The various studies into arbitration since the 
1970’s provide insights not only into the views and opinions of those closely involved in 
arbitration, but also potential alternative approaches. 
Widespread criticism of the status quo has come from many quarters: academics, 
practitioners, lawyers as well as senior members of the judiciary.  Two aspects of the Arbitration 
Act 1996 that are commonly considered as being in need of reform are those relating to the appeal 
of arbitral awards and confidentiality.  Focusing on the primary issues of confidentiality in 
arbitration, the thesis asks who and what are bound by these obligations?  Is confidentiality an 
implied term as held by Potter LJ in Ali Shipping Corporation v Shipyard Trogir2 - an approach 
subsequently criticised by the Privy Council in Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services 
Ltd v European Reinsurance Co of Zurich (Bermuda)3, where their Lordships expressed 
reservations about the desirability or merit in so characterising a duty of confidentiality?  Lord 
Hobhouse viewed any attempt at generalisation to be unworkable:  
It runs the risk of failing to distinguish between different types of confidentiality which 
attach to different types of document or to documents which have been obtained in 
different ways and elides privacy and confidentiality. Generalisations and the formulation 
of detailed implied terms are not appropriate.4   
This thesis explores the reasons why confidentiality should be codified with respect to the 
arbitral process.  That those involved - the parties, institutions, arbitrators, solicitors and witnesses 
- should be bound by its provisions.  It argues that there is a pressing need to address the gaps in 
 
2 Ali Shipping Corporation v Shipyard Trogir [1998] 2 All ER 136; [1999] 1 WLR 314 (Ali Shipping). 
3 Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd v European Reinsurance Co of Zurich (Bermuda) [2003] 
1WLR 1041; [2003] UKPC 11 (on appeal from Bermuda). 
4 ibid [1050]. 
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the current law such as the consolidation of proceedings and the use of materials generated during 
the course of an arbitration.  Equally important is the need to create a framework that determines 
how awards are used in related arbitrations and litigation, whilst meeting the societal expectations 
of judicial transparency.  The stunting of commercial law and the hindering of its development 
due to the dearth of published awards is addressed threefold: by making award publication the 
default rule; requiring copies of all arbitral awards to be deposited with the courts; and enabling 
redacted awards to be published.  The modernisation proposals continue by addressing and 
requiring transparency when third party funding is utilised; by defining and addressing exceptions 
including those in the interests of justice and what constitutes in the public interest.  I view it as a 
fundamental necessity that the ethics, transparency and disclosure obligations of every arbitrator 
is core to ensuring the integrity and continued success of English arbitration.  The arguments that 
excessive intervention, whether judicially or by statute, risk London’s place in the world of 
arbitration are in my view misguided.  An emphasis on openness, ethics and transparency will 
ultimately be more beneficial to English arbitration.  The thesis concludes by proposing 
amendments that codify privacy and confidentiality in the Arbitration Act 1996.   
Keywords 
Arbitration; awards; concurrency, confidentiality; consolidation; development of the law; 
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Privacy and confidentiality are fundamental features of arbitration.  Yet their nature is 
frequently misunderstood, the terms being used interchangeably and oft misapplied.  This should 
come as no surprise given the differing systems of civil and common law that may play a role and 
the notable differences that exist even between common law countries.  Different laws may apply 
to the substantive dispute that has been referred to arbitration; to the arbitration itself including 
the procedure of the arbitration and the role of national courts in supervising or supporting it; to 
the arbitration agreement including issues as to its scope, effect, construction or validity; and to 
the award – including matters pertaining to enforceability, validity and recognition.  Despite the 
freedom to choose the substantive law that will apply to their dispute, parties to international 
arbitration cannot always contract out of any applicable institutional rules or terms governing the 
dispute that may amend or replace the non-mandatory provisions of the procedural law at the seat 
of the arbitration.  The potential for confusion and uncertainty is not only apparent, it is real.  The 
consequences that flow from this, the issues that arise as a result and how to effectively address 
them whilst taking into account the disparate needs of the many stake holders are addressed. 
This thesis will deal primarily with voluntary arbitration, more specifically relating to 
international commercial arbitration, whilst taking note of some of the concepts and philosophies 
arising out of investment and intellectual property arbitration.  It will analyse the elements of 
confidentiality in juxtaposition with the interest of justice and the public interest in arbitration, 
offering a critique as to whether the latter outweighs the former.  It addresses the current tensions 
between the contradictory rules on confidentiality as interpreted by the courts and whether they 
should be relaxed or abolished altogether given the potential for parties who are familiar with 
arbitration to abuse the advantage of confidentiality.  It argues that codification by means of 
amendments to the Arbitration Act 1996 is a more appropriate approach.  The potential impact 
on the desirability of London as a venue for international commercial arbitration as a method of 
dispute resolution a change in the law might entail, the unequal bargaining power of arbitrating 
parties and the desirability of greater transparency in arbitration are amongst the peripheral factors 
to consider. 
Traditionally most texts did not address in any substantive form privacy or confidentiality in 
arbitration, the authors considering the issue as deserving of little or no comment.  Despite that 
lack, there are relevant questions e.g., Who and how are individuals bound by it?  How far does 
it extend?  What are the remedies and penalties for breach?  What are the exceptions?  And how 
do privacy and confidentiality differ?  In the absence of codification, it has been left to courts to 
determine the nature and extent of these questions.  To understand why England chose not to 
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codify arbitral confidentiality requires an understanding and examination of the historical 
development of English commercial law. 
Whilst addressing the principal elements of confidentiality, this thesis recognises that not all 
issues are equal - either in importance or the extent to which the courts have been required to 
consider them.  The courts for example have regularly been called upon to decide issues relating 
to the use of awards and materials.  Some issues have been touched on more lightly and 
infrequently, such as consolidation.  Third party funding, award publication or what constitutes a 
public interest exception have yet to receive any detailed scrutiny.  Only now has England’s 
highest Court turned its mind to the ethical questions of transparency and the obligations of 
disclosure incumbent on an arbitrator. 
It is more than 20 years since Neill’s warning that: ‘should English law no longer regarded 
the privacy and confidentiality of arbitration proceedings . . . as a fundamental characteristic of 
the agreement to arbitrate . . . there would be a flight of arbitrations … to more hospitable climes’.5  
Nevertheless, much has changed in the world in those intervening years.  As this thesis will shew, 
academics, practitioners, the judiciary and commentators are broadly in agreement that there is 
scope for refinement and improvement in the current law on confidentiality in relation to arbitral 
proceedings.  That reform is long overdue.6 
Methodology 
Confidentiality, if no longer the very essence of arbitration that it was once perceived to 
possess, is sufficiently recognised that its very existence to a large extent hinders research and 
analysis: arbitration awards are usually private and not published, generally coming only into the 
public domain in the event of an appeal.  ⁠This thesis will rely principally on the core materials to 
which critical analysis will be brought i.e., case law, statute, academic texts, surveys, journals, 
foreign laws and the rules of various arbitral institutions.  The principal methodologies used are 
as follows. 
 
5 Patrick Neill, ‘Confidentiality in Arbitration,’ 12 Arb. Int’l. 287 (1996) at 315 - 316. 
6 To take but a single example relating to consolidation, one only has to take a brief dip into the sad fable of Interbulk 
Ltd. v Aiden Shipping Co. Ltd. (“The Vimeira”) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 66, [75] where Goff LJ urged a legislative 
solution be found such as that found in Hong Kong, deploring the fact that ‘English arbitration law provides at 
present no power either to arbitrators or the Court to ensure that both arbitrations will be considered by the same 
tribunal either at the same hearing or at immediately succeeding hearings to avoid the danger of inconsistent awards’.  
Skilfully analysed in V V Veeder’s ‘Multi-party disputes: Consolidation under English law The Vimeira – a Sad 
Forensic Fable’ (1986) 2 Arbitration International 4, 310.  See also Anthony Diamond, ‘Multi-Party Arbitrations A 
Plea for a Pragmatic Piecemeal Solution’ (1991) 7 Arbitration International 408.  The 1978 Commercial Court 
Committee in its Report on Arbitration (Cmnd. 7284) recommended that the High Court should have a statutory 
power to order arbitrations be consolidated. 
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1. An analysis of how the concept of confidentiality in arbitration has developed in English 
law; to identify the law’s current strengths and weaknesses with a view to determining 
to what extent reform is required. 
 
2. Conducting a comparative analysis of how arbitral confidentiality has developed outside 
England, including both common and civil law jurisdictions, in order to understand the 
diversity of approaches: how other countries had solved (or attempted to solve) the 
difficulties identified in this thesis.  Focusing on international rather than domestic 
arbitration statutes, primarily on the pragmatic grounds that there are too many domestic 
arbitration laws in (say) Australia or the USA to include within the limits of a study such 
as this, where every State has the option to promulgate its own arbitration laws.  Initially 
the legal systems of 112 countries were the subject of review.  These included states 
which were active in the area of international arbitration; had relevant laws and possessed 
arbitral centres in their jurisdictions.  For practical considerations this was subsequently 
reduced to 12 for more detailed consideration.  The initial net had been cast too wide.  It 
had included countries that did not publish in English.  More importantly, that initial 
analysis revealed a number of countries had little substantive jurisprudence on arbitration 
law: the concept of arbitral confidentiality was often entirely absent.  Inexorably there 
was a natural coalescence around those countries that had recognised the issues and/or 
had developed modern approaches and solutions to such issues as consolidation, the 
public interest or the publication of awards.  It was those countries laws therefore that 
came under special focus i.e., the UNCITRAL Model Law and the following 11 
countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Norway, Singapore, Sweden and the United States.  
  
3. By analysing how selected arbitral institutions approached the principles and issues of 
confidentiality in their respective rules and terms.  The challenge with respect to 
identifying which arbitral institutions to study in some respects mirrored that for the 
overseas jurisdictions.  Amongst the determining factors was the availability and 
accessibility of published information e.g., whether an institution’s rules were published 
on-line and in English: in practice all major centres do both.  More importantly perhaps, 
the relative activity of the arbitral centre in the context of international arbitration.  Whilst 
noting that this methodology may have its detractors, I view it as a pragmatic 
compromise: an institution’s popularity amongst users is a relevant and significant factor 
 
xxxi 
in its appeal to an international audience.7   
Four tables highlighting the data collated appear at the end of Chapter 1.  Table 1 details the 
arbitral activity of 25 international arbitral centres for the period 2005 - 2019.  Table 2 compares 
the approaches of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the following countries: Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden and the 
United States.  Table 3 makes similar comparisons for the following institutions: the AAA/ICDR, 
CIETAC, DIS/GMAA, HKIAC, IBA, ICC, LCIA, LMAA, SCMA, SIAC and SCC.  These 
methodologies provided the tools to aid identifying suitable and effective approaches with respect 
to privacy and confidentiality in international commercial arbitration and insights as to what form 
confidentiality amendments to the Arbitration Act 1996 might take.  Table 4 is a typology of 




7 See for example the ICC’s written submissions in Halliburton Co v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd and others 
[2018] EWCA Civ 817 (Halliburton v Chubb) to the Supreme Court: ‘It is not apparent to the ICC, however, that the 
respective significance of an arbitral institution’s perspective on the issues in this appeal is to be measured purely by 





Chapter 1: An Introduction to Confidentiality in 
Arbitration 
‘All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is 
founded on compromise and barter’.8 
- Edmund Burke 
Preamble: A Hypothetical Case Study - iWidgets 
Should you had been fortunate enough to have been in the vicinity of EC4 on the appropriate 
day and bestowed of both sufficient curiosity and time on your hands, you might have walked 
into the Rolls Building, off Fetter Lane.  Noting that there was hearing scheduled to be heard by 
the Intellectual Property List (ChD)9 concerning the iWidget - a useful, popular and profitable 
device - you elect to sit in the public gallery to view the proceedings.  The designer of the iWidget 
had outsourced their manufacture.  Two satisfied commercial parties, until the designer 
discovered that the manufacturer was selling imitations of the iWidget.  The designer sued, 
alleging that the manufacturer had improperly retained copies of the iWidget drawings, using 
them to make pirated versions of the iWidget.10 
You may have heard the evidence being presented.  Watched the examination and cross 
examination of witnesses and the conflict of expert testimony on the fundamental characteristics 
of an iWidget.  Perhaps you listened intently to the judge’s summing up and been impressed by 
the efficiency of the English judicial system.  Or not, depending on your political temperament 
and outlook: ‘The informed observer of today can perhaps be expected to be aware of the legal 
traditions and culture of this jurisdiction … But he may not be wholly uncritical of this culture’.11   
Weeks pass.  Perusing the Law Section of The Times one Thursday, you come across a report 
of the iWidget judgement.  Having been an observer to part of the proceedings at least, you may 
well have formed your own conclusions as to the correctness or otherwise of the outcome.  The 
 
8 Edmund Burke, HC Deb 22 Mar 1775. 
9 The Intellectual Property List is a specialist court within the Business and Property Courts of the High Court of 
Justice, based at the Rolls Building in London.  It was set up to deal with claims and appeals concerning patents, 
registered designs, copyright issues, trademarks, semiconductor topography rights and plant varieties, claims and 
appeals concerning intellectual property rights. 
10 Whilst the iWidget is a fictional creation, my thanks nonetheless to V V Veeder and his ginger beer analogy with 
arbitration in ‘Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions: Legal Risks for Product Liability?’ (2016) 5 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 
335 for acting as the conceptual catalyst. 





key part of this short fictional narrative is that however briefly was your interaction with the 
English legal system, what you experienced can be described as ‘open justice,’ a judicial principle 
that can be traced back from before the Magna Carta to the present day.12  It should not be 
overlooked that it was after all English lawyers who substantially drafted the European 
Convention on Human Rights, of which Article 6 upholds the right ‘to a fair and public hearing’.13   
What if that dispute had come to arbitration?  Our venue has now perhaps moved a five-
minute walk away to the IDRC at Fleet Street.  Endeavour to obtain access and see how far you 
get.  Probably not past the pleasant but politely firm receptionist.  The parties, the evidence, the 
arguments, and the results - the arbitration award - would in all probability be neither reported 
nor published.  If one of the parties had appealed, it is possible that the matter may have found its 
way into the law reports.  But there is no guarantee.  The CPR Rules provide at 62.10 the default 
position that whilst arbitration claims be heard in private, it does not apply to the confidentiality 
of judgments.14  Parties can and do request the court to anonymise the appeals process, although 
recent judgements suggest that the courts are in favour of greater openness in this regard, a subject 
discussed in depth in Chapter 8. 
At this point a nagging question may have arisen in your mind along the lines of: ‘why should 
I care?’  An understandable sentiment.  Arcane aspects of a business dispute between commercial 
parties of whom you may know little and care somewhat less, are unlikely to appeal to the average 
citizen.  But instead of iWidgets, let us suppose that the dispute had been between an energy 
company and a public utility, the outcome of which would determine the size of the price increase 
of your domestic electricity charges.  Discretionary spending on our hypothetical iWidgets may 
not hold your attention.  But it is likely that you pay for domestic gas or electricity and very much 
hold a view about the size of your utility bill.  The English courts have not had such a clearly 
defined public interest case as that of Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (Minister for 
 
12 If our hypothetical iWidgets resonated in some small way, it may have called to mind Prince Albert v Strange 
(1849) 1 Mac & G 25; 41 ER 1171, widely regarded as the first English case that dealt specifically with breach of 
confidence as a potential basis for granting relief.  The claimant sought to prevent the publication of a catalogue 
containing unpublished etchings made by Queen Victoria and the Prince.  An employee of the Royal printer made 
unauthorised copies of plates provided which later appeared in the catalogue.  Lord Cottenham held that the Queen 
and Prince had property rights in the etchings and that an injunction could be founded upon ‘breach of trust, 
confidence, or contract’ because the impressions must have come into the defendant's possession by such breach. 
13 Buxton LJ (1999) Chapter 6 in The Human Rights Act and the Criminal Justice and Regulatory Process, Hart 
Publishing.  A key author of the ECHR was lawyer and MP David Mexwell-Fyfe, whose contribution to the 
Convention was so significant that he has been described as: ‘the doctor who brought the child to birth’. 
14 See Symbion Power LLC v Venco Imtiaz Construction Co (with respect to the public interest in publishing 
judgments challenging arbitral awards) and Teekay Tankers Ltd v STX Offshore and Shipbuilding Co Ltd (on whether 






Energy and Minerals (Esso/BHP v Plowman),15 a 1995 Australian decision rejecting the hitherto 
uncontroversial English concept of arbitral confidentiality.  Esso/BHP v Plowman addressed 
some difficult political and philosophical choices that had not been previously considered: 
specifically the public’s right to know how consumer energy prices were set.   
That private arbitration scenario could have been mirrored in almost any jurisdiction.  
Singapore has its equivalent to the IDRC at Maxwell Chambers, the 1930’s former colonial 
customs house (and one-time driving centre) in Singapore.  Or at the AIAC (formerly the 
KLRCA), a modern integrated dispute resolution centre dealing with arbitration, mediation, 
Islamic finance and sports (CAS) disputes, located at the Bangunan Sulaiman, a building that 
originally housed the Federated Malay States Railway in Kuala Lumpur.16  Welcome to the 
secretive world of arbitration.  If the wider public thinks at all about arbitration, it would most 
probably view it as some form of private justice.  It certainly has its own ecosphere of privacy, 
confidentiality and secrecy from which outsiders are excluded.  But should that be so?  Can self-
policing in any form of judicial dispute resolution be acceptable?  This thesis takes the position 
that it is not, that there is a fundamental need to frame society’s reasonable expectations: it should 
not be the preserve of a small, professional clique.  As will be explored in this thesis, criticism of 
the status quo is widespread amongst academics, lawyers and the judiciary: practitioner’s views 
tend to be more evenly balanced, as highlighted by the opposing arguments in the submissions to 
the Supreme Court in Halliburton Co v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd and others [2018] EWCA 
Civ 817 (Halliburton v Chubb). 
The aspects of the Arbitration Act 1996 viewed as being in need of reform typically relate to 
the appeal of arbitral awards and confidentiality.  This thesis asks who and what are bound by 
these obligations.  Is confidentiality an implied term as per Ali Shipping Corporation v Shipyard 
Trogir [1998] 2 All ER 136; [1999] 1 WLR 314 (Ali Shipping) or does the Privy Council’s 
expressed reservations to that approach in Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd v 
European Reinsurance Co of Zurich (Bermuda) (AEGIS v European Re)17 better reflect the law?  
Lord Hobhouse dismissed as unworkable any attempt at generalisation and the formulation of 
detailed implied terms as being inappropriate.  Is that approach still relevant, or sustainable?  This 
thesis argues that confidentiality should be codified with respect to all aspects of the arbitral 
process.  Firstly to encompass the actors involved: the parties, institutions, lawyers, arbitrators 
 
15 [1994] 1 VR 1. 
16 The Centre was established under the Asian African Legal Consultative Organization (“AALCO”), an international 
organization comprising 47-member states from across the region. 
17 Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd v European Reinsurance Co of Zurich (Bermuda) [2003] 





and witnesses.   Secondly to address the many gaps in the law of arbitral confidentiality.   
Those gaps have long been there, as the number of years judges have been grappling with 
the issues of consolidation, the use of arbitral materials and arbitration awards highlight.  More 
recently have concerns about the lack of development of the law have surfaced.  It took the 
world’s largest and most expensive oil spill from the MODU “Deepwater Horizon” to bring to 
the fore arguments about the ethics and transparency of arbitrators.18  The televised proceedings 
in the Supreme Court have helped open a window into what were otherwise remote, arcane 
branches of the law.  Concerns over how to deal with third party funding demand attention.  In 
my view Lord Thomas was broadly correct: the dearth of published awards has stunted and 
hindered the development of commercial law.19  It is addressed threefold: by making award 
publication the default rule; requiring copies of all arbitral awards to be deposited with the courts; 
and enabling the publishing of redacted awards.  Ultimately parliament needs to define and 
address the gaps in the law: including identifying what constitutes ‘in the interests of justice’ and 
‘in the public interest’, as well as the extent and scope of any exceptions. 
The starting point in this Chapter is to analyse and understand how arbitration has developed 
in England: to study the internal and external dynamics that have guided us to the current 
problematic state.  How the commercial imperatives to maintain London as an international 
arbitration centre have acted to resist change and continue to shape its evolution.   If this was a 
political analysis, it would be hard not to describe the views of the establishment as reactionary: 
the DAC and its successors views of confidentiality has remained unchanged for more than 40 
years.  Chapters 2 and 3 compare how overseas legal systems and selected arbitral institutions 
have viewed these concerns and the steps that they have taken.  Chapters 4 and 5 address the less 
controversial topics related to the use of materials and awards, consolidation and concurrency.  
Chapter 6 deals with third party funding, a development not envisaged when the 1996 Act became 
 
18 In United States v BP Exploration & Prod. (In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of 
Mexico, on April 20, 2010) 148 F. Supp. 3d 563; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160150; 2015 AMC 2921; 81 ERC (BNA) 
2205, Barbier J ruled in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Phase Two Trial on January 15, 2015, that 4 
million barrels of crude oil were released from the reservoir, of which 3.19 million barrels or approximately 168 
million gallons were released into the Gulf of Mexico (0.81 million barrels of oil were recovered).  Such figures can 
be difficult for the human mind to comprehend.   In a shipping context, 4 million barrels of crude oil is the equivalent 
of two fully loaded 300,000 tonnes deadweight VLCC’s (very large crude oil carriers) i.e., a 600,000-tonne spill.  By 
comparison the Exxon Valdez spilled around 37,000 tonnes of crude oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska on 24  
March 1989.  The UK’s worst spill was from the Torrey Canyon, which went aground at Pollard's Rock on Seven 
Stones reef between the Cornish mainland and the Isles of Scilly on 18 March 1967, spilling more than 100,000 
tonnes of crude oil into the English Channel. 
19 Lord Thomas’ strong views with respect to a lack of arbitration appeals appeared to have softened by the time of his 
April 2017 speech in Beijing, where he recognized that the majority of appeals emanate from commodity and shipping 
arbitration disputes, which markets do not generally ‘opt out’ of the ability to appeal to the courts on a point of law.  






law.   Chapter 7 aims to define and formulate an approach to public interest exceptions.  Chapter 
8 has a more philosophical underpinning in relation to the law’s development through s.69 appeals 
and award publication.  Chapter 9’s concerns in relation to the ethical transparency of arbitrators 
is hardly new, but the focus on disclosure and how that should be managed is very much at the 
forefront of current legal thinking.  Chapter 10 summarises the thesis and concludes with 
proposals for reform.  The four tables described in the methodology appear at the end of Chapter 
1.   
Fast, Cheap, Private? 
The typical textbook mantra is misleading.  Arbitration is neither fast nor cheap.  It is however 
private and supposedly confidential.  But how and why?  And to what extent?  But first, what is 
arbitration and why do parties arbitrate?  ‘Giles Jacob’s Law Dictionary’ of 1729 defined an 
‘arbitrator’ for the first time: 
An Arbitrator is a private extraordinary Judge between Party and Party, chosen by 
their mutual Consents, to determine Controversies between them. And Arbitrators 
are so called because they have an arbitrary Power; for if they observe the 
Submission and keep within due bounds their Sentences are definitive, from which 
there lies no Appeal.20 
Hirst LJ described arbitration in O’Callaghan v Coral Racing21 as ‘a procedure to determine 
the legal rights and obligations of the parties judicially, with binding effect, which is enforceable 
in law, thus reflecting in private proceedings the role of a civil court of law’.  Despite there being 
no statutory definition of arbitration, the courts have developed tests to determine parties’ 
intentions regarding whether they agreed to arbitrate.  Arbitration proceedings may arise from an 
arbitration agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties or from statutory provisions, such as 
employment arbitration tribunals or consumer arbitrations.  
As to why parties might prefer to arbitrate rather than litigate, the following case highlights 
the potential pitfalls faced by those engaged in international commerce when a contract sours and 
a dispute arises.  Nelson Honey, a New Zealand company supplying honey and William Jacks, a 
Singaporean distribution company, had been doing business together for several years.  There 
was no written contract.  Two consignments of honey were rejected by the buyers for being off 
specification.  William Jacks’ sued Nelson Honey in Singapore.22  Nelson Honey sued William 
 
20 Jacob, New Law Dictionary (1729) title ‘Arbitrator’. 
21 [1998] EWCA Civ 1801. 





Jacks in New Zealand.23  Both Courts held that they had jurisdiction to hear the dispute.  The case 
illustrates one reason behind arbitration’s popularity amongst internationally trading companies: 
it avoids the risk of parallel and concurrent proceedings in two different jurisdictions.  The court 
records show that the Singapore claimants filed a notice of discontinuation.  There are no 
judgments from either case, but it is likely that they settled.24  Two competing judicial sets of 
proceedings were likely to have focused minds on the issues of cost and the possibility of 
inconsistent judgements - an echo of Longmore LJ’s warning in Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. 
Ltd v Eastern Betchel Corporation (Abu Dhabi Gas).25  
Gaillard created a terminology that divided participants in international arbitration into one 
of three categories.  The first comprised the arbitrators and parties, the ‘essential actors’.  
Essential, on the premise that there is no arbitration without parties or without arbitrators, but 
arbitration can exist without anyone else.26  In Gaillard’s view the parties are probably the social 
category that feels the most neglected in contemporary arbitration.  He cited as an example the 
CCIAG (a group for corporate counsels actively involved in international arbitration) whose web 
site home page proclaims:  
The CCIAG is an Arbitration users’ interest group, aiming at an optimized management 
of disputes in the best interest of the users… Simply put, the CCIAG is the voice of the 
users.27   
No doubt the CCIAG is a worthy institution committed to the fair and efficient promotion of 
dispute settlement: a representative voice of the primary users of arbitration however, it is not.  
Gaillard is not alone in his view that the institution of arbitration has evolved with insufficient 
attention being paid to the primary needs and concerns of its core users.28  Numerous studies and 
surveys into arbitration provide a barometer of the sentiments and preferences of those connected 
with arbitration.29  Notwithstanding the perception that these (typically sponsored) surveys, are 
focussed on targeting specific market segments and audiences, there are two more pertinent 
criticisms.  Firstly, that the surveys disproportionately collate the views of those involved in 
institutional rather than ad hoc arbitrations, despite the overwhelming statistical evidence of the 
 
23 Nelson Honey & Marketing (NZ) Ltd v William Jacks and Company (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2015] NZHC 1215. 
24 With thanks to Petra Butler and Dhjarshini Prasad (2020) ‘A Study of International Commercial Arbitration in the 
Commonwealth’ Commonwealth Secretariat at 2.2 for highlighting the Nelson Honey and William Jacks dispute.  
25 Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. Ltd v Eastern Betchel Corporation [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 425. 
26 Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Sociology of International Arbitration’ (2015) 31 Arbitration International 1. 
27 http://www.cciag.com accessed 10 February 2019. 
28 Gaillard’s two other categories of social actors are service providers who dedicate their activity exclusively, or 
almost exclusively, to international arbitration; and value providers such as states and certain types of NGO’s. 





preference for the latter.   
The second criticism is that a disproportionate number of the respondents to these surveys 
are the secondary tier of users i.e., the service providers such as law firms, barristers’ chambers 
and arbitral institutions.  That the surveys therefore do not adequately represent the real users or 
arbitration such as the ship owners, charterers, shippers, buyers and sellers of goods, trading 
companies, construction firms, insurers or banks for example that form the bulk of the claimants 
and respondents in commercial arbitration.  How narrow is the range of views captured?  
Appendix C of the 2006 Report on the Arbitration Act 199630 provides a breakdown on the types 
of users who responded.  That for ‘A Party’ was 8 out of 500 responses, i.e., less than two percent.  
As the report highlighted, the number of actual parties who responded directly whilst 
disappointing, was not considered surprising in the light of experience.31  Combined with the 
other core users such as arbitrators, together they made up just over one third of the respondents.  
Lawyers by comparison accounted for almost two thirds (64 percent) of those who took part in 
the survey.  Was that 2006 survey a correct reflection?32  Probably.  Only a quarter of the 
responses to a 2012 survey conducted by White & Case and the Queen Mary University33 came 
from arbitrators and none were identified as having originated from a party.  It is a stark reminder 
that the views of those who use and pay for arbitration are largely absent. 
The Development of Arbitration in England 
The origins of arbitration are unclear.  All that can be said with certainty is that as a dispute 
resolution mechanism it is rooted in antiquity, pre-dating legal systems and the courts.  Lord 
Mustill described it as a dispute resolution process more than 2500 years old.34  Others propose 
earlier origins.  They include ‘Domke on Commercial Arbitration’ and Callaghan, who suggests 
that there is evidence for its existence in 2550 B.C.  Heraldus’ Animadversiones describe a court 
of reconcilement that existed among the Greeks.35   
 
30 Bruce Harris ‘Report on the Arbitration Act 1996’ [2007] 23 Arbitration International 3. 
31 ibid para 10. 
32 Whether the survey was tilted towards (say) lawyers or arbitrators is not known.  Details of the methodology are 
described as a mailing list compiled from various (unspecified) sources, with in excess of 2,200 emails being sent out 
to individuals and bodies, who were also asked to pass details of the survey to others who might be interested. 
33 White & Case and the Queen Mary University: International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices in 
the Arbitral Process - (2012).  The initial phase of the survey was an online questionnaire comprising 100 questions 
completed by 710 respondents of whom the majority of respondents were primarily private practitioners (53 percent), 
followed by arbitrators (26 percent), in-house counsel (10 percent), as well as counsel from arbitral institutions, 
academics and expert witnesses (together, 11 percent). Refer to Table 4 for a more expansive commentary.   
34 Newman & Hill (2004) p.1. 





References to arbitration practice in the Roman period abound.  Indirect evidence points 
towards arbitration being used during the Roman occupation of the British Islands for the 
settlement of commercial disputes.  The famed Roman jurist Javolenus Priscus - an expert on the 
law of arbitration and quoted frequently in Justinian’s Digest - was appointed by the emperor 
Domitian in AD 84 as legatus iuridicus in Britannia.  The role was not only as the governor 
Agricola's legal adviser, but also as the emperor's deputy in charge of the administration of justice.  
Agricola’s son-in-law Tacitus tells us that in the time of Claudius, that Londinium was a place 
‘not distinguished by the colonial title, but particularly famed for the number of its merchants and 
the extent of its commerce.’36  Roebuck takes the view that: ‘it is likely that a system similar to 
that described in Roman Arbitration applied here contemporaneously’.37  The Apostle Paul’s 
direction to the Corinthians to appoint people from their own community for the purpose of 
resolving disputes rather than submitting disputes to the court for resolution would be a concept 
familiar to the modern commodity arbitrator. 38  Over time this arbitral linkage extended from the 
Greeks to the Romans to the law merchants.    
In the aftermath of the Roman occupation, merchants, Guilds, land owners, the nobility and 
other groups continued to use arbitration to settle disputes.  The King, the Chancellor and the 
King’s Council resorted to arbitration to settle ecclesiastical and commercial conflicts.  For the 
landed gentry it offered a means to settle property disputes.  It provided a means to agree on 
compensation for physical assault and homicide.  City and borough courts were active in 
promoting arbitration, whether in disputes between private litigants or between craft and religious 
guilds.  A lady could bring an arbitration for a man’s failure to honour a promise to marry.39  
Mcsheffrey recounts how in 1480 Edward IV wrote to the Mercers’ Company and asked them to 
arbitrate a dispute that appears to involve a deal amongst two of their members, who had made ‘a 
sinister bargain’ to arrange a marriage for one to marry the wife of another mercer for the sum of 
540 Flemish pounds.  Despite the unusual subject matter (by implication, an apparently 
murderous plot) by the king's letter and the Mercers’ Company’s own court minutes, such a matter 
was considered capable of being dealt with by private arbitration of the Worship Company of 
Mercers.40 
Shakespeare wrote: ‘The end crowns all, And that old common arbitrator, Time, Will one 
 
36 James S Reid (1913) Municipalities of the Roman Empire, 228. 
37 Bricks Without Straw: Arbitration in Roman Britain (2007) 23 Arbitration International (2007) 143. 
38 I Corinthinans 6:1-4. 
39 Although the right for damages was lost if she should marry another before the award was made. 
40 Mcsheffrey S, Marriage, Sex, and Civic Culture in Late Medieval London (2006) University of Pennsylvania Press. 
According to the King, as the woman was still married to a husband very much alive ‘such a bargain could only be 





day end it’.41  Throughout the middle ages the administration of justice depended on the 
cooperation of local society, the Crown lacking the means or resources (through the modern tools 
of a police force or standing army) to enforce what was primarily a punitive system of justice.  
These disadvantages manifested themselves in inefficiency and corruption.  Compare the 
similarities between Spelman’s sixteenth century comments: ‘the vast majority of cases 
commenced in the central courts never reach trial; the issue of a writ is as much an inducement to 
compromise as it is a threat to pursue the law to its conclusion’42 with those of Biggs LJ, who 
estimated that around 90 percent of civil cases settle before trial.43  Arguably little progress in 
four centuries - or evidence of common sense and pragmatism ruling the day? 
The earliest surviving manuscript recording an arbitration award of any kind in England since 
the Roman occupation dates to 1249.  Arising from a dispute between two Jewish brothers who 
sought to arbitrate the physical division of land left to them equally by their late father, the 
fragmentary Hebrew manuscript is kept in Westminster Abbey.44  In his Alexander Prize Essay 
on arbitration and law in the Middle Ages, Powell noted: ‘Violent self-help is the only form of 
extra-judicial remedy for the settlement of disputes which has attracted much notice from 
historians45‘  However it was not simply a matter of choice between self-help and the law.  There 
were alternatives: mediation, negotiation or submission to the award of elected arbitrators.  Bacon, 
commentating on law in the Anglo Saxon period, noted that physical force was the natural method 
of redressing wrongs: ‘[w]hen men are grouped in small families or communities, this leads 
naturally to the blood feud’.   
Recourse to court was considered to be an unpopular innovation that was disliked and with 
difficulty followed: ‘…regarded, in fact, much as some of us regard the submission of 
international disputes to arbitration’.46  The suggestion that going to court was as tiresome and 
unwelcome an innovation as arbitration itself was unmistakeable.  Typical of the arbitration 
awards of the medieval period that came before the courts for enforcement was the case of 
Anonymous47 concerning an appeal over the date and substance of an award: ‘all suits and quarrels 
should cease and determine, and that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff forty pounds, for 
 
41 Troilus and Cressida. 
42 The Reports of Sir John Spelman, ed. J. H. Baker (Selden Soc., xciii- xciv, 1976- 7) ii. 
43Briggs LJ, Civil Courts Structure Review: Interim Review 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/CCSR-interim-report-dec-15-final-31.pdf accessed 19 
April 2020. 
44 Westminster Abbey Muniment WAM6816.  See An Arbitration Award from AD124. Professor Derek Roebuck.  
ICCA Newsletter # 5, April 2014. 
45 Powell, Edward.  ‘Arbitration and the Law in England in the Late Middle Ages: The Alexander Prize Essay’. 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. 33, 1983, 49. 
46 Holdsworth W.S., A History of English Law, Methuen & Co, (1903) 43. 





recompense of a slander’.   
In their discussion of the medieval guilds Pollock and Maitland wrote:  
There can hardly exist a body of men permanently united by any common interest that 
will not make for itself a court of justice if it be left for a few years to its own devices.48 
The guilds gave rise to the local commercial courts of the middle ages.  Over the centuries, 
the common law courts absorbed most of these special jurisdictions and in so doing incorporated 
into the common law many of their mercantile rules.  The discrepancy between law and 
commercial practice - an inevitable outcome of the reactive manner in which courts facilitated 
the development of the law - encouraged merchants to settle their differences without resort to 
the courts.  There was however a problem.  Agreements to arbitrate were not enforceable at 
common law.  Lord Coke had held in Vynior’s Case49 that agreements to arbitrate were revocable 
by either party.  The steady expansion of the economy and the growing demand for arbitration 
made the need for legislation increasingly obvious, culminating in the first codification of English 
laws on arbitration by an act of Parliament in 1698.50   
In his commentary of the 1698 Act, Blackstone wrote of the importance and usefulness of 
‘peaceable and domestic’ arbitration tribunals, especially for settling matters and other mercantile 
transactions: ‘which are difficult and almost impossible to be adjusted on a trial at law, the 
legislature has now established the use of them’.51  It was drafted on behalf of the Board of Trade 
by John Locke, no admirer of the legal profession, who in a journal entry for 1674, listed among 
those who hindered trade ‘multitudes of lawyers’. 52   The Act made it lawful for Merchants and 
Traders desiring to end any ‘Controversie Suit or Quarrel’ for which there was no other remedy 
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but by a personal action or suit in equity to go to arbitration.53   
Seeking a formula that would encourage private dispute settlement between merchants 
without recourse to the courts, Locke’s solution was based on the familiar and well-understood 
practice of consensual referrals of litigated cases to arbitration.  Referrals (or references, both 
terms being still in use) had an important advantage over private arbitration.  When a reference 
was agreed to, the agreement was made a rule or order of court, thus making the arbitration 
agreement and so generally the award also, enforceable by law.  Mathew Bacon was one of the 
eighteenth century’s ablest law commentators.  Critical of the obscurity of legal literature of the 
day he wrote: 
It is one of the greatest Objections to our Laws, that the Way to the Knowledge of them 
is so dark and rugged, so full of Windings and Turnings, that the most Knowing very 
often find it difficult to be able to pronounce with Certainty.54 
To address that lack of awareness he published a compilation of the practice of English 
arbitration entitled: ‘The Compleat Arbitrator: or, the Law of Awards and Arbitraments’ in 1731.  
It was the first self-help guide to assist lawyers pick their way through the ‘windings and turnings’ 
of the system.  Arbitration was further regulated in the nineteenth century.  The Civil Procedure 
Act, 1833, rendered the authority of an arbitrator irrevocable.  The Common Law Procedure Act, 
1854 was substantially devoted to arbitration and is considered to have formed the foundation for 
subsequent arbitration laws.  It introduced for the first time the provision to allow an arbitrator to 
state his award in the form of a Special Case for the opinion of the court.  The Board of Trade 
Arbitrations Act 1874 was an Act to amend the powers of the Board of Trade with respect to 
inquiries, arbitrations, appointments, and other matters under Special Acts; it also amended the 
Regulation of Railways Act of 1873, so far as regards the reference of differences to the Railway 
Commissioners in lieu of Arbitrators.   
The second half of the nineteenth century saw an increasing use of standard form contracts 
containing arbitration clauses.  Coinciding with the steady increase in the number of commercial 
arbitrations, it pointed towards the need to improve the legal framework.  This manifested itself 
in the Arbitration Act 1889.  The Arbitration Act 1934 was a result of the recommendations of a 
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Committee chaired by MacKinnon J in 1927.  A further consolidation of the arbitration legislation 
was brought about by the Arbitration Act 1950 which reproduced in consolidated form (without 
amendment) the law contained in the Arbitration Acts, 1889 to 1934. Confidentiality and privacy 
were not addressed.  The Arbitration Act 1975, which gave effect to the New York Convention 
under English law, was concerned only with non-domestic arbitrations and required the English 
courts to stay English proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration clause in a non-domestic 
agreement.55   
During the final reading of the Arbitration Bill in the House of Lords in February 1979, Lord 
Hacking expressed the view that the Bill would provide the foundation for the development of an 
international arbitration centre based in London.  That the country’s future in international 
arbitration lay not only in the reforming of our laws but also in the provision of appropriate 
facilities for arbitrations: ‘a well-equipped building, arbitration halls, conference rooms and a 
library; an efficient secretariat and a service for reporting arbitrators’ decisions’.56   
The Arbitration Act 1979 introduced sweeping changes.  Judicial control of arbitrations was 
reduced.  It abolished the general power of review of the Courts by means of case stated and 
replaced it with specific but limited powers of review.  The 1979 Act also contained a number of 
‘tidying-up’ amendments to the Arbitration Act 1950.  The Brussels Convention of 1968 was 
implemented into English Law by means of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which 
impacted on the ability of arbitrators to order security.  The Consumer Arbitration Agreements 
Act 1988 provided a means of protecting consumers from being bound by the operation of 
arbitration clauses.   
The Impetus for Change 
The uncertainty of English arbitration law in the years prior to the Arbitration Act 1996 gave 
it a complex and uncertain hew, being dealt with by the Arbitration Acts 1950, 1975 and 1979 
and a large body of case law.  As Lord Fraser of Carmyllie summarised the then situation:  
Anyone coming for the first time into contact with an English arbitration, and wishing to 
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acquaint himself with the relevant principles of law, might reasonably look to the current 
Arbitration Acts (those of 1950, 1975 and 1979) for a coherent exposition of the central 
principles of arbitration law.  If so, he would be disappointed.57  
What emerges from a review of the English cases prior to 1996 was the implied obligation 
arising out of the nature of arbitration for both parties not to use or disclose materials obtained in 
the arbitration for any other purpose.  This included documents prepared for and used in the 
arbitration or disclosed or produced in the course of the arbitration; transcripts or notes of the 
evidence in the arbitration; witness evidence given in the arbitration; and the award, save with the 
consent of the other party or pursuant to an order or leave of the court.  
International developments led directly to reform of English arbitration law.  Doubts as to 
the efficacy of the New York Enforcement Convention were voiced by a number of small trading 
nations, with various suggestions for improving it being put forward to the United Nations in 
1977.  But it was the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
which provided a more far-reaching solution.  Rather than choosing to strengthen the New York 
Convention, it sought the adoption by trading nations of a common series of rules for international 
arbitrations.  UNCITRAL agreed on proposals for a Model Law, that was officially adopted by 
the United Nations in June 1985.  That intensified an existing concern in England of the risk that 
foreign lawyers and participants58 would be further discouraged from using English law and 
arbitration.  The implementation by various countries competing with London for international 
commercial arbitration of the Model Law exacerbated those concerns.  The Model Law itself was 
modified in a number of respects much later in 2006.  One of the changes was the addition of a 
new Article 2A, which attempted to ensure consistency of interpretation in all countries which 
have adopted the Model Law as part of their domestic law.   
The Departmental Advisory Committees 
The Departmental Advisory Committee (DAC) was established by the Department of Trade 
and Industry to advise on potential changes to the Arbitration Acts, a remit later widened as to 
whether England should enact the UNCITRAL Model Law.  The DAC reporting in 1978 prior to 
the passing of the Arbitration Act 1979 was critical of English arbitration law, considering the 
courts as being too willing to intervene in the arbitral process.  Arbitrating in England was seen 
as unattractive for foreign users, with London being viewed at risk of losing out to overseas 
jurisdictions as an international commercial arbitration venue.  Criticisms included its 
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inaccessibility to lay and foreign users alike.  It was perceived as being slow and expensive:  
‘litigation without wigs’.59  But not all of the DAC’s recommendations were adopted.  Whilst the 
1979 Act did significantly restrict the right of appeal and so put a break on intervention by the 
Courts, nonetheless it did not address the more fundamental problems.   
The DAC, under the chairmanship of Mustill LJ, reported in June 1989.  It considered that 
the existing law was unsatisfactory, was found predominantly in case law and inaccessible to all 
but specialist lawyers.  That the relevant statute law was spread out in the Arbitration Acts of 
1950, 1975 and 1979 and a mixture of subordinate legislation was considered unhelpful.  The 
DAC had the difficult task of balancing a conflicting array of jurisdictional approaches, including 
those of the numerous arbitral organisations.  There was an awareness that privacy and 
confidentiality were seen by its users as essential, defining characteristics of English arbitration, 
a view bolstered by the findings of contemporary studies.  Research by the London Business 
School’s in 1992 for example, found that confidentiality was ranked ahead of neutrality and 
enforceability as the most important perceived benefit for US and European users of international 
commercial arbitration.60   
Coinciding with the DAC’s deliberations, the English courts were being required to examine 
the legal basis for such principles and the extent of the exceptions ‘without seriously questioning 
the existence of the general principles themselves’.61  Collectively these cases highlighted the 
difficulties in codifying an area of law that was still very much a work in progress, although the 
1995 Appeal Court decision in Ali Shipping was helpful in establishing an obligation of 
confidentiality in arbitration, with specified exceptions. 
The Mustill Report took two divergent views for the United Kingdom.  For Scotland it 
recommended adoption of the Model Law.62 But for England, Wales and Northern Ireland it 
advocated an alternative approach, drawing up a new Act on the grounds that case law and 
practice were too well developed to justify the Model Law’s wholesale incorporation.  This Act 
would state the key principles of the English law of arbitration, both statutory and where 
practicable, those of the common law.  The principal drive was to ensure London continued to be 
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the preferred venue for international arbitration: ‘We are satisfied that these … would answer the 
needs of keeping English arbitration law up to date and remaining in the vanguard of the various 
systems currently enjoying the preference of regular international users’.63  Despite those 
admirable aims, the first draft Bill in February 1994 did little more than consolidate the existing 
statutes of 1950, 1975 and 1979.   
In an Interim Report in April 1995, the DAC was forced to acknowledge that the draft Bill 
circulated in February 1994, whilst a ‘highly skilful piece of work’ was not what most users 
actually wanted.  Instead of consolidating the existing Acts, a new Bill should be drawn up, 
grounded on the objectives set out but reinterpreted more along the lines of a restatement of the 
law, in clear and ‘user-friendly’ language.  The Bill would so far as possible follow the structure 
and spirit of the Model Law.64  A fresh review transpired and the DAC, now under the new 
chairmanship of Saville LJ, produced a completely new draft Bill in December 1995.  
The 1996 DAC Report took the view that unsettled areas of the law were better left to the 
common law to evolve and so did not address them in the draft Act.  One such area regarded 
privacy and confidentiality.  Recognising this area deserved special mention, the Report 
highlighted the long-held assumptions of privacy and confidentiality as general principles in 
English commercial arbitration, subject to various exceptions.  That privacy and confidentiality, 
with certain exceptions, were long assumed to be generally applicable principles in English 
commercial arbitration and that the English courts had only recently been called upon to: 
‘examine both the legal basis for such principles and the breadth of certain of these exceptions, 
without seriously questioning the existence of the general principles themselves’.65 
The DAC noted that some arbitral institutions such as WIPO and the LCIA responded to the 
Australian decisions by amending their arbitration rules to provide expressly for confidentiality 
and privacy.  On the other hand there was no statutory guidance with respect to confidentiality in 
the UNCITRAL Model Law whatsoever.  Whilst the Committee was persuaded of the desirability 
of placing these general principles on a firm statutory basis: ‘grave difficulties arose over the 
myriad exceptions to these principles - which are necessarily required for such a statutory 
provision’.  As the DAC explained: ‘it soon proved controversial and difficult’. Quoting Lord 
Mustill on the difficulty of defining what constituted ‘confidential’ in a House of Lords decision 
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In Re. D (Minors) (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality)66:  
To give an accurate exposition of confidentiality at large would require a much more 
wide-ranging survey of the law and practice than has been necessary for a decision on the 
narrow issue raised by the appeal, and cannot in my opinion safely be attempted in the 
abstract.67   
The DAC considered that codifying the principles of confidentiality could create two issues 
they viewed as intractable: the codification of arbitral confidentiality and setting out effective 
sanctions for breach of the parties' obligation of non-disclosure.  It highlighted some of the 
exceptions to privacy and confidentiality which were considered to be ‘manifestly legion and 
unsettled in part’.  It made reference to the 1930 Lena Goldfields Case where the arbitration 
tribunal in London opened the hearing to the press but not the public.  That had been justified in 
order to defend the proceedings against fierce criticisms that appeared in the USSR state-
controlled newspaper Pravda: on 9 September 1930 the paper attacked the tribunal for making an 
award without the third Soviet arbitrator, that as ‘bad jugglers of figures’ unable even to amuse 
children, ‘they ought to find their audience amongst the savages of the Pacific islands who do not 
know how to count up to three’.  A reciprocal dig at the British.68  Lloyd George defended his 
negotiations with the Soviet Trade Delegation in the House of Commons: ‘Were we responsible 
for the Czarist Government? … [for] its corruption, its misgovernment, its pogroms, its scores of 
thousands of innocent people massacred? …this country has opened up most of the cannibal trade 
of the world, whether in the South Seas or in Kumassie’.69  The reference to cannibals was, 
according to Gromyko and Ponomarev, neither popular, nor well received in the Kremlin.70   
Other exceptions and difficulties that the DAC touched on included: that an award may 
become public in legal proceedings (as in stating a special case); abroad during enforcement 
(under the 1958 New York Convention); if subjected to judicial scrutiny through an appeal; or a 
company’s disclosure requirements for accounting or regulatory purposes.  Various other non-
parties could have legitimate interest in being informed as to the content of a pending arbitration 
such as a P&I Club, parent company and even the supervising arbitral institution (e.g., FOSFA or 
the ICC, both of which approve a tribunal’s draft award).  The DAC considered that formulation 
of statutory principles would result in the creation of new impediments to the practice of English 
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arbitration.  Rather than clarifying the law, it would achieve the opposite, causing greater 
uncertainty and result in an increase in litigation.  That even if acceptable statutory guidelines 
could be formulated, there would remain the issue of enforcing sanctions for non-compliance.   
The DAC preferred an approach whereby institutional rules filled in the gaps and specified 
the necessary provisions if desired.  That whilst the breadth and existence of certain exceptions 
remained disputed, these were best resolved by the English courts on a pragmatic case-by-case 
basis.  And should all the unresolved issues become judicially resolved, then it would remain 
possible to add a statutory provision by way of amendment to the Bill.  In my view this is a key 
point.  That to a large extent a number of the issues - certainly with regard to the use of arbitral 
materials, awards and protecting a legal right for example - have been addressed and decided by 
the courts.   
As the DAC’s then Chairman, Lord Saville’s speech at the 1995 Denning Lecture provided 
valuable insight into the Committee’s collective mind, in which he compared the two extreme 
views of privacy.  On the one side was the view that if parties agree to resolve their disputes 
through the use of a private arbitration rather than public court proceedings, then the court system 
should play no part at all apart from involvement - where required - to enforce awards.  The 
opposing view urged active judicial oversight on the grounds that the state was responsible for 
justice: arbitration being just another form of dispute resolution, justice dictated that certain rules 
should apply and the courts therefore should not hesitate to intervene as and when necessary.71  
The DAC chose not to address these issues.  As a result, the Arbitration Act 1996 does not enact 
the generally implied principles of privacy and confidentiality into arbitration proceedings. 
Saville LJ later described the development of the arbitration legislation as a process of putting 
‘new wine into old bottles’.72  Reflecting the cautious approach taken by the DAC to the two 
crucial areas of consolidation and confidentiality, the Final Report stated:  
We made a number of suggestions…  [in paragraphs 383 – 386 of the 1996 Report].  First 
we suggested a reference to privacy and confidentiality.  This suggestion was not adopted, 
since we finally concluded (especially as the law on this topic is in a stage of 
development) that it would be better to have no express reference at all…73 
The Government agreed with the DAC, pointing out that there were exceptions to 
confidentiality in the case of New York Convention awards, which are enforceable in public 
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proceedings, and, as is shown in the cases, in the common law itself.  The Government determined 
that the matter should be resolved by the courts in the usual developmental fashion.  After 
extensive consultation, but with relatively few changes, this became the Arbitration Act 1996, 
which began: ‘An Act to restate and improve the law relating to arbitration pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement…’.  The DAC’s view that it would be for the courts to determine the ambit 
of confidentiality within arbitration is, as Dennington and Turner would later note, something 
with which the courts are still grappling.74  
The Arbitration Act 1996 
When the Arbitration Act 1996 came into force on 31st January 1997 it restated English 
arbitration law in modern, accessible language, adopting such parts of the UNICTRAL Model 
Law where necessary.  It consolidated previous legislation whilst updating and clarifying various 
provisions applicable to English Arbitrations.  The Act’s objectives, as set out in Section 1, being 
to: ‘obtain the fairest solution of disputes by an impartial tribunal…  subject only to such 
safeguards as are necessary in the public interest’.  Divided into mandatory and non-mandatory 
provisions - dealing with, for example, costs, awards, powers of the arbitrators and appeal 
procedures - it is silent on both privacy and confidentiality.  By the conventional standards of 
traditional English parliamentary drafting, the Act was considered ‘radically innovative and 
unconventional’.75  The Act also aimed to promote England as a venue for international 
arbitration. 
A minority of commentators such as Landau considered that the draft Act suffered from 
‘common law quirks’ and had developed an ‘isolationist approach’.76 The overwhelming response 
however was positive and was widely welcomed: ‘The Act has … given English arbitration law 
an entirely new face, a new policy, and new foundations’. 77  Recognising the influence of ‘foreign 
and international methods and concepts’ the Act embodied a rebalancing of the relationships 
between parties, advocates, arbitrators and the courts, replacing English judicial authorities by 
statute as the principal source of arbitration law. 
During the second reading of the Bill in the House of Lords Lord Wilberforce explained the 
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essence of the new philosophy and revised relationship between arbitration and the courts: ‘I have 
never taken the view that arbitration is a … poor relation to court proceedings.  I have always 
wished to see arbitration … free to settle its own procedure and free to develop its own substantive 
law.78‘  The Act was passed the year following the publication of the ‘Access to Justice: Interim 
Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales’ by the Rt Hon 
the Lord Woolf, which itself led to far-reaching reform of the Civil Procedure Rules.  The strong 
support for the Arbitration Act 1996 was in keeping with the new spirit of optimism in the judicial 
modernisation already well underway.  Commentators at the time such as Carbonneau praised it 
as: ‘[d]espite some minor flaws, the 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration Act is an outstanding, 
indeed masterful, legislative framework on arbitration’.79 The flaws being referred to were the 
restricted right of appeal on questions of law and the view that the Act would have benefitted 
from a more transparent set of regulatory provisions, matters that we shall return to in due 
course.80 
Preparatory materials such as the DAC Reports would typically only be taken into account 
where there was an ambiguity in the statute’s wording.81  Nevertheless, the DAC reports are 
routinely used by the English courts as aids to interpreting the Arbitration Act 1996.  Clarke LJ 
provided a strong endorsement in the Court of Appeal in Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd82: that 
it was legitimate and appropriate to construe the Act’s meaning consistently with the view of the 
DAC as expressed in their Report, noting the number of cases in which the court has treated the 
DAC Report as a valuable aid to the construction of the 1996 Act.83  The continued relevance of 
the DAC Reports on arbitration is reinforced when considering recent law reports.  In 2019 there 
were three s.68 applications from arbitrations to the courts where the subsequent judgements cited 
the DAC Reports.84 
The Lack of Codification 
The importance of commercial certainty and clarity has been long recognised by the 
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judiciary: ‘In all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty: and therefore, it is 
of more consequence that a rule should be certain, than whether the rule is established one way 
or the other.’85  Lord Mansfield would not infrequently return to the theme: ‘Convenience is the 
basis of mercantile law,’86 a view expanded on by Lord Devlin in Kum and Another v Wah Tat 
Bank Ltd: ‘The function of the commercial law is to allow, so far as it can, commercial men to do 
business in the way in which they want to do it and not to require them to stick to forms that they 
may think to be outmoded.  The common law is not bureaucratic.’ 87 
It is therefore an intriguing question to ask - how can it then be that aspects of one of the 
most common systems for resolving disputes – one with which society has arguably had several 
millennia to perfect – remains subject to such uncertainty and debate?  There are several views.  
A commonly held one is that the secrecy now inherent in arbitration has created a backlash against 
anonymous corporations fighting their legal battles before nameless judges, in private hearings 
behind what some view as a veil of secrecy: where in almost all cases even the outcomes are 
unknown.   This view was perhaps most forcefully (and notoriously) articulated in 2010 in a New 
York Times article which described investment arbitration proceedings under NAFTA as follows:  
Their meetings are secret.  Their members are generally unknown.  The decisions they 
reach need not be fully disclosed.  Yet the way a small number of international tribunals 
handles disputes between investors and foreign governments has led to national laws 
being revoked, justice systems questioned and environmental regulations challenged.88  
This common thread of criticism pervades the views of many scholars when it comes to 
investment arbitration.  Gus Van Harten argued that arbitration is inappropriate for investment 
treaty disputes, because they ‘concern the exercise of general regulatory powers that are typically 
subject to judicial review under constitutional or administrative law’.89  Choudhury queried 
whether the current regime of investment arbitration was in crisis.90 Waibel et al considered: ‘the 
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rising discontent over the perceived and actual problems of the international investment regime 
risks undermining the tremendous gains in the rule of law on cross-border investment flows 
achieved over the last decades.91‘  An alternative approach might see the currently debated and 
often heatedly argued issues amongst the arbitral community as being the embodiment of a 
dynamic, evolving Lex Mercatoria: the very opposite of ossification, as the law and legal systems 
adapt and change to meet the needs of a constantly evolving global business community.   
A more nuanced view holds that confidentiality came increasingly to the fore as an issue after 
the special case procedure was abolished.  The reason for this long period of silence regarding 
confidentiality in English arbitration law can be found in the relevant statutory acts.  English 
courts traditionally retained an extensive degree of control over arbitral proceedings.  Section 5 
of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 and later s.21 of the Arbitration Act 1950 provided for 
the power to state a special case for the opinion of the court on a question of law.  The court’s 
power to require referral of any question of law that it thought ought to be decided by it, was 
considered by many to be a deterrent to the bringing of international arbitration in England.  The 
frequent court intervention in arbitration proceedings had another effect: it compromised 
confidentiality.  There was in any case little point in arguing for or against confidentiality when 
cases were liable to be exposed to the glare of publicity through court proceedings.  That power 
was less frequently used and had largely fallen away by the late 1970’s.  Section 3 of the 
Arbitration Act 1979 significantly curtailed the special case procedure and it was abolished 
completely in the Arbitration Act 1996.  Under the new regime, appeals were allowed in very 
limited circumstances under s.67–71. With that restriction parties became increasingly conscious 
of the confidential nature of arbitration and started raising it more frequently.  There is thus a 
correlation between confidentiality and the extent of the right of appeal.  However, it cannot be 
credited as being the only or even the main reason.  The English cases referred to in the 1996 
DAC Report as well as its reference to Esso/BHP v Plowman testify that the issues existed well 
before the 1996 Act was passed.  
The Commercial Imperatives of London Arbitration 
What was the reasoning behind the curtailing of the right of appeal?  Lord Byron’s speech in 
the Second Reading of the Arbitration Bill in the House of Lords is insightful.   Recounting a post 
settlement lunch with German and Italian counterparts in which his German client remarked on 
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the lack of ships, televisions and computers built being in the UK and the Italian opponent 
disparaged British cuisine, both however expressed confidence when it came to English law, the 
courts and arbitration (notwithstanding the familiar complaints about delay and expense).  The 
point of the story was explained as being to emphasise the central place that English arbitration 
had in the resolution of disputes, particularly in the international field:  
Not only is dispute resolution in the City of London a major industry and major earner of 
foreign currency, but it is also a vital lubricant to other forms of commerce… There is no 
doubt that government have an important role in keeping the wheels well oiled.   
 
‘…[t]he great balancing act which this Bill has had to perform is between those who wish 
to exclude the courts from all aspects of arbitration procedure and those who would like 
to preserve a significant measure of court supervision.  Generally, I believe that this Bill 
has got that balancing act about right…’. 92 
International arbitration is a legal service and the default mechanism for the settling of 
international disputes, with London being the world’s leading centre.  The UK’s capital possesses 
a heavy concentration of insurers, brokers, solicitors, ship operators and not least the pool of trade 
specialists who sit as arbitrators.  Various commodity trade associations with their own specialist 
arbitration panels call London their home: the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA), the 
Federation of Oil Seeds and Fats (FOSFA), the Sugar Association of London (SAL) and the 
London Metal Exchange (LME) are some of the most well-known.  London is also the centre of 
dispute resolution for many other commodities including coffee, cocoa, rice and cotton.  Of them 
all however, arbitrations held under the London Maritime Arbitrator’s Association (LMAA) 
Terms are the most prolific.  Ad hoc arbitrations conducted under the LMAA’s Terms are the 
most significant globally in terms of numbers of international commercial arbitrations, 
particularly for shipping disputes.  Table 1 provides a comparison of arbitration statistics amongst 
the leading institutions for the period 2005 - 2019.  In 2016, two of the most ‘popular’ arbitral 
institutions, the SIAC reported 343 cases; the HKIAC 262.  The comparable figure for the LMAA 
was 1,720, highlighting its significant contribution to London’s dominant position in global 
arbitration. 
Whilst ad hoc arbitrations appear to have been ignored in the typical international commercial 
 
92 HL Deb 18 January 1996 vol 568 cc760-94.  Lord Byron went on to say: ‘Although London is still the leading 
world centre for arbitration there are plenty of competitors only too anxious to attract arbitrations to their own 
jurisdictions. It is now more than 10 years since the UNCITRAI, Model Law was introduced and adopted by a 
number of countries without this country doing anything to improve its statutory framework except for the odd 
change here and there. It has been widely perceived in the commercial and legal communities where arbitration is 






arbitration surveys, their significance and economic contribution to the United Kingdom should 
not be overlooked.  Shipping is the largest constituent industry in the United Kingdom in terms 
of economic activity.  Maritime UK estimated that the sector directly supported more than £40 
billion in business turnover, £14.5 billion in Gross Value Added (GVA) and 185,700 jobs for UK 
employees in 2015.  The turnover contribution by the maritime business services industry - 
comprising shipbroking, legal, insurance, consultancy, accountancy and financial services - was 
in excess of £4.5 billion.93  Shipping, legal services and arbitration are major contributors to the 
UK economy.  And it is in that context that worries have arisen with respect to arbitration and the 
associated principles of confidentiality.  Sir Patrick Neill captured the concerns of many 
practitioners in the 1995 Bernstein Lecture when he stated:   
If some Machiavelli were to ask me to advise on the best method of driving international 
arbitration away from England I think that I would say that the best way would be to 
reintroduce... all the court interference that was swept away... The second best method 
but the two boats are only separated by a canvas would be for the House of Lords to 
overthrow Dolling-Baker and to embrace the majority judgment of the High Court of 
Australia in Esso/BHP.94 
Chapter 1 Summary 
Confidentiality in arbitration can be approached from various perspectives: commercial and 
business needs; public policy; legal efficacy; natural justice and not least, the development of 
mercantile and commercial law.  It is argued that the principal tensions result where the needs of 
the commercial world come up against those of natural justice and public policy.  Ultimately these 
contradictory positions prompt the question: is there a case for reform of the Arbitration Act 
1996?  And its corollary - if so to what extent?  Paulsson & Rawding considered the current state 
of the law regarding confidentiality in international arbitration and concluded that a general 
obligation of confidentiality did not exist: that at best the concept was in the early stages of 
development.  In their view, as most national jurisdictions had not addressed the issue at all, 
parties should take matters into their own hands, by suggesting that parties stipulate a provision 
for confidentiality into the arbitration clause. 
A robust defence of the status quo came from Bruce Harris in a forthrightly argued article 
prepared as the tenth anniversary of the Act approached.95  In 2006 the Commercial Court Users’ 
Committee (“CCC”), then chaired by Thomas J, carried out a comprehensive survey into how the 
 
93 https://www.maritimeuk.org/value/ 
94 Sir Patrick Neill, ‘Confidentiality in Arbitration’ (1996) 62 Arbitration International 3 (Supplement). 





Arbitration Act 1996 had worked in practice.  In its Report the CCC emphatically recommended 
that no attempt be made to change the law in respect of confidentiality.96  Commentating on the 
CCC’s published findings, Cohen, reached a diametrically opposed conclusion,  interpreting the 
report as providing majority support in favour of releasing at least some part of the award to the 
public.  Confidentiality was identified as being the biggest issue.  Interestingly, user sentiment 
was in favour of releasing at least some part of the award to the public.  Some commentators have 
proposed that the default position should be publication of an award i.e., an opt-out regime such 
as operates in the USA and elsewhere.97  Cohen makes some very valid points.98   
Commentators are divided on the issue of reform.  By attempting to codify confidentiality 
there is the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate in confidence.  As Young and Chapman suggested, 
having demonstrated how difficult drafting a confidentiality rule of sufficient clarity applicable 
in all circumstances was, perhaps it was better to leave the issue of confidentiality to be 
determined by the parties, an approach that: ‘…not only has the benefit of simplicity, but it would 
also allow the parties to decide the extent to which an obligation of confidentiality …should apply 
in their particular circumstances’.99 
In my view however it is clear that the benefits of revising the Arbitration Act with respect 
to confidentiality outweigh the disadvantages of the status quo.  The areas for which reform is 
required include awards and their publication; consolidation; materials; privacy; its application to 
parties, witnesses, legal counsel & tribunals; third party funding; potential exceptions, such as 
protecting a legal right or the public interest and finally ethics and transparency.  When 
formulating confidentiality, the drafters of the Arbitration Act found the challenge ‘controversial 
and difficult’.  The ‘myriad of exceptions’ and ‘qualifications that had to follow’ proved in their 
mind’s insurmountable obstacles.  The aim of this thesis is an ambitious one, to build on the work 
started by Lords Mustill and Saville and mount those insurmountable obstacles.  Support for 
change is identifiable within the 1996 DAC Report itself, which concluded the confidentiality 
section: ‘In due course, if the whole matter were ever to become judicially resolved, it would 
remain possible to add a statutory provision by way of amendment to the Bill’.100  That point has 
arguably long been reached: the law is more than sufficiently resolved to permit the codification 
 
96 Prepared for the Commercial Court Users’ Committee, the British Maritime Law Association, the London 
Shipping Law Centre and other bodies. 
97 Michael Cohen, ‘A Missed Opportunity to Revise the Arbitration Act 1996’, (2007) 23 Arbitration International 
461 
98 As for the 2006 CCC study itself, the raw data appears to have been lost to researchers.  Approaches to members of 
the committee in the Autumn of 2019 indicated that none of the original source documents had been retained. 
99 Michael Young & Simon Chapman, ‘Confidentiality in International Arbitration – Does the exception prove the 
rule?  Where now for the implied duty of confidentiality under English law?’ (2009) 27 ASA.Bulletin 26, 32-33. 





of statutory provisions for the less uncontroversial areas of the Arbitration Act 1996.  The 1996 
DAC Report was a product of an earlier legal age.  Societal expectations and demands have 
evolved.  And so, inexorably, must the law.  Examples of how approaches to these issues have 





Table 1.  Case Load Summary Selected Arbitral Institutions 2005 – 2019 
 
By Year 
Institution 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
AAA/ICDR
101 
 - - - - - 888 994 996 1165 1052 1064 1050 1026 993  882 
AIAC102 20 N/A N/A N/A 42 22 52 135 156 112 113 157 134 115 163 
BAC 53 53* 37 56 72 32 38 26 44 41 52 69 77 88  - 
CICA103  75 79 54 60 63 57 28 29 19 20 35 35 25 24 39 
CIETAC104 427 442 429 548 559 418 470 331 375 387 437 483 476 522 617 
CMAC105 - - - - - - - -  137 120 136 69 - - - 
DIAC - - 77 100 292 431 440 379 310 174 177 207 201 161 208 
DIS106 72 75 100 122 176 155 178 97 107 120 112 141 121 116  110 
HKIAC  281107 - 448 - 429 291 275 293 260 252 271 262 297 265  308 
ICAC108  - - 319 - - - - 306 428 696 922 553 - -  - 
ICC -  - 599 - 817 793 795 759 767 791 801 966 810 842 869 
ICSID109  - - 35 - - - - 50 40 38 52 48 53 56 39 
JCAA110  - 11 12 12 17 21 17 18 24 11 20 18 14 13 9 
KCAB111 -  47 59 47 78 52 77 85 77 87 74 - 78 62 70 
 
101 https://adr.org/research 
102 Previously the KLRCA. 
103 Response received by email to request for information, 27 February 2020. 
104 http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=40&l=en 
105 http://www.cmac.org.cn/?page_id=1545&lang=en Consolidated figures from Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin Commissions. 
106 http://www.disarb.org/de/39/content/statistik-id79 
107 Dr Loukas Mistelis ‘International Arbitration - Corporate Attitudes and Practices - 12 Perceptions Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report’ (2004) 15 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 
108 https://icac.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/Statictics-and-Practice-of-the-ICAC_2017_eng.pdf   In 2012-2017 one quarter of arbitrations were with parties from CIS states. 
109 https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/The%20ICSID%20Caseload%20Statistics%202020-1%20Edition-ENG.pdf 
110 Japanese Arbitration: Green Tea and Sympathy?  http://the-tclr.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/TCLR_5-web-03.pdf   







Institution 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
LCIA112 118 133 137 215 272 246 224 265 290 296 326 303 285 317 395 
LMAA - - 1540 2058 2511 2026 2050 2207 1759 2049 1813 1720 1496 1561 1756 
PCA113      11 11 27 35 39 42 40 41 56 49 
SCMA -  - - - 6 14 16 20 20 25 37 46 38 56 41 
SIAC114 74 90 86 99 160 197 188 235 259 222 271 343 452 402 479 
SCC115 56 74 87 85 96 91 96 92 86 94 103 103 96 76  88 
SMA116 214 177 203 193 176 195 153 148 108 104 129 92 84 57 27 
SCAI117 -  - 58 - - - - 92 68 105 100 81 74 83 96 
VIAC118 -  - 40 - - - - 70 56 56 40 60 59 44 51 






116 The SMA does not publish statistics, but all awards are published.  The SMA entries are a guide to caseload only, as the numbers are for the awards published each year. https://0-www-lexisnexis-
com.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/uk/legal/international?countryId=1517130&sourceId=urn:contentItem:csi:1069983&page=4&character=S&contentTypeId=all accessed 11 April 2020. 
117 https://www.swissarbitration.org/files/515/Statistics/SCAI%20Stats%202019_PDF_v20200609_for%20publication.pdf 
118 https://www.viac.eu/de/service/statistiken 
119 WIPO does not break down its ADR figures between ‘Good Office Requests’ (between about half and two thirds of the total cases) and the balance consisting of mediation, arbitration and expert 









Persons to whom confidentiality provisions 
extend 
Application to Documents General Application 











2006 - - - - - - - - - Art.12 
Australia 1974 s.23C s.23C - s.23D s.23D - - s.24 - s.18A 
Canada 1985 - - - - - - - - - Art.12 
France 2011 - - - - Art.1464 - 
Art.1464 
Art.1479 
- - Art.1456 
Germany 1998 - - - - - - - - - s.1036 
Hong Kong 2017 - s.18 - s.18 s.18 - - Schedule 2 s.2 s.98 s.25 
Malaysia 2018 - s.41A - s.41A s.41A - - - - s.14 
New Zealand 2019 s.14B s.14B - s.2(1)b s.2(1)b - s.14A Schedule 2 s.2 - s.12 
Norway 2004 - - - s.5 s.5 s.5 s.5 - - s.14 
Singapore 2002 - - - - - - - - - 
1st Schedule 
Art.12 






















































Table 3.  Confidentiality Provisions in Selected Arbitral Institutions 
Institution Version 
Persons to whom confidentiality provisions extend Application to Documents General Application 
Administering 
Institution 






Consolidation TPF Transparency 
UNCITRAL 
Rules 
2010 - - Art.34.5 - Art.34.5 - - Art.34.5 - - Arts.11~13 
AAA/ICDR 2014 Art.30, 37 Art.30, 37 - - Art.30, 37 Art.30, 37 - Art.23.6 Art.7 ~ 8 - Art.13 ~14 
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120 The GMAA Code of Ethics (coe). 
121 Main references are to the Administered Arbitration Rules 2018.  Other references are to the Practice Note on Consolidation of Arbitrations (pn); Securities Arbitration Rules 2013 (sar); Electronic 
Transaction Arbitration Rules 2002 (etar).  
122 Main references are to the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration.  Other references are to the General Standards (GS) contained in the Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest 
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App II Art.1, 6 
 
ntp.40 ~ 46 
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App I Art.9 
Art.3 - - 
Art.42, 
App I Art.9 
- - Art.32.3 Art.13 ~ 15 - Art.18 ~ 19, 23 































































Table 4.  Summary of Arbitration Surveys 1979 to 2019 
    
    
Year Name of Survey Author(s) Comment 
1979 - Professor Tore Sandvik A limited survey of [20] Norwegian users asked to rank the different reasons for choosing arbitration. ‘Voldgifs-og 
domstolsbehandling’ (1979) Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, 456.  
1992  London Business 
School/LCIA 
 
A survey of Fortune 500 US corporations conducted by the London Business School on behalf of the LCIA in 1992 found that 
confidentiality was ranked ahead of neutrality and enforceability as the most important perceived benefit for US and European 
users of international commercial arbitration.  Cited by the DAC Report on the Arbitration Bill dated February 1996 
(paragraphs 10 – 17). 
1996 A Survey on Arbitration and 
Settlement in International 
Business (1991 and 1996) 
 
Dr. Buhring-Uhle Two surveys of the perceived advantages of international commercial arbitration in connection with a doctoral thesis he 
presented to the University of Hamburg.  Published in Arbitration and Mediation in International Business (1996). The 
researchers asked participants for their reasons in choosing international commercial arbitration to resolve their disputes.  
Approximately one hundred and fifty questionnaires were distributed to arbitrators, attorneys and in-house counsel in over 
twenty countries. A total of ninety-one individuals from seventeen countries responded and Dr. Buhring-Uhle personally 
interviewed sixty-eight.  The respondents came from the U.S., Europe, Scandinavia, South America, Middle East and 
Australia: most were American or European.  The results indicated that confidentiality was ranked as the third most important 
advantage of arbitration in a list of eleven, behind only the neutrality of the tribunal and the international enforcement by treaty 
of awards. 
1998  Cornell 
University/PERC 
Institute on Conflict 
Resolution 
 
Fortune 1000 companies in the U.S.were asked why they had chosen arbitration rather than state courts for resolving disputes.  
The response rate was > 60%.  43 percent of the respondents answered that preserving confidentiality was a reason to use 
arbitration.  The study revealed a previously overlooked aspect: that the more frequently companies used arbitration, the more 
important was confidentiality perceived to be ranging from 55 percent (for very frequent users of arbitration) to 37 percent 
(those who had never or rarely used arbitration). 
2001 The [Norwegian] Legislative 
Committee's Proposal NOU 
2001: 33 s.1-5 
- A legislative committee was formed prior to the introduction of the Norwegian Arbitration Act 2004, of which one of its tasks 
was to take opinions on the issue of confidentiality.  Norwegian users of arbitration expressed a broad range of opinion to this 
question.  The Norwegian Bar Association supported the legislative committee's proposals.  The Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise, the Norwegian Financial Services Association and the Federation of Norwegian Coastal Shipping stressed that 
discretion and confidentiality was often a decisive reason for parties to choose arbitration. 
   Conversely, the Nordisk Defence Club, a specialized form of P&I Club providing legal insurance cover in the marine industry, 
requested for even more publicity than the legislative committee had proposed.  In summary there was no consensus on the 





2002  Terje I. Våland Terje I. Våland conducted the Norwegian survey among the offshore industry and concluded that arbitration is chosen with the 
specific aim of avoiding publicity.  Konflikter i petroleumsklyngen (2002), page 6. 
2003  AAA Dispute-Wise 
(2003) 
 
In 2003, the AAA undertook a major research study aimed at examining the attitudes and experiences associated with the use 
of arbitration and alternative dispute resolution.  The study examined how these techniques and practices were employed by a 
broad sample of businesses, ranging from Fortune 1000 companies to privately held businesses.  The study compared and 
updated the arbitration and mediation usage trends discussed in the 1998 Cornell study.  The percentage of companies 
reporting privacy as being extremely/very Important was 37%, ranking it ninth out of eleven categories, behind Cost (72%), 
Winning (72%), Predictability (65%), Speed (60%), Fairness (60%), Finality (58%), Maintain relationships (53%) and Industry 
expertise of neutrals/arbitrators (43%): but ahead of the ability to appeal (26%) and International capabilities (12%). The 
number of respondents who stated that the reasons for using arbitration preserves confidentiality increased from 43% to 54% 
during the period 1998 to 2003.  
2003 (Originally entitled 
‘International Private 
Commercial Arbitration: 
Expectations and Perceptions 
of Attorneys and Business 
People’) 
Global Center for 
Dispute Resolution 
Research; Naimark and 
Keer 
This 2003 U.S. study compiled responses from 145 participants involved in AAA international arbitrations why they opted for 
international commercial arbitration.  Participants were asked to rank eight issues in their order of importance: speed of 
outcome, privacy, receipt of a monetary award, a fair and just outcome, cost-efficiency, finality of decision, arbitrator 
expertise, and continuing relationship with opposing party. An overwhelming majority (81%) ranked a ‘fair and just result’.  
The importance given to privacy was low - 8 percent for all participants in the survey, putting it in the bottom third.  Other 
attributes, such as a fair and just result, a monetary award, the finality of the decision, and arbitrator expertise, all ranked 
significantly higher than privacy in terms of importance to the participants. Naimark and Keer explained that ‘subsequent 
discussions with arbitrators in a round-table setting revealed a view that privacy is an often-overrated attribute’ in international 
arbitration.   
2005 International Arbitration - 
Corporate Attitudes and 
Practices - 12 Perceptions 
Tested: Myths, Data And 
Analysis Research Report 
QMU The main outcome of this survey is that arbitration is a popular and generally the preferred dispute resolution mechanism.  
Some inhouse lawyers interviewed explained that though their corporations maintain a dispute resolution policy, such policies 
are not cast in stone and can always be modified by negotiation. Reputation of the potential arbitrator within the international 
arbitration community was mentioned by all our interviewees as one of the most important factors they consider when 
choosing an arbitrator for appointment. ... Amongst in-house lawyers interviewed, 30 of the 40 corporations always instruct 
specialist arbitration firms or firms with a substantial international arbitration practice. ... There is a perception that 
international arbitration is a rather young dispute resolution mechanism and in-house counsel have yet to gain significant 
experience in managing international arbitration cases. ... A set of guideline questions, divided into quantifiable data, 
effectiveness of arbitration, choices and policy, strategy, perceptions, procedure and future of international arbitration, was 
forwarded to interviewees before each interview and formed the basis of the interview. 
2006 The 2006 Commercial Court 




The Commercial Court Users' Committee, then chaired by Thomas J, concluded that such a review should be carried out.  The 
committee emphatically recommended that no attempt be made to change the law in respect of confidentiality.  Cohen 






2006 International Arbitration: 
Corporate Attitudes and 
Practices 
 
PWC; QMU This study sought the views of in-house counsel at major corporations around the world in order to test twelve perceptions 
around international arbitration.  It was conducted over a six-month period.  The first part was an online questionnaire 
completed by 103 respondents.  This was followed by 40 interviews.  Respondents from the industrial manufacturing, energy, 
banking/capital and engineering/construction industries accounted for 61% of the industry sectors. Privacy was ranked third 
behind flexibility and enforceability in terms of the important advantages of international arbitration, highlighting the 
importance to many respondents of arbitration as ‘an effective way to keep business practices, trade secrets, industrial 
processes, intellectual property, as well as proceedings with a possible negative impact to the brand, private’.  It is interesting 
to note the inherent tension as users were also aware that not everything in arbitration is automatically secret or confidential, 
merely that proceedings are private and may be confidential.  The paper records that 76% of the respondents opted for 
institutional over ad hoc arbitration; the methodology section lists 8% of respondents coming from the automotive and 
transportation sectors. 
2007 A Comparative Study on the 
Arbitration Systems of 
LMAA and the GMAA 
Wiebke Harke, LLM 
Student, University of 
Northumbria at 
Newcastle  
A special focus on the level of satisfaction of the Northern German users of the system. 
2008 International Arbitration: 





Conducted over a six-month period, this study summarizes data from 82 questionnaires and 47 interviews.  Surveyed major 
corporations that were users of arbitration services. Conducted in two phases over six months.  Most of the disputes involving 
interviewed corporations arose from commercial transactions and construction disputes (52%) with 11% from the shipping 
sector.  Phase 1 consisted of an online questionnaire completed by 82 respondents comprising general counsel, heads of legal 
departments or counsel, at the end of 2007 and early 2008.  Phase 2 comprised 47 face-to-face or telephone interviews with 
corporate counsel in the first half of 2008 (30 minutes for telephone interviews to two hours for face-to-face interviews). Face-
to-face interviews were conducted in the UK, USA, Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, Japan, Mexico and Brazil. 
   The survey focused on corporate attitudes and practices, such as settlements, outcomes and enforcement.  If privacy and 
confidentiality were addressed in the study, there was no mention of these aspects in the published report.  The report was very 
useful however in one particular respect, in that it published a table of reported statistics from various arbitration institutions.  
The top three for 2007 were ICC (599), AAA/ICDR (621) HKIAC (448).  Care must be exercised in handling such figures as 
different institutions use different methods of reporting the number of cases handled e.g., the number of cases (which might 
include default appointments but be categorised as ad hoc) may not necessarily the same as number of administered 
arbitrations.  By comparison, the LMAA recorded 1540 appointments in 2007. 
2009  ICC The ICC followed up on its 1998 survey on arbitration practise, with a Special Supplement in 2009 entitled ‘Confidentiality in 
Arbitration: Commentaries on Rules, Statutes, Case Law and Practice’.  More a series of discussion papers rather than a 
survey, it aimed to initiate discussions on revising the ICC Rules.   
   Summarizing the state of institutional rules, Dimolitsa (2009) concluded: ‘We are far from an international consensus on the 
parties' obligation of confidentiality, my personal opinion is that the Rules should remain unchanged in this respect given their 





2010 International Arbitration 
Survey: Choices in 
International Arbitration  
QMU & White & Case 
LLP  
 
The objective of this study was to determine the key factors that drive corporate choices about arbitration: how are decisions 
made about arbitration, who influences these decisions and what considerations are uppermost in the minds of corporate 
counsel when they negotiate arbitration clauses.  Phase 1 consisted of an online questionnaire comprising 78 questions 
completed by 136 respondents.  Respondents were general counsel, heads of legal departments, specialist legal counsel and 
regional legal counsel.  Phase 2 comprised 67 face-to-face or telephone interviews with corporate counsel.  62% of respondents 
said confidentiality is ‘very important’ to them in international arbitration.  This figure rose to 86% when ‘very important’ and 
‘quite important’ categories were combined.  While international arbitration is private, respondents were aware that it is not 
necessarily confidential and may not be considered so by the counterparty. It was acknowledged that confidentiality was at 
times ‘porous’.  This was particularly so when it came to the obligation on corporations - particularly publicly listed ones - to 
report to shareholders and make disclosures in their annual accounts and reports. The sentiment was expressed that commercial 
arbitration matters are not of great interest to outsiders and do not generally involve sensitive commercial information. 
Therefore, in many cases confidentiality is not a prime consideration.  Respondents identified the key aspects of the arbitration 
that they think should be kept confidential: top choices included the amount in dispute (76%), the pleadings and documents 
submitted in the case (72%) and the full award (69%).  The (lack of) published awards was highlighted to be of concern by 
some users, who expressed a desire to see more awards available in the public domain in order to understand the arbitral 
process better and to look at the previous decisions of potential arbitrators.  It was also acknowledged that this might be 
inconsistent with the desire for confidentiality of their own awards. 61% of respondents considered that the arbitration 
institution, the lawyers involved, the national courts, the parties and the tribunal should all bear the responsibility of keeping 
the arbitration confidential. 
2011 Costs of International 
Arbitration Survey 
CIArb According to the survey, a typical claimant spends approximately £1,580,000, while respondents spent an average of 
£1,413,000.  Significant sums.  However, the small sample size and the low number of arbitrations the statistics are derived 
from - a survey of 254 international commercial arbitrations conducted between 1991 and 2010 - suggest the survey captured a 
disproportionate number of large and expensive claims that exaggerate the true cost of a typical arbitration. 
2012 International Arbitration 
Survey: 
Current and Preferred 
Practices in the Arbitral 
Process  
 
QMU & White and 
Case 
Phase 1 was an online questionnaire comprising 100 questions completed by 710 respondents of whom the majority of 
respondents were primarily private practitioners (53%), followed by arbitrators (26%), in-house counsel (10%), as well as 
counsel from arbitral institutions, academics and expert witnesses (together, 11%).  The majority of respondents (71%) had 
been involved in more than 5 international arbitrations in the five years prior to the study, and most of them (57%) worked for 
organisations that were involved in more than 20 arbitrations in the preceding 5 years.  Phase 2 comprised 104 telephone 
interviews, each lasting on average 15 minutes.  Amongst the issues the study aimed to address was to what extent had truly 
harmonised practices emerged in international arbitration in the context of international arbitration having grown and 
flourished. 
   Had a cross-fertilisation of these practices and procedures occurred?  And if such practices were emerging, did they reflect the 
preferred practices of the international arbitration community?  The study found that the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence 
in International Arbitration (‘the IBA Rules’) were used in 60% of arbitrations: in 53% as guidelines and in 7% as binding 









QMU & White and 
Case 
This survey had a particular focus on how arbitration was used in the Energy, Construction and Financial Services industries.  
Phase 1 comprised an online questionnaire of 82 questions was completed by 101 respondents (general counsel, heads of legal 
departments or counsel).  Phase 2 comprised over 30 interviews with corporate counsel and ranged from 20 to 90 minutes.  The 
survey looked at comparative choices in dispute resolution i.e., comparing arbitration to litigation, mediation and expert 
determination in various sectors.  The benefits in international arbitration were ranked.  Respondents were asked to rank the 
following perceived benefits of arbitration in order of importance for their industry sector: neutrality, expertise of decision 
maker, flexibility of procedure, costs, speed, enforceability, and confidentiality. Respondents rated the benefits into seven 
categories ranging from 1 (most important) to 7 (least important).  In Energy, neutrality, flexibility, confidentiality and 
expertise of decision maker were the top four perceived benefits.  At the other end of the spectrum, costs and speed were least 
likely to be viewed as benefits of arbitration.  Similar results were obtained from companies in the Construction sector.  If the 
results are analysed slightly differently, confidentiality came in as the second most important benefit (21%), behind neutrality 
in the ‘most important’ category.   If the results from the first and categories are aggregated, then confidentiality fell to third 
with 37%, behind ‘expertise of the decision maker’ (47%) and neutrality (43%).  
2014 Publication of International 
Arbitration Awards and 
Decisions 
New York City Bar The authors viewed the trend towards more publication as a potential catalyst that - for good or ill - would impact on 
international arbitration, particularly those issues of confidentiality, concentration of knowledge and expertise and the extent to 
which arbitral decisions and awards should have persuasive or precedential effect.  It was recognised that whilst publication of 
arbitral awards and challenges to arbitrators had become more common, it was not without controversy.  The results shewed 
significant diversity in the rules and practices of the institutions.  Several published selected, redacted decisions.   
   A number published nothing, whilst others published all awards.  The LCIA was unique in publishing redacted decisions on 
challenges to arbitrators. The conclusions drawn by the authors were that those contemplating or advising on arbitration 
matters should be aware of and factor in the confidentiality provisions and publication policies when selecting the institution to 
administer a dispute 
2015 International Arbitration 
Survey: Improvements and 
Innovations in International 
Arbitration 
QMU & School of 
International 
Arbitration 
Soft law instruments such as the IBA Rules of Taking Evidence and the IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest now appear to 
have universal acceptance.  The same 2015 Queen Mary study found only 5% of respondents finding them ‘not useful’. 
 





The survey investigated how arbitration clauses are utilised in the field of consumer credit.  Report to Congress, pursuant to 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street. Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a).  The report recognised that arbitration is a private 
although not a confidential process.  See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, ‘Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration’ 54 U. Kan. L. 
Rev. 1211, 1211 (2006) (‘Arbitration is private but not confidential . . . Arbitration is private in that it is a closed process, but it 





   It found that arbitration hearings are closed to the public, and awards in consumer arbitrations typically are not published.  
Schmitz, (2006) at 1216.  It noted that the AAA Consumer Rules, contemplated the possibility that redacted arbitration awards 
would be made public, as is the case with AAA employment arbitration.  As the study highlighted, arbitration rules typically 
do not impose express confidentiality or nondisclosure obligations on parties to the dispute, although arbitrator ethics rules do 
impose confidentiality obligations on arbitrators. e.g., American Bar Association & American Arbitration Association, Code of 
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Canon VI(B) (Mar. 1, 2004) ‘The arbitrator should keep confidential all matters 
relating to the arbitration proceedings and decision’. In summary the study found that most arbitration clauses were silent on 
confidentiality and did not impose any nondisclosure obligation on the parties.  
2016 Pre-empting and Resolving 
Technology, Media and 
Telecoms Disputes  
Pinsent Masons & 
QMU  
Built on 343 questionnaires and 62 personal interviews.  TMT refers to Technology, Media and Telecoms.  The survey asked 
users and suppliers of technology about the main types of TMT disputes that arise and examined how can they be efficiently 
resolved.  It focused on the types of technology, media and telecoms disputes that arise.  70% of respondents came from the IT, 
energy and manufacturing industries.   
   It followed the familiar two-phase format.  Phase 1 was an online questionnaire of 55 questions completed by 343 respondents: 
42% from civil law, 32% from common law with 21% of the respondents combining both legal traditions.  Phase 2 consisted 
of 62 face-to-face or telephone interviews ranging from 15 to 120 minutes. Unsurprisingly perhaps for a modern sector where 
the perception would be that innovation, technology and the preservation trade secrets would rank highly, 60% of respondents 
ranked confidentiality and privacy as ‘very important’.  Third behind ‘enforceability’ (68% of respondents ranking it as ‘very 
important’) and to ‘avoid litigation in a foreign jurisdiction’ (65%). 
   The study found that when a dispute resolution policy specified arbitration, the three most important elements were institution, 
seat and confidentiality. 
2016 Enhancing Hong Kong’s 
position as the leading 
international arbitration 
centre in Asia-Pacific 
KPMG KPMG was commissioned by the Hong Kong Trade Development Council to assess the role played by the arbitration sector in 
Hong Kong’s legal sector and the economy generally and to assess its competitiveness within a broader international and 
regional context.  ‘Enhancing Hong Kong’s position as the leading international arbitration Centre in Asia-Pacific’ (2016) page 
19.  A key shortcoming identified was a lack of opportunities for aspiring arbitrators to view first-hand how arbitrators work in 
handling arbitration proceedings, unless they have themselves acted as counsel or solicitors, concluding: ‘given the 
confidentiality around the arbitration proceedings this is not surprising’. 
2018 International Arbitration 
Survey: The Evolution 
of International Arbitration  
 
QMU & White & Case 87% of respondents believed that confidentiality in international commercial arbitration is of importance. Most respondents 
think that confidentiality should be an opt-out, rather than an opt-in, feature.  The most valuable characteristics of arbitration: 
respondents were asked to identify the characteristics of international arbitration that they find most valuable.  The two most 
frequently selected options were ‘enforceability of awards’ (64%) and ‘avoiding specific legal systems/national courts’ (60%).  
This reinforces the continued success of the New York Convention and the benefit to parties of eluding the potential biases and 
specificities of domestic courts. The third and fourth spots were taken by ‘flexibility’ (40%) and ‘ability of parties to select 
arbitrators’ (39%), respectively, followed in fifth place by ‘confidentiality and privacy’ (35%). 
2018 ICCA-Queen Mary Task 
Force on Third-Party Funding 
ICCA & QMU The Task Force’s starting objective was the identification of issues that arise in relation to third-party funding in international 
arbitration, and the determination of what outputs, if any, would be appropriate to address those issues.  the Task Force 






2019 Commonwealth Secretariat Commonwealth 
Secretariat 
The study was requested by Senior Officials of Commonwealth Law Ministries at a meeting with the Secretariat in London in 
October 2018.  The Commonwealth Secretariat invited any of the following Commonwealth entities and individuals to provide 
input to the study: lawyers, arbitrators, enterprises and academic institutions.  The study was launched by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat to identify and address challenges to accessing international commercial arbitration across the Commonwealth.  
Through the study, the Secretariat aims to understand the use of international commercial arbitration in addressing commercial 
disputes across the Commonwealth, and which member countries may strengthen the accessibility and effectiveness of 
international commercial arbitration.  The Secretariat is seeking views on the study, which must be submitted via questionnaire 
by 30 April 2019. 
   Five of the 50 questions addressed confidentiality.  
14. What are the four key factors (please rank 1 being the most important, 4 being the least important) that determine the 
preferred method for resolving B2B disputes? 
29. What are the three most valuable characteristics of arbitration? 
30. What are the three worst characteristics of arbitration? 
45. In your opinion, what are the three most pressing issues in your country that need to be resolved to strengthen international 
arbitration? 
46. In your opinion, what are the three most pressing issues in the Commonwealth that need to be resolved to strengthen 
international arbitration? 
   This writer has had the privilege of sighting the draft unpublished Executive Summary which in part concluded: 
8. The impact of arbitration on the development of the law might be perceived as a challenge.  The confidential nature of 
arbitration may hinder the practical application and interpretation of the law, which in turn can delay law reform. 
20. …Arbitration also generally offers privacy and confidentiality in the dispute resolution process, particularly in common 
law jurisdictions such as the Commonwealth member countries.  
128. The confidential nature of arbitration awards has the potential to deprive policy makers and academics of valuable 
insights regarding the practical application and interpretation of the law in question… In addition, the legal profession and the 
courts might lose valuable precedent.  The importance of binding precedents and authoritative interpretation of contractual 






Chapter 2: Confidentiality in Overseas Jurisdictions 
‘I do not work on a theory.  Instead I ask: what will make this work? … I choose a solution which offers a 
higher probability of success, but if it fails, I have some other way.  Never a dead end’.124 
- Lee Kuan Yew 
Introduction 
The ‘Arbitrage International Commercial’ Volume 1 (‘International Commercial Arbitration’ 
in English) was published at the occasion of the 1956 Paris Congress of the Union Internationale 
des Avocats (UIA).  Subtitled ‘A World Handbook’ it offered a description of the law and practice 
of arbitration of 16 countries of Western Europe and of the United States.  Volume 2 following 
in 1960, expanded the contributions to five Latin-American and seven Eastern Europe countries.  
As the UIA President, Mr Hans Peter Schmid noted in the (translated) English Preface: ‘For the 
settlement of international commercial disputes arbitration presents in many cases the best 
answer’. Neither Volume 2 running to 483 pages nor its slightly slimmer predecessor at 400 pages 
however, addressed the privacy or confidentiality or arbitration proceedings in any of the 
jurisdictions or societies listed.  The USSR, Yugoslavia and the London Dried Fruit Association125 
have long since gone.126  But the issues of privacy and confidentiality remain and the extent to 
which those various jurisdictions have addressed them is the subject of this chapter. 
The overseas laws examined were chosen based on their various contributions to the issue of 
arbitral confidentiality.  It should come as no surprise that the more flexible common law 
jurisdictions are better represented in this regard.  The courts in Australia, England, France, the 
USA and Sweden have handed down judgments specifically dealing with the issue.  New Zealand, 
Norway and Spain127 adopted legislation addressing it.  Firstly however, it is appropriate to 
examine the UNCITRAL Model Law.  There are 80 countries in 111 jurisdictions which have 
adopted legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (1985), as amended in 2006.128  It was used it as a point of reference by the drafters 
of the Arbitration Act 1996.  Table 2, Arbitral Confidentiality Provisions in Selected Jurisdictions, 
summarises the confidentiality requirements for the laws and jurisdictions discussed in this 
 
124 Tom Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew, Citizen Singapore: How to Build a Nation (Marshall 
Cavendish, Singapore 2010). 
125 It survived on as the London Dried Fruit Association Benevolent Fund until, finally being wound up in 1965.  See 
https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/search/archives/6e292b40-2d9f-34d9-9de8-74cb3e3e8705 accessed 3 March 2020. 
126 All of which contained entries in those two volumes. 
127 Spanish Arbitration Act 2004 Art.24. 






The UNCITRAL Model Law  
The first point to make is that the UNCITRAL Model Law does not address confidentiality, 
a widely criticised omission.  Mantilla-Serrano considered such a state of affairs as 
unsatisfactory129, principally because countries that had adopted the Model Law wholesale would 
have no confidentiality regime at all, leading to potential uncertainty e.g., in the situation where 
the arbitrators hail from outside the jurisdiction and are unfamiliar with the arbitration law 
applicable to its seat.  Even if the country has addressed confidentiality, there is in all probability 
going to be a lack of uniformity of approach.  Divergent views are likely to arise with respect to 
what constitutes confidential material e.g., evidence, statements, expert witness testimony, 
affidavits, skeleton arguments and the arbitral award.  These are not uncommon issues in 
international commercial arbitrations in the absence of codification.  Less discussed is the matter 
of openness in the arbitral process itself.  Take an arbitration with its seat in a jurisdiction 
possessing a more robust approach to confidentiality, such as Singapore, England, France or New 
Zealand for example.  The strict obligations of confidentiality ought to produce an environment 
more conducive to openness in the conduct of the proceedings.  Compare that to countries with 
legitimate concerns that disclosed documents may potentially fall into the public domain and 
public scrutiny; or that the existence of the dispute can be divulged to third parties as in the United 
States, Sweden or Australia.  Would those environments reduce the parties openness in the 
proceedings?  The answer is unclear.  The five most preferred and widely used seats are London, 
Paris, Hong Kong, Singapore and Geneva.130  But recent research suggests that it is not issues of 
privacy or confidentiality driving those figures: these attributes rank behind ‘general reputation 
and recognition’; ‘formal legal infrastructure’; ‘neutrality and impartiality of its legal system and 
the national arbitration law’; and ‘track record in enforcing agreements to arbitrate and arbitral 
awards’.131  
When UNCITRAL’s Working Group met in 2016 to discuss a revision of its ‘Notes on 
Organizing Arbitral Proceedings’, there was no appetite to amend the Model Law to address 
confidentiality.  Whilst noting that confidentiality is perceived as being an ‘advantageous and 
helpful feature of international commercial arbitration’ the committee recognised the lack of 
 
129 ‘UNCITRAL Model Law: Missed Opportunities for Enhanced Uniformity’ (2008) 31 UNSW Law Journal 1. 
130 According to two of the QMU’s most recent surveys: ‘International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and 
Innovations in International Arbitration’ (2015); and ‘International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International 
Arbitration (2018).  See Table 4.   





uniformity of approach in domestic laws or arbitration rules and the extent to which the duty 
applies.  The Secretariat highlighted the options available to parties in an arbitration should the 
issue of confidentiality be a concern, including the parties agreeing their own confidentiality 
regime and the expectation that arbitrators should keep the arbitral proceedings confidential.132  
These recommendation were subsequently adopted and incorporated into UNCITRAL’s ‘Notes 
on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings’.   
In essence UNCITRAL side stepped the issue: unable to cater to multiple jurisdictions and 
disparate legal philosophies it pushed the responsibility for confidentiality back to the individual 
states that had adopted the Model Law: ‘[t]he Notes do not seek to promote any practice as best 
practice, given that procedural styles and practices in arbitration vary and each of them has its 
own merit…’ ⁠ 133  This might be regarded as unfortunate.  UNCITRAL missed a rare opportunity 
to bring a degree of harmonization to the practice of international arbitration.  It is of interest to 
note however, that two of the proposals made (the exceptions and required disclosure suggestions) 
were straight out of Colman J’s judgement in Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel v Mew [1993] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 243 (Hassneh Insurance).  The other three can be found in any number of 
institutional rules.  
The Model Law thus provides a template for those jurisdictions with no existing arbitration 
statutes or case law to fall back on but provides limited assistance in formulating a solution to 
codification of confidentiality.  Böckstiegel (2009) described a growing harmonization between 
national arbitration laws even where the Model Law is not followed, driven by commercial 
pressures.  That harmonization is apparent in some of the overseas jurisdictions looked at 
below.134 
Australia 
There are two principle nationwide arbitration acts, as well as the state and territory laws that 
regulate domestic commercial arbitrations.  The Australia Capital Territory’s Commercial 
Arbitration Act 2017 is applicable to domestic commercial arbitrations.  The International 
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cwlth) covers international commercial arbitrations and the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards, last being amended in 2018.  The Attorney General pointedly addressed 
 
132 ‘Settlement of commercial disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings. Note 
by the Secretariat’  https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.194 accessed 11 April 2020. 
133 ‘2016 Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’  
at https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/71/137 accessed 11 April 2020. 






the confidentiality issue when he introduced the Commercial Arbitration Bill 2016, recognising 
that ‘confidentiality is a key feature of the arbitration process, as it protects commercial interests 
and potential reputational harm’.135 The Bill aimed to ensure greater certainty to the parties that 
their arbitration would be ‘cost effective, unbiased and fair’.136 
Australia’s Commercial Arbitration Bill 2016 provides for limited grounds for the disclosure 
of confidential information e.g., in the case of a public interest reason.  Sections 23C ~ 23G 
(disclosure of confidential information) address disclosure of confidential information, 
circumstances in which confidential information may be disclosed, the circumstances when an 
Arbitral tribunal may allow disclosure, and circumstances when a Court may prohibit or permit 
disclosure.  The Act defines ‘confidential information’ in relation to arbitral proceedings as being 
information that relates to the proceedings or to an award made in the proceedings.  It is detailed 
and includes: all pleadings, submissions, and other information supplied to the arbitral tribunal 
by a party to the proceedings; all evidence supplied to the arbitral tribunal; any notes made by the 
arbitral tribunal of oral evidence or submissions; transcripts of oral evidence or submissions; any 
rulings, directions or orders of the arbitral tribunal; the award(s) of the arbitral tribunal.  ‘Disclose’ 
in relation to confidential information is defined as giving or communicating the confidential 
information in any way.  The public interest exception is formalised with respect to investor state 
arbitrations.  Sections 23C to 23G do not apply to arbitral proceedings to which the Transparency 
Rules apply.137 
Esso/BHP v Plowman  
The 1995 Australian High Court decision in Esso/BHP v Plowman decided by a majority of 
four to one, upholding the decisions of the lower courts, firmly rejected the English principles in 
Dolling-Baker v Merrett,138 determining that there was no general over-riding principle of 
confidentiality which attached to documents disclosed in an arbitration.139  Stung perhaps by the 
criticism following Esso/BHP v Plowman, Australia subsequently developed detailed provisions 
relating to confidentiality at both federal and state level.   
At the time, it was viewed in England as a dramatic decision, prompting Sir Patrick Neill’s 
 
135 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly for the ACT, 15 December 2016, 246, (Mr 
Ramsay, Attorney-General).  
136 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly for the ACT, 21 March 2017, 771, (Mr Ramsay, 
Attorney-General). 
137 The confidentiality provisions in the two Acts are nearly identical.  They also closely follow those found in State 
laws such as Northern Territories (2011), Queensland (2013) and Western Australia (2012). 
138 [1990] 1 WLR 1205. 





1995 Bernstein Lecture ‘Machiavelli’ speech.140  A special edition of Arbitration International 
was devoted to the confidentiality theme, with an editorial,141 articles by Jan Paulsson and Nigel 
Rawding,142 Michael Collins QC143 and two by Hans Smit.144  Nosworthy145 considered that as a 
result of the decision many documents which would previously have been considered private and 
confidential could now find their way into the public domain; that as the parties and tribunal had 
the power to agree that documents would be treated as confidential, this was capable of being 
addressed by means of a supplementary arbitration agreement.  Pryles reviewed the results of a 
survey of international commercial arbitration conducted by Dr. Buhring-Uhle.  Respondents 
rated confidentiality as the third most important advantage of arbitration (out of eleven options).  
Pryles commented: ‘Outside Australia the decision … in Esso Australia has not been well 
received’.146  Bagner later considered that following Esso/BHP v Plowman (and also the Swedish 
case of Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd v AI Trade Finance Inc (Case T-1881-99, Swedish 
Sup Ct, 27 October 2000) (Bulbank) the assumption that ‘confidentiality is an obvious and 
inherent part of commercial arbitration’ was no longer tenable.147 New Zealand reacted by 
explicitly rejecting the approach of Esso/BHP v Plowman, amending the law in support of the 
English stance.148  
It was not as if Esso/BHP v Plowman was completely unexpected however: the signs were 
there to see for a careful observer of Australian arbitration law.  Two years earlier Miller (1993) 
presciently commented that ‘[p]ublic policy can rarely be objectively ascertained, and its potential 
to influence and even determine the result of an international arbitration’.149   There is a certain 
sense of over-reaction to Esso/BHP v Plowman.  The criticism of Mason CJ’s reasoning echoes 
the attacks on some of Lord Denning’s judgements, both men being possessed of a reformist, 
pragmatically intellectual approach to the law.  Denning was not infrequently accused of being 
more concerned with the notion of justice and reaching an equitable decision as he was the strict 
application of the law.150  But Mason CJ’s decision seems, in my view at least, as being an 
 
140 Sir Patrick Neill, ‘Confidentiality in Arbitration’ (1996) 12 Arbitration International 287, 316. 
141 (1995) 11 Arbitration International 231. 
142 Jan Paulsson, Nigel Rawding, ‘The Trouble with Confidentiality’ (1995) 11 Arbitration International 303. 
143 Michael Collins, ‘Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings’ (1995) 11 Arbitration International 321. 
144 Prof Hans Smit, ‘Case-note on Esso/BHP v Plowman (Supreme Court of Victoria)’ (1995) 11 Arbitration 
International 299; ‘Confidentiality in Arbitration’(1995) 11 Arbitration International 337. 
145 Ian Nosworthy & Andrew Robertson, ‘A Setback for Arbitration - High Court Rules No Implied Confidentiality in 
Arbitral Proceedings’ (1995) ACLN Issue 42. 
146 ‘Assessing Dispute Resolution Procedures’ (1996) 7 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 267. 
147 Hans Bagner, ‘The Confidentiality Conundrum in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2001) 12 ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 1, Spring, 18 
148 New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996 Art.14. 
149 Dan Miller, ‘Public Policy in International Commercial Arbitrations in Australia’ (1993) 9 Arbitration International 
2. 
150 There is no shortage of literature on the subject of Lord Denning’s judicial activism.  For an informative and 





eminently correct one.  It could be argued that this is a revisionist approach through the prism of 
today’s standards and expectations.  Nevertheless, like Lord Denning before him, I would suggest 
that he was possessed of a progressive streak in regard to his judicial philosophy and 
temperament.  If rather than having justified the decision on the grounds that confidentiality was 
not an implied term, the focus had been one of public interest, the judgement might have been 
considered less controversial and better received generally.  This therefore was not a maverick 
decision, but one in keeping with the development of a modern, coherent philosophy whereby the 
rights of a society must be balanced against those of all its users.  The law serves not only the rich 
and the powerful.151  Unfortunately the court did not explore the boundaries of a public interest 
exception.  Brennan J, agreed with the Chief Justice that there was a public interest exception to 
the principle: but it had not having arisen in the appeal and so considered: ‘… [it] unnecessary 
and inappropriate to discuss the boundaries of that exception’.152  
Transfield Philippines Inc & Ors v Pacific Hydro Ltd & Ors153 (Transfield Philippines) 
The uncertainties caused by Esso/BHP v Plowman were addressed again in Transfield 
Philippines.  Transfield Philippines, believing that there might have been judicial or governmental 
impropriety in earlier arbitration proceedings in the Philippines, sought the Supreme Court of 
Victoria to excuse them from any implied undertaking not to use the documents obtained by 
discovery other than for the purposes of the arbitration.  Hollingworth J was unpersuaded that the 
Court had jurisdiction to release a party from such an implied undertaking given in separate 
arbitral proceedings: Transfield’s application was dismissed on the grounds that it was brought in 
breach of the arbitration agreement.  Transfield Philippines pulls back a little from Esso/BHP v 
Plowman.  It undid some of the damage that case did to the perception that the Australian courts 
had undermined arbitral confidentiality, arguably narrowing the differences between English and 
Australian law in the process.  It will be relatively rare for documents to be produced outside the 
usual discovery process.  Australian courts are likely to still view as confidential documents that 
have been produced subject to an implied undertaking not to use them other than for the purposes 
of the arbitration and be reluctant to relieve a party from that undertaking.   
 
Journal 127. 
151 A recurring theme amongst US commentators.  See for example Adam Cohen (2020) who described how the US 
Supreme Court ‘[s]ided with the rich and powerful against the poor and weak, in virtually every area of the law’. 
Supreme Inequality: The Supreme Court's 50-Year Battle for a More Unjust America (Penguin 2020). 
152 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v The Hon Sydney James Plowman & Ors.[1995] HCA 19 [26]. 





Wilmar Sugar Pty Ltd v Burdekin District Cane Growers Ltd [2017] QSC 3 (Wilmar Sugar) 
The most recent restatement of the Australian approach, again with a strong public interest 
dimension, came in Wilmar Sugar where the Supreme Court of Queensland was given an 
opportunity to consider the issue of confidentiality of arbitral proceedings.  A dispute had arisen 
between the operator of various sugar cane mills in Queensland and growers that supply sugar 
cane to those mills.  The mills crush sugar cane and manufacture raw sugar.154  Negotiations for 
a supply contract broke down and the parties were obliged by statute to refer the dispute to 
arbitration.  The tribunal ordered the respondent growers be allowed to disclose certain 
confidential information to two government members of parliament, an order the mill owners 
appealed to the courts to prevent.  The issue for the court to determine was whether a public 
interest in disclosure outweighed the confidentiality of the arbitration.  Jackson J agreed with the 
arbitrator and allowed the disclosure.155  Unusually the judge provided confidential reasons to the 
parties, considering it impossible to be specific about the confidential information in the public 
reasons for judgment: ‘…to identify the relevant subject matter, …would arguably communicate 
the substance of the balance of the confidential information which the applicant seeks an order to 
preserve’.  Wilmar Sugar emphasises that Australian courts appear sympathetic to and will 
generally uphold a public interest exception to confidentiality, even if its extent remains opaque. 
Canada 
Based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, Canada’s Federal Commercial Arbitration Act, RSC 
1985, c 17 (2nd Supp) applies in limited circumstances where at least one of the parties to the 
arbitration is a government department or corporation or in relation to maritime and admiralty 
matters.  As a result, the jurisdiction of the majority of arbitration cases in Canada falls under the 
laws of the relevant province or territory, at which level separate legislation for international and 
domestic arbitration has been enacted.  Whilst only Quebec has legislated for confidentiality, 
there is some modern jurisprudence. 
Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction with a Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) that governs 
procedures applicable to private dispute prevention and resolution.  Chapter C-25.01 at Article 1 
 
154 Historically, the sugar industry in Queensland was highly regulated and up until the passing of the Sugar Industry 
Amendment Act 2005 (Qld), Queensland Sugar Ltd held an effective monopoly.  Even after deregulation however, 
choice for growers remained limited because of practical factors relating to harvesting and getting the harvested sugar 
cane to the mill for crushing:  the perishable nature of cane, transport costs and that most cane farming regions are 
only in the vicinity of one mill or of mills owned by the same mill owner. 
155 Although the reasoning perhaps was slightly tortuous - the court took the view that there was a drafting mistake in 
the Act at s.27H(1) which (following Adams v Lambert (2006) 228 CLR 409, [21] made it permissible to so read the 





‘Principles of Procedure Applicable to Private Dispute Prevention and Resolution Processes’ 
notes that the main private dispute prevention and resolution processes are negotiation between 
the parties, and mediation/arbitration, in which the parties call on a third person to assist them.  
Three Articles explicitly reference confidentiality.  Article 4 requires that the parties and ‘the third 
person assisting them’ undertake to preserve the confidentiality of anything said, written or done.  
Article 5 is uncommon in that it allows for that ‘third person’ to disclose information for research, 
teaching or statistical purposes without being a breach of confidentiality, provided no personal 
information is revealed.156 Article 644 exempts the arbitrator from breaching the confidentiality 
of the arbitration process by stating conclusions and reasons in the award.   
In Rhéaume v Société d’investissements l’Excellence inc157 the Quebec Court of Appeal had 
to consider the following issues: the extent of the obligation of deliberative secrecy imposed on 
arbitrators; if there had been a breach of the obligation, whether the award should be annulled; 
and whether Quebec arbitrators were subject to an obligation of confidentiality, and if so, what 
was the sanction for a breach of the obligation?  The court highlighted that the rule of deliberative 
secrecy was as important in arbitration as it was in litigation, a hallmark of judicial independence 
worthy of protection in order to ensure that decisions: ‘[a]re made with circumspection and 
reflection and in freedom… the process of discussion and compromise among different points of 
view would not work if stripped of its confidentiality’.158   
Whilst recognising that the arbitrators conduct was not above criticism, the court took the 
view that it would be wholly inconsistent with the intention of the legislature and the trend in the 
courts to treat every breach of the procedure, however minor and however inconsequential, as 
requiring a court to annul an award.  A court should balance the nature of the breach, determining 
whether it was of such a nature as to undermine the integrity of the process.  After analysing the 
domestic and overseas authorities, Hilton J refused to recognize an implicit obligation of 
confidentiality associated with the arbitral process binding on arbitrators and parties alike.  
Ontario had the opportunity to address confidentiality in Adesa Corporation v Bob Dickinson 
Auction Services Ltd.159 The case involved an application for the production of transcripts from 
an arbitration in which the Claimants (but not the Respondents) were parties.  The information 
sought was in relation to identical issues in front of both the court and arbitration.  The court held 
 
156 An interesting concept that, whilst outside the scope of this thesis, is deserving of further consideration and research. 
157 2010 QCCA 2269. 
158 James Kenneth McEwan and Ludmila Barbara Herbst, Commercial Arbitration in Canada, A Guide to Domestic 
and International Arbitrations, (Aurora, Cartwright Group, 2008) 9. 





that there was a confidentiality provision in the arbitration agreement and made a finding of fact 
that there was an expectation of privacy in the arbitration.  While accepting that there were 
advantages to confidentiality, Cameron J held that confidentiality was not essential to the 
arbitration process, remarking: ‘I am not persuaded that the confidentiality of the arbitration 
process … is so important as to outweigh the need in this court for justice if that requires the 
disclosure’.160 
The Supreme court of British Columbia took a more typically English approach in Hi-Seas 
Marine Ltd v Boelman.161  Davies J, viewing the contradictory positions taken in England and 
Australia, noting the lack of decided authority on this point in his own jurisdiction, commented 
that: ‘While it may eventually be necessary for the courts of this province to comprehensively 
address the contradictory positions taken … it is not necessary that I do so in this case’.162  
Nevertheless, the transcript of evidence taken in an arbitration to be produced for court was 
allowed, the court being unsympathetic to the prospect of being prevented from so doing by the 
private nature of arbitration.  Despite a lack of statutory provisions, Canada’s case law provides 
some guidance as to how the State’s courts view confidentiality with respect to materials 
(supportive) and awards (pragmatic). 
France 
The main provisions applicable to arbitration in France are set out in Book IV of the Code of 
Civil Procedure.163  Article 1469 addresses the principle of confidentiality of the arbitrators’ 
deliberations,164 with further provisions set out in the French Civil Code.165  French arbitration 
law is not based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.  Whilst France does not as such follow the 
English doctrine of precedent, French lower courts nevertheless generally follow the decisions of 
higher courts and so decisions of the Court of Cassation and of the Court of Appeal in Paris 
become important in interpreting the law.  French case law recognizes and strictly supports the 
confidentiality of arbitration. 
One of the most important reported cases in French law with respect to international 
arbitration is Aita v Ojjeh166 by the Court of Appeal of Paris, as it reviewed almost all challenges 
 
160 ibid [56]. 
161 (2006) BCSC 488. 
162 ibid [67]. 
163 Promulgated in Decree No. 2011-48 of 13 January 2011, Articles 1442 to 1527. 
164 Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile or NCPC. 
165 Articles 2059 to 2061. 





to awards.  The Court issued a judgment against the party seeking annulment in France of an 
award that had been published in London by Lord Wilberforce acting as umpire.  It held that the 
very bringing of a challenge to the court violated the principle of confidentiality for causing ‘a 
public debate of facts which should remain confidential’ and that it is in ‘the very nature of arbitral 
proceedings that they ensure the highest degree of discretion in the resolution of private disputes, 
as the two parties had agreed’.  The Court in a somewhat unusual move, imposed a significant 
penalty on the party bringing the appeal.  Paulsson & Rawding viewed the reasoning of the Court 
of Appeal as troubling, suggesting that the court was punishing a politically motivated attempt to 
set aside an English award in the French courts.167  Whether such a perception is justified is 
unclear.  But the reasoning of the Court of Appeal does appear to be unsatisfactory on two 
grounds.  The judgement failed to articulate the extent of the limit of any duty of confidentiality.  
Neither did it provide authority for the view that the nature of arbitration intrinsically calls for 
confidentiality.  As Paulsson and Rawding diplomatically commented: ‘This was not, perhaps, a 
context that lent itself to a careful balancing of considerations’. 168 
The Paris Court of Appeal decision in Société National Company for Fishing and Marketing 
‘Nafimco’ v Société Foster Wheeler Trading Company AG,169 which held that there was no prima 
facie presumption of confidentiality, is strongly indicative that the French courts are still 
grappling with the concept and searching for a settled guiding principle.  Seemingly questioning 
the confidential nature of arbitration, the court required the party alleging that confidentiality had 
been breached to explain the existence and reasons for a principle of confidentiality in French 
international arbitration law. 
Germany 
German arbitration law is contained in s.1025 to s.1066 of the German code of civil procedure 
or Zivilprozessordnung ("ZPO”).170  The ZPO is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law (1985).  
It contains no provisions addressing confidentiality and is silent on whether arbitration 
proceedings are confidential.  There is no consensus in Germany as to the confidentiality 
obligations of the parties and is subject to debate as to whether an implied obligation can be 
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derived from the arbitration agreement. 
It is generally accepted that arbitrators - unlike the parties - are under an implied general duty 
of confidentiality.  Confidentiality will in the most part depend on the parties’ agreement, by 
expressly choosing the 2018 DIS Rules (which contain an explicit confidentiality provision in 
s.44) or, as in the case of maritime arbitrations, adopting the 2013 GMAA Rules.  In 1991 and 
1992 Dr. Buhring-Uhle undertook two surveys of the perceived advantages of international 
commercial arbitration in connection with a doctoral thesis he presented to the University of 
Hamburg.171  They asked participants for their reasons in choosing international commercial 
arbitration to resolve their disputes.  Approximately one hundred and fifty questionnaires were 
distributed to arbitrators, attorneys and in-house counsel in over twenty countries (though mostly 
American or European).  A total of ninety-one individuals from seventeen countries responded 
and Dr. Buhring-Uhle personally interviewed sixty-eight.  The results indicated that 
confidentiality was ranked as the third most important advantage of arbitration in a list of eleven, 
behind only the neutrality of the tribunal and the international enforcement by treaty of awards.172  
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is a Model Law jurisdiction, having incorporated the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration 1985 (with amendments as adopted in 2006) in the Arbitration Ordinance.  It applies 
to all arbitrations (domestic or international) seated in Hong Kong.  Hong Kong adopted a new 
arbitration law, the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609, Laws of Hong Kong) 
(Arbitration Ordinance) in 2011, subsequently amended in 2013 and again in 2017.  The Hong 
Kong Ordinance is not only one of the most modern and up to date, it also codified the implied 
duty of confidentiality imposed on the parties under pre-existing Hong Kong law under s.18, itself 
being modelled on s.14 of the New Zealand Arbitration Act (prior to its amendment in 2007).  
Confidentiality provisions were originally introduced in 2011.  Weeramantry are  & Choong
as  confidentiality probably correct that the Hong Kong Administration views one of the main 
reasons parties choose to settle disputes by arbitration.173  Fang considered Hong Kong  arbitration 
attractive on the grounds that the duty of confidentiality will bind the proceedings and negate the 
specific need to draft a specific confidentiality clause.  Whilst that view may be correct, there is 
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no supporting empirical data.174  
Parties are prohibited from disclosing information relating to arbitral proceedings, including 
the awards.  The Arbitration Ordinance provides four clear principle exceptions to the duty of 
confidentiality in s.18(2).  Namely, that the publication, disclosure or communication of 
information concerning an arbitration can be made: in pursuance of a legal right or interest of the 
party; to enforce or challenge the award; where obliged to do so by law - whether to a court, 
government or regulatory body; and to the party’s professional or other advisers.  Provisions 
relating to the privacy of the arbitration are also addressed.  Section 16 requires that proceedings 
are to be heard otherwise than in open court, a move away from pre 2011 Ordinances under which 
the presumption was that arbitration-related court proceedings would be heard in open court.  
Section 17 details restrictions on reporting of proceedings heard otherwise than in open court 
whilst s.17(4) gives the court discretion to direct that reports of the judgment may be published 
in law reports and professional publications if the court considers that judgment to be of major 
legal interest.   
The text of the Ordinance suggests that subject to the various exceptions identified, the 
implied duty of confidentiality under the common law applies to all pleadings, evidence, 
documents, the hearing and the award that arise out of the arbitration.  The Hong Kong courts 
held in Parakou Shipping Pte Ltd v Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Ltd175 that those 
exceptions apply where a party wishes to disclose an award obtained in a previous arbitration.  
The HK Arbitration Ordinance, bearing several similarities with New Zealand law from which it 
borrowed, provides some thoughtful ideas, particularly in the context of award publication. 
Malaysia 
Malaysia’s Arbitration Act 2005 (Act 646) is based on the Model Law.  The 2005 revision 
however did not address confidentiality, the Malaysian courts continuing to rely on common law 
principles.176  Only following the 2018 amendment and a new s.41A (modelled on s.18 of Hong 
Kong’s Arbitration Ordinance) did the Act address confidentiality.177  Section 41A provides that 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, no party may publish, disclose or communicate any 
information relating to arbitral proceedings, including any award.  There are disclosure 
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exemptions with respect to protecting or pursuing a party's legal right or interest; enforcing or 
challenging the award; when obliged by law to do so; and to a party’s professional or any other 
adviser. 
One of the first cases following the implementation of the 2005 Act (although without the 
benefit of the 2018 confidentiality provisions of s.41A) was Malaysian Newsprint Industries Sdn 
Bhd v Bechtel International, Inc & Anor.178  Abdul Malik Ishak J expressed the view that: ‘Privacy 
of the hearing and confidentiality are two major benefits of arbitration … it is now accepted, by 
all and sundry, that arbitrations are private and confidential’.179  The High Court adopted the 
English law position, that a presumption of confidentiality arises as an implied term of an 
arbitration agreement, even in the absence of an express term for confidentiality.   
Third party confidentiality was again addressed in Jacob and Toralf Consulting Sdn Bhd & 
Ors v Siemens Industry Software Gmbh & Co KG & Ors.180  The claimants had sought to expunge 
a document that had been exhibited to an affidavit in a Singapore ICC arbitration, on the grounds 
that arbitration proceedings are private: that all documents produced or created for the purpose 
arbitration are confidential in nature and cannot be used by third parties without the prior leave 
of the court.181  The respondents argued that common law principles were inapplicable.  The 
document was not in itself a confidential document and the information it contained had been in 
the public domain for three years, relying on two English cases.  Coco v AN Clerk (Engineers) 
Ltd182 where Meggary J held that: ‘[t]here can be no breach of confidence in revealing to others 
something which is already common knowledge…’ And AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 
2)183 where Lord Goff determined that: ‘[o]nce it has entered what is usually called the public 
domain…the principle of confidentiality can have no application to it’.⁠184   
Komathy J took the view that in neither case did the principles apply to arbitration 
proceedings.  Even if the document contained information that was not inherently confidential or 
information that was already in the public domain: ‘it is still subject to the obligation of privacy 
and is a document private to the parties to the arbitration and the arbitral tribunal’.  That an 
arbitration hearing was a private process between the parties to an arbitration agreement to which 
third parties had no access: ‘It stands to reason that documents generated for use at that hearing 
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should remain private and confidential’.  In the court’s view there was no point in excluding third 
parties from an arbitration hearing, if they were later able to use such documents without the 
permission of the party who had produced them.  In so doing it would be ‘tantamount to opening 
the door of the arbitration venue to a third party and would serve to compromise the arbitration’.185  
It was a point of view reiterated in Malaysia’s Court of Appeal in Petronas Penapisan (Melaka) 
Sdn Bhd v Ahmani Sdn Bhd.186 
The powers of a court to order redaction of an award or to parts thereof were addressed in 
the Malaysian High Court in Sabah Electricity187 which affirmed that where proceedings are 
commenced to register and enforce an award in Malaysia, the High Court does not have the power 
to order a redaction of any part of the award sought to be registered and enforced.  The court 
distinguished the lack of powers it had to do so under the Act, unlike jurisdictions such as 
Singapore. 
This common law interpretation of confidentiality remained settled until Dato’ Seri Timor 
Shah Rafiq v Nautilus Tug & Towage Sdn Bhd188 (Rafiq v Nautilus) where Goon J held that the 
prohibition under s.41A of the Arbitration Act 2005 did not extend to non-parties to the 
arbitration.  Whilst the common law principles of confidentiality attached to an arbitration had 
been superseded, the implied obligation between the parties to an arbitration could not be 
extended to non-parties to an arbitration.  Rafiq v Nautilus raises the issue that whilst s.41(A) 
allows a party to the arbitration to disclose confidential documents where litigation proceedings 
are brought against it, the Act does not contemplate the situation where a third party commences 
proceedings against one of the parties to an arbitration and in the process relies on confidential 
documents in that arbitration.  It would appear that the prohibition against third parties publishing, 
disclosing or communicating information relating to arbitration proceedings is no longer the law 
in Malaysia.  However, there is arguably a disconnect between the judgement and s.8 of the 
Arbitration Act 2005 which provides that no court shall intervene in matters governed by it.  If 
that analysis is correct, then the Malaysian common law rule prohibiting third parties from using 
confidential documents produced in arbitral proceedings should still apply, the matter not being 
specifically regulated by the Arbitration Act 2005 itself. 
The impact of the repeal of s.42 of Malaysia’s Arbitration Act 2005, deleting the provision 
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for challenging arbitral awards on questions of law is also currently unclear.  Ezeoke considered 
that the Malaysian courts experienced difficulty in dealing with applications under s.42 prior to 
its repeal, highlighting the inconsistent approaches of the courts and their struggle to find a 
balanced approach towards arbitration.189  Nevertheless, the repeal of s.42 has removed an 
element considered fundamental to English arbitration and that features widely in the arbitration 
laws of many other common law jurisdictions. 
Broadly following the principles of English law with respect to arbitral confidentiality, 
Malaysia can however be seen to have diverged with respect to appeals and its application to third 
parties. 
New Zealand 
New Zealand’s response to the uncertainty caused by Esso/BHP v Plowman was to include 
a specific confidentiality clause in New Zealand’s Arbitration Act 1996.  The provisions of s.14 
provided that an arbitration agreement - unless otherwise agreed by the parties - was deemed to 
provide that the parties would not publish, disclose, or communicate any information relating to 
arbitral proceedings under the agreement or to an award made in those proceedings. Section 14 
still however gave rise to interpretive difficulties.  
In Television New Zealand Ltd v Langley Productions Limited190 the New Zealand courts 
accepted that confidentiality is lost once a matter came before it on a matter of appeal.  The dispute 
was between Television New Zealand (“TVNZ”) and a newsreader, John Hawkesby.  TVNZ 
contended that the dispute should be referred to arbitration and stressed the importance of 
confidentiality.  Hawkesby submitted that arbitral proceedings would deny him ‘the opportunity 
to try and salvage his damaged reputation in a public forum’ and submitted that the High Court 
should settle the dispute.  The two parties subsequently agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration.  
The award was in Hawkesby’s favour and TVNZ appealed.  The public speculated over the likely 
outcome.  Deciding that publication of the award would be appropriate, TVNZ applied to the 
court to waive the confidentiality provisions of the arbitration agreement.  Robertson J concluded 
that as a matter of principle, the confidentiality provisions could not automatically extend to 
subsequent High Court proceedings.  That once High Court proceedings were initiated, the 
principles applicable to the High Court would determine the question of access and public 
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knowledge.  The court considered (in an approach reminiscent of both Bentham and Hallam) that: 
‘The openness of justice is a central tenet of our system.  Proceedings will be open for reporting 
and scrutiny unless there are exceptional reasons which militate against that’.191 
The court held that it was inappropriate to conduct confidential court proceedings because 
the matter was of serious public interest; that the parties had both changed their positions as to 
the importance of confidentiality as it suited them; and that the express adoption by the parties in 
their arbitration agreement allowing an automatic right to appeal against the award.  Robertson J 
held that whilst the arbitral award ‘should be made available for public scrutiny and without any 
impediment being created by the confidentiality term in the contract’ recognised that there would 
be some cases where it would be appropriate for the Court to exercise a discretion in 
circumstances where confidentiality was an essential ingredient. 
It is unclear however the extent to which this is still the law in New Zealand subsequent to 
the 2007 amendments.  The New Zealand Law Commission recommended in 2003 that it be 
replaced by a more elaborate provision,192 those amendments being adopted on 18 October 2007.  
Amongst other amendments, significantly enhanced provisions for confidentiality came into 
force.  These included that all arbitration hearings are private and that arbitrators are obliged to 
conduct them as such is stipulated under s.14A.  That arbitration agreements, with certain 
exceptions, are deemed by default to provide that disclosure of confidential information is 
prohibited under s.14B.  Exceptions include disclosure to a professional or other adviser or if the 
disclosure is necessary in order for example: to ensure that a party has a full opportunity (a 
potentially troubling phrase: compare this with the English law position of ‘reasonable 
opportunity’)193 to present the party’s case, as required under article 18 of Schedule 1; for the 
establishment or protection of a party’s legal rights in relation to a third party; in order to make 
an application to a court; and when reasonably required.  The circumstances under which an 
arbitral tribunal may allow disclosure of confidential information is addressed in s.14D.  Section 
14E deals proscribes the High Court’s role in allowing or prohibiting disclosure of confidential 
information, for example if arbitral proceedings have been terminated or party lodges an appeal 
concerning confidentiality.  The decision of the High Court is final under s.14E for which there 
 
191 CL 7/99, HC Auckland, 7 February 2000.  See also Cullen Investments Ltd v G Lancaster & Another 27/9/02, 
Chambers J, HC Auckland. 
192 New Zealand Law Commission ‘Improving the Arbitration Act 1996’. (2003) Report 83, para 53. 
193 The formulation in s.33(1) of the [English] Arbitration Act 1996 is based on Art.18 of the Model Law, differing 
mainly in that that the Model Law refers to ‘full opportunity’ to present the case, whereas section 33(1) refers to 
‘reasonable opportunity’.  The DAC Report at 165, makes the point that the formulation ‘full opportunity’ may lead 





is no further appeal. 
New Zealand’s approach is arguably out of step with jurisdictions such as England, Hong 
Kong and Singapore which provide greater assurance of arbitral confidentiality with respect to 
related court proceedings.  Nevertheless, the 2007 amendments were considerable changes, in 
terms of scope and philosophy.  They make New Zealand one of few countries with a very specific 
and detailed confidentiality code for arbitrations.  The text of s.14 comprises over 120 lines and 
two pages, highlighting the potential complexity of codifying arbitral confidentiality. 
Minor changes were incorporated by the Arbitration Amendment Act 2016 which was 
adopted in 2017.  The New Zealand Ministry of Justice was unpersuaded that other possible 
changes such as including extending the presumption of confidentiality in arbitration to the 
conduct of related court proceedings were necessary and the Arbitration Amendment Act 2019 
did not impact on the confidentiality provisions.  The extent to which (or whether) evidence and 
pleadings can be relied on in other proceedings has not yet been tested in the courts. 
Norway 
There are few statistics with respect the number of arbitrations that take place in Norway.  
The Oslo Institute administers between three and five cases per year.  Knudtzon cited a survey 
that shewed 372 arbitration awards being filed in the Oslo Court between 1987 and 2001.194 
The position prior to the adoption of the 2004 Act was that confidentiality provisions were 
uncertain: there was ‘no legislation… no case law, but plenty of literature’.195  A legislative 
committee was formed prior to the introduction of the Norwegian Arbitration Act 2004196, of 
which one of its tasks was to take opinions on the issue of confidentiality.197  Norwegian users of 
arbitration expressed a broad range of opinion to this question. During the lengthy consultation 
process, arguments were made that Norwegian arbitration practice needed more openness; that it 
would benefit from the publishing and making available for reference more awards.  It was clear 
that there was no consensus amongst Norwegian users of arbitration with respect to how far the 
confidentiality provisions were to be liberalised. 
The Norwegian Bar Association supported the legislative committee's proposals.  The 
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Nordisk Defence Club, one of the largest P&I Defence Club users of maritime arbitration 
representing both ship owners and charterers were not only sympathetic to greater openness, they 
requested an even greater degree of transparency than that proposed.  Was that a disinterested, 
detached viewpoint or one borne out of pragmatism?  As one of the largest defence clubs, there 
would be a practical benefit of award publication: the more arbitration awards in the public 
domain, the better strategically placed a defence insurer might be to evaluate when to settle and 
when to fight a case. 
By contrast the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), the Norwegian Financial 
Services Association and the Federation of Norwegian Coastal Shipping all stressed that 
discretion and confidentiality were the decisive reasons for parties to choose arbitration.  Terje I. 
Våland’s survey conducted amongst participants involved in offshore industry in Norway 
concluded that arbitration is chosen with the specific aim of avoiding publicity.198  In summary 
there was no consensus on the importance of confidentiality within the business community in 
Norway, a view ultimately reflected in the Act. 
Transparency and simplicity prevailed however when the Norwegian Arbitration Act 2004 
was enacted into law: applicable to both domestic and international arbitrations, the Act is based 
upon and closely follows the UNCITRAL Model Law.  The duty of confidentiality and public 
access is set out at Art.5, which provides that the arbitral proceedings and the award are not be 
subject to a duty of confidentiality, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.  Third parties are 
excluded from hearings without the permission of the parties.  Of note is that Art.36 requires the 
arbitral tribunal to send one signed copy of the arbitral award to the Municipal Court for filing in 
the archives of the Court.  Whether and to what extent the depositing of awards with the Municipal 
Court might affect the award’s confidentiality is unclear.  The old Civil Procedure Act 1915 
provided that the arbitral tribunal was to send a signed copy of its award to the local District 
Court’s archives,199 an obligation that according to Nisja, few tribunals fulfilled.200  Whilst there 
was no implication that this made the awards publicly available - the aim reputedly being for 
statistical purposes - neither the old or new provisions appears to have been tested: there are no 
authorities or other data to indicate whether non-participants to an arbitration have sought access 
to an award filed with the Municipal Court.  Overall it is clear that Norway has moved towards 
greater arbitral openness and transparency, favouring disclosure rather than confidentiality. 
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Nisja considered that the Norwegian Arbitration Act 2004 was better received and less 
criticised than had been predicted.  Overall users appear satisfied that the clarity on the issue of 
confidentiality has brought.  There are no significant concerns that confidentiality now requires 
an ‘opt in’ rather than ‘opt out’ approach. 
Singapore 
The Government’s active policy to develop Singapore as an international arbitration centre 
has seen a steady increase in arbitration activity in the Lion City.  Maxwell Chambers, an 
arbitration centre launched in 2010 with Government funding, increased its floor capacity 
threefold with the addition of the former Red Dot Museum in 2019.  The white stucco colonial-
era building in Tanjong Pagar, built in 1928 as a police force barracks, became the Traffic Police 
Headquarters until 1999.  Now renamed Maxwell Chamber Suites, together with Maxwell 
Chambers they form the world’s first and largest integrated international dispute resolution centre. 
The Model Law, except for Chapter VIII, has the force of law in Singapore.  International 
arbitration in Singapore is governed by the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A) (IAA) whilst 
domestic arbitration is governed by the Arbitration Act (Cap 10) (AA) which is based on the 1985 
UNCITRAL Model Law i.e., without the 2006 amendments.  Whilst neither the AA and nor the 
IAA explicitly impose a duty of confidentiality, an implied obligation of confidentiality in 
arbitrations has been recognised by the Singapore courts.  There is limited case law dealing with 
arbitral confidentiality.  In Myanma Yaung Chi Oo Co Ltd v Win Win Nu,201 Kan J dealt with the 
issues of confidentiality of arbitration proceedings and documents disclosed in those proceedings. 
On whether there was an implied duty of confidentiality, the court preferred the English position 
in Ali Shipping over the Australian one in Esso/BHP v Plowman.  The court reasoned that parties 
consider that arbitration hearings are private whilst court proceedings are open and public: their 
reasonable expectations therefore would be that proceedings were confidential.  On whether it is 
necessary to first obtain the leave of court before disclosure of the arbitration proceedings, the 
court held that leave was not automatically required.  When it is reasonably necessary to disclose, 
the duty of confidentiality is lifted.  If, however the other party disputes the necessity, it can apply 
to the courts who will then determine if it is reasonably necessary.  The principle of confidentiality 
in arbitration was affirmed by the Singapore High Court in AAY v AAZ202 as a ‘general principle 
or doctrine of arbitration law developed through the common law’.  The following year in AZT v 
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AZV203 the Singapore High Court took a further step towards the enhancement of confidentiality 
in arbitration when it ordered court documents relating to an arbitration to be sealed. 
Singapore’s formal position of favouring confidentiality in arbitration is broadly welcomed 
by the arbitration community.204  There is nonetheless a political dimension to the push for greater 
openness, the cause of award publication being championed by senior members of the judiciary.  
Menon CJ of the Supreme Court of Singapore was supportive of greater publication of arbitration 
awards in the keynote address to the SCMA in October 2019.205  The Chief Justice expressed the 
view that limited rights of appeal were having an adverse impact on the development of the law, 
citing references, including Lord Thomas’s 2017 speech.  Award publication is analysed in 
Chapter 8, Development of the Law. 
The Singapore courts have a relatively strict attitude towards and are supportive of arbitral 
confidentiality.  The exceptions to that obligation are: the public interest or the interests of justice 
require disclosure; an order or leave of the court has been obtained; consent has been obtained 
from the party which originally produced the documents; and where disclosure is reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of one party.  Interestingly the biggest threat 
to arbitration in Singapore are their courts, which are consistently ranked amongst the best judicial 
systems in Asia.  The resulting perception is that disputes may be resolved as quickly and 
efficiently through litigation (and its development of international commercial courts) as through 
arbitration.  
Minor amendments to the International Arbitration Act were scheduled to be approved by 
Parliament in early October 2020.  Section 9B introduces a new provision containing a default 
process for appointing arbitrators in multi-party arbitrations where a tribunal appointment 
procedure has not been specified.  Section 12(1) was updated to recognize the powers of an 
arbitral tribunal to enforce confidentiality obligations.  However, as the confidentiality provisions 
must already have been specified within the arbitration agreement itself, it is unclear what 
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The privacy or confidentiality of proceedings is not addressed by the Swedish Arbitration 
Act.207  In practice, arbitral proceedings are held in private.  Whilst there is a general view that 
the tribunal must maintain confidentiality throughout the arbitration, case law suggests that there 
is no obligation of confidentiality unless there is a contractual agreement to that effect.  The 
Swedish Arbitration Act does contain a disclosure requirement at s.9, which is unchanged from 
the earlier legislation: ‘A person who is asked to accept an appointment as arbitrator shall 
immediately disclose all circumstances which …. might be considered to prevent the person from 
serving as arbitrator’.  That duty is an ongoing one, as an arbitrator is required to inform the 
parties and the other arbitrators of any change in circumstance. 
Sweden’s principal contribution to case law on arbitral confidentiality was the Swedish 
Supreme Court's decision in 2000 in Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd v AI Trade Finance Inc208 
(Bulbank).  Bulbank was considered an important challenge to the concept of arbitral 
confidentiality.  The Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank challenged an arbitration tribunal's 
jurisdiction on the ground that no arbitration agreement existed between the parties.  The tribunal 
issued an interim award holding that it had jurisdiction.  The award was published in Mealey’s 
‘International Arbitration Report’.  Following publication of the final award, the bank applied to 
the Swedish court to declare the award invalid on the grounds that publication of the interim 
award was a material breach of the contractual requirement of confidentiality.  The Stockholm 
city court determined that under Swedish law, specifically ECE Rules, Art.29, the proceedings 
are held in camera and should be confidential: ‘there is a presumption within the private sector 
of community life that confidentiality prevails unless otherwise agreed or prescribed by law’.  The 
court held that publication of the arbitration decision had violated an implied obligation of secrecy 
in arbitration agreements and took the severe step of vacating the arbitration award.209  This drastic 
action led commentators such as Bagner and Rosenberg to question an award’s binding nature.210 
Following an appeal, the Supreme Court declared that as a matter of Swedish law, no legal 
duty of confidentiality in arbitration exists, whether by implication or inherent in an agreement to 
arbitrate.  Neither did the Swedish Arbitration Act provide for any duty of confidentiality.  The 
Court acknowledged that companies choose arbitration for the confidentiality connected to 
arbitration proceedings. Nevertheless, it held that there was no duty of confidentiality on 
arbitrating parties unless there was an agreement to that effect.  Recognising that the general 
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public does not have the right to be present at oral hearings and does not have the right to access 
written documents in the file, nonetheless the court saw no contradiction for parties to be entitled 
to disclose to third parties information concerning the arbitration proceedings, that it could not: 
‘necessarily assume that the parties are bound by a confidentiality undertaking’.   
The Swedish Supreme Court addressed the confidentiality of arbitral documents in 2012 in 
Euroflon Tekniska Produkter AB v Flexiboys I Motala AB.211  The matter began as an application 
for court assistance in taking evidence from a third party in an on-going arbitration, that was 
objected to on the basis that the requested material lacked evidentiary value and contained trade 
secrets that should only be disclosed in extraordinary circumstances.  When it came before the 
Supreme Court, it decided that under s.26 of the Swedish Arbitration Act the evidentiary value of 
the requested material is a question exclusively for the tribunal that authorizes the request for 
assistance, which the court may not review.  The court’s review is limited to the legality of the 
disclosure order and whether an exception for the disclosure exists.  The court found no legal 
impediments to ordering the disclosure and conducted a balancing test, concluding that 
extraordinary circumstances to except disclosure did not exist.  The Supreme Court affirmed the 
District Court’s decision and ordered the disclosure of the requested material. 
Rubino-Sammartano asked whether in certain law regimes third parties may commit a tort 
by divulging confidential information, quoting the Svea Court of Appeal in Bulbank: ‘the 
publicising of information in arbitration proceedings could be viewed as a breach of the duty of 
good faith’.212  This is a relatively unexplored area of the law that may yet need to be addressed 
in the future.  The Swedish legal framework provides no basis for arbitral confidentiality.  There 
is an obligation for arbitrators to disclose circumstances which might prevent the person from 
serving as arbitrator.  But with no definitions or guidelines as to what those circumstances might 
be, the obligation is vague by nature.  Swedish case law is not particularly supportive of the 
principles of arbitral confidentiality. 
United States 
The passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FFA) in 1925 predates and is thus not based on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law.  Each State has adopted their own arbitration statutes based on either 
the Uniform Arbitration Act or the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act.  The FAA contains no 
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explicit provision regarding the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings and neither Act requires 
the parties or the arbitrators to protect information as confidential.  Nevertheless, there is a 
movement toward treating privacy and confidentiality on different footings and a growing move 
to limit the extent of that confidentiality.   
Case law does not demonstrate any general duty of confidentiality in arbitration.  The 
principle United States case is United States v Panhandle Eastern Corp. 118 FRD 346 (D. Del. 
1988) (Panhandle) where a district court held that confidentiality does not necessarily attach to 
documents obtained in arbitration.  The Government had applied to the court for the production 
of documents arising out of an earlier ICC arbitration in which the respondent was a party.  The 
respondent sought to resist disclosure on the grounds that ICC Rules require documents relating 
to an arbitration to be kept confidential.  The court rejected that argument, ruling that the Internal 
Rules applied only to members of the ICC Court, not to parties to the arbitration or to the arbitral 
tribunal.  Because the arbitration agreement and applicable arbitration rules did not provide for 
the confidentiality of the proceedings, the government could access the documents.  Panhandle 
finds its roots in domestic arbitration-related court decisions.   
In AT v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance213 the court determined that whilst 
arbitrations conducted under the rules of the American Arbitration Association provide for 
confidentiality, this was not so under the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1975214 which was silent on 
the subject: as the arbitration statute provides that an arbitration award can be filed, enforced, and 
challenged in court, the arbitration proceedings ‘become an open public record’.  With no express 
confidentiality agreement in place, there was considered to be no disclosure restriction. 
Whilst there is some contrary authority from the Texas Court of Appeals in Rutherford v 
Blanks215 concerning the confidentiality of the arbitral tribunal's deliberations, the move to restrict 
grounds for confidentiality is clear.  United States courts have used the doctrine of 
unconscionability to limit arbitration clauses that require the award to remain confidential when 
the parties are of unequal bargaining power e.g., involving repeat participants.  In Luna v 
Household Finance Corp216 the court reasoned: ‘The advantages repeat participants possess over 
‘one time’ participants in arbitration proceedings are widely recognized in legal literature and by 
federal courts’.  It was a point raised by Ashford when he dealt with documentary discovery and 
 
213 989 P.2d 219 (Colo. App., 1999). 
214 §13-22-201, et seq., C.R.S.1998. 
215 No. 04-95-00770-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 2578 (Texas Ct. App., June 28, 1996). 





the concerns related to the release of technically sensitive material in arbitration.217  After looking 
at how different jurisdictions approached the issues of confidentiality, Ashford concluded that it 
was for the arbitral tribunal to provide the necessary directions consistent with the applicable 
arbitral rules and encourage consensus with the aim of limiting excessive discovery and discovery 
requests. 
Lipsky & Seeber published the results of a study conducted by Cornell University in 
conjunction with the PERC Institute on Conflict Resolution218 of United States Fortune 1000 
companies.  The aim was to determine the reasons companies chose arbitration over state courts 
for resolving disputes.  The response rate exceeded 60 percent.219  Of the respondents, 43 
percent220 answered that preserving confidentiality was a reason to use arbitration.  The study 
revealed something new: the more frequently companies used arbitration, the higher the value 
placed on confidentiality.  The figures ranged from 55 percent (for very frequent users of 
arbitration) to 37 percent (those who had never or rarely used arbitration).221  The AAA followed 
up on the Cornell study, comparing and updating the arbitration and mediation usage trends in a 
new study in 2003, examining the attitudes and experiences associated with the use of arbitration 
and alternative dispute resolution.  It contained a broad sample of businesses, ranging from 
Fortune 1000 corporations to privately held companies.  The percentage reporting Privacy as 
being extremely/very important was 37 percent, ranking it ninth out of eleven categories.222  The 
number of respondents who stated that the reasons for using arbitration preserves confidentiality 
increased from 43 percent to 54 percent during the period 1998 to 2003.223 
With respect to arbitrator ethics and transparency, much of USA law stems from the case of 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v Continental Casualty Co., 224 a decision under the FAA.  The 
Supreme Court held that an undisclosed business relationship between an arbitrator and one of 
the parties constituted ‘evident partiality’ requiring the award to be vacated.  The court however 
was divided on the standards for disclosure.  The majority concluded that disclosure of ‘any 
dealings that might create an impression of possible bias’ or creating ‘even an appearance of bias’ 
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would amount to evident partiality.225 Two justices supported a more limited test i.e., disclosure 
of ‘a substantial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business with a party’.226  
Three justices gave dissenting opinions. 
The statutory regimes, case law and consistent feedback from American users of dispute 
resolution point to an environment where confidentiality is less important than other aspects of 
arbitration.  For participants in the United States, it would appear that cost, winning and 
significantly, a ‘fair and just result’ are by far the most important factors.  In the context of 
international investment and trade disputes there is a widespread view that confidentiality in such 
arbitrations should not be maintained.227  
Chapter 2 Summary 
As a means of dispute resolution, arbitration is global.  That interconnectedness compels an 
understanding of how the issues of privacy and confidentiality are addressed in different 
jurisdictions.  The varied approaches towards arbitral confidentiality within and between common 
and civil law jurisdictions is significant.  There are countries whose statutes have no 
confidentiality provisions.  Others such as Australia and New Zealand have detailed, prescriptive 
requirements.  England primarily relies upon case law.  The unsurprising result is that 
international law does not lend itself to clarity of legal interpretation.  Whilst the U.S., 
Scandinavia and Australia, have weakened or diminished the concept of confidentiality in 
arbitration, England, New Zealand and Singapore by contrast, have further entrenched it.  This 
chapter has seen how confidentiality in arbitration has developed outside England with a range of 
different statutory approaches and judicial interpretations.  A comparative analysis suggests that 
there are practical lessons to be learnt, particularly from the commonwealth countries of Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and Singapore, and from the civil law jurisdictions of Norway and Sweden.   
Whilst this Chapter has addressed and compared approaches outside England in selected 
jurisdiction, Chapter 3 looks at how the absence or otherwise of statutory regimes dealing with 
confidentiality has encouraged institutions to step in and provide a parallel framework of ‘soft 
law’.  
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Chapter 3: Confidentiality in Institutional Rules 
‘Convenience is the basis of mercantile law’.228 
- Lord Mansfield 
The Origins of Arbitral Institutions 
The origins of arbitral institutions are almost as opaque as the origins of arbitration itself.  
They certainly predate the first English Statute of 1698.  The Privy Council was active in 
appointing arbitrators for commercial matters throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.229  The early London Guilds, forerunners of the livery companies, used 
arbitration to decide commercial disputes, their elected master’s acting as arbitrators in disputes 
involving guild members.  The ‘Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Between His 
Britannic Majesty and the United States of America’ of 1794 (“the Jay Treaty”)230 established 
three arbitral commissions to settle claims arising out of the American Revolution231 and can be 
viewed as an early forerunner of international arbitration commissions.  The 1871 Treaty of 
Washington provided a mechanism whereby disputes relating to British neutrality during the 
American Civil War were settled by arbitration.   
It was with the aim of avoiding what seen even then as an inevitable war with the Empire of 
Germany that the Marquess of Bristol rose on 25 July 1887 to call attention to the subject of 
international arbitration, moving: ‘That this House, in view of the yearly increasing armaments 
of European nations, is of opinion that the formation of an international tribunal for the reference 
of national disputes in the first instance is highly to be desired’. 232  There was no body of 
international law to which countries in dispute could agree on to submit – a chimera as per Lord 
Stanley - nor was there any effective means of enforcement.  Those concerns pre-dated the New 
York Convention by nearly 80 years.  In the days when all of Europe was Catholic, it was to the 
Court of Rome that nations turned as the natural arbitrator of their disputes.  A practice fallen into 
disuse, it was resurrected in the early 1870’s when the Papal See arbitrated a dispute over the 
Caroline Islands between the German Empire and Spain: in so doing prevented what had seemed 
an imminent war.  ‘Men's minds on the Continent had been prepared for a revival of the 
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intervention of the Court of Rome, in order to diminish the evils of unjust wars’.⁠233  Lord Stanley 
went on to remind the House that a Court of Arbitration existed already, referring to the first 
international arbitration institute, the forerunner of today’s LCIA. 
The LCIA is one of the oldest arbitral institutions in the world, having started out in life as 
the tribunal of the Court of Common Council of the City of London, renamed the London Court 
of Arbitration in 1903 and then the London Court of International Arbitration in 1981.234  The 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) was established by the Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes, during the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899 with the 
object: ‘of seeking the most objective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and 
lasting peace, and above all, of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments’.235   
The oldest Institute in the USA is the American Arbitration Association, established in 1926.  
New arbitral institutions are regularly being created.  One website that sets itself the almost 
Sisyphean challenge of setting out the world’s leading arbitration institutions has links to more 
than 220.236 
The Growth and Harmonisation in Arbitral Institutions 
The extent to which harmonization currently exists in international dispute resolution took 
longer than Salisbury’s three generations.237  But the current fragmented landscape would be 
familiar to an observer from the nineteenth century, despite a Model Law, the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules and the New York Convention on Enforcement of Awards.  Nevertheless, there 
is evidence of a developing convergence, a commonality in approach amongst arbitral institutions,  
a fact regularly highlighted by commentators.238  Arbitral institutions are generally independent, 
or semi-autonomous organisations, whose capability to update their rules in response to legal 
developments is unshackled from cumbersome, sometimes inefficient legislatures and political 
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interference.  After Esso/BHP v Plowman in Australia and Bulbank in Sweden, various 
commentators such as Bagner,239 Qureshi240 & Weixia241 correctly predicted that the likely 
response by arbitral institutions would be to develop and promote their own rules in order to 
restore equilibrium and ensure that the status quo was maintained.   
Arbitral institutions supply what might be described as the soft law of arbitration, a 
framework that underpins the arbitration mechanism chosen by the parties.  Most arbitral 
institutions have their own rules.242  The LMAA, an association of practicing arbitrators, 
promulgate terms.  There is no practical difference in the terminology: providing the rules or 
terms are not in conflict with the law of the seat or the arbitration they will be equally valid.  
Although the institutions vary in their approach to the obligations of confidentiality, the privacy 
of arbitration hearings is (almost) universally recognized e.g., the LCIA requires that: ‘All 
hearings shall be held in private, unless the parties agree otherwise in writing’.243  Confidentiality 
is less well defined, as analysis of the various arbitral rules shews. 
Fesler examined the extent to which parties’ assumptions as to confidentiality were justified 
in international commercial arbitration and set out to determine whether there was a ‘discernible 
international consensus in law, arbitration rules and practice’ as to how those confidentiality 
obligations were dealt with.  He considered that neither academic literature nor case law provided 
a definitive answer on the confidentiality issue: recognising that arbitral institutions are competing 
for business, there was unlikely to be any significant harmonisation of arbitral institution rules in 
that respect.  I am unpersuaded that analysis has stood the test of time.  One thing that has been 
apparent is the convergence globally in institutional arbitral rules.  Rules allowing the 
appointment of an emergency arbitrator for example, have been adopted by, amongst others, the 
ICC, LCIA and SIAC.  The necessity of such a standardisation in approach is debateable: in 
English law it may even be detrimental.  Section 44(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 allows the 
courts to grant emergency relief.  But that relief may not be available if the parties have contracted 
to an institution having emergency arbitrator provisions.  In Gerald Metals SA v The Trustees of 
the Timis Trust and others,244 the court held that the effect of the LCIA emergency arbitrator 
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provisions on the scope of the court’s jurisdiction under s.44 limited a court’s power to grant a 
freezing injunction.  
Fesler is on surer footing when he states that if confidentiality is to be assured, the only likely 
successful mechanism is if the parties incorporated an appropriate confidentiality clause into the 
arbitration agreement.245  That may well be true in many jurisdictions, although in the common 
law jurisdictions of England, New Zealand and Singapore, despite their lack of codification and/or 
piecemeal approach, confidentiality is generally well protected.  A more accurate assessment 
might be the advice to choose your jurisdiction carefully: and that if confidentiality is an 
especially important component, ensure that it is clearly addressed in the dispute resolution 
provisions within the contract. 
This chapter analyses the differences in approach of the main international arbitral 
institutions.  As with the preceding chapter on overseas jurisdictions, it aims to identify the most 
useful features that may be of assistance in approaching reform in English law.  There are several 
areas that an arbitral institution can address in its rules with reflect to confidentiality: the privacy 
of the proceedings; consolidation; the disclosure of awards & materials; what might constitute a 
public interest; the publication of awards; ethics and transparency; and third party funding.246  
Table 3, Arbitral Confidentiality Provisions in Selected Arbitral Institutions, summarises the 
confidentiality requirements for the institutions discussed in this chapter. 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) and ICDR Rules 
The AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (2013) apply to the 
AAA’s domestic arbitrations, the International Dispute Resolution Procedures (2014) applicable 
to international arbitrations.  The comments below apply to the International rules.  Naimark & 
Keer compiled responses from 145 participants involved in AAA international arbitrations as to 
why they opted for international commercial arbitration.247  Participants were asked to rank eight 
issues in their order of importance: speed of outcome, privacy, receipt of a monetary award, a fair 
and just outcome, cost-efficiency, finality of decision, arbitrator expertise, and continuing 
relationship with opposing party.  The importance given to privacy was low - eight percent for all 
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participants in the survey, putting it in the bottom third.248  The study suggested that privacy or 
confidentiality were not the most valued aspects of international commercial arbitration.  Open 
dialogue discussions with arbitrators led Naimark and Keer to the view that privacy is a frequently 
overrated quality in international arbitrations.   
Article 37(1) Confidentiality requires that: ‘Confidential information disclosed during the 
arbitration by the parties or by witnesses shall not be divulged by an arbitrator or by the 
Administrator except as provided in Art.30.  Article 37(2) ‘the members of the arbitral tribunal 
and the Administrator shall keep confidential all matters relating to the arbitration or the award’. 
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the tribunal may make orders concerning the confidentiality 
of the arbitration or any matters in connection with the arbitration and may take measures for 
protecting trade secrets and confidential information. 
The wording of Article 30(3) is a little convoluted.  It permits that an award may be made 
public only with the consent of all parties or as required by law, with the exception that the 
Administrator may publish or otherwise make publicly available selected awards, orders, 
decisions, and rulings that have become public in the course of enforcement or otherwise.  It also 
goes on to provide that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the Administrator may publish 
selected awards that have been edited to conceal the names of the parties and other identifying 
details. 
Not only are arbitrators required to be impartial and independent, upon accepting 
appointment an arbitrator is required under Article 13.3 to sign a Notice of Appointment, 
affirming availability to serve and the arbitrator’s independence and impartiality.  An arbitrator 
must disclose any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to impartiality or 
independence.  The ICDR has as one of its aims rules that reflect best international practices.  
That philosophy is reflected in the quite different treatment of the confidentiality provisions 
between domestic and international arbitration. 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) 
The most well-known arbitral institution in China is probably the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).  Others familiar to international 
arbitration practitioners will include the Beijing Arbitration Commission/Beijing International 
 
248 ibid 80.  Other attributes, such as a fair and just result, a monetary award, the finality of the decision, and 





Arbitration Centre (BAC/BIAC); the Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA); and 
the Shanghai International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission/Shanghai International 
Arbitration Centre (SHIAC).249  
It is important to note however, that China has more than 260 arbitration institutions, each 
with its own set of rules.  The Chinese government’s laws and rules on arbitration are still in a 
state of development.  In the meantime, the Guo Ban Fa (1995) No 44 ‘Notice of the State Council 
on Printing and Distributing’, ‘Plan for the Reorganization of Arbitral Institutions’, ‘Provisional 
Procedures for the Registration of Arbitration Commissions’, ‘Measures on Arbitration Fees to 
be Charged by the Arbitration Commissions’ and the ‘Circular on Furthering the Work of 
Reorganizing Arbitral Institutions’ are all still in force.  China’s Plan for the ‘Reorganization of 
the Arbitral Institutions’ was designed to restrict arbitral commissions so that only one unified 
arbitration commission could be established per city in order to avoid unnecessary duplication or 
competition.  The ‘Provisional Procedures for the Registration of Arbitration Commissions’ 
requires that each such institution adopt ‘Appendix I Model Articles of Association of the 
Arbitration Commission,’ which includes the following two provisions.  Article 22, which 
requires that the arbitrators shall maintain the secrecy of the arbitration process and not reveal 
information such as the case proceedings, status of the arbitration tribunal's decision or any trade 
secrets.  And Art.25, whereby the arbitration shall not be held publicly unless both parties agree.  
If state secrets are involved (undefined) the arbitration may not be held in public. 
All arbitral institutions in China are thus required by supplementary legislation to include 
confidentiality provisions with respect to the proceedings and decisions, and to ensure hearings 
are held in private.250 CIETAC is amongst the few institutions to directly address the private 
nature of arbitrations.   
Article 38.2 is significantly more prescriptive than other mainland Chinese institutional rules.  
It stipulates that for cases heard in camera, the parties and their representatives, the arbitrators, 
the witnesses, the interpreters, the experts consulted by the arbitral tribunal, the appraisers 
appointed by the arbitral tribunal and other relevant persons shall not disclose to any outsider any 
substantive or procedural matters relating to the case.  This would appear to apply to the disclosure 
of awards.  Meetings under Art.38.1 Confidentiality are to be held in camera.  The concept of 
party autonomy however is less well developed in China: even if both parties request an open 
 
249 The arbitration rules of CIETAC, BAC and SHIAC were last amended in 2015, those for the SCIA in 2016.   





hearing, the final decision remains the prerogative of the arbitral tribunal. 
CIETAC publishes a Code of Ethics for Arbitrators.  These set out various principles and 
emphasise the importance of arbitrators maintaining independence, impartiality and fairness.  The 
Code gives guidance as to when arbitrators should not accept an appointment, situations where 
they should make disclosure or apply for withdrawal.  Under Art.51 the arbitral tribunal is 
required to submit its draft award to CIETAC for scrutiny before signing the award. It is unclear 
whether CIETAC falls under the Art.38.2 catchall of ‘and other relevant persons’ and thus whether 
CIETAC in its capacity as administrator is bound by the requirements of confidentiality. 
German Arbitration Rules (DIS  and GMAA ) 
Die Deutsche Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit e.V. (DIS), or the German Institution of 
Arbitration in English, offers administrated arbitral proceedings pursuant to the DIS Arbitration 
Rules and other ADR procedures.  The old 1998 Rules required at s.43.1 that the parties, the 
arbitrators and the persons at the DIS Secretariat involved in the administration of the arbitral 
proceedings maintain the conduct of arbitral proceedings confidential.  The language used 
however was arguably unclear when it came to how far that obligation extends to others: ‘The 
parties … shall maintain confidentiality towards all persons regarding the conduct of arbitral 
proceedings, and in particular regarding the parties involved, the witnesses, the experts and other 
evidentiary materials’.  The wording suggested that it was the parties, tribunal and administrators 
who had a confidential duty towards other participants (my emphasis) not that witnesses or 
experts, for example, are bound by such a duty.  ‘Persons acting on behalf of any person involved 
in the arbitral proceedings shall be obligated to maintain confidentiality’ would presumably apply 
to the legal representatives.   
Aiming to modernise the DIS Arbitration Rules to bring them into line with international 
arbitration best practice, a two-year consultation process resulted in major procedural changes in 
the revised 2018 Rules.  The revisions focussed on institutional changes and the increased 
time/cost efficiency in arbitration proceedings.  One meaningful change was that privacy and 
confidentiality were more clearly addressed.  Article 44.1 requires that the parties, counsel, 
arbitrators, and DIS employees shall not disclose to anyone any procedural orders or awards, or 
any evidence that is not publicly available, including its existence, names of the parties, nature of 
the claims and names and details of any experts or witnesses.  A disclosure exemption is provided 
at Art.44.2 when required to by law or to protect a legal right i.e., to the extent required by 





arbitral award.  As with the 1998 Rules, there is no specific confidentiality obligations with 
respect to witnesses or experts.  Awards may not be published without the prior written consent 
of all the parties.  The DIS may however publish statistical data or other general information 
concerning arbitral proceedings, provided that no party is identified by name and that no particular 
arbitration is identifiable on the basis of such information.  
Consolidation is specifically dealt with in Art.8 (DIS 2018).  Article 17 addresses the 
consolidation of multi-contract arbitrations and Art.18 that for multi-party arbitration.  In all cases 
any dispute as to whether the parties have so agreed consolidation when there is no express 
agreement in writing to that effect, shall be decided by the arbitral tribunal.   
The German Maritime Arbitration Association (GMAA) is not an institution but an 
association of practicing arbitrators, not unlike the LMAA.  The GMAA Rules were last published 
in 2017.  It does not administer nor otherwise interfere in the individual proceedings.  Rules are 
published based on German procedural law and the UNCITRAL rules.  The confidentiality 
requirements under the GMAA are simpler than those for the DIS.  Issues as to the proceedings, 
obligation of parties and witnesses is not defined.  However, in addition to the Association Rules, 
the GMAA publishes an (undated) Code of Ethics for arbitrators accessible on-line.251  § 9 entitled 
Confidentiality of the Deliberations, sets out that the deliberations of the arbitral tribunal and the 
contents of the award itself, are to remain confidential in perpetuity unless the parties release the 
arbitrators from this obligation.  An arbitrator is prohibited from participating in, or giving any 
information for the purpose of assistance in, any proceedings to consider the award unless, 
exceptionally, he considers it his duty to disclose any material misconduct or fraud on the part of 
his fellow arbitrators. 
GMAA 2017 § 14.6 allows, unless a party objects, that the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled 
to publish the award under the name of the vessel but redacted as to the names of the parties and 
other identifying details.  Allowing the name of the ship to be included in a published award 
would appear to negate the intent of providing anonymity: whist the charterer’s names may 
remain hidden, little effort would be required to identify the vessel’s owners and managers with 
the publication of the ship’s name.  § 5.1 requires that every arbitrator has a duty of impartiality 
and confidentiality.   
The amended and updated DIS Rules do not fundamentally effect or change the rights or 
obligations of the parties to an arbitration.  Party autonomy is maintained; consolidation remains 
 





an option only by agreement of the parties.  Having a Code of Ethics for arbitrators is arguably a 
more effective and practical method than endeavouring to incorporate detailed ethical 
considerations within institutional rules. 
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) 
HKIAC boasts four sets of administered rules, five sets of ad hoc rules (if the two versions 
of UNCITRAL Rules are included) and four ‘Others’.  Four sets of Rules are of particular 
relevance to arbitration: the Administered Arbitration Rules (2018) which came into force on 1st 
November 2018; the Domestic Arbitration Rules (2014); the Securities Arbitration Rules (1993); 
and the Electronic Transaction Arbitration Rules (2002).  In addition to containing confidentiality 
provisions very similar to those in the Electronic Transaction Rules, the Domestic Rules 
incorporate domestic legislation, specifically Arbitration Ordinance Chapter 609 of 2010.  For 
the sake of consistency this section will focus on the rules applicable to international arbitrations. 
Administered Arbitration Rules 2018  
The Administered Arbitration Rules 2018 at Articles 45.1 and 45.2 prohibit the HKIAC, 
tribunal secretary, parties, arbitrators, experts and witnesses publishing, communicating or 
disclosing any information relating to the arbitration or any award made in the arbitration, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties.  Article 45.4 emphasizes that the deliberations of the arbitral 
tribunal are also confidential.  The exemptions to publication or disclosure by a party as outlined 
at Art.45.3 are similar (though more detailed) to those increasingly found in various institutions 
that have updated their rules in recent years i.e., to protect or pursue a legal right or interest; to 
enforce or challenge the award; in legal proceedings before a court; to a government body, 
regulatory authority, court or tribunal where the party is obliged by law to do so;  to a 
professional/other adviser including any actual or potential witnesses or experts; to a party or 
arbitrator relating to joinder, consolidation, single arbitration under multiple contracts or 
concurrency as per Articles 27, 28, 29 or 30; or to a third party funder.  
HKIAC may order consolidation even if the parties to each arbitration are different, making 
consolidation possible for related disputes arising under a web or chain of contracts e.g., in charter 
party chains.  Article 27 contains a provision to allow an additional party to be joined to an 
existing arbitration.  Article 29 permits a claimant to commence a single arbitration under multiple 
contracts.  The HKIAC also publishes a ‘Practice Note on Consolidation of Arbitrations’.  





a common question of law or fact; for claims arising out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions; and where the arbitration agreements are compatible.   
Publication of an award is permitted under Art.45.5 provided all identifying information 
including the parties’ names are deleted and that HKIAC receive no objection from a party to its 
publication.  The HKIAC is one of the few centres to address third party funding in detail at 
Art.44.  See Chapter 6 for a discussion on the HKIAC’s TPF provisions.   
Under Art.11.4 a prospective arbitrator is to confirm in writing verifying that he or she is 
impartial and independent.  Any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to 
impartiality or independence must be disclosed prior to confirmation or appointment.  This 
remains an ongoing obligation throughout the reference.  The same requirements are required of 
any tribunal secretary appointed under Art.13.4. 
Other HKIAC Provisions 
The Electronic Transaction Arbitration Rules at Art.26 stipulates that no information relating 
to the arbitration shall be disclosed by any person without the written consent of ‘each and every 
party to the arbitration’.  It is assumed that this reference is to the arbitrating parties in dispute 
and is not a sweeping inclusion of (say) the arbitrators or witnesses etc.252  The Securities 
Arbitration Rules at Art.35.4 provides that hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties 
agree otherwise.  The Electronic Transaction Arbitration Rules are similar at Art.9.6 which 
require that unless the parties agree otherwise, all meetings and hearings shall be in private.  
HKIAC has with the 2018 updates gone to great lengths to keep their Rules relevant to current 
arbitration practice.  They are one of the few institutions to address third party funding, although 
there are no identified sanctions should a party receiving litigation funding fail to disclose the 
fact.  The HKIAC Rules provide an excellent template for any institution that wishes to include 
in its rules a modern and comprehensive overview of confidentiality provisions. 
International Bar Association (IBA) 
The International Bar Association (IBA) is not an arbitration institute, but an association 
 
252 By an exchange of emails, HKIAC confirmed that: ‘Our understanding is that the reference “each and every party 
to the arbitration” does not encompass people who are not parties to the arbitration, i.e., arbitrators and witnesses. 
Such is consistent with the definitions in the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609) and also our 2018 HKIAC 
Administered Arbitration Rules, which defines “party” or “parties” as meaning “a party to an arbitration agreement 
or, in relation to any arbitral or court proceedings, means a party to the proceedings” or “Claimant, Respondent 





representing legal practitioners, bar associations and law societies.  Its membership comprises 
about 80,000 lawyers globally and approximately 190 bar associations and law societies in more 
than 170 countries.  The IBA publishes rules and guides with respect to arbitration, two of which 
are of particular relevance here: ‘Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration 
(2010)’ and ‘Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (2014)’.   
Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (2010)  
Article 2.2 requires that the arbitral tribunal consult with the parties at an early stage of the 
proceedings in order to agree on the level of confidentiality applicable to the evidence in the 
arbitration. Article 3.8 deals with the exceptional circumstance of when the production of a 
document is considered to have such a degree of confidentiality attached that even its disclosure 
is objected to.  In such circumstances the tribunal may appoint an independent and impartial 
expert to review and determine the merits of the objection.  Article 3.13 is general clause 
providing that any document submitted in the arbitration - subject to it not being in the public 
domain - shall be kept confidential by the parties and the tribunal.  It also allows the tribunal to 
specify the terms of confidentiality to any document.  Article 9 concerns the admissibility of 
evidence.  It allows the tribunal at Art.9.2(e) to determine whether to exclude from evidence or 
production any document or statement on the grounds of commercial or technical confidentiality.  
Special provision is also made in connection with documents to which legal privilege attaches at 
Art.9.2 and Art.9.3.  Article 9.4 is a fail-safe by which the tribunal may make any evidence 
confidential.   
The obligation of confidentiality as per Art.3.13 applies to the parties and the tribunal only.  
The ‘exceptional circumstances’ scenario in Art.3.8 extends the confidentiality provision to the 
independent and impartial expert called in to review and determine the disclosure of a disputed 
document.  Exceptions to confidentiality are set out at Article 3.13 -  a legal duty; to protect or 
pursue a legal right; or to enforce or challenge an award in court.   
Article 5 dealing with Party Appointed Experts has the rare provision at Art.5.2(c) of 
requiring the expert’s reports to contain a statement of their independence from the Parties, their 
legal advisors and the tribunal.  The IBA Rules are silent however with respect to the 
confidentiality of witness evidence, the Guidelines directing users to the applicable institutional 
or ad hoc rules.253    
 





Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (2014)  
The 2014 Guidelines set out the general standards of independence and disclosure to govern 
the selection, appointment and ongoing role of an arbitrator.  They are divided into two parts.  
Part 1 deals with the general standards with respect to impartiality, independence and disclosure; 
Part 2 addresses the practical application of the general standards.  The document focuses 
specifically on the scope of disclosure obligations incumbent on arbitrators and party 
representatives.   
At its core is the philosophy enshrined in General Standard 1: ‘Every arbitrator shall be 
impartial and independent of the parties at the time of accepting an appointment to serve and shall 
remain so until the final award has been rendered or the proceedings have otherwise finally 
terminated’.  General Standard 2 deals with conflicts of interest, requiring that if an arbitrator has 
doubts as to their ability to be impartial and independent, they must decline the appointment.  
General Standard 3 concerns disclosure by the arbitrator.  If from a party’s perspective there are 
facts or circumstances which may give rise to doubts as to an arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence, that arbitrator must disclose them to the arbitral institution/appointing authority 
(as appropriate), the parties and to the co-arbitrators prior to accepting the appointment.  Further 
General Standards deal with Waiver by the Parties (GS4); Scope (GS5); Relationship (GS6); and 
Duty of the Parties and the Arbitrator (GS7).254   
General Standard 6 recognises that there may be cases where a legal entity has a direct 
economic interest in the arbitration or a duty to indemnify a party for any award.  In such 
circumstances that legal entity may be considered the identity of the party to the arbitration.  In 
practice this is likely to mean third-party funders and insurers in relation to the dispute who may 
have a direct economic interest in the outcome of the arbitration. 
Part 2 deals with the practical application of the General Standards.  Recognising that if the 
Guidelines are to be relevant, they must address practical scenarios and detail appropriate 
guidance as to what constitutes a conflict of interest as well as what does - or does not - need to 
be disclosed.  These examples are of practical benefit to the parties, courts, institutions and not 
least, the arbitrators (who it has to be remembered) are the ones who might find themselves at the 
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wrong end of a potential challenge through the courts.  The Guidelines categorise situations which 
may occur in the form of three lists.  A Red List divided into waivable and non-waivable parts; 
an Orange List and a Green List. 
These two IBA guides make important contributions, applying to arbitrators irrespective of 
whether they are legal practitioners.  Whilst the Guidelines do not override the arbitral rules or 
governing law of the arbitration chosen by the parties, the IBA sought to find broad acceptance 
within the international arbitration community for their provisions with respect to the impartiality 
and independence of arbitrators.  QMU’s 2012 study into the emergence of harmonised practices 
in international arbitration found that the IBA Rules were used in 60 percent of arbitrations. 
Nevertheless, the IBA Guidelines are voluntary.  They will have limited relevance, particularly 
with regard to ad hoc and commodity arbitrations, most of whose arbitrators are not lawyers and 
will not be members of the IBA.  Notwithstanding the QMU study referred to above, the IBA 
Guidelines are not generally used in ad hoc arbitrations.255    
International Chamber of Commerce (The ICC) 
The ICC followed up on its 1998 survey on arbitration practise, with a Special Supplement 
in 2009 entitled ‘Confidentiality in Arbitration: Commentaries on Rules, Statutes, Case Law and 
Practice’.  More a series of discussion papers than a survey, it aimed to initiate discussions on 
revising the ICC Rules.  Summarizing the state of institutional rules, Dimolitsa concluded: ‘We 
are far from an international consensus on the parties’ obligation of confidentiality, my personal 
opinion is that the Rules should remain unchanged in this respect given their genuinely 
international and open character’.256  The Arbitration Rules were issued in 2012 and amended in 
2017.  In 2019 the ICC published a ‘Note to the Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of 
Arbitration’. 
Joinder, multiple contracts and multiple parties are addressed under Articles 7, 8 and 9.  The 
ICC Court also retains a wide discretion to consolidate related arbitrations under Art.10.  It may 
do so by agreement of all the parties; or if all the arbitrations fall under the same arbitration 
agreement; where there is more than one arbitration agreement, if the arbitrations are between the 
 
255 White & Case and the Queen Mary University: ‘International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices 
in the Arbitral Process’ (2012).  In 53 percent they were used as guidelines and in 7 percent as binding rules.  Most 
respondents (85 percent) found the IBA Rules to be useful.  That most ad hoc and commodity arbitrations do not 
incorporate the IBA Guidelines highlights the limited pool from which the respondents to some of these surveys are 
drawn.  See Table 4.   
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same parties; or the disputes in the arbitrations arise in connection with the same legal 
relationship, and the Court determines that the arbitration agreements are compatible.  When 
arbitrations are consolidated, they are to be consolidated into the arbitration that first commenced, 
unless otherwise agreed by all parties. 
The ICC may allow academic researchers to access awards and ‘other documents of general 
interest’ with the exception of materials used in the arbitration proceedings, subject to an 
undertaking to submit for approval to the ICC text intended for publication.257  The ICC retains 
copies of all awards, Terms of Reference and decisions of the Court.258  
Article 11(1) requires that every arbitrator must be and remain impartial and independent of 
the parties involved in the arbitration.  Article 11(2) requires a prospective arbitrator to sign a 
statement of impartiality and independence before appointment or confirmation.  Any facts or 
circumstances that call into question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes of the parties - or 
any circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality - are 
to be disclosed in writing to the Secretariat.  Article 11(3) states that this is an ongoing obligation. 
Obligations of confidentiality apply to the arbitrator, institution, parties and witnesses.  The 
arbitral tribunal may make orders concerning the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings or 
of any other matters in connection with the arbitration where requested to do so under Art.22(3), 
as well as take measures for protecting trade secrets and confidential information. 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) 
As befits one of the world’s oldest arbitration institutions, the LCIA Rules provide one of the 
most coherent regimes addressing privacy and confidentiality.  The Rules were updated in 2014 
and 2020,259 bringing them more broadly into line with the more recent innovations of, say, the 
HKIAC or SIAC. 
Article 22 grants additional powers of consolidation.  Specifically, at Art.22(ix) the tribunal 
can, with the approval of the LCIA Court and provided the parties agree, order the consolidation 
of one or more other arbitrations into a single arbitration.  Article 22(x) permits the tribunal, with 
the approval of the LCIA Court, to order the consolidation of an arbitration with one or more 
other arbitrations to which the LCIA Rules apply, and the arbitration agreement is either the same 
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or compatible.  That is subject to no other arbitral tribunal having been formed by the LCIA Court 
for such other arbitration(s): or if there have, when those tribunals are composed of the same 
arbitrators.  A tribunal has the power to allow third persons to be joined in the arbitration under 
Art.22(viii) where the parties so consent. 
The 2014 edition of the LCIA Rules subtly revised Art.30 by removing the preamble to 
Art.30.1.  Deleted was the caveat ‘Unless the parties expressly agree in writing to the contrary’.  
The parties are now required to undertake at Art.30.1 to keep confidential all awards and materials 
in the arbitration created for the purpose of the arbitration and all other documents produced not 
otherwise in the public domain.  Article 30.2 provides that the deliberations of the arbitrators is 
to remain confidential to its members, save as required by any applicable law.  Article 31.2 deals 
with Limitation of Liability.  It provides that once the award has been issued, neither the LCIA, 
the arbitrators or experts involved are under any legal obligation to provide a statement 
concerning any aspect of the arbitration; nor can they be compelled to become a witness in any 
legal or other proceedings in connection with an arbitration.  
The scope of arbitral confidentiality in the context of a challenge to an LCIA arbitral award 
in the High Court was provided by Teare J in UMS Holdings v Great Station Properties SA.260  
The respondent challenged an award under s.68, the hearing for which was heard in public.  The 
challenge failed and the resulting judgment was treated as public.  The respondent contended that 
the claimant remained under an obligation of confidentiality under Art.30 of the LCIA Rules; that 
the s.68 challenge had not removed that confidentiality provision, not any resulting judgment.  
The respondent subsequently applied for an order to the effect that the award could not be used 
by that party for any purpose other than the proceedings, applying NAB v Serco Limited.261  Teare 
J concluded that the appeal had resulted in the award entering the public domain and therefore 
concluded that the obligation under Art.30 of the LCIA Rules (which gave rise to an undertaking 
‘to keep confidential’ all awards) no longer continued to exist.  However, the judge was troubled 
by the suggested conclusion that the claimant was free to do with the award as desired, particularly 
in the context that the court did not know the claimant’s intention with regard to the award.  The 
award was a confidential document that had only entered the public domain due to the s.68 
challenge which the court had considered should be heard in public paying due regard to the 
principle of open justice.  Noting the court’s inherent jurisdiction to regulate the consequences of 
a decision that a s.68 challenge be heard in public, Teare J determined: ‘[w]here the Award has 
entered the public domain because of the court’s own order …Some uses of the Award (for 
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example, showing it to a business associate) would be inimical to the confidentiality which 
normally attaches to awards’.262 
Article 30.1 provides that there is an exception to the confidentiality provision i.e., when 
required as a legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or to enforce or challenge an award in 
legal proceedings.  Only the parties are under an obligation of confidentiality under Art.30.1.  
Under Art.30.3 the LCIA confirms that it will not publish any award or any part of an award 
without the prior written consent of all parties and the tribunal.  Under Art.5.4, prior appointment 
by the LCIA Court, each arbitral candidate is required to furnish to the Registrar a written 
declaration detailing any circumstances which are likely to give rise to any justifiable doubts as 
their impartiality or independence.  Article 5.5 makes that initial written declaration at Art.5.4 an 
ongoing duty of disclosure i.e., in the event that any new circumstances arise. 
When the LCIA’s 2014 Rules were first published they provided one of the most coherent 
regimes addressing privacy and confidentiality and they remain relevant.  The LCIA’s limitation 
of liability article is a protective, if unusual provision. 
London Maritime Arbitrator’s Association (LMAA) 
The LMAA is an association of practicing arbitrators, comprising around 33 Full Members 
and several hundred supporting members.  London receives more maritime arbitration disputes 
than any other arbitration centre worldwide: in 2019 the LMAA estimated 1,756 new arbitrations 
had been started under LMAA Terms and 529 awards published.263  Maritime arbitrations in 
London are conducted under the Arbitration Act 1996, most of which under the LMAA Terms.  
The LMAA Terms are periodically updated, most recently in 2017.  In addition to the main Terms, 
there are small claims and intermediate claims procedures.   
Rule 16 outlines the powers of the tribunal which at 16(b) provides that where two or more 
arbitrations appear to raise common issues of fact or law, the tribunals may direct that they shall 
be conducted and, where an oral hearing is directed, heard concurrently.  Rule 16 (ii) provides 
that the documents disclosed by the parties in one arbitration shall be made available to the parties 
to the other arbitration.  Rule 16 (iii) that the evidence given in one arbitration shall be received 
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and admitted in the other arbitration, subject to all parties being given a reasonable opportunity 
to comment upon it.  The LMAA Terms are silent with respect to consolidation. 
Rule 28 allows for the publication of awards where the tribunal considers that an arbitration 
decision merits publication.  Notice must be given to the parties of its intention to release the 
award for publication.  Unless either or both parties inform the tribunal of an objection to 
publication within three weeks, the award may be publicised in an anonymised format so as to 
preserve anonymity as regards the identity of the parties, of their legal or other representatives, 
and of the tribunal. In practice, a proportion of the awards are published in Lloyd’s Maritime Law 
Newsletter (LMLN).  Such awards are not infrequently referred to in other maritime arbitrations. 
The LMAA also publishes an on-line guide ‘Advice on Ethics’.  This is an  internal document 
applicable only to the LMAA’s arbitrator members, drawing on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts 
of Interest in International Arbitration.  It provides detailed guidelines on both independence and 
impartiality.264  It provides that an arbitrator is not to disclose any materials received in the course 
of the reference, nor may the Award or any part of it be disclosed except with the consent of the 
parties.  At s.6.6 it highlights that the proceedings, evidence and the Award are confidential.  
Despite its unique importance in maritime arbitrations, the LMAA Terms do not address the 
issues of privacy or confidentiality, allowing these matters to be determined either directly by the 
parties, or failing that English case law and the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996.  The 
LMAA has never embraced the concept of confidentiality in its Terms.  Its views on codification 
have been more attuned to those of the DAC and the 2006 CCC, on which committees’ various 
members of the LMAA have sat. 
Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration (SCMA) 
The Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration was originally established in November 
2004 under the umbrella of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC).  From May 
2009 the SCMA began operating as a separate entity from the SIAC.  Like the SIAC it is indirectly 
government funded.  The SCMA publishes various sets of rules and guidelines but does not 
administer arbitrations.  Arbitrations held under SCMA Rules would be categorised as ad hoc.  
The SCMA issues four sets of Rules -  SCMA Arbitration Rules 2015 (3rd Edition), Singapore 
Bunker Claims Procedure (SBC TERMS), the SCMA Expedited Arbitral Determination of 
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Collision Claims (SEADOCC) and a Small Claims Procedure.  As the latter three rules are little 
used in practice, this section will consider only the SCMA Arbitration Rules 2015 (3rd Edition).   
Under Rule 33, Additional Powers of the Tribunal, where two or more arbitrations appear to 
raise common issues of fact or law, the Tribunals are empowered to direct that the two or more 
arbitrations may be heard concurrently.  Rule 44 Confidentiality provides that the arbitrators and 
parties shall at all times treat all matters relating to the arbitration, its existence and any award as 
confidential. Disclosure of such matters is only permitted with the prior written consent of the 
other party or the parties, or with respect to specific exceptions.  Rule 44 sets out the exceptions 
of disclosure on a party or arbitrator.  i.e., for the purpose of making a court application; to enforce 
an award; pursuant to an order of court; to comply with the law; or to comply with the 
requirements of any regulatory body.  The application of confidentiality in Rule 44 applies only 
to the parties and the arbitrators.  The position of the institution, witness and experts is not 
addressed. 
Rule 28.5 provides that the arbitration meetings and hearings are to be in private unless the 
parties agree to the contrary.  Rule 36 The Award requires at 36.8 that the Tribunal send a copy 
of the Award to the SCMA within 14 days from the date of collection by one of the parties.  Rule 
36.9 permits the publication of redacted awards (so as to preserve the anonymity of the parties, 
legal representatives and of the Tribunal) for academic and professional purpose, unless any party 
files an objection to publication within 60 days of the date of the publication of an Award.  The 
SCMA has taken the position that publication of summaries of awards is important for the 
development of arbitration law and practice and arbitration in Singapore.   
Rule 15 provides that the Tribunal shall always remain independent and impartial and shall 
not act as an advocate.  A prospective Arbitrator is to disclose any circumstances likely to give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence.  The SCMA Rules are in a large 
part a mirror of those found at the SIAC from which institution the SCMA was created.  Some 
aspects of confidentiality are addressed, but generally only relating to the arbitrators and the 
parties.  No obligations are set out that place a similar obligation on witnesses, experts, or the 
SCMA secretariat. 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) 
The SIAC began in 1991 as an independent, not-for-profit organisation.  The SIAC 





before publication.  The SIAC has been issuing a revised set of rules approximately every three 
years since 2007: the current Rules in force are the 6th Edition 2016.  The first edition of the 
Investment Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, a specialised set 
of rules for the conduct of international investment arbitration came into force on 1st January 
2017. 
Rule 7 describes the procedures for the SIAC Court to allow at its discretion joinder of 
additional parties.  Rule 8 covers the detailed provisions for consolidation of two or more 
arbitrations under the SIAC Rules into a single arbitration.  Under Rule 24.4 any recordings, 
transcripts, or documents used in relation to the arbitral proceedings shall remain confidential.  
Rule 39.1 requires that the parties, arbitrators, experts or any person appointed by the Tribunal, 
including for example an administrative secretary, shall treat all matters relating to the arbitration, 
including pleadings, evidence, other materials and the award as confidential unless the parties 
agree otherwise.  This does not apply to any matter that is in the public domain.  The discussions 
and deliberations of the arbitrators is likewise confidential.  Rule 40.1 under Decisions of the 
President, the Court and the Registrar binds the parties to accept that any discussions and 
deliberations of the SIAC Court are confidential. 
The obligations of confidentiality under Rule 39.1 applies to the parties, arbitrators, or any 
person appointed by the Tribunal, including any administrative secretary.  Rule 39.1 references 
experts, but the wording is imprecise:  
A party and any arbitrator, … and any person appointed by the Tribunal, including any 
administrative secretary and any expert, shall at all times treat all matters relating to the 
proceedings and the Award as confidential. 
It is unclear as to whether this rule applies to any expert giving evidence in the arbitration or 
only those appointed by the Tribunal. Rule 39.2 lists the exceptions to the confidentiality 
obligations of Rule 39.1.  They include: when making an application to court for enforcement or 
challenge of an ward; when required to comply with an order of court; to pursue or enforce a legal 
right or claim; when required in accordance with the laws the disclosure is a requirement of 
regulatory body or other authority; when so ordered by the Tribunal; on application by a party; or 
with respect to joinder or consolidation under Rule 7 or Rule 8.   
Rule 24.4 provides that all meetings and hearings shall be in private, unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties.  Under Rule 32.12 the SIAC may, with the consent of the parties and the Tribunal, 





Party Funding is not addressed in the SIAC Rules.  However the SIAC’s Investment Arbitration 
Rules (1st Edition, 1 January 2017) at Rule 24(l) allow a tribunal to order the disclosure of: the 
existence of a TPF arrangement; the identity of the TPF; details of the TPF’s interest in the 
outcome of the proceedings; whether or not the TPF has committed to undertake any adverse 
costs order.  The tribunal is allowed to take into account any TPF arrangements when apportioning 
the costs of the arbitration (Rule 33.1) and when ordering in its Award that all or a part of the 
legal or other costs of a Party be paid by another Party (Rule 35). 
Rule 13 details the Qualifications of Arbitrators.  Rule 13.5 obliges an arbitrator to disclose 
to the parties, to the other arbitrators and to the Registrar any circumstances that may give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence that may arise during the arbitration.  
Once appointed, ex parte communications between arbitrators and parties or a party’s 
representatives are prohibited under Rule 13.6.  Prior to that appointment such communications 
are limited to advise a potential candidate an outline of the nature of the dispute; the anticipated 
proceedings; making enquiries as to the candidate’s qualifications, availability or independence; 
or to discuss the suitability of candidates for selection as a presiding arbitrator where the parties 
or party-nominated arbitrators are involved in that selection.  No party or person representing 
them is permitted to have any ex parte communication relating to the case with any candidate for 
presiding arbitrator. 
The SIAC is one of the few institutions to provide remedies for a party’s breach of 
confidentiality.  Rules 39.4 states that in the event of a breach of Rule 39, a tribunal has the power 
to take appropriate measures, including issuing an order or award for sanctions or costs.  It also 
deals in detail with the potential issue of ex parte communications between arbitrators and the 
parties.  There is an interesting dichotomy between the strict rules of confidentiality found in 
institutions such as the SIAC and the more open approach of publication promoted by the 
Singapore Judiciary and the SCMA.  Whereas the SIAC’s 2013 Rules under Rule 28.10 permitted 
the publication of redacted awards without the parties’ or tribunal’s consent, the 2016 Rules 
reversed those provisions.  The current default rule is that there is no publication except by the 
consent of the parties and the tribunal, a recognition perhaps of the lack of international consensus 
on the publication of awards.  It is likely that the SIAC recognised the potential harm of such a 
policy: it risked driving away potential users of the institution to jurisdictions more jealously 
protective of their user’s secrets.  The SIAC felt the chill of the debate between development of 






Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) 
Founded in 1917, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) 
is one of the world’s leading forums for dispute resolution, prized for its independence and 
recognised as a neutral centre for the resolution of east-west trade disputes.  It also play a singular 
role in the international system developed for bilateral and multilateral investment protection 
worldwide: more than 120 of the current bilateral investment treaties (BITs) cite Sweden or the 
SCC as the forum for resolving disputes between investors and the state.  The SCC is the world’s 
second largest institution for investment disputes.  The SCC Rules, the Arbitration Rules and the 
Rules for Expedited Arbitration entered into force on 1st January 2017.  In addition to arbitration 
rules, the SCC publishes Guidelines to serve as a practical tool and source of information for 
arbitrators appointed in SCC arbitrations, e.g., providing information on case administration, 
arbitration costs, timelines and the structure and contents of the final award.  The latest version 
was published in October 2019.265 
Article 11(iii) gives the Board powers to determine whether claims made under multiple 
contracts shall proceed in a single arbitration pursuant to Art.14 and at Art.11(iv) whether to 
consolidate cases pursuant to Art.15.  Article 14 addresses multiple contracts being brought 
together in a single arbitration.  Claims may proceed in a single arbitration provided that the SCC 
does not manifestly lack jurisdiction and subject to the Board consulting the parties and is required 
to have due regards to (a) whether the arbitration agreements under which the claims are made 
are compatible; (b) whether the relief sought arises out of the same trans-action or series of 
transactions; (c) and whether such an arrangement would enhance the efficiency and 
expeditiousness of the proceedings.  Article 15(1) deals specifically with consolidation which the 
Board may direct if: (a) the parties agree to consolidate; (b) all the claims are made under the 
same arbitration agreement; or (c) where the claims arise out of the same transaction(s) and the 
Board considers the arbitration agreements to be compatible.  Article 15(2) specifies that the 
determining factors for the Board to consider in regard to consolidation are the stage of the 
pending arbitration as well as the efficiency and expeditiousness of the proceedings. The Board 
may release any appointed arbitrator in the case of a consolidated arbitration.   
Article 3 Confidentiality states that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the SCC, the 
Arbitral Tribunal and any administrative secretary of the Arbitral Tribunal are to maintain the 
confidentiality of the arbitration and the award.  This is somewhat similar to the wording in 
 





Appendix I, Art.9 that requires the SCC to maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration and the 
award and to deal with the arbitration in an impartial, efficient and expeditious manner.  
Submissions by a third party are addressed at Art.3(6).  A ‘third person’ may apply to the Arbitral 
Tribunal for access to submissions and evidence filed in the arbitration, for which application the 
tribunal is required to consult with the parties before deciding.  The tribunal is required to take 
into account, and if necessary, safeguard any confidential information. 
Consolidation is addressed as is the obligation on the tribunal and arbitrators to maintain the 
confidentiality of the award. However, the phrase ‘maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration’ 
suggests a requirement to maintain confidential the existence of the arbitration, rather than 
specifically any materials.  Parties, witnesses and third parties are not subject to any obligation of 
confidentiality.  Where consolidation occurs, the Board’s power to release any arbitrator already 
appointed, potentially undermines party autonomy and the fundamental principle - at least in 
common law countries - of the right of a party to choose its own arbitrator. 
Chapter 3 Summary 
The arbitral institutions studied in this chapter and the rules by which they operate account 
for a significant proportion of international commercial and maritime arbitrations conducted 
globally.  The preservation of confidentiality of documents produced, materials created and the 
award itself is confined to just four arbitral institutions: LCIA, SIAC, WIPO and CIETAC.  Some 
important arbitral rules are silent on confidentiality, such as the UNCITRAL Rules and those of 
the ICC.  The rules of the AAA and UNCITRAL provide for confidentiality of the award.  This 
incomplete and contradictory patchwork of rules addressing confidentiality mirrors the divided 
sentiments that exist in both common and civil law jurisdictions. 
Buys argued that the costs and benefits of confidentiality against the needs of transparency 
need to be carefully assessed by all those involved in the arbitral process, proposing that arbitral 
institutions should amend their rules to create a presumption that awards will be published unless 
both parties object in advance, thus benefiting the arbitration community.266  In some cases that 
has happened, although with some not entirely unexpected consequences.  As noted above, 
enforced publication under the SIAC Rules lasted just one editorial revision: the default 
publication under the 2013 rules was dropped in 2016 as it was perceived by users as an unfriendly 
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and unwelcome development. 
The most useful of the institutional rules from the perspective of any potential English reform 
are those of the HKIAC and SIAC, between them addressing not just confidentiality provisions, 
but also a sanction mechanism for their breach.  Whilst many institutions have addressed the need 
to disclose circumstance that are likely to, or might give rise to justifiable doubts as to an 
arbitrators impartiality or independence, none provide (the IBA Rules excepting) a definition or 
examples of what constitutes ‘justifiable doubts’.  It is precisely this vagueness that has led to the 
situation of the Supreme Court appeal in Halliburton v Chubb that will be explored in Chapter 8.   
Having traced the evolution of arbitral confidentiality in England, discussed how those 
concepts are addressed in overseas jurisdictions and by the major arbitral centres, we next turn 
our attention to some of the basic and arguably less controversial areas:  the use of arbitral 
materials and awards in Chapter 4, consolidation and concurrency in Chapter 5 and - a relative 
newcomer among the group who inhabit our legal village267 - third party funding in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4: Of Privacy, Materials and Awards 
‘There is no principle in English law by which documents are protected from discovery by reason of confidentiality 
alone’268 
- Lord Wilberforce 
Introduction 
The Arbitration Act 1996 is silent with respect to the confidentiality of affidavits, pleadings, 
submissions, witness statements of fact or expert, transcripts of evidence, directions, or any other 
documents ancillary to the arbitral process.  For the sake of convenience they are referred to 
collectively in this thesis as ‘materials’.  Nor does the Arbitration Act 1996 address the 
confidentiality or use that may be made of arbitral awards.  This chapter aims to remedy that 
shortcoming by means of statutory amendments, proposals that would fall under the DAC’s ‘less 
controversial’ category of codification.  Case law however does provide substantial protection 
against disclosure of materials generated in the course of arbitration proceedings.  This is in no 
small part due to the principles developed in Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of 
England [1924] 1 KB 461 (Tournier) which strongly influenced the development of the 
exceptions subsequently set out by the English courts. 
Tournier brought an action against the respondent bank for slander.  Unsuccessful in the court 
of first instance, Tournier appealed.  One of the grounds was for breach of an implied contract by 
the bank not to divulge a customer’s information, a matter the appeal court considered to be of 
considerable public importance.  Bankes LJ considered the trial judge had erred in what was a: 
‘difficult and hitherto only very partially investigated branch of the law’.  Too much reliance had 
been placed on Hardy v Veasey269 which had raised - but not decided - various questions in relation 
to the duty of banker towards a customer not to disclose his affairs.  The court was faced with 
difficult questions.  Was the duty a legal or a moral one?  If it was a legal one, did it arise out of 
contract or out of tort?  The Court held that whilst the duty was a legal one arising out of contract, 
it was qualified, not absolute: ‘It is not possible to frame any exhaustive definition of the duty.  
The most that can be done is to classify the qualification and to indicate its limits’.270  The 
difficulties, as the court saw it, was the extent of the obligation.  
Noting that ‘There appears to be no authority on the point’271 Bankes LJ directed the jury to 
 
268 Scientific Research Council v Nasse, [1980] AC 1028, 1065 (Lord Wilberforce). 
269 LR 3 Ex 107. 
270 [1924] 1 KB 461, [484]. 





the limits and qualifications of the bank’s contractual duty of secrecy to its customer, classifying 
the qualifications as follows: where disclosure is under compulsion by law; where there is a duty 
to the public to disclose; where the interests of the bank require disclosure; where the disclosure 
is made by the express or implied consent of the customer.  Keenly aware of the potential pitfalls, 
he continued: ‘It is very necessary to speak with caution on this question upon which there is no 
authority’.  The court also considered what was reasonable and proper for the bank’s own 
protection272 and in terms of what was ‘reasonably necessary for the protection of the bank’s own 
interests’.273   On one view the difficulties in approaching the issue of confidentiality may in part 
be due to an over-reliance on the analogy with banking principles in Tournier and because the 
obligations of privacy and confidentiality may differ.  As Thomas LJ was to conclude in Emmott 
v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd274 ‘[t]he law relating to arbitrations may need to parallel the 
distinction in the general law where the law relating to privacy and confidentiality are distinct’.  
The Private Nature of Arbitration  
One of the less controversial aspects of international commercial arbitration is its private 
nature.  It is not, as remarked by the editors of Arbitration International, ‘a spectator sport’.275  
The privacy of arbitration is supported by a long line of authorities.  Cook and Songate’s Case276  
noted the propensity of arbitration to avoid litigation and controversy, it being ‘a good and 
sufficient consideration, because it was to avoid controversies & suits’.  As the nineteenth century 
cases make it clear, there was an implicit understanding arbitration agreements involved an 
obligation of privacy.  In Russell v Russell (1880) 14 Ch D 471 the litigants were brothers and 
partners.  The contest between them assumed, in the words of Jessel MR ‘a very unpleasant 
phase’.  One brother had accused the other of fraud: accusations indignantly denied.  The judge 
considered that it was undesirable for the partnership to continue:  
As a rule, persons enter into these contracts with the express view of keeping their 
quarrels from the public eyes, and of avoiding that discussion in public, which must be a 
painful one … If ever I could imagine a case to which that observation would 
emphatically apply it is the case before me.277 
These traditional principles resurfaced in Union-Castle Mail Steamship Co. Ltd. v Houston 
 
272 ibid [481] (Scrutton LJ). 
273 ibid [486] (Atkin LJ). 
274 [2008] 1 Lloyd's Rep 616, [635] (Thomas LJ). 
275 Editorial, ‘The Decision of the High Court of Australia in Esso/BHP v Plowman’ (1995) 11 Arbitration 
International 231. 
276 (1588) 4 Leon 31. 





Line Ltd278 where Greer LJ noting in his usual earthy fashion that businessmen prefer arbitrations 
to hearings in court as arbitrators do not sit in public and therefore are ‘not called upon to wash 
soiled linen in public or to disclose their business to other people’.279   
The difficulties that arise emanate from a failure to differentiate between ‘confidentiality’ 
and ‘privacy,’ an omission in both statute and in many cases, of the rules of arbitral institutions.  
Professor Lew explained the difference between the two in his export report for the court in 
Esso/BHP v Plowman.  Privacy refers to the right of persons other than those directly involved in 
the dispute (such as arbitrators, parties, legal counsel, witnesses etc.) to attend and be made aware 
of the arbitration.  Confidentiality referred to the obligation on those involved in those 
proceedings, specifically the arbitrators and the parties, not to divulge materials connected to the 
reference such as evidence, transcripts of the hearings or the award.280 In Lew’s opinion: ‘there is 
no general binding rule that arbitration proceedings are private and confidential precluding the 
parties divulging details to third parties’.281  Regardless of the correctness of that view in 1995, 
many arbitral institutions do now specifically impose a duty of confidentiality upon the tribunal 
and parties.   
The court confirmed in Oxford Shipping Co. Ltd. v Nippon Yusen Kaisha (“The Eastern 
Saga”) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 373 that arbitrations are private proceedings by virtue of an implied 
term in the arbitration agreement, from which members of the public may be excluded by the 
arbitrators.  The very concept of private arbitration was derived from the parties agreement to 
submit to arbitration any disputes arising between them and only between them: ‘[i]t was therefore 
implicit in this that strangers would be excluded from the hearing’.282 
Unresolved and uncertain however is whether the arbitrators have the right to exclude any 
person whom either party wishes to be present if that person is not a representative.  On this the 
Arbitration Act 1996 is also silent.  In Tillam v Copp283 Wilde CJ was of the view that an arbitrator 
has a general discretion as to the mode of conducting the inquiry before him and refused to set 
aside an award on the ground that the arbitrator had refused permission for a stranger to be present 
in order to assist the respondent's solicitor.  Conversely Turner LJ held in Haigh v Haigh284 that 
the arbitrator’s exclusion of the son of one of the parties who was involved in the running of the 
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business was unjustified and so set aside the award.  These two older cases thus demonstrating 
the inconsistency of approach and an unsettled view as to what is good law.  If arbitrators do have 
a discretion, it would be subject to their overriding duty in s.33(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1996 
to secure a fair hearing.285   
In Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel & Ors v Steuart J. Mew286 Colman J considered that the 
concept of private arbitration as deriving from the fact that the parties had agreed to submit to 
arbitration particular disputes arising between them, quoting Leggatt J in The Eastern Saga that 
it was implicit that strangers should be excluded from the hearing and the conduct of the 
arbitration.  Neither the tribunal nor the parties could insist that the dispute be heard or determined 
concurrently with another dispute, irrespective of how closely associated with each other those 
disputes were or how convenient such a course of action might be.  Parties who refer their disputes 
to arbitration are entitled to assume that the hearing will be conducted in private, it being an 
assumption that: ‘arises from a practice which has been universal in London for hundreds of years 
and, I believe, undisputed’- it was the one facet that gave arbitration an important advantage over 
the courts as a means of dispute resolution.  The informality and candour attaching to a hearing 
being held in private was, in the court’s view, an essential ingredient of arbitration.287 
Collins LJ considered in Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners that it does not necessarily 
follow that as arbitrations are held in private, all that follows is thus confidential.  Because 
arbitration is private, that privacy would be violated by the publication or dissemination of 
documents deployed in the arbitration.  Lord Hoffman recognised in West Tankers Inc v Ras 
Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA [2007] UKHL 4 (The Front Comor) that the most important 
consideration was that arbitration was the practical reality for those engaged in commercial 
disputes.  People choose arbitration precisely to be outside the procedures of any national court, 
frequently preferring the privacy, informality and absence of any prolongation of the dispute by 
appeal which arbitration offers.288   
Industry surveys are of limited value in this regard as they typically conflate the two concepts 
into a single enquiry i.e., ‘privacy and confidentiality’289  Nevertheless, in the White and Case 
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2018 survey, 46 percent of in-house counsel selected ‘confidentiality and privacy’ as being among 
the top three most valuable characteristics of arbitration.  Nearly 40 years earlier Professor Tore 
Sandvik carried out pioneering work in this field.  With a background in construction disputes,290 
Sandvik asked 20 experienced Norwegian practitioners to rank from one to six the different 
reasons for choosing arbitration, with one was most important and six least important.291  
Avoiding publicity was given a value of 4.64292 i.e., not very important.  Sandvik concluded that 
avoiding publicity in general was not a motivating factor for choosing arbitration.293  Setting aside 
the limitations inherent from Sandvik’s small sample size, it nevertheless implies that not all users 
need or expect their disputes to be confidential. 
Trakman’s premise that a primary reason for parties to choose arbitration is the expectation 
that their business and personal confidences will be maintained, remains valid, being supported 
by the empirical data of many of the more recent studies.294  Kouris argued that reinstating 
legitimate arbitral confidentiality would be a major benefit.295  Whilst uncontroversial it goes 
against the current trend towards greater transparency.  The 2020 Commonwealth Secretariat 
Report recommended that: ‘Member jurisdictions might want to consider… A provision that sets 
out the confidentiality and privacy obligations of the parties’.296 
It is evident from the materials and cases reviewed that arbitration is considered a private 
matter between the parties.  It follows that it would be uncontroversial and, in my view, desirable 
that the first amendments of the Arbitration Act 1996 addressed the privacy of the process.  To 
that end the following privacy provision is proposed. 
Privacy 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, all meetings and hearings shall be in private. 
Who Decides Confidentiality: Competence-Competence 
Competence-Competence, the jurisprudential doctrine whereby an arbitral tribunal has the 
jurisdiction to rule as to the extent of its own competence on an issue before it does not generally 
feature highly in the authorities.  However, the finding that the confidentiality - or privacy - 
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obligation was implied into the arbitration agreement led the court in Emmott v Michael Wilson 
& Partners297 to consider the hitherto unexplored area of where jurisdiction lay to determine 
matters of confidentiality.  Collins LJ considered that any dispute as to its scope would fall within 
the scope of the arbitration agreement.  Thomas LJ was of the opinion that the decision as to who 
had jurisdiction to determine the ambit of the obligations of confidentiality should primarily be 
one for the arbitral tribunal.298  The court concluded that a dispute between the parties as to the 
agreement over the limits of the obligation of confidentiality should ordinarily be determined by 
the arbitral tribunal, not by a court.   
This was a new, and as it stands an underdeveloped philosophical concept, since the question 
of which forum should decide on confidentiality matters had not been raised in the earlier cases.  
This expanded role for the arbitral tribunal accords with current views of competence-
competence, of promoting the effectiveness of arbitration such that the tribunal itself should be 
the starting point for determining confidentiality.  However, there will be some limits on what 
tribunals may be expected to determine, particularly for example to any public interest argument. 
In line with the Court of Appeal’s view on competence-competence, and a definition of 
confidential materials having already been set out, the following codification will allow the 
tribunal to identify the limits of that confidentiality for the purposes of the arbitration. 
Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on the confidentiality of documents  
In consultation with the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on the issue of 
confidentiality of any materials pertaining to the arbitration.   
Who is Subject to the Duty of Confidentiality? 
Arbitration typically involves three distinct groups of participants to whom a duty of 
confidentiality could be considered to apply: the arbitrators, including where involved the arbitral 
institutions; the parties to the arbitration; and third parties such as witnesses and legal counsel.  In 
the category of third parties fall Third Part Funders (“TPF’s”).  Due to the distinct issues raised 
by TPF, it is treated as a discrete topic in Chapter 6. 
The Parties 
Most of the major institutions impose a requirement of confidentiality upon the parties, 
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although sanctions for its breach are rarely addressed.  The SIAC Rules are one of the few to 
empower a tribunal to take appropriate measures, including issuing an order or Award for 
sanctions or costs if a party breaches the confidentiality provisions.299  It has thus far not been 
tested in court.   
Arbitrators & Tribunals 
To what extent are arbitrators and arbitral tribunals bound by confidentiality in proceedings?  
The short answer is that in the case of many ad hoc arbitrations possibly none.  There is no 
provision in the Arbitration Act 1996 that binds arbitrators or tribunals to any obligation of 
confidentiality.  If such an obligation does exist, it must either derive from a common law duty 
or arise from the set of arbitral rules or terms that apply to the reference.  It is arguable of course 
that the risk of an arbitrator betraying a confidence might seem remote.  Several institutions do 
apply such strictures on the tribunals formed under their rules, although to what mischief they 
mean to prevent is unclear.  And if there is an identifiable need for such a provision to be 
incorporated into in the Arbitration Act 1996, what form would be appropriate?  Reviewing the 
arbitration landscape seven years after Esso/BHP v Plowman, Oakley-White pointedly asked 
exactly who is under the duty of confidence i.e., whether it was the tribunal, institutional staff or 
witnesses300, noting that institutions had made limited and sporadic attempts to address the issue: 
‘one is left with a rich but irregular and disjointed tapestry of research from which to seek to 
formulate a cohesive definition of confidentiality and its limits’.301 Table 3, Confidentiality in 
Selected Arbitral Institutions, highlights this dichotomy. 
The lack of codification from the arbitral institutions (e.g., neither the ICC nor LCIA impose 
an obligation of confidentiality on arbitrators) is not a reason however to shrink from proposing 
a formal regulatory regime.  The primary benefit of codification is clarification and consistency.  
The following is proposed: 
Prohibition of disclosure of confidential information 
Every arbitration agreement to which this section applies is deemed to provide that the 
arbitral tribunal must not disclose confidential information. 
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Arbitral Institutions  
The Arbitration Act 1996 is silent as to the extent that arbitral institutions are bound by the 
confidentiality of the process that they oversee.  Some arbitral institutions that administer 
arbitrations (e.g., the SCMA) require their secretariats to maintain the confidentiality of the 
process, although the philosophy and rationale is unclear and goes enunciated.  Perhaps it merely 
reflects the ongoing convergence of arbitral institutions’ rules.  There is no jurisprudence of which 
I am aware that might indicate how a court might treat a breach of confidentiality on the part of 
an arbitral institution.  Several of the major arbitral institutions do not address their own 
obligations.302   
Of the national laws that have addressed the issue, New Zealand’s Arbitration Act 1996 as 
amended in 2012 provides a helpful guide.  The Act sidesteps directly addressing the 
confidentiality requirements incumbent upon an arbitral institution by defining in the 
‘Interpretation’ provisions as s.2(1)(a) an arbitral tribunal as being: ‘… a sole arbitrator, a panel 
of arbitrators, or an arbitral institution’.  What constitutes confidential information is precisely 
defined by the Act.  Thus the confidentiality obligation at 14B(1): ‘…the parties and the arbitral 
tribunal must not disclose confidential information’  applies equally to the arbitral institution as 
to the arbitrators/tribunal.  
The range of provisions by the various institutional rules prompt the following questions: 
would an amendment to the Arbitration Act with respect to arbitral confidentiality serve any 
purpose in the absence of any case law to suggest that there is a mischief in need of addressing?  
Or would such an amendment be a tidy up exercise to ensure that all aspects of the issues of 
confidentiality had been considered?  Probably the latter, but for reasons of consistency I consider 
it appropriate to be addressed.  New Zealand supplies a simplicity of approach i.e., by including 
in the definition of an arbitral tribunal an arbitral institution and propose borrowing their 
phraseology. 
Definitions 
An arbitral tribunal means a sole arbitrator, a panel of arbitrators, or an arbitral institution. 
Legal Counsel and Obligations of Confidentiality  
In England and Wales solicitors are regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA).  
Chapter 4 of the SRA’s Code of Conduct provides that the protection of confidential information 
 





is a fundamental feature of the solicitor-client relationship.  It describes the duty on the part of 
the solicitor to keep the client’s affairs confidential, an ongoing obligation that continues even 
after the matter is closed.303  That duty to keep a client’s affairs confidential unless disclosure is 
required by law, or with the client’s consent in my view obviates the need for a specific statutory 
provision addressing or imposing confidentiality provisions on a parties’ legal counsel. 
The likelihood of a party appointing a non-lawyer (and therefore one who would not be bound 
by the SRA’s Code of Conduct) to represent him in a commercial arbitration dispute is in most 
instances remote.  In the case of overseas solicitors, they would be bound by their own equivalent 
codes of conduct.  In France for example, lawyers are bound by an oath that incorporates the 
principle of confidentiality, which covers ‘verbal or written communications between lawyers 
and their clients’.304  For European lawyers the ‘Code of Conduct for European Lawyers’ 
applies,305 which lays down fundamental principles of professional conduct applicable to lawyers 
throughout the EC that requires: ‘A lawyer shall respect the confidentiality of all information that 
becomes known to the lawyer in the course of his or her professional activity’.306  The impact of 
the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU on legal services and indirectly solicitor 
representation in arbitration, is however currently unclear. 
There is one scenario where a non-lawyer does represent a party in an arbitration.  In trade 
bodies such as FOSFA, an appeal of a FOSFA arbitration award in the first instance goes to a 
FOSFA Board of Appeal.  At that appeal hearing each party may state their case and may appear 
either personally or be represented by a listed representative i.e., a Trading, Full Broker or Full 
Non-Trading member of FOSFA.  Counsel, solicitors, or any members of the legal profession are 
specifically barred from appeal hearings.  Nevertheless, such a representative would still be 
required to follow the existing confidentiality rules concerning arbitrators and so fall under the 
heading of third parties. 
Witnesses 
In London & Leeds Estates Ltd v Paribas (No. 2)⁠ Mance J extended the concept of 
confidentiality to witnesses as well as the tribunal.307  The claimant landlord's expert witness 
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allegedly gave testimony that was contradictory to other evidence that he had given in two other 
sets of proceedings.  The court held that confidentiality was not an absolute bar to the enforcement 
of the production of documents by subpoena, but it was a relevant consideration in deciding 
whether such a subpoena was necessary for the fair resolution of the proceedings and should be 
permitted.  Privacy and confidentiality could be overridden where it was in the public interest or 
in the interests of individual litigants: ‘These applications raise interesting questions regarding 
the use in a current arbitration of subpoenas … with a view to obtaining an expert witness’ proofs 
produced in evidence in two previous arbitrations’.  Where a witness had given inconsistent 
evidence in the arbitrations it was in the public interest that, where a witness denies a prior 
inconsistent statement, evidence of such previous expression be put in evidence: ‘legitimate 
interest’ outweighed objections on grounds of privacy or confidentiality.  Mance J is understood 
to have been referring to the ‘public interest’ in the sense of ‘the interests of justice,’ namely the 
importance of a judicial decision being reached upon the basis of the truthful or accurate evidence 
of the witnesses concerned. 
Disclosure of Materials 
There is no set definition of ‘materials’ in either the literature or the authorities.  Nor do 
institutional rules consistently address precisely what they mean by materials: numerous terms 
including evidence, affidavits, transcripts etc. are variously used.  Colman J in Dolling-Baker v 
Merrett308 referred to: ‘transcripts or notes of the evidence in the arbitration or the award,’ as well 
as evidence given by any witness in the arbitration, as coming under the umbrella of 
confidentiality.  With the aims of simplicity and consistency it will be helpful to provide a clear 
definition.  The following is proposed:  
Definitions 
Materials 
For the purposes of this Act, materials are defined as all documents generated in the 
course of an arbitration, whether generated e.g., by the tribunal, an arbitral institution, the 
parties or third parties, or legal representation, including but not limited to affidavits, 
pleadings, submissions, witness statements of fact or expert, transcripts of evidence, 
directions or other documents ancillary to the arbitral process. 
The evolution of the concept of confidentiality attaching to materials in arbitration can be 
traced through a series of English cases beginning with the Court of Appeal decision in Dolling-
Baker v Merrett.  The claimant claimed against the respondent’s payments due under a policy of 
 





reinsurance for which the first respondent was one of the insurers and the second respondents 
were the placing brokers.  The claimant had applied for an order for discovery against the first 
respondent.  Phillips J granted the application.  The first respondent appealed and applied for an 
injunction restraining the second respondent from disclosing those documents to the claimant.  
The judge refused the application whereupon the first respondent appealed against both orders.  
The court granted an injunction restraining one party from disclosing in any subsequent action 
documents relating to an arbitration.  Parker LJ recognised the essentially private nature of an 
arbitration, coupled with the implied obligation of a party who obtains documents on discovery 
not to use them for any purpose other than the dispute in which they were obtained save with the 
consent of the other party, or pursuant to an order (or leave) of the court. 
Drawing on the HL decision in Science Research Council v Nassé,309 the court referred to the 
established principle that if confidentiality attaches to documents for which discovery is sought, 
that is a relevant factor to be taken into account before an order is given.  Parker LJ declined 
however to give a precise definition of the extent of the obligation, noting that just because a 
document is used in an arbitration does not automatically confer upon it privilege or 
confidentiality relevant to subsequent proceedings.  Nor was it a question of public interest: if the 
document is relevant, its relevance remains.  That the obligation existed in some form was in the 
court’s view ‘abundantly apparent,’ an implied obligation arising out of the nature of arbitration 
itself.  ‘When a question arises as to production of documents or indeed discovery by list or 
affidavit, the court must … have regard to the existence of the implied obligation, whatever its 
precise limits may be’.310  The Court of Appeal overruled the court of first instance that had 
ordered disclosure to be given of all the documents relating to the arbitration and stipulated that, 
in determining whether to order disclosure, the court must first take account of the duty of 
confidentiality relating to that arbitration and consider whether the same outcome could be 
achieved by other means. 
In Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel & Ors v Steuart J. Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 243 
(Hassneh Insurance) the respondent commenced arbitration claiming to recover under various 
policies against the reinsurers.  The respondent reinsured wished to disclose to the brokers the 
interim award and the reasons in order to make a claim against their brokers.  The claimants 
objected to the disclosure of other documents, such as pleadings, witness statements or transcripts 
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and sought an injunction to restrain the disclosure as a breach of confidence.  Colman J’s starting 
point was to investigate the nature and scope of the duty of confidentiality which applies in 
relation to arbitrations and the documents in them, remarking: ‘Surprisingly, there is little 
authority on the point, at least in English law’.  Applying the principles of Distillers Co 
(Biochemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd311 the court concluded that as with litigation, there 
was there is an implied undertaking not to use documents disclosed in arbitration proceedings for 
any other purpose, except in relation to the dispute in which the document was disclosed. 
Documents such as pleadings witness statements, disclosed documents in the arbitration and 
transcripts were subject to a duty of confidence: it was the final determination of rights expressed 
in the award, which was pertinent as against third parties, not the raw materials for that 
determination.  There was nothing to justify the voluntary disclosure to a third party of such 
arbitration documents: to disclose such documents without the consent of the other arbitrating 
party would be a breach of the obligation of confidence.  Colman J, noting the implied obligation 
identified in Dolling-Baker v Merrett as the basis for the confidentiality attaching to documents 
used in an arbitration, concluded that such an obligation can exist: ‘only because it is implied in 
the agreement to arbitrate’.  That like any other implied term it must be capable of reasonably 
precise definition and based on custom or business efficacy.  Colman J’s view that there was an 
implied term in every agreement to arbitrate ought to be uncontroversial.312  Hearings are held in 
private.  It must logically follow that a principle of privacy extends to documents created for the 
purpose of that hearing. 
In Hyundai Engineering v Active,313 Phillips J concluded that whilst any person who acquired 
confidential information arising from an arbitration would be subject under English law to the 
self-same duties of confidentiality as the party to the arbitration, those duties were not always 
self-evident: ‘[t]he nature and extent of the duty of confidentiality applicable to documents and 
information obtained in arbitration proceedings is by no means fully chartered’.  Whilst the Court 
considered that it was unclear whether the duty of confidentiality arose out of a contractual term 
or by virtue of the relationship between the parties, it considered that a duty of confidentiality 
must be subject to limits. 
Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd314 was a complex dispute born out of a failed 
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partnership involving the provision of legal services in Kazakhstan.  Related proceedings are still 
on-going, 12 years after first judgement was handed down in the Court of Appeal by Carnwath, 
Thomas and Lawrence Collins LJJ in 2008.  It has spanned multiple jurisdictions, including 
England, The Bahamas and Australia.  A dispute to which Jessel MR’s caution: ‘of avoiding that 
discussion in public, which must be a painful one’ is singularly apt. 315  It is relevant to the 
discussion of arbitral confidentiality as it directly addressed the issue of disclosure in the interests 
of justice. 
Michael Wilson and Partners Ltd (“MWP”) commenced arbitration proceedings against a 
former employee, Emmott, alleging fraud and conspiracy, allegations that were subsequently 
withdrawn.  In related claims against two other former MWP employees, MWP applied the 
following year to amend proceedings in New South Wales and the British Virgin Islands to allege 
fraud and conspiracy against Emmott in order to ‘bring a level of parity to the proceedings 
presently being conducted in New South Wales, the British Virgin Island and England’.  
Concerned that allegations of fraud and conspiracy continued to be made against him, Emmott 
applied to the Court for an order that he be at liberty to disclose the documents in the London 
arbitration to the respondents in the BVI and NSW proceedings so that they could be disclosed to 
the courts because (a) MWP’s case in the arbitration was materially inconsistent with that 
advanced in the BVI and NSW proceedings and that (b) MWP was presenting a misleading or 
inaccurate picture.  Flaux J considered that disclosure to be in the interests of justice to avoid the 
foreign courts being misled.  MWP appealed against the decision. 
In giving the main speech Lawrence Collins LJ outlined the nature and degree of privacy and 
confidentiality in arbitration, referring extensively to Leggatt J in The Eastern Saga, the DAC 
Reports and compared the various Institutional Rules.  He pertinently noted: ‘It is not always easy 
to distinguish confidentiality and privacy…quite different rules may apply in different 
contexts’.316 
The Court proceeded to look at four different types of cases.  Firstly, a party to litigation in 
the courts may seek discovery or disclosure of documents generated in an arbitration: the court 
will compel disclosure only if it considers it necessary for the fair disposal of the case, citing 
Science Research Council v Nassé and Dolling-Baker v Merrett.  It did not consider 
confidentiality an absolute bar in a second type of case, where a party to an arbitration seeks the 
assistance of the court to obtain through a witness summons material deployed in another 
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arbitration.317  The third type of case was where issues arise about the disclosure of documents on 
the court file relating to an arbitration as identified by Colman J318 or whether the judgment of a 
court given in relation to an arbitration should be published.319  In this instance the court viewed 
that the privacy of arbitration was an important, but not decisive factor.  Lawrence Collins LJ 
identified the fourth and most relevant type in relation to the proceedings.  A party to an arbitration 
may have an interest in disclosing documents generated in an arbitration (including the award 
itself) to third parties320 or in another arbitration (as in Ali Shipping321 and AEGIS v European 
Re322) and the other party to the arbitration may seek to restrain disclosure by injunction.  The 
court recognized that it exercises a discretion in which privacy or confidentiality is an important 
factor in the balance. 
The court identified three relevant legal concepts or categories in these cases: (a) privacy, in 
the sense that because arbitration is private that privacy would be violated by the publication or 
dissemination of documents deployed in the arbitration; (b) confidentiality in the sense where it 
is used to refer to inherent confidentiality in the information in documents, such as trade secrets 
or other confidential information generated or deployed in an arbitration; and (c) confidentiality 
in the sense of an implied agreement that documents disclosed or generated in arbitration can only 
be used for the purposes of the arbitration. 
The court then proceeded to consider the emergence from recent English authorities a 
separate, implied obligation of confidentiality arising out of the nature of arbitration itself that the 
parties would not disclose materials generated in the course of the arbitration for any other 
purpose.   That obligation extended to documents, transcripts, witness statements, notes of the 
evidence and the award itself.  Not as a matter of business efficacy, but implied as a matter of 
law.323 The court’s tentative view was that ‘[b]ecause the confidentiality rule has developed as an 
implied term of the arbitration agreement, any dispute as to its scope would fall within the scope 
of the arbitration agreement’.324  The court held that the implied agreement was really a rule of 
substantive law masquerading as an implied term.  The content of the obligation may depend on 
the context in which it arises and on the nature of the information or documents at issue.  ‘The 
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limits of that obligation are still in the process of development on a case-by-case basis’.   
The key principles as to when disclosure will be permissible were: (a) with consent, express 
or implied; (b) where there is an order or leave of the court; (c) when reasonably necessary for 
the protection of the legitimate interests of an arbitrating party; (d) where the interests of justice 
require disclosure; and (perhaps) (e) where the public interest requires disclosure.  Lawrence 
Collins LJ concluded that the interests of justice required disclosure.  Thomas LJ agreed on the 
grounds that the public interest also reasonably required the use of those documents in other 
proceedings.325  The court left open the door for further debate: ‘I prefer to treat this case as falling 
under ‘interests of justice’ exception, clearly recognised in Ali Shipping, and to leave for another 
occasion exploration of the boundaries of a possible ‘public interest’ criterion’.326 
Colman J also dealt with an application by a non-party to an arbitration for copies of 
documents on the court file in arbitration proceedings involving allegations of fraud against 
respondents in a joint venture in Glidepath Holding BV v Thomson.327 The applicant, who was 
not a party to those proceedings, sought various documents such as the particulars of claim, 
witness statements and procedural orders, on the grounds that they would assist him in his claim 
in an employment tribunal.  The court rejected the application: permission would not be granted 
to a non-party to inspect evidence without the permission of all the parties to the arbitration, unless 
necessary to protect or establish a legal right.  The applicant failed to establish that access to the 
documents in question was reasonably necessary to protect or establish his legal rights which he 
sought to enforce in the proceedings before the employment tribunal.  Nor was the confidentiality 
of the documents overridden by the public interest in providing him access to them.  Glidepath 
BV v Thomson highlighted that third parties not directly involved in an arbitration wishing to 
obtain documents face a significant hurdle.  Brandishing the phrase ‘in the public interest’ is 
inadequate justification unless there is an overriding interest of justice.  Mere convenience is not 
enough.  
In John Milsom & Others v Mukhtar Ablyazov,328 the claimant receivers were appointed by 
the court in pursuance of a freezing injunction and other orders of the court.  The issue before the 
court was whether a temporary notice regime should be made permanent, discharged or replaced 
by some other restriction upon the use or disclosure of the documents by the receivers.  After 
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reviewing the authorities Briggs J concluded:   
[a]rbitration confidentiality or privacy is not absolute.  Its preservation in any particular 
situation, for example an arbitration appeal, is only the starting point and may be 
overridden where either the public interest or, I would add, the interests of justice require. 
329  
In Westwood Shipping Lines330 the court also dealt with document disclosure and had to 
consider whether to allow the claimant to rely on documents used in an arbitration.  Westwood 
time-chartered a vessel (from GMB) which in turn had chartered the vessel from her head owners 
(Kimberley).  At a time of strong market charter party rates, Westwood sub-chartered the vessel 
back to GMB.  The market dropped and GMB purported to terminate the sub-charter.  Westwood 
brought a claim against GMB both for breach of the sub-charter and also for breach of the main 
charter between themselves and GMB.  A London arbitration award was in the claimants’ favour, 
subsequent to which GMB went into liquidation in Germany. 
The claimants brought an application under s.44 of the Arbitration Act 1996 for liberty to 
rely upon certain documents in the arbitration in support of a proposed claim which they had 
issued in the Commercial Court against a number of entities and individuals alleging an unlawful 
conspiracy.  The claimants alleged that there was a backdated agreement which purported to 
waive any rights that GMB had against Kimberley in the arbitration chain, thereby precluding 
any claim under the head charter.  The claimants submitted that confidentiality had been waived 
because the documents were referred to at a creditors’ meeting; alternatively the documents were 
in the public domain because they were referred to in a judgment dealing with the claimants’ 
attempt to enforce the arbitration award or that one of the exceptions to confidentiality recognised 
in Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd331 applied.   
In Flaux J’s view just because an arbitration becomes public through an appeal for example, 
does not mean that all the material in the arbitration loses its confidential status: ‘In the present 
case the interests of justice clearly required disclosure…the court should not allow confidentiality 
of arbitration materials to stifle the ability to bring to light wrongdoing’.  An order was be made 
for disclosure of all the relevant arbitral materials, the award and the reasons. 
Westwood Shipping Lines was a case in which the interests of justice clearly required 
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disclosure for two reasons.  Firstly, the claimants would have been precluded from making what 
was otherwise an arguable claim.  Secondly because there appeared to be strong evidence of 
illegality having taken place.  The court applied the same principle as in Emmott v Michael Wilson 
& Partners, namely that the confidentiality of arbitration materials should not prevent 
wrongdoing from being brought to light.  The case also provided a helpful exposition in regard to 
the principles attaching to the privacy of an appeal hearing.  The liquidator had attempted to have 
the appeal proceedings treated as private.  In determining as to whether the judgment should be 
in public (whereas the hearing had taken place in private) Flaux J referred to Mance LJ in 
Department of Economics, Policy and Development of the City of Moscow v Bankers Trust [2005] 
QB 207 (“City of Moscow v Bankers Trust”) that during the course of hearings in private, the 
court should be ready to hear representations as to whether the hearing should be continued in 
public:  ‘…even though the hearing may have been in private the court should … bear in mind 
that any judgment should be given in public, where this can be done without disclosing significant 
confidential information’.332 
Overseas Approaches to Disclosure of Materials 
A widespread view that the Australian court decision in Esso/BHP v Plowman significantly 
undermined arbitral confidentiality is perhaps overstated and explored in more detail in Chapter 
7.  That court held that documents produced under compulsion are subject to a duty to be used 
solely for the purposes of the arbitration, but all other aspects of confidentiality were rejected, not 
considering that this principle required that all information disclosed during an arbitration should 
remain confidential: ‘The existence of this obligation does not provide a basis for the wide ranging 
obligation of confidentiality … to all documents and information provided in and for the purposes 
of an arbitration’.333  It is probably accurate to state that in Australia only documents produced as 
a matter of compulsion by a court or a tribunal have attached to them a measure of confidentiality: 
everything else is fair game. 
The Singapore High Court considered the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings and 
documents disclosed in those proceedings in Myanma Yaung Chi Oo Co Ltd v Win Win Nu334  The 
Court reaffirmed that jurisdiction’s view that there is an implied duty of confidentiality in 
arbitrations subject to the limitations considered by the court.  The claimant was a company jointly 
set up by the parties but subsequently wound up due to disagreements between the joint venture 
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entities.  The first respondent was a Myanmar government-controlled company.  The second 
respondent commenced arbitration proceedings against the government of Myanmar for wrongful 
expropriation of its investment in the claimant company.  In Singapore, the claimant filed an 
action against both respondents.  The respondents applied to stay the action pending the 
arbitration proceedings.  The claimant objected to the respondent making use of documents 
referred to in the arbitration and applied to strike them out.   
On appeal from the assistant registrar’s decision to grant the orders sought by the claimant, 
the High Court had to determine two issues.  Whether parties in arbitration proceedings have a 
duty to maintain the confidentiality of the documents, and whether leave of court was necessary 
for a party to disclose such documents.  The leading English and Australian authorities were 
considered.  On the issue of the confidentiality of the documents, the court preferred the English 
line of reasoning: parties who opt for arbitration are aware of and influenced by the fact that 
arbitration hearings are held in private, whilst litigation through the courts involves open hearings.  
It is in keeping with the parties’ expectations that proceedings should be considered confidential.  
The court held that when it is reasonably necessary to disclose, the duty of confidentiality is lifted, 
and that prior or retrospective permission of the court is not required. 
The respondents succeeded on the legal issues but failed on the facts.  The case is of interest 
because it confirmed that in the Singapore Court’s view that it was not necessary to draw a 
distinction between the type of information disclosed.  Unfortunately the court did not discuss the 
reasoning in AEGIS v European Re.  Whether Singapore would also follow the reasoning of the 
Privy Council i.e., that such an approach ran the risk of failing to distinguish between different 
types of confidentiality which attach to different types of documents, or to documents which have 
been obtained in different ways and the Privy Council’s expressed reservations about the 
approach taken in Ali Shipping of characterizing a duty of confidentiality as an implied term, 
remains to be seen.   
Despite a limited statutory point of reference, the Canadian courts have been supportive of 
the view that there was a general public interest in preserving the confidentiality of materials filed 
in court in pending arbitration.335  Quebec’s Art.5 allowing for the ‘third person’ - typically the 
arbitrator or mediator in the dispute - to disclose (non-personal) information for research, teaching 
or statistical purposes without breaching the confidentiality provisions, is also worth exploring.  
Canadian courts have taken the view that there is an implied undertaking by parties not to use 
 





information obtained through the course of an arbitration for collateral purposes.  The New 
Zealand Arbitration Act, having defined confidential information as including the award and 
materials used in an arbitration,336goes on to prohibit its disclosure.337 
Institutional Approaches to Disclosure of Materials 
Institutions have been quicker to address the issue of confidentiality of arbitral materials than 
national laws, a reflection of their (generally) private status and ability to modify rules more 
speedily than parliaments.  The ICDR for example does not specifically address the 
confidentiality of materials outside the obligations imposed on arbitrators.338  The tribunal may 
however make orders concerning the confidentiality of the arbitration or any matters in 
connection with the arbitration and may take measures for protecting trade secrets and 
confidential information.  The BAIAC rules provide that all recordings, transcripts, or documents 
used in relation to the arbitral proceedings shall be private and confidential.339   CIETAC rules 
stipulate that for cases heard in camera, anyone involved in an arbitration is prohibited from 
disclosing any substantive or procedural matters.340  The DIS Rules addresses the prohibition of 
disclosing evidence.341  The HKIAC’s various rules and articles that refer to ‘no information 
relating to the arbitration shall be disclosed’ is probably sweeping enough to include all materials 
in an arbitration. 
The IBA Rules do not so much proscribe limits on using arbitral materials, as they require 
the arbitral tribunal to consult with the parties so as to agree on the level of confidentiality 
applicable to the evidence in the arbitration.342  The tribunal may nonetheless make any evidence 
confidential if it considers it necessary.343  The ICC rules do not address restrictions on the use of 
materials: their provision for academic researcher’s access to documents of general interest 
specifically excludes materials used in the arbitration proceedings.  The LCIA rules require the 
parties to keep confidential all materials in the arbitration not otherwise in the public domain.344  
It is unclear whether a court would approach the SCMA’s Rule 44 to keep confidential ‘all 
matters relating to the arbitration’ as being sufficiently precise to be capable of including 
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materials: this aspect has not been tested in the courts.  There is no such equivocation under the 
SIAC Rules which require any materials to remain confidential.345  Similarly precise are the 
WIPO Rules which provide that all materials shall be treated as confidential and expressly state 
that they not be disclosed to any third party.346 
Summary 
Lord Roskill, during the Second Reading of the Arbitration Act proposed that a fourth general 
principle should be inserted, namely, that arbitrations, documents used in them and any resulting 
awards be confidential.  The matter was considered by the DAC in its 1996 Report.  Its proposed 
solution was an amendment to what is now s.81(2) of the Act, creating an express saving for the 
common law rules on confidentiality and privacy to apply.  The approach was ultimately not 
adopted by the Government.  Having defined confidential information as including both materials 
and awards, and demonstrated adequate justification for amendment, the proposed wording for a 
prohibition of disclosure of confidential information will be addressed in the following section.  
Disclosure of Awards  
The reference to disclosure of awards in this section refers to releasing information about the 
existence or contents of an arbitral award, otherwise than for the purposes of journal or 
institutional publication.  The publication of awards and their contribution to the development of 
the law is discussed in Chapter 8. 
The issue of the use of awards as well as materials arose in Hassneh Insurance.347  Colman J 
held that an award could be disclosed, including the reasons, to that third party in order to found 
a defence or as the basis for a cause of action if it was reasonably necessary for the establishment 
or protection of an arbitrating party’s legal rights vis-à-vis a third party,348 citing Tournier v 
National Provincial and Union Bank of England.349  The effect of the Hassneh Insurance decision 
was two-fold.  Firstly, an agreement to arbitrate contained an implied term which imposed on 
both parties to it a duty to keep confidential from third parties the award, the reasons and all other 
documentary materials relating to the arbitration.  Secondly the implied term further qualified that 
duty by the exception that the award and reasons might be disclosed as of right if it was reasonably 
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necessary for one party to disclose them for the purpose of the establishment of that party’s legal 
rights against a third party, either in order to found a defence or as the basis for a cause of action. 
Colman J revisited similar issues to those raised in Hassneh Insurance in Insurance Co. v 
Lloyd’s Syndicate.350  The assured obtained an arbitration award against a leading reinsurer.  
Whilst not binding on the following reinsurers, the assured asserted its entitlement to disclose the 
award and the reasons for it to the five following re-insurers in order to persuade them to accept 
liability.  The claimants refused consent on the ground that the award was confidential to them 
and that they were entitled to enforce that duty of confidence.  An ex parte injunction was granted 
restraining disclosure of the arbitration award by the respondent.  The claimants sought to 
continue that injunction.  In both cases, the issue was in what circumstances the principle that an 
arbitration award is confidential to arbitrating parties should be modified to enable the award to 
be released to a third party i.e., how necessary does disclosure of the award have to be for the 
protection of the parties’ legal rights before he is entitled to disclose it as of right? 
Colman J held: (a) that there was no contractual liability on the reinsurers to be bound by the 
award against the leading underwriters; (b) that, given the implied term in the arbitration 
agreement that the respondents owed a duty of confidence in respect of the award, the scope of 
the qualifications to that duty were to be implied as a matter of business efficacy; (c) that 
disclosure would only be permitted if it was sufficiently necessary in order to enforce or protect 
the legal rights of a party and that would be the case only if such rights could not be enforced or 
protected without disclosure; (d) that the award and reasons would not be a necessary element in 
the establishment of the re-assured’s claim; and that therefore, whilst the claimants would not 
suffer any commercial detriment if the award were disclosed, they were entitled to an injunction 
restraining disclosure since the grant of such would not cause hardship.  The themes as first teased 
out by Tournier are clear in this judgement.  Colman J therefore went further than in Hassneh 
Insurance and held that the test of ‘reasonable necessity’ applied only to disclosure where it was 
‘unavoidably necessary’ to protect the legal rights of a party. 
Whilst acknowledging the undesirability of holding five separate arbitrations over essentially 
identical factual issues, Colman J pointed out that the parties could have avoided this by inserting 
an appropriately drafted ‘follow the leader’ underwriters’ settlement clause.  In finding for the 
claimants, Colman J set out the following principles: (a) A party was only entitled to disclose an 
arbitration award to a third party if such disclosure was necessary to establish that party’s legal 
 





right against a third party - disclosure was not justified if disclosure was merely helpful; (b) 
Disclosure of the award would only be persuasive - it would not establish any legal right; (c) The 
duty of confidentiality was an implied covenant to maintain the (unquantifiable) benefit of secrecy 
for both parties, it was unnecessary to establish a loss to justify its enforcement; (d) The Court’s 
exercise of discretion did not apply as the respondent had failed to establish that hardship would 
result. 
The nature and scope of the implied term of confidentiality were further developed in Ali 
Shipping Corporation v Shipyard Trogir [1998] 2 All ER 136; [1999] 1 WLR 314 (Ali Shipping).  
The respondent shipyard failed to complete a hull construction.  Ali Shipping, owned by 
Greenwich who in turn also owned three other one-ship companies (each of which had contracted 
with the same yard to build vessels) rescinded the contract and claimed damages.  Each of those 
one-ship companies failed to pay the first instalments of the price of their respective contracts.  In 
the subsequent arbitration, the shipyard sought to pierce the corporate veil and have all 
Greenwich-owned companies treated as one to permit the yard's plea of justification and/or set-
off in respect of their claims for the unpaid instalments. 
The arbitrator rejected the yard's arguments and refused to pierce the corporate veil, holding 
that the use of one-ship companies in connection with such transactions was a normal way of 
doing business, and that the ‘contractual arrangements were made by the parties deliberately 
observing the separate nature of the legal personalities involved’.  Whatever the position under 
the contracts for the other three one-ship companies, it was irrelevant to the issue of the 
respondents’ liability to Ali Shipping and rejected the shipyard’s claim for set off.  The arbitrator 
awarded Ali Shipping £34m.  The Court of Appeal refused to lift the corporate veil as between 
the various companies and treated them as independent third parties, so that the scope of the duty 
of confidentiality arose.  The court held that the duty of confidentiality in relation to arbitration 
awards and documents used in arbitrations takes effect as a term implied in arbitration agreements 
as a matter of law and not on the basis of the presumed intention of the parties: ‘It seems to me 
that, in holding as a matter of principle that the obligation of confidentiality (whatever its precise 
limits) arises as an essential corollary of the privacy of arbitration proceeding’.351   
Potter LJ’s exceptions to disclosure are closely modelled on Tournier and were set out as 
follows: (a) consent, i.e., where disclosure is made with the express or implied consent of the 
party who originally produced the material; (b) order of the court e.g., an order for disclosure of 
 





documents generated by an arbitration for the purposes of a subsequent court action; (c) 
permission of the court; (d) disclosure when, and to the extent to which, it is reasonably necessary 
for the protection of the legitimate interests of an arbitrating party; and (e) where the interests of 
justice so require.  Potter LJ explained: ‘it is not enough that an award or reasons might have a 
commercially persuasive impact on the third party to whom they are disclosed’.352 
The Privy Council expressed reservations about Potter LJ’s approach in Ali Shipping in an 
appeal from the Bermuda High Court that came before the Privy Council in AEGIS v European 
Re.  Two disputes arose under a reinsurance agreement between the parties.  Both disputes were 
referred to arbitration before two separate tribunals.  In the first arbitration (‘the Boyd arbitration’) 
the parties agreed that the arbitration would be confidential.  An award was rendered in favour of 
European Reinsurance who sought to rely on it in the second arbitration (‘the Rowe arbitration’).  
AEGIS submitted that this would be in breach of the confidentiality agreement and obtained an 
injunction preventing disclosure of the award.  The injunction was later discharged by the Court 
of Appeal of Bermuda and AEGIS appealed to the Privy Council to have the injunction reinstated.  
In the confidentiality agreement in the Boyd arbitration the parties had agreed that: ‘The 
arbitration result will not be disclosed at any time to any individual or entity, in whole or in part, 
which is not a party to the arbitration between AEGIS and European Reinsurance’.  In construing 
that wording, the Privy Council held that it could not conceivably impose an absolute ban on 
disclosure of the award, as this would clearly render the award incapable of being enforced in the 
courts.  Lord Hobhouse addressed the issue of the confidentiality of arbitration awards:  
However Potter LJ… having followed Dolling-Baker v Merrett… affirming the privacy 
of arbitration proceedings, went on to characterise a duty of confidentiality as an implied 
term… and then to formulate exceptions to which it would be subject… Their Lordships 
have reservations about the desirability or merit of adopting this approach… 
Generalizations and the formulation of detailed implied terms are not appropriate.353 
The Privy Council drew a distinction between documents used in proceedings and a 
subsequent award: they were different classes of documents and subject to different rules of 
confidentiality.  An award was confidential as between the parties and as between the parties and 
the arbitrators.  However, an award should be capable of enforcement, notwithstanding its 
confidential nature.  The Privy Council further held that it was an implied term of the arbitration 
agreement that the parties agreed to perform the award.  The confidentiality agreement was 
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intended to prevent third parties from relying on material generated during the arbitration against 
either of the two insurance companies.  The legitimate use of an earlier award in a later arbitration 
between the same two parties was therefore not a breach of the confidentiality agreement.  
The unexpected Privy Council decision in AEGIS v European Re attracted significant 
comment.  Dundas contended that the Privy Council ‘imposed new limitations on confidentiality 
in arbitration and, in effect, rebuked Potter LJ for beginning the attempt, in Ali Shipping v 
Shipyard Trogir’.  The industry view is that the different approaches by Potter LJ and the Privy 
Council are bound to resurface in due course.  Rawding and Seeger were more sceptical of the 
AEGIS v European Re decision, asking what, if any, is the scope of the implied duty of 
confidentiality.354  Loh and Lee argued that the strong Privy Council decision in AEGIS v 
European Re casts doubt on whether a similar case to Ali Shipping would survive an appeal.  The 
criticism of Ali Shipping by the Privy Council in AEGIS v European Re has in my view needlessly 
muddied the waters of the debate.  Both decisions are capable of being viewed as correct and 
mutually consistent.  AEGIS v European Re can be differentiated on the facts, having dealt not 
with strangers to an arbitration, but two arbitration awards with the same parties.  Whichever 
analysis is correct, AEGIS v European Re exemplifies the ongoing development and inherent 
tensions between judicial philosophy and policy considerations.  Despite the divergent views as 
expressed in the CA in Ali Shipping and the Privy Council in AEGIS v European Re, there is 
sufficient agreement in scope to approach codification with respect to both use of materials and 
arbitral awards, notwithstanding the courts have not delineated the full extent of the exceptions. 
In UMS Holding Ltd and others v Great Station Properties SA [2017] EWHC 2473 (Comm) 
(UMS Holdings) Teare J held that the Courts had an inherent jurisdiction to regulate access to an 
award that was in the public domain (by virtue of a public enforcement challenge hearing) and 
granted an order prohibiting disclosure of an award even though it was not subject to a 
confidentiality obligation under Art.30 of the LCIA Rules then in force. 
Overseas Approaches to Awards 
Despite a lack of statutory provisions, Canada’s case law offers some interesting 
counterpoints to other jurisdictions e.g., compare the approach of Ontario’s courts in declining to 
seal an award on the basis that indiscriminate confidentiality risks undermining public confidence 
in the judicial system, with the comparatively secretive regime operating in Scotland, where s.15 
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provides that the court must grant the order, with fairly limited exceptions.  In the United States 
the State courts more routinely deal with applications to stay or to enforce an award as they 
frequently have no supervisory role with respect to arbitral awards.  A court may seal files relating 
to arbitral proceedings in order to preserve their confidentiality.355  In New Zealand, as with 
materials, awards are similarly subject to a prohibition on disclosure subject to certain exceptions 
specified such as by order of the tribunal or court or in the interests of justice. 
Institutional Approaches to Awards 
The arbitral institutions typically view award disclosure with a similar proscriptive approach 
as they do for materials e.g., the ICDR, CIETAC, DIS, SIAC and WIPO.  Where exceptions to 
disclosure are addressed - at least amongst rules that have been updated in recent years - they are 
similarly couched.  For the HKIAC for example they include:  to protect or pursue a legal right 
or interest; to enforce or challenge the award; in legal proceedings before a court; to a government 
body, regulatory authority, court or tribunal where the party is obliged by law to do so.356  The 
LCIA states that it will not publish any award or any part of an award without the prior written 
consent of all parties and the tribunal.357  The ICC does not address award publication.  By contrast 
to its indeterminate approach to the confidentiality of materials, the SCMA specifically provides 
that the award is confidential, disclosure of which allowed only with the prior written consent of 
the parties.358 
Penalties for Breach  
Harpwood’s view that the tort of breach of confidence was a developing area of the law that 
would in time be explored in more detail by the courts has not yet come about.359  Determining 
what penalties should be proscribed for such a breach of confidence in relation to an arbitration 
was of course one of the very concerns that vexed the DAC in their deliberations: ‘Indeed, even 
if acceptable statutory guidelines could be formulated, there would remain the difficulty of fixing 
and enforcing sanctions for non-compliance.  The position is not wholly satisfactory’.360   
Whilst formulating a solution for breach of confidentiality has not yet been addressed by the 
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courts, I consider it appropriate to include a positive reference with the following: 
Breach of Confidentiality 
The Tribunal has the power to take appropriate measures, including issuing an order or 
Award for sanctions or costs, if a Party breaches any of the confidentiality provisions of 
this Act.  
Chapter 4 Summary 
The examples from overseas jurisdictions on the use of materials and awards is sparser than 
that for the arbitral institutions, most of whom address confidentiality to varying degrees.  The 
richer jurisprudence in England and Wales with respect to the use of materials prepared for or 
used in an arbitration and awards after the arbitration is concluded is well developed and 
articulate, receiving support in both the High Court and Court of Appeal.  The views of the Privy 
Council as to the distinction between the confidentiality attached to materials and awards and 
their disagreement as to whether confidentiality should be considered an implied term is a judicial 
tension between the courts that is yet to be resolved.  Nonetheless, there is sufficient support 
within the decided cases to provide a firm foundation on which to craft a suitable amendment of 
the Arbitration Act. 
The hurdle set by Saville J in the DAC Report: ‘if the whole matter were ever to become 
judicially resolved, it would remain possible to add a statutory provision by way of amendment 
to the Bill’361 has to a substantial extent been satisfied.  The following provision with regard to 
confidential information i.e., awards and materials is proposed. 
Prohibition of disclosure of confidential information 
Every arbitration agreement to which this section applies is deemed to provide that the 
arbitral tribunal, parties, legal counsel and witness must not disclose confidential 
information, except:- 
(a) to a professional adviser; or 
(b) to the extent necessary for the establishment or protection of a party’s legal rights; or 
(c) for the making and prosecution of an application to a court under this Act; or 
(d) if the disclosure is in accordance with a court order; or 
(e) the disclosure is authorised or required by law; or 
(f) for the purposes of obtaining litigation funding. 
This chapter has addressed the confidentiality of arbitral materials and awards and the extent 
to which they can be used, both in relation to the arbitration proceedings for which they were 







use of materials in court proceedings are discussed in Chapter 7, The Public Interest Exception.  
The following chapter continues the debate with a related issue that has long vexed the courts, 





Chapter 5: Consolidation & Concurrency 
‘Somebody said that it couldn’t be done, 
… 
He started to sing as he tackled the thing 
That couldn’t be done, and he did it’362 
- It Couldn't Be Done. Edgar Guest 
Issues in Consolidation 
Consolidation, whereby multiple disputes are consolidated into a single arbitration, goes to 
the heart of arbitral confidentiality, involving fundamental principles of party autonomy, privacy 
and the confidentiality of materials.  The issue is one with which the courts have been grappling 
with mixed results for decades, exemplifying the tension that exists between due process and 
efficiency.  Reform is long overdue.   
The main drawback in the current law in this regard can be summarised as follows:  Without 
the ability to order consolidation or concurrent hearings of related disputes, there is a possibility 
of different tribunals reaching inconsistent decisions on the facts or the law in the two disputes.  
It may result in a party to one of the two arbitrations being unable to obtain or adduce the evidence 
relevant to his case e.g., evidence disclosed by claimant A in the head charter arbitration being 
unavailable to respondent C in the sub charter arbitration, whereas B will not seek to call it and 
cannot be compelled to do so.  Holding successive hearings before either the same tribunal or 
different panels with common membership raises an issue of potential unfairness to the parties 
involved in the later hearings if the earlier tribunal was influenced by evidence in earlier hearing, 
which is unbeknown to the party in question and which had no opportunity to challenge. 
In general terms, consolidation of two or more claims involving all related parties and 
disputes such as in a chain arbitration involving back-to-back charter parties and arbitration 
clauses, aims to prevent the repetition and duplication of the same or similar evidentiary materials, 
minimise costs and avoid different tribunals arriving at contradictory outcomes arising out of the 
same factual matrix.  Fortese and Hemmi commented however that consolidation may end up 
being less efficient and more costly ‘…for a party with a small claim, the settlement of which is 
likely to take longer and is, accordingly, less cost-effective’.363  An order for concurrent hearings 
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could give rise to delay in scheduling hearings due to the need to accommodate the diaries of a 
greater number of people: if not carefully managed hearings can become unwieldy.  The 
fundamental question is whether related claims can (or should) be consolidated into one 
proceeding.  On balance, I would answer that question as a qualified yes.  
Whilst the Civil Procedure Rules make it possible for the defendant to join a third party to 
judicial proceedings, the Arbitration Act 1996 makes no provision for proceeding between more 
than two parties.  Section 35 provides only that the parties are free to agree on the consolidation 
of arbitration proceedings or concurrent hearings.  Without such an agreement from the parties, 
the arbitrators have no power to order either consolidation of concurrency.  Such agreements are 
not unsurprisingly difficult to achieve once a dispute has arisen. 
Underlying the clarity of s.35 there is significant discussion.  This is particular so in two 
specific areas.  In the construction industry, where main/subcontractor disputes are common 
throughout the value chain - from large infrastructure projects, offices, factories down to domestic 
conversions and renovations.  And in the shipping industry, typically in the chartering of ships 
where extended charter party chain or string contract disputes are common features of the trade.  
Goods on board a ship are bought and sold multiple times during the course of a voyage.  Ships 
can be chartered, sub-chartered and sub-sub-chartered multiple times over in both voyage and 
time charter parties.  The large number of arbitrations that can arise over a single ship incident 
can and does cause serious obstacles to timely and cost-effective determination.  Construction 
disputes involving main contractors and subcontractors are usually within the same jurisdiction 
and typically determined by adjudication.  Shipping by its very nature is generally international 
in scope.  The ownership or nationality of cargo, ship, technical operator, commercial operator, 
loading and discharging ports etc. all point towards the need for a transnational dispute resolution 
system, of which arbitration is overwhelmingly preferred.  It is one of the reasons that so many 
disputes emanate from the shipping world and why London maritime arbitration - in terms of 
volume of international disputes – significantly exceeds those of the arbitral institutions. 
Under the Arbitration Act 1950, a court’s refusal to grant a stay could ensure that such 
multiparty disputes remained before the court.  During his long judicial career, Lord Denning was 
involved in several multi party cases.  In the Court of Appeal case of Bruce (W) Ltd v J Strong,364 
Bakirzis & Co. Ld., a company importing figs from Greece sold two consignments to another 
company, Abraham & Co., both being members of the London Dried Fruit Trade Association.  
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The contract incorporated the rules of association which required that in the event of a dispute, it 
was to be settled by arbitration prior to any court proceedings being initiated.  The figs were 
bought and resold three times.  By the time that the final buyer W Bruce Ltd discovered that the 
figs were deficient in weight, the two months allowed under the rules of the association for 
commencing arbitration had expired.  W Bruce Ltd sued their immediate seller J Strong for 
damages.  Other party notices passed the claim up to Abraham & Co., who thereupon sought to 
bring in as fifth parties Bakirzis & Co.  The last-named applied under s.4 of the Arbitration Act 
1950 for an order to stay proceedings in the action.  The master refused the application for a stay.   
On appeal, Parker J confirmed that order and the matter reached the CA.  One of the 
difficulties that arose for the court was the two-month time bar to bring arbitration proceedings 
under the association’s rules.  At the end of the chain the sellers were in effect arguing (a) that 
court proceedings should be stayed because an arbitrator’s award was a condition precedent under 
the contract prior to the bringing of court proceedings; and simultaneously; (b) that no arbitration 
could be initiated because the two-month time bar had already passed.  
The court noted the difficulties that could arise in chain contracts and the usefulness in such 
situations to have before the court the various parties involved: ‘It is the last man who is landed 
with the goods who suffers the immediate damage’.  If the contractual terms were sufficiently 
similar, then the claim could be passed up to the person who originally contracted to sell the goods 
i.e., the parties up the chain being brought in.365  It noted: ‘[b]ut the answer is that the High Court 
has power in case of undue hardship, to extend the time for arbitration.  That was the machinery 
provided by the Act for the very difficulty which has arisen’. 366  Neither of the expressions ‘in 
the interest of justice’ or ‘in the public interest’ were in vogue at the time, but they would have 
meshed well with Denning LJ’s judicial philosophies. 
The Court’s support for avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings was also evident in Taunton-
Collins v Cromie and Others367 the claimant employer wishing to build a house, employed an 
architect and entered into a building contract with contractors on a standard Royal Institute of 
British Architects (RIBA) form which contained an arbitration clause.  The claimant considered 
the work unsatisfactory and sued the architect claiming damages for negligence and breach of 
duty in respect of alleged faults in design and lack of proper supervision of the contractors.  After 
the transfer of the action to an official referee, the claimant joined the contractors as second 
 
365 ibid 451 (Somerville LJ). 
366 ibid 458 (Denning LJ). 





respondents.  The contractors in turn applied to the official referee to stay the proceedings under 
s.4 of the Arbitration Act, in reliance upon the arbitration clause.  The official referee ordered that 
there should be no stay and the contractors appealed.   
Pearson LJ viewed it as a conflict of two well-established and important principles, namely 
(a) that the parties should normally be held to their contractual agreements; and (b) that a 
multiplicity of proceedings is highly undesirable.  The court considered that there were strong 
reasons based on the principle of avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings why the action should 
continue.  That if there were two proceeding before different tribunals there would be delay, 
increased costs, procedural difficulties: ‘If the two proceedings should go on independently, there 
might be inconsistent findings.  The decision of the official referee might conflict with the 
decision of the arbitrator’.368  
The court devised a creative solution to the issue of multi-party proceedings in Abu Dhabi 
Gas Liquefaction Co. Ltd v Eastern Betchel Corporation,369 an appeal from a construction 
arbitration.  Contracts for the erection of tanks for the purposes of liquefying gas from oil were 
made between the employers and the main contractors and between the main contractors and sub-
contractors.  The tanks were built and installed between 1973 and 1975.  After a time, cracks 
appeared in one of them, caused by brittleness in the structure:  the cost of repairs ran into millions 
of pounds.  The question then arose as to who was responsible for the repairs.  The employers 
claimed against the main contractors which in turn claimed against the sub-contractors.  The issue 
before the Court was whether there should be separate arbitrations and separate arbitrators for the 
two contracts or whether there should be one arbitrator only for both proceedings.  Bingham J 
held in the court of first instance that there should be two separate arbitrators in that if there was 
only one, the arbitrator might make an adverse finding in the first arbitration which would affect 
his decision in the second.  
The matter came before the Court of Appeal.  Recognising that it was highly desirable for 
the same arbitrator to be appointed in each arbitration and thereby avoided inconsistent findings, 
Lord Denning considered that it was equally important to ensure that neither party considered that 
any issue had been decided against them beforehand, nor without having an opportunity to be 
heard.  Although the Court could not impose conditions on the appointment of an arbitrator, it 
had the powers under s.10 of the Arbitration Act 1950 to appoint in each arbitration the same 
arbitrator.  The solution was to appoint the same arbitrator in both arbitrations.  There would be 
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a pre-trial conference at an early stage with all parties, whereby the issues could be segregated 
into those that could be separated and decided by the arbitrator at that stage and those which could 
not be separated e.g., the issue of causation.  Should the arbitrator consider that there was a 
possibility of prejudice at any point in the first arbitration he could himself excuse himself from 
the second arbitration.   
The court viewed that the ideal solution would have been an arbitration resembling a civil 
action in which claimant, respondent and third parties litigate their disputes in a single hearing: 
‘Unhappily the parties to this vast dispute are unable to agree a procedure of that kind’.370  The 
Court was unpersuaded by the argument of the risk of prejudice by having a single arbitrator for 
both arbitrations: the single arbitrator could separate out the issues at a preliminary stage and by 
so doing save time.  In Fox LJ’s view the general advantages of a single arbitrator outweighed 
the risk of prejudice.  The Court’s approach was well thought out, appointing an experience 
arbitrator (and former Lord Justice of Appeal) who was more than capable of handling the 
intricacies of the multiple references.371  Whether the typical commercial arbitrator would be so 
well equipped to deal with such complex, high value disputes is another matter. 
Concurrency and Other Commercial Practices 
In maritime string disputes, such as concurrent disputes arising under both a head charter and 
a sub-charter of the same vessel, the accepted view was that if there were inconsistent arbitration 
clauses in the two charter parties e.g., with seats in different jurisdictions or if the different 
tribunals consisted of different arbitrators, then there was probably no way in which the two 
disputes could be combined.  But in cases that called for three-man tribunals under say LMAA 
Terms, those involved in London arbitrations thought that the arbitrators could provide a remedy.  
A typical example might involve a head owner (A), a head charterer (B) and a sub-charterer 
(C) with the two charter parties both providing for arbitration in London under LMAA Terms 
before three-man tribunals consisting of two party appointed arbitrators and a third arbitrator to 
be chosen by them.  If a string dispute arose then it was unlikely that more than three (or possibly 
four) arbitrators would be appointed.  Assume ‘A’ was the claimant and appointed his arbitrator 
‘a’.  ‘B’ as the respondent in the head charter and the claimant in the sub-charter appoints as 
arbitrator ‘b’ for both disputes.  ‘C’ at the end of the chain would appoint his arbitrator in the 
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usual manner, which might be ‘a’ or a third arbitrator ‘c’.  In the case of the former, due to the 
close links in the small maritime arbitration community in London, the two party appointed 
arbitrators (‘a’ and ‘b’) would be likely to appoint the same person (‘c’) to act as third arbitrator 
in the two disputes.  Or with three party appointed arbitrators, the two tribunals consisting of (‘a’ 
+ ‘b’) and (‘b’ + ‘c’) might appoint the same individual ‘d’ as third arbitrator in both.372  The point 
being, that without thus making a formal order for consolidation, the two tribunals could schedule 
a way for both arbitrations to be heard at the same time, hearing the evidence raised in both 
arbitrations together and so avoiding the risk of inconsistent findings of fact and law being 
reached in the two disputes. 
Does this idealised scenario work in practice?  Sometimes.  But not always.  From this 
writer’s own experience, it can just lead to interminable delay as the following example illustrates.  
A chemical tanker loaded multiple grades of palm oil at the port of Kuala Tanjung on the 
Indonesian island of Sumatra in 2013.  On completion of loading the lines were ‘pigged’ and 
‘blown through’ i.e., air or nitrogen under high pressure is used to force a plastic cylinder that 
snugly fits inside the cargo pipeline that runs through the terminal pipeline system from the shore 
tank where the oil was stored to the jetty where the ship was berthed.373  During, or perhaps shortly 
after the pigging phase (accounts diverge on this point) a cargo tank over-pressurised.  Over-
pressurisation of a ship’s tank can do a little damage - or it can break a ship in two.  The ship did 
not sink, but there was extensive damage to the vessel’s internal structure.  The loud explosion 
from the ship was reportedly heard in the small resort of Wisata Alum Datuk, 5km away. 
Cargo leaked into ballast tanks and become contaminated with sea water.  Sea water leaked 
into ruptured cargo tanks containing coconut oil and various other chemicals374 contaminating 
those cargoes in the process.  Cargo leaked between cargo tanks containing different cargoes, 
resulting in commingling and off-specification.  There was no fire and no injuries to personnel, 
but the damage to ship and cargo would in the final tally exceed USD5 million.  The ship blamed 
the terminal.  The terminal pointed the finger of responsibility back to the vessel.  A series of 
disputes would emerge, that would involve the terminal, the ship, several charterers, the buyers 
and sellers of the cargo and the various owners of the other cargo parcels on board whether they 
were damaged or not.  Insurers for cargo, hull and the P&I Clubs became involved.  So too did 
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customs, the marine police and safety officials from the local authorities.  Before long the ship 
was awash with surveyors, experts and representatives of the numerous parties who had an 
interest in the ship or its cargo. 
In one of the many disputes, arbitration was initiated by the head owners (A) against the time 
charterers (B).  The arbitration agreement incorporated English law and LMAA Terms.  The time 
charterers (B) in turn commenced proceedings against the voyage charterers (C), which contract 
also incorporated English law and LMAA Terms.  So far so good: the first two arbitrations were 
capable of an LMAA provision that permitted concurrency, with the potential for saving time and 
expense.  The voyage charterers (C) initiated arbitration proceedings against the sub-charterers 
(D).  However, the applicable arbitration clause here was an ad hoc arbitration subject to 
Singapore law, with no institutional terms or rules applying.  This writer was appointed as 
arbitrator in the three arbitrations in 2013: by head owners (A) in the first arbitration; by voyage 
charterers (C) as respondents in the second arbitration; and by the same voyage charterers, now 
as claimants in the (ad hoc) third arbitration.  Three arbitrations comprising similarly constituted 
panels in the two LMAA arbitrations and a differently constituted tribunal (but with one common 
arbitrator) in the Singapore arbitration.   
Did the arrangement assist in resolving the dispute fairly and quickly?  No. The parties were 
unable to agree consolidation or concurrency or in fact much else at all.  All three disputes dragged 
on over the course of the next seven years, during which two party appointed arbitrators passed 
away and being duly replaced before the parties finally reached a mediated, though partial 
settlement in January 2020.  The informality and closeness of the participants in say London 
arbitrations may work to advantage in some instances, but it is not the evergreen panacea it is 
sometimes promoted as being.  It certainly cannot substitute for a formal approach to 
consolidation.375 
It was not until Oxford Shipping Co. v Nippon Yussen Kaisha (The Eastern Saga)376 that 
English law considered that arbitration was viewed as generally confidential as opposed to merely 
private; that there existed an unqualified rule that arbitrators enjoy no power to order concurrent 
hearings of related arbitrations.  The vessel’s owners had chartered the ship to NYK who in turn 
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had sub-chartered the vessel to Sanco.  A dispute arose between owners and charterers, mirrored 
by a dispute between charterers and sub-charterers.  The same arbitrators were appointed in 
respect of each of the disputes.  An application was made to the arbitrators for an order for 
concurrent hearings in each of the references.  Holding that they held such powers, the tribunal 
made an order for concurrent hearings, a not unusual procedural order at the time.  It therefore 
came as something of a surprise when a challenge was made to the exercise of this arbitral soft 
power.  The owners contended that the arbitrators had no such power because either (a) they did 
not enjoy it by statute or at common law or, alternatively, (b) because there was an implied term 
in the arbitration agreement between the owners and charterers that the arbitration was private.  
The arbitrators, recognising perhaps that the law was unclear on the jurisdiction point, encouraged 
an appeal to the Courts, the tribunal welcoming ‘the view from The Strand’.377   
Leggatt J noted that the matter raised the question ‘often discussed but apparently never 
decided by a Court’ as to whether arbitrators had the power or jurisdiction to order concurrency 
(i.e., the concurrent hearing of two arbitrations) without the consent of the parties.  It was 
recognised that matters which start within the privacy of an arbitration may become public e.g., 
when leave to appeal is granted and matters arising out of an arbitration come before the Court of 
Appeal.  The court viewed the concept of private arbitration as deriving simply from the fact that 
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration disputes that arose between them and only between 
them.  It was therefore implicit in this construction that strangers should be excluded from the 
arbitration hearings.  Neither the tribunal nor the parties could insist that the dispute be heard or 
determined concurrently nor consolidated with any other another dispute, irrespective of how 
convenient that option may or however closely associated with each other the disputes may be.   
The Court held that arbitrators enjoy no power to order concurrent hearings without the 
consent of the parties.  The only powers that arbitrators enjoy relate to the reference in which they 
have been appointed.  That power could not be extended merely because a similar dispute exists 
that was capable of being and is referred separately to arbitration under a different agreement. 
The court held that it was ‘graven upon the heart of any commercial lawyer’ that arbitrators enjoy 
no power to order concurrent hearings without the consent of the parties.378   
The desirability of there being a power to order consolidation was also discussed in the CA 
in Interbulk Ltd. v Aiden Shipping Co. Ltd. (“The Vimeira”).379  The court observed that it was 
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well known that related arbitrations can arise out of the same factual dispute: that disputes 
between owners and charterers on the one hand and charterers and sub-charterers on the other 
(with regard to damage suffered by the ship at a loading or discharging port for example) were a 
classic instance of such a situation.  Nevertheless, English arbitration law provided no power 
either to arbitrators or the Courts to ensure that the same tribunal can hear both arbitrations - either 
by consolidation or through immediately succeeding hearings - so as to avoid the danger of 
inconsistent awards: ‘There is … no means of ordering consolidation of two such related 
arbitrations’.380   
Whilst noting that Hong Kong arbitration law had found a solution to this issue, this was not 
so in England.  In a reference to those responsible for proposing and formulating amendments to 
the arbitration laws, the court expressed the hope that: ‘…the present case will, I trust, provide an 
additional impetus and urgency to the efforts now being made to fill this gap in our law’.  Ackner 
LJ agreed: ‘If ever there was a case that emphasized the need for additional powers of the 
arbitrators and the Court, this is such a case’.381  In the ‘Strand’s view’ there was a gap in the law 
that is still waiting to be filled. 
The difficulties that consolidation of arbitration proceedings evoked was not universally 
recognised by the judiciary as an intractable problem in need of fixing.  Compare the views 
conveyed by the court in The Vimeria with that in World Pride Shipping v Diachi Chuo K.K. (The 
Golden Anne):382 ‘The inconvenience of multiple arbitrations, though it exists, can be 
exaggerated’.  The court considered that it was not a new problem and one that London arbitrators 
had evolved ways to deal with.  For example, assuming a degree of co-operation between the 
parties, the inconvenience could be reduced and so too the risk limited of conflicting decisions, 
by tribunals hearing arbitrations together or sequentially, one immediately after the other. An 
eminently reasonable approach, but in some respects idealistic and not always workable.  As 
practical experience and examples have shewn, parties to an arbitration tend to avoid comprise if 
it is viewed as strategically weak or outside their commercial interests.  In arbitration, for the 
parties winning is all.  
The views of commentators are similarly divided.  Collins posed two privacy questions in 
relation to arbitration.  Whether there was a prohibition on consolidation or the holding of 
concurrent hearings in the absence of agreement by the parties; and if the use of materials used in 
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an arbitration for any purpose other than the arbitration itself, was prohibited.383  Collins 
concluded that choice of law and any applicable institutional rules that may apply 
notwithstanding, in the case of English law the answer to both questions was likely to be a ‘yes’, 
whereas jurisdictions such as in the United States and Australia the answer was probably ‘no’.  In 
the case of English law, Collins is undoubtedly correct, consolidation is still not permitted.   
Inconsistent Decisions 
It was suggested in the consultation process on the 1996 Act that the arbitrators should have 
the very power denied to them in The Eastern Saga, either absolutely or unless the parties agreed 
to remove it from them.  However, the DAC in its February 1996 Report384 considered that 
consolidation was too difficult to legislate: however justifiable consolidation might be in terms 
of speed and efficiency, it would undermine the fundamental principle of party autonomy.  The 
DAC therefore refrained from recommending that parties should be forced to arbitrate with those 
whom they had not contracted.  The old common law remained.  Saville LJ, responding to 
criticism385 replied that arbitration institutions should prepare terms to enable such consolidated 
arbitration: the LMAA 2017 Terms do at least address the issue of concurrency, which a tribunal 
has the power to exercise under 16(b).  But neither mandatory consolidation nor empowerment 
of the courts to order a consolidation of proceedings appear in the Arbitration Act 1996, where 
s.35 is restricted to a statement of principle emphasising the party’s freedom to confer upon the 
arbitrators the power to consolidate proceedings or to hold concurrent proceedings.  Thus it 
remains the case that one arbitral tribunal may reach a view on the interpretation of a certain term, 
and another tribunal may reach quite a different view: neither of those views binds the other, nor 
anyone else.  More generally of course, no one other than the parties to a specific arbitration are 
likely to be even aware of a tribunal’s views on any specific matter, because of the confidentiality 
arbitral awards invariably attract. 
The English court approach that confidentiality is implied by law was exemplified and upheld 
in Lincoln National Life Insurance Co v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada and Others.386  The 
case was concerned with whether a stranger was bound by an interpretation of contract held in an 
arbitral decision.  It was recognised that different arbitrations on closely inter-linked issues might 
as a result lead to different results, despite the evidence before the different tribunals being largely 
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the same.  Arbitrators in each arbitration are appointed to decide the disputes in that arbitration, 
i.e., between the particular parties to that arbitration.  The privacy and confidentiality attaching to 
arbitration underline this: ‘[e]ven if they do not lead to non-parties remaining ignorant of an 
earlier arbitration award, they are calculated to lead to difficulties in obtaining access, and about 
the scope of any access, to material relating to that award’.  The court considered that the inability 
to enforce the solutions of joinder of parties or proceedings in arbitration, or to try connected 
arbitrations together other than by consent, was well-recognised: ‘[t]hough the popularity of 
arbitration may indicate that this inability is not often inconvenient or that perceived advantages 
of arbitration, including confidentiality and privacy are seen as outweighing any 
inconvenience’.387    
The court was well aware of the prospect of two arbitrators coming to inconsistent decisions 
based on the same set of facts: ‘The sad truth is that in the absence of any third-party or 
consolidation procedure in arbitration, parties may be put into the position of making inconsistent 
cases in different proceedings’.388  In considering the difference between litigation and arbitration, 
noting that whilst in litigation it is possible to make inconsistent cases in the same proceedings, 
and if done later, in different proceedings, it could be considered as an abuse of process, the Court 
considered that was not a reason to extend the law of issue estoppel in arbitration proceedings. 
This reversed the same Court’s reasoning some 20 years earlier in Abu Dhabi Gas 
Liquefaction Co. Ltd v Eastern Betchel Corporation.389  Saville J’s comments in the George 
Moundreas and Co SA v Navimpex Centrala Navala390 accepting parts of an arbitration award 
into court as facts, objected to by the respondents on the grounds that the award only represented 
the opinion of the arbitrators and was thus inadmissible as evidence was summed up by Lord 
Mance: ‘[t]he conclusion that I would reach is that … the dicta of Mr. Justice Saville in 
Moundreas cannot be regarded as reflecting or as based on any general principle of law in the 
arbitral context to which they were directed’.391 
Do Users Have a Say?  
In addressing consolidation, the Report on the Arbitration Act 1996 asked the following 
question: ‘Those who drafted the Act felt unable to find a satisfactory solution to the problems 
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that would arise from statutory provisions for the consolidation of arbitrations, and so made none. 
Do you think this position should be changed?’  Despite the leading nature of the question, of the 
192 responses the replies were finely balanced between 43 percent who indicated that there should 
be no change and 42 percent who thought that there should.392  The Committee, like the DAC 
before it, was not receptive to authorising consolidation in the statute, considering that the 
‘conceptual difficulties’ could not be overcome.  It echoed the conclusion of an earlier DAC 
Committee reporting under Sir Michael Mustill in 1991, against a provision for consolidation.  
The arguments included that a power to consolidate would inevitably lead to delay and extra 
expense whilst the consolidation is debated in the courts; the serious risk that judicially imposed 
consolidation may make the award unenforceable overseas; and that consolidated proceedings 
would inevitably take longer and cost more than one separate set of arbitration proceedings.  In 
summary the DAC’s Second Report concluded against consolidation on the grounds that: ‘In our 
view there are formidable obstacles’.393  
Cohen had a different interpretation of the results, noting that the respondents who expressed 
an opinion were nearly evenly divided about whether the 1996 Act should empower the courts to 
order consolidation of arbitral proceedings, that the risk of inconsistent awards where related 
contracts contained the same arbitration clause was a major flaw of the arbitral process.  Cohen 
compared the English position with Holland, where the law authorises court ordered consolidation 
unless the parties have agreed to bar it.  And also to the United States, where common law 
consolidation of arbitrations had been allowed for several decades, unless the parties had 
prohibited it in their agreement: there were few problems in practice.  The most difficult issue is 
when a clause provides for party-appointed arbitrators because, unless the size of the arbitral 
tribunal is enlarged by the court (which was done, from time to time, in the United States), a party 
might not always be able to exercise a personal choice for one of the arbitrators.394  Cohen was 
critical of the failure to address consolidation and proposed a revised wording of the statute. 
In the case of some administered arbitrations an appointing authority chooses all of the 
members of the tribunal. 395  Even when a clause provides for party appointed arbitrators, in order 
to obtain consolidation a party has been known to waive its right to have a personal choice on the 
panel. For example, in two related agreements each of which contained an identical clause 
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providing for disputes to be heard by a sole arbitrator, two of the three parties could agree to 
accept as sole arbitrator the nominee of the person who would not voluntarily agree to 
consolidation.  In cases involving a back-to-back charter and sub-charter, it is not unusual in the 
United States for a head charterer in the middle simply to waive its right to nominate an arbitrator, 
submitting instead to a tribunal consisting of one arbitrator appointed by each of the other two 
parties and the third by the two so chosen.   
Unfortunately, the Committee did not satisfactorily address why the court should not have 
the power to order consolidation of related proceedings under identical arbitration clauses.  The 
Commercial Court’s Report as to whether there should be changes in consolidation stated: ‘no 
one could say how to overcome the conceptual difficulties which the DAC outlined, let alone how 
that might be done satisfactorily’.396  The justification was that attitudes to confidentiality were 
complex, with no agreement or consistent theme as to what limits or exceptions there should be, 
a consideration which persuaded the authors to militate strongly against any attempt to codify 
rules on confidentiality.397   
Institutional Rules and Consolidation 
The small number of arbitral institutions that provide a template for consolidation are 
discussed below under three categories: consolidation allowed by agreement; by order of the 
institution; and where the rules so empower the tribunal. 
Institutions that Allow Consolidation by Agreement 
The GMAA Rules specifically address the consolidation of arbitrations at Art.8, which upon 
the request of one or more parties, empowers the DIS to consolidate two or more arbitrations 
conducted under the Rules into a single arbitration if all parties to all of the arbitrations consent 
to the consolidation.  Article 17 concerns multi-contract and Art.18 multi-party arbitrations.  
Claims arising out of or in connection with more than one contract may be decided in a single 
arbitration provided that all of the parties to the arbitration agree.  Any dispute as to whether all 
of the parties have so agreed - and in particular when there is no express agreement in writing to 
that effect - it is for the arbitral tribunal to decide.  Similarly, as per Art.17.2, claims that are made 
in reliance on more than one arbitration agreements may be decided in a single arbitration 
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providing the parties agree and where such arbitration agreements are compatible.   
Claims made in an arbitration with multiple parties may be decided in that arbitration ‘if there 
is an arbitration agreement that binds all of the parties to have their claims decided in a single 
arbitration…’  Any dispute as to whether the parties have so agreed, in particular when there is 
no express agreement in writing to that effect, is to be decided by the arbitral tribunal.  As per 
Art.18.2, the provisions relating to of Art.17 Multi-Contract Arbitrations apply in addition to the 
provisions of Art.18.  This presumably relates to those provisions of Art.17 concerning agreement 
of the parties and the termination provisions that the DIS may exercise at Art.42.4 (ii).  The 
difficulty with both Art.8 and Art.17 is that in both cases it requires the parties consent: ‘…if all 
parties to all of the arbitrations consent…’ and ‘…if all parties to all of the arbitrations consent to 
the consolidation…’ respectively. 
The 2014 LCIA Rules include at Art.22.1(ix) the ability to consolidate into a single 
arbitration (with the approval of the LCIA Court), one or more other arbitrations into a single 
arbitration subject to all the parties to the arbitrations to be consolidated being in agreement.  
Consolidation also applies at Art.22.1(x) to arbitrations commenced under the same arbitration 
agreement or where the same parties are in dispute in any compatible arbitration agreement(s).  
The 2014 LCIA Rules suffer from the same limitation as the GMAA Rules: consolidation requires 
party agreement.   
Institutions That Can Consolidate or Order Concurrency 
The revised 2020 LCIA Rules have however addressed some of these issues.  Under Art.1.2 
a Claimant wishing to commence more than one arbitration under the LCIA Rules (whether 
against one or more Respondents and under one or more Arbitration Agreements) may serve what 
the LCIA refers to as a ‘composite’ request for arbitration in order to commence multiple 
arbitrations at the same time.  The 2020 LCIA Rules introduce a new article, Article 22A Power 
to Order Consolidation/Concurrent Conduct of Arbitration.  A key new provision grants a 
Tribunal the power with the approval of the LCIA Court to order, with caveats, consolidation (at 
Art.22.7(ii)) or concurrency (at Art.22.7(iii) of proceedings subject to giving all affected parties 
‘a reasonable opportunity to state their views’. 
Singapore’s SCMA Rules under Rule 33, Additional Powers of the Tribunal, permit that 
where two or more arbitrations appear to raise common issues of fact or law, the tribunals are 





at least a potential saving of time and cost but falls short of consolidation.  The SIAC Rules go 
slightly further, detailing the procedures that permits the Court to allow at its discretion joinder 
of additional parties.  Rule 8 covers the detailed provisions for consolidation of two or more 
arbitrations under the SIAC Rules into a single arbitration.  Consolidation is allowed if one of the 
following is met: all parties have agreed to the consolidation; or all the claims in the arbitrations 
are made under the same arbitration agreement; or the arbitration agreements are compatible, and 
the disputes arise out of the same legal relationship(s) or arise out of the same transaction or series 
of transactions. 
Institutional Rules That Grant Consolidation or Concurrency Powers to the Tribunal  
The HKIAC goes further.  The Administered Arbitration Rules 2018, Art.28 provide detailed 
requirements with respect to consolidation.  Consolidation is at the discretion of the HKIAC: it 
does not require agreement between the parties under Art.28.1.  Article 29 deals with the related 
issue of a single arbitrations under multiple contracts.  Article 30 provides for concurrent 
proceedings at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal where the same arbitral tribunal is constituted 
in each arbitration and there is a common question of law or fact arising in all the arbitrations. 
Overseas Jurisdictions and Consolidation 
Article 1046 of the Netherland’s Arbitration Act 1986 gives the President of the District 
Court in Amsterdam a discretionary power to order the consolidation of proceedings where the 
subject matters are connected at the request of one of the parties.  Under this article however there 
is a risk that one or more of the parties may lose their appointed arbitrator: if the parties cannot 
agree on the appointment of an uneven number of arbitrators within the period of time prescribed, 
the responsibility for the appointments falls on the President of the District Court. 
If an arbitral tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction by inappropriately ordering consolidation, it 
risks having the award set aside.  An example of such a pitfall that can trap an unwary arbitral 
tribunal came from the US Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen SA v Animal Feeds International 
Corporation398 which set aside a partial interim award consolidating multiple arbitrations 
involving different parties against various ship-owners, involving similar arbitration agreements.  
The claimants sought consolidation of the multiple proceeding, an application opposed by the 
respondents.  The tribunal considered that the necessary preconditions had been met, including 
common questions of law and fact among the different claims and so allowed the consolidation 
 





of the claims.  The US Supreme Court vacated the award, holding that the arbitrators had exceeded 
their powers by imposing their own policy choice rather than in accordance with the law.  In the 
eyes of the Court, efficiency was insufficient grounds on which to base a decision to impose upon 
the respondents a class or consolidated arbitration to which they had not consented.  Concurrency 
in the USA at least is less controversial, where the 2nd Circuit decided that arbitrators have the 
power to order concurrent hearings of related disputes.  It was sometimes viewed as a distinct 
advantage of a party’s decision to opt for New York arbitration, where it is possible to combine 
different arbitrations at a single hearing, a feature particularly useful in maritime arbitrations.  
However, there is also a view that procedural issues caused by unwieldy hearings and problems 
with regard to the scheduling of hearing dates have taken the gloss off New York SMA 
arbitration.399 
Chapter 5 Summary 
Objections to changes to the Arbitration Act do exist: ‘…there is always a group that favours 
maintaining the status quo.  As with all policy changes, there will be winners and losers’.400  One 
argument is that the existence of a legislative power to order concurrent hearings would constitute 
a risk to the confidentiality of the arbitration process.  Would this though be a case of ‘…elevating 
the subsidiary virtue of confidentiality into something of a sacred cow to treat this factor as a 
determinative reason for objecting to the proposed power?’401  Another concern is that it would 
reintroduce the interference of the courts that was done away by the Arbitration Act 1996: ‘Such 
a view is ... out of keeping with the current view that the parties should have complete autonomy 
over the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and the procedure which it is to follow’.402  And would 
the existence of a compulsory power of the Court to order concurrent hearings be viewed as an 
unattractive element of the arbitration process?  Perhaps, but probably not.  The results of the 
Commercial Users Survey revealed that views were finely balanced. 
It is now 30 years since the LMAA put forward proposals to the DTI Departmental 
Committee on Arbitration law in June 1990.403  The LMAA did not suggest new legislation for 
the Courts to be given power to order the consolidation of two or more arbitrations, but instead 
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the exercise of a discretion that would allow for the limited relaxation of the rules of arbitral 
confidentiality, where, and only where, such relaxation was necessary in order to avoid the risk 
of inconsistent decisions.  As summarized by Diamond, these suggestions were: (1) courts would 
be vested with a discretion to order the concurrent hearings of two or more arbitrations where 
necessary to avoid inconsistent conclusions of fact or law; (2) that where such discretion is 
exercised, the Court could order that documents disclosable in one arbitration be disclosed to one 
or more parties to the other arbitration(s); (3) the court would not replace arbitrators appointed by 
the parties; (4) the court would be required to balance the risk of any loss of confidentiality against 
the risks of inconsistent findings inherent in refusing to make the order; and (5) the Court’s power 
would apply to ad hoc arbitrations only: it would not extend to situations where the arbitration 
agreement provided that an arbitral institution was charged with the administration of the 
arbitration.404  These proposals were not taken up, but nevertheless form a useful basis for a 
statutory codification. 
The DAC considered that it ‘would amount to a negation of the principle of party autonomy’ 
to allow court ordered consolidation.  This is to my mind is not a persuasive or sustainable 
viewpoint.  Reform is strongly suggested on the grounds of practicality, cost, time and not least 
by being supported by an overwhelmingly majority of the judiciary who have considered the 
matter.  One solution could simply be the reversal of the existing default rule prohibiting 
consolidation, replacing it with a rule authorising consolidation.  This would be subject to s.4(2), 
under which the parties have the option to prevent consolidation by positively excluding as a 
contractual term in the arbitration clause.  Whilst the ability to order consolidation has advantages, 
it would have to satisfy at least the following conditions: (a) The arbitrations have the same seat; 
(b) the same law governs the related disputes; and (c) the procedural rules of the related disputes 
are the same. 
I therefore suggest the following amendment: 
Consolidation 
(a) The court may on an application by one of the parties order either consolidation or 
concurrency of related arbitral proceedings under multiple arbitration agreements which 
are substantially similar, provided no party is deprived of its right to appoint its own 
nominee as an arbitrator. 
(b) The court shall not order consolidation where an arbitration is being conducted under 
the supervision of an arbitral institution. 
(c) Where consolidation or concurrency is ordered under this section, the Court may order 
that documents disclosable in one arbitration be disclosed to one or more parties to the 
 







(d) The court shall balance the risk of any loss of confidentiality against the risks of 
inconsistent findings inherent in refusing to make the order. 
By addressing the issue of party autonomy and not depriving a party of its choice of arbitrator, 
a potential issue of how to deal with two or more differently composed tribunals is addressed.  In 





Chapter 6: Third Party Funding 
‘Parties shall not by their countenance aid the prosecution of suits of any kind; every person must bring his 
suit upon his own bottom and at his own expense’405 
- Wallis v Duke of Portland 
Introduction to Third Party Funding (TPF) 
According to the CIArb’s ‘Costs of International Arbitration Survey 2011’ a typical claimant 
spends approximately £1,580,000, while respondents spent an average of £1,413,000.406  These 
are significant figures.  The small sample size and the low number of arbitrations the statistics are 
derived from - a survey of 254 international commercial arbitrations conducted between 1991 and 
2010 - suggest the survey captured a disproportionate number of large and expensive claims that 
exaggerate the true cost of a typical arbitration.  At one end of the scale will be a typical LMAA 
arbitration dispute involving a modest, five-figure demurrage claim.  In an LCIA arbitration by 
contrast the average sum in dispute in 2017 and 2018 was over USD 50 million.  As these sums 
highlight, pursuing a claim through arbitration for some disputants can be prohibitively expensive 
without external financing.  This chapter deals with one of the newest additions to that category, 
third party funding.  Hereafter both third party funding and the organisation who supply the 
money, third party funders, will be collectively abbreviated to TPF.   
Whilst the term third party funding can be considered misleading, having entered into the 
lexicography and become synonymous with litigation funding, the adoption of an alternative 
phraseology would likely result in confusion.  TPF is conceptually similar to ATE insurance.  
There is no internationally agreed definition of TPF, but it is generally accepted as a type of 
investment, granted by means of a contractual agreement between party to an arbitration (more 
commonly the claimant than the respondent) and a funder unrelated to the proceedings. TPF is 
thus the provision by a third party of capital to fund the costs of pursuing a claim in the expectation 
of a return to the funder of any recovery in arbitration.  Or as Peysner described it: ‘In principle 
Third Party Funding (TPF) is just the same as borrowing money from the bank to finance a party’s 
litigation’.407  Although of course banks do not traditionally take a cut in the form of a percentage 
from the proceeds of the litigation.  Before proceeding further, despite the inherent difficulties 
noted by a number of institutions, a definition for a TPF is called for.  The following is proposed: 
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Definition of Third Party Funding 
Third party funding is the provision of funds for the purposes of making or defending a 
claim in an arbitration by a person or entity that is not a party to the dispute in return for 
remuneration or reimbursement wholly or partially dependent on the outcome of the 
proceeding. 
This definition has the virtue of differentiating it from financial support from an insurer who 
does not directly benefit - nor has a stake - in the outcome of the dispute. 
Issues Relating to Third Party Funding 
A TPF will by definition be a third party to the arbitration with consequently no right to 
participate in the arbitration proceedings and would be relying on the funded party or their legal 
representatives for information about those proceedings.  The degree to which a funder is involved 
in the management of the claim varies.  Whilst solicitors acting on behalf of a party would 
generally be aware of the existence and identity of the funder, that is not always the case.  It is 
also not uncommon for funders to be involved in the selection of solicitors as well as payment of 
their fees.  As a consequence the solicitors may well be directly accountable to the funder for the 
conduct of the arbitration.   
The first issue in connection with a funded arbitration therefore relates to disclosure.  
Specifically, whether the arbitral tribunal and opposing party should be informed about the 
funding.  Unless the funded party voluntarily discloses the existence of such funding, it is unlikely 
that either the tribunal or the other party will become aware of it.  There is currently no obligation 
under the Arbitration Act 1996 to disclose that a party to an arbitration is being funded by a third 
party.  Furthermore, there is no consensus as to whether and if so to what extent disclosure should 
be made.  Those in support of a general obligation to disclose TPF argue that such an obligation 
is required to tackle the potential imbalances and other problems TPF creates.  Opponents of 
disclosure argue that imposing a general duty to disclose TPF is unworkable and unnecessary; 
that existing general disclosure rules and international arbitration practices sufficiently address 
the twin issues of transparency and disclosure. 
The starting point therefore is whether an (a) an arbitral tribunal should require the party to 
state if they are being funded and if so, (b) to disclose details of that funding.  Whilst TPF is 
arguably not so radically different to other existing forms of litigation finance, in circumstances 
where the involvement of a TPF is not known either to the opposing party or the tribunal, it raises 
discrete issues of confidentiality, potential conflicts of interest and enforceability of costs orders 





statutory regulation of TPF will be explored and a suggested form of what a proposed amendment 
to the Arbitration Act could embrace.  Although TPF also touches on transparency, for the 
purposes of continuity the subject will be dealt with here rather than in Chapter 9. 
Champerty & Maintenance 
In many common law jurisdictions this was and remains illegal, contravening the doctrine of 
champerty and the related concept of maintenance.408  According to Hodges, Peysner and Nurse, 
they arose in order to retain the purity of the litigation process, thereby preventing speculation in 
litigation by those who ‘had no interest in the legal process or the pursuit of justice, and whose 
activities might amount to an abuse of process’.409  Chitty on Contracts defines champerty as: ‘the 
person maintaining another stipulates for a share in the proceeds of the action or suit or other 
contentious proceeds where property is in dispute’410 and of maintenance: ‘if he supports litigation 
in which he has no legitimate concern without just cause or excuse’.411  The traditional eighteenth 
century viewpoint was exemplified by the Lord Chancellor Loughborough in Wallis v Duke of 
Portland412 that ‘maintenance is not malum prohibitum, but malum in se’.413 By the time of  Lord 
Denning’s comment that: ‘Maintenance is a very ancient offence.  It was a crime, and also a civil 
wrong, officiously to intermeddle in another man's lawsuit,’414 the strict application of the rules 
of maintenance and champerty had largely fallen away.  There were exceptions, but these never 
were clearly defined.  Referring to the earlier case of Oram v Hutt,415 Lord Denning commented: 
‘[t]he modern law is not to be rested on those old notions’.416 
In Ireland, the funding of litigation by a TPF with no interest in the proceedings who enters 
into a form of profit-sharing agreement was regarded as likely falling foul of the offences and 
torts of maintenance and champerty.  The issue arose in Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v Minister 
for Public Enterprise417 where the Supreme Court concluded by a four to one majority that a 
professional TPF arrangement does come within the scope of maintenance and champerty:   
It may be true that such third party funding can enhance access to justice and foster 
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development of the law but there are, also other consequences…  One of the historical 
objections to maintenance and champerty was the risk of the perversion of justice.418 
The minority judgement expressed unease that a case of significant public importance could 
not be litigated due to the rules on champerty and maintenance with its negative implications in 
undermining access to justice.419  In light of the diversity of opinion expressed in the Court’s 
judgement Biehler’s comments that in light of the of ‘…the difficulties posed by the increasing 
complexity and cost of litigation’ that it is a matter that needs addressing sooner rather than later 
is likely correct.420 
A Concept Rooted in Antiquity 
The origins of third-party support for disputing litigants can trace its roots to the oldest and 
earliest forms of maritime insurance, general average (“GA”).  GA possesses a pedigree dating 
back to antiquity: ‘…it is as old  as seafaring and it was known certainly to the Greeks, probably 
to the Phoenicians’.421  It was born out of a viewpoint that all parties who partook or had an 
interest in a voyage would share in any voluntary sacrifice of cargo or damage to the ship 
occasioned or necessitated by some misfortune in order for that maritime adventure to continue.  
As the centre of maritime commerce migrated from its medieval insurance roots of Greece and 
Rome, London appeared in the seventeenth century as the new global trading hub.  With it new 
forms of marine insurance developed, our traditions associating their beginnings in Edward 
Lloyd’s coffee shop of the 1680’s.  Initially it was hull insurance that covered the loss of the 
vessel.  In time this expanded with the formation of small protection and indemnity associations 
(now commonly known as P&I Clubs) to provide third party insurance to cover those claims 
unrecoverable from the hull (and later hull and machinery) underwriters, such as loss or damage 
to cargo, personal injury and collision liability cover.  
P&I Clubs did not initially provide assistance in covering the cost of fighting an owner’s 
legal battles with cargo owners or charterers.  As trade expanded, with it came an increase in 
claims and disputes between owners and charterers, leading to the creation of specialised 
insurance that fell outside of traditional mutual club cover.  That support was provided by the P&I 
Clubs (and some speciality Defence Clubs) as “Freight, Demurrage and Defence” insurance, more 
commonly known as “FD&D” or just “Defence”.  Amongst the largest are the UK Defence Club, 
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incorporated in England in 1888 and the Nordisk Skibsrederforening (the Nordisk Defence Club 
in English) in Oslo in 1889. 
FD&D provides cover for legal costs and claims handling assistance in relation to disputes 
involving an entered vessel that are outside the scope of the standard P&I or H&M insurance e.g., 
the costs of pursuing or defending claims and disputes in relation to charter parties, bills of lading, 
shipbuilding or sale and purchase of vessels.  FD&D cover was and generally still is, a 
discretionary legal costs insurance.422  It protects members’ interests and assets by supporting 
them to recover claims for uninsured losses and/or to defend and resist any actions brought against 
them, that fall within the remit of a P&I or Defence Club’s rules.423 To some eyes, FD&D is 
merely another form of TPF that has through historical accident evaded regulation.  We will return 
to that theme later in the chapter. 
Modern Litigation Finance 
Beyond the narrow confines of the shipping industry, the two most common forms of 
litigation insurance are before-the-event (BTE) or after-the-event (ATE) legal protection 
insurance.  BTE provides cover against possible future claims, being purchased before any legal 
dispute has arisen.  It typically includes legal advice, representation and the costs and expense of 
legal proceedings.  Nevertheless, according to the 2013 PWC survey, BTE insurance remains 
relatively uncommon with 6 percent of respondents reportedly having made use of it in an 
arbitration.424   
The Access to Justice Act 1999 aimed to reduce the amount spent on Legal Aid and provide 
an alternative to traditional litigation finance.  It replaced the Legal Aid Board with the Legal 
Services Commission.  Two new schemes were created: the Community Legal Service to fund 
civil and family cases and the Criminal Defence Service for criminal cases.  The Act introduced 
the use of ‘Conditional Fee Agreements’ (‘No Win No Fee’) in most civil court cases and After 
the Event Insurance (‘ATE’).  ATE policies, as their name implies, provide insurance cover for 
an existing dispute.  Proceedings will generally not have started nor significant legal costs 
incurred.  Cover tends to be available only where the insurer assesses that there is a high prospect 
of success.  Should the case fail, ATE insurance would protect the insured against the risk of 
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having to pay their own expenses and adverse costs.   
The Jackson Reforms 
The recoverability of ATE insurance premiums as part of the legal costs were frequently 
challenged.425  The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 implemented 
the reforms of Jackson LJ.  Changes in relation to the funding of civil litigation included that the 
premium had to be paid by the insured out of any damages received.  The Jackson Reforms also 
led to the introduction of damages-based agreements (DBA’s).  Envisaged as an important 
litigation funding tool by Sir Jackson in his 2009 report ‘Review of Civil Litigation Costs’, DBA’s 
are not dissimilar to the contingency fee agreement concept found in the United States.  If 
successful, the solicitor’s fees are calculated as a percentage of the financial benefit obtained: in 
commercial cases they are capped at 50 percent.  If unsuccessful, the solicitor receives no fee.  
Their use however is infrequent.  Lord Jackson viewed this as due to a combination of three 
reasons.  The first was poorly drafted DBA Regulations.  Secondly, that due to the indemnity 
principle, one side could advance technical arguments of the kind that gained popularity during 
the ‘Costs War’ over CFAs.426  And in larger cases, whilst solicitors and clients might wish to 
enter ‘no win – low fee’ DBAs, there was a concern that these would fall outside the existing 
DBA Regulations.427  CFA arrangements are in themselves not above criticism.  They are for 
example banned in Singapore, although The Law Ministry sought public feedback in 2019 on its 
proposal to legalise CFA’s for prescribed categories of proceedings.428 
Why TPF? 
Numerous articles in the past ten years endeavour to paint TPF as a radically new form of 
litigation finance.  And undoubtedly TPF does raise new issues.  The ICCA - Queen Mary Task 
Force was set up to examine and investigate the impact of TPF on the process of international 
commercial arbitration; to provide a forum to discuss and debate TPF issues.  It envisioned that 
parties, counsel and arbitrators would reference or ‘invoke the Principles and analysis … to 
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address issues that arise in the course of an arbitration, in entering into a funding agreement, and 
in continued discussions and debates regarding third-party funding’.429  However it may be 
dressed up, at its heart TPF is just another business model for which investors seek returns. 
In return for providing the capital to fund the costs of legal representation, expert’s fees, fees 
of the arbitral institution and tribunal as required, the TPF shares in the proceeds if the litigant 
wins the case or a settlement is reached.  If the claim is unsuccessful, the funder receives nothing.  
Depending on the provisions of the contract, the TPF may be obliged to cover the costs of the 
proceedings, including those of the prevailing party: ‘…non-recourse financing, where repayment 
is contingent on the client’s success in the dispute, is the quintessential scenario for third-party 
funding in international arbitration’.430  TPF is to be distinguished from a contingency fee 
arrangement.  Whilst the extent of such funding of arbitration in England is unknown, it has 
existed for several years in litigation as evidenced in the law reports.  A survey of English cases 
indicates that there were two cases involving TPF in 2000.  In 2010 this rose to 7, to 19 in 2015 
and reached a peak in 2018 when there were 23 TPF cases before the English courts.431  TPF is 
also increasingly used in investment arbitrations.  As ICSID has noted in its 2018 Report: ‘…there 
has been increased resort to third-party funding (TPF) in domestic and international litigation, 
including in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).  TPF is obtained mainly by claimants, but 
has also been used by respondents, including States’.432 
What are the criteria TPF rely on to determine whether or not to fund a dispute?  The strength 
and the value of the claim and the probability of winning, or at least reaching a settlement, are 
primary considerations.  A typical TPF will not consider a case unless the claim exceeds USD 1 
million, for some the threshold is USD 2 million.  The expected length of the arbitration 
proceedings counts: the general view is that TPF’s tend to avoid protected disputes i.e., lasting 
more than two years.  The financial strength of the opponent is important, as a win against an 
impecunious party may be meaningless.  Jurisdictional factors come into play.  The seat of the 
arbitration, any applicable arbitral institutional rules and the country of any award enforcement 
are all relevant.  Peripheral issues such as the experience of the legal team and the quality of the 
evidence and witness evidence may be considered. 
When the ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force published its final report in April 2018 there were 
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extensive disclaimers, recognising that in such industries such as maritime, forms of TPF had 
long-existed.433  The report however did not attempt to address dispute funding in the maritime 
arbitration context, considering maritime arbitration as outside its recommendations because of 
its ‘distinctive features, in particular the fact that mutual funding by P&I Clubs is well established 
and already subject to a set of existing practices and internal norms’.434  Rather, it considered the 
maritime insurance context as a useful reference point when discussing TPF as a whole. 
One of the reasons for this was that the Report recognised that maritime arbitrations typically 
involve a specialized pool of independent, full-time arbitrators and a well-regulated industry of 
mutual funding by P&I and Defence Clubs within an established and transparent regime.  
Awareness of the identity of an insurer of a ship is rarely an issue in the maritime context.  It is 
not a compulsory form of insurance in the same manner as say that required under the Wreck 
Removal Convention, CLC or CLC Bunkers for wreck removal,435 oil spill436 or bunker spills437 
respectively.  For all practical purposes a sea going vessel is not capable of international trading 
without being entered with a recognised P&I Club438, the name of which can easily be determined 
in a variety of commercial and public databases such as Equasis,439 OCIMF SIRE,440 CDI 
Marine441 and Q.88.442  The position of any ship in the world can be obtained for free through the 
vessel’s automatic identification system (AIS) combined with ownership, insurer and charterer 
details offered by a commercial service such as MarineTraffic.443 
This high level of openness, developed over many decades and well known within the 
maritime industry, ensures that there is substantial transparency as to the identity of a ship’s 
insurer, how his support funding works and its impact on matters such as disclosure, conflicts, 
and security for costs.  In a nod to the established practices of the London commodity markets 
the QMU Report also considered that in addition to maritime arbitration, its recommendations: 
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‘may also be inapposite for other forms of ad hoc and trade association arbitration’.444  The report 
also made a tacit recognition that criticism had been levelled at the Queen Mary survey results 
for not taking sufficient account of practices in maritime arbitration sector.445   
The Challenges TPF Pose to Confidentiality 
When one party is funded by a third party, an issue of confidentiality arises throughout the 
arbitration.  In order to decide whether to invest, the funder will need information about the 
dispute and will want to review the progress of the arbitration in order to decide whether to 
continue contributing to the costs.  That review is likely to include a consideration of the 
documents disclosed in the arbitration, as well as witness evidence of the opposing party.  Unless 
the existence of the funder is disclosed to the opposing party and an agreement reached, the funded 
party may breach its duty of confidentiality by providing this information to the funder.  A typical 
concern is that disclosure by a party that it is funded may influence an arbitral tribunals’ decision 
on costs allocation and security for costs applications.  
The prevailing consensus is that a party obtaining funding should disclose this fact to its 
opponent and the tribunal at the earliest opportunity.  As for the disclosure of the content of the 
funding agreement, von Goeler argued that there should be a differentiation between an obligation 
to disclose the presence and identity of a TPF and that of disclosing the specifics of a TPF 
agreement: that since no specific disclosure practices exist, a funding agreement should be treated 
as any other.446  
Lack off Regulation & Oversight 
TPF in England and Wales is self-regulated by the Association of Litigation Funders (ALF).  
The ALF’s voluntary code of conduct for litigation funders developed by a Ministry of Justice 
working group on TPF was first published in November 2011, having been set up in response to 
a recommendation by Jackson LJ in his review of civil litigation costs.  Covering funder’s capital 
adequacy requirements and rights to terminate or control proceedings,  the Code applies only to 
its own members.  At the time of writing that numbered 15, thus leaving a significant proportion 
of the market unregulated.447  In the view of the ICCA-QMU Report No 4: ‘This poses real 
 
444 ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force (2018) ‘Report of the ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force on Third Party Funding in 
International Arbitration’ 9. 
445 ibid 4. 
446 Jonas Von Goeler, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration and Its Impact on Procedure (Wolters 
Kluwer 2016) 140. 





questions over the viability of self-regulation’. The current (2018) ‘Code of Practice for Litigation 
Funders’ requires that a funder observe the confidentiality of all information and documentation 
relating to the dispute to the extent that the law permits.  Funded parties are also bound by 
confidentiality and non-disclosure clauses contained within the funding agreements between the 
funder and the funded party.448  These are good intentions, but does a voluntary code of conduct 
really go far enough?  I would argue it does not, especially since the publication of the 2018 Code.  
Firstly the Code is voluntary and therefore does not apply many TPF’s who operate outside the 
voluntary system of self-regulation.449 The exact number of TPF’s operating in the UK is 
unknown, but Ells believes that far greater in number than those who are members of the ALF.450  
More importantly however the ALF made a change to their Code of Conduct with the 
consequence that agreements to fund arbitration and other methods of alternative dispute 
resolution were no longer within the scope of the regulatory regime. 
The 2011 Code clearly envisaged that a funder may meet the costs of a dispute which was to 
be resolved by means other than litigation: ‘A Funder has access to funds immediately within its 
control or acts as the exclusive investment advisor to an investment fund… to enable a Litigant 
to meet the costs of resolving disputes by litigation or arbitration…’.451  The 2016 Code expanded 
this to include other forms of ADR such as mediation: ‘…to enable a party to a dispute … to meet 
the costs (including pre-action costs) of resolving disputes by litigation, arbitration or other 
dispute resolution procedures’.452  The 2018 Code however reads: ‘This code … sets out standards 
of practice and behaviour to be observed by Funders… in respect of funding the resolution of 
Relevant Disputes’.  The Code defines ‘Relevant Disputes’ as being: ‘disputes whose resolution 
is to be achieved principally through litigation,’ making no reference to arbitration or ADR.  The 
intention of the ALF appears to have been to restrict the scope of the regulatory regime for TPF.   
The regulatory regime for TPF in England and Wales has thus widened as arbitration is 
excluded entirely, of which Baldock warned: ‘The perils of unregulated TPF should not be 
overlooked and recent decisions in common law jurisdictions have reminded us about the 
importance of taking this issue seriously’.453  The 2018 Code which specifically removed the 
requirement to disclose TPF involvement in an arbitration is a retrograde step, one more than any 
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other that calls for a change in the law to address TPF in arbitration. 
There are a number of reasons why funders like confidentiality.  Neither a funder nor a funded 
party have an incentive to disclose their funding arrangement unless required to do so, such as 
where the funder is a listed company and there exist disclosure requirements.  Although disclosure 
may be strategically beneficial - e.g., where the funded party wants its opponent to be aware that 
it has the necessary resources to pursue the arbitration though to its conclusion, providing leverage 
with respect to subsequent negotiations and potential settlement - the converse can also be true.  
A funder may desire to keep the funding relationship confidential, as knowing that professional 
funders support one side may affect their opponents position on settlement or other aspects of the 
arbitration.  If an impecunious claimant’s opponents become aware that the TPF agreement 
excludes the TPF’s liability for any adverse costs award, an application for security for costs is 
much more likely.  Where disclosure of a TPF has been made, it is not uncommon for the other 
party to the arbitration to ask the tribunal to require the funder to enter into an undertaking to 
respect the confidentiality of the arbitration.  The tribunal may also be asked to place some limit 
on the funder’s access to certain sensitive documents and to exclude the funder from the 
evidentiary hearing, for example, where the funder is involved in a related dispute. 
Conflicts of Interest. 
The requirement of an impartial and independent arbitral tribunal is one of the fundamental 
principles of arbitration, found in most arbitration laws and rules.  Various factors can contribute 
to the perception of partiality: the close relationship between major law firms and leading 
arbitrators; the steady increase already noted in the number of cases dealing with TPF; and the 
highly concentrated segment of the funding industry.  However, does TPF have the potential to 
create material economic relationships and connections which might affect arbitrator’s 
impartiality and independence of a degree that requires amendment to the Arbitration Act?  Is 
s.1(a) ‘the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal’  
and s.33 (1)(a) requiring the tribunal to: ‘act fairly and impartially as between the parties’ 
sufficiently robust?  
If the name of the funder is revealed, it would be certainly be appropriate that each member 
of the tribunal disclose any relationship with the funder, as failure to disclose the existence of 
such a relationship between an arbitrator and a funder of one of the parties may result in a 
successful challenge being made to the appointment of that arbitrator on the grounds of a lack of 





parties’ commercial interest to settle the arbitration, the funder prefers the arbitration to continue 
in order to recover a share in any award of damages.  A conflict could also arise in the following 
scenario.  A TPF is actively involved in two arbitrations, A v B and C v D, in each of which it 
exerts its right to influence the funded parties with respect to the appointment of the law firms 
and the selection of arbitrators.  Suppose the TPF selected arbitrator in A v B is also the legal 
counsel to a party in C v D, i.e., these are unrelated arbitrations, but the arbitrator has regular and 
frequent contact with the TPF as a counsel to the funded party.  This could raise justifiable doubts 
as to the degree of independence and impartiality.  Or a conflict of interest could occur because 
of the involvement of partners of an arbitrator’s law firm in an unrelated case involving the same 
TPF.  Repeat appointments of one arbitrator by the same TPF also create a potential for conflict 
of interest: the perception and/or concern being that an arbitrator could decide in favour of the 
funded party in view of prospective future appointments by that TPF.  
These and similar issues of transparency and ethics are of course not new and are discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 9.  At its heart however is the issue that the international commercial 
arbitration world is drawn from a relatively small pool of professionals: many arbitrators are 
practicing solicitors or barristers.  This has coincided with a trend away from part-time arbitrators 
drawn from a primarily technical and commercial background to full time arbitrators coming from 
the legal field.  As Clay phrased it:  
Arbitration is not . . . a job; it is a mission, a temporary function, not a profession.  All 
those who act as arbitrators have, in principle, another job, a principal occupation 
providing them with a steady income.  Arbitration is their side activity.454 
Gaillard considers this emerging class of professional arbitrators as a distinct social group: 
‘Until recently, the function of arbitrating was viewed as occasional by nature.  This is no longer 
the case today. Being an arbitrator has become a social-professional category of its own’.455 It 
does however raise the intriguing scenario of prohibiting practicing lawyers and barristers from 
acting as arbitrators, similar to the existing practice in many commodity associations.  No doubt 
it would be an unwelcome development from those in the legal profession who view being an 
arbitrator as an ideal professional sideline.  But it would at a stroke resolve many conflict 
scenarios and issues.  
The moment at which an arbitrator becomes aware of a potential conflict of interest will 
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dictate how the issues should be addressed.  If an arbitrator is aware of a potential conflict of 
interest at the appointment stage, the question becomes whether the appointment should be 
accepted at all.  In part that answer depends on whether the circumstances could justify a 
successful challenge to the arbitrator.  A different situation exists if the existence of a TPF is 
revealed during the arbitral proceedings, e.g., this could occur in connection with an application 
for security for costs.  If the involvement of a TPF is revealed after an award has been rendered 
it may result in its non-enforcement under Article V(d) of the NY Convention.456 
An arbitrator who is unaware that a party is involved with a TPF may not be able to disclose 
the relationship with that funder e.g., shareholdings in the TPF, his law firm’s involvement in 
cases funded by such corporations or his employment by that funder as an advisor: many TPF’s 
have employed full time arbitrators for just this role.  There is an argument that if an arbitrator is 
unaware of the presence of a TPF there can be no conflict of interest.  But by what mechanism 
can it be ensured that the arbitrator was truly unaware of the TPF relationship?  There currently 
is none.  The opposing party can still argue that the arbitrator was in breach of their duty to search 
for that conflict of interest.  If such conflicts emerge during the arbitration, the arbitrator may 
have to be replaced thereby increasing both the time and cost of the proceedings. 
Some institutions have endeavoured to address TPF disclosure issues.  In 2016 CIETAC HK 
issued a consultation paper named ‘Guidelines for Third Party Funding in Arbitration’.  These 
disclosure obligations however lack teeth.  Clause 2.9 requires the funded party to promptly 
disclose its funding when the funding ‘might give rise to any possible issues of conflict of 
interest’, i.e., there is no general duty: it is left to the discretion of the funder and funded party to 
determine whether such conflicts of interest exist.  Such a view is reinforced by the provision in 
Clause 3.1 that: ‘Where the tribunal considers it appropriate, it may invite, or in certain cases 
direct, any Funded party to disclose its Funding’ confirms that no general duty of disclosure 
exists.  In my view Clause 3.1 does not go far enough.  Neither the TPF nor the funded party have 
any incentive to disclose their relationship.  Combined with the general inaccessibility of such 
evidence, the likelihood is that funding would remain discreetly veiled in secrecy.  Clause 3.1 
would only take practical effect when there is some evidence available to the tribunal or the 
opposing party to indicate the existence of funding.  TPF creates new potential for conflicts of 
interest to arise that justify a disclosure clause to be added to the Arbitration Act. 
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Security for Costs 
In general terms, the costs of an action - whether litigation or arbitration - are proportional to 
its complexity.  They do not always correlate, but as a guide the larger the claim, the larger the 
volume of documents, the more witnesses, experts, lawyers and barristers involved and 
disbursements made, the expense of which contributes to the overall cost of a dispute.457  
International commercial arbitration not uncommonly involves complex legal issues, 
necessitating significant resources being allocated to fighting the dispute and consequentially 
higher costs.  The losing party to a dispute will, in English law, be liable for both his own and his 
opponents’ costs: “costs following the event”, also known as “cost shifting”.  Those costs may be 
awarded to the winning party in the final arbitration award dealing with the merits and or as a 
separate award.  
Whilst used sparingly, tribunals being traditionally reluctant in granting such an order in 
commercial arbitration, the Arbitration Act 1996 s.38 does expressly confer the authority on a 
tribunal to order security for costs.  In practice a respondent would make an application for an 
interim order for security for costs to the arbitral tribunal on the grounds that a claimant was 
financially weak and unable to honour any adverse cost award.  If an impecunious claimant had 
a weak case and lost, it might escape the financial consequences of losing, leaving the respondent 
to have won a phyric victory: succeeding on the merits but financially out of pocket. 
A detailed analysis of security for costs applications falls outside the scope of this paper, 
suffice it to say that it generates significant discussion, particularly in relation to arguments 
concerning access to justice.  A respondent’s application for security for costs may reflect genuine 
concerns that the claimant has a weak case and/or there would be issues in securing 
reimbursement for costs should the respondent prevail e.g., factors such as the jurisdiction in 
which the respondents assets were based and indeed the ownership structure could all play a part.  
This writer dealt with such an application in an LMAA arbitration concerning a mega yacht 
charter party dispute.  It was granted with one of the relevant factors being that the location and 
structure of the claimant’s assets were so opaque that an adverse costs award in favour of the 
respondent risked not being enforceable.458  
 
457 Some jurisdictions can get quite prescriptive in this regard.  The Singapore Law Society’s 2018/2019 Guidance 
Notes Practice Directions for example, specify how much a solicitor may charge a client for photocopying. It is 
currently S$0.10 (for black & white) and S$1.00 (for colour) per page. 
458 Other examples abound.  A more complicated scenario involved an impecunious ship owner whose 30-year old 
vessel had grounded and subsequently sunk, in dispute with a bankrupt hull insurer that had rejected the claim for 





But it is also the case that a security for costs application might have the effect of dissuading 
a claimant from proceeding with the arbitration if it lacks the financial resources to deposit money 
to the arbitral tribunal or provide some other form of security before being allowed to proceed.  
A security for costs application can also be seen as form of interim measure filed during the 
proceedings by a party responding to a claim (or counter-claim) who wants to ensure that the 
claimant will be able to pay a potential adverse costs award rendered against it.459   In the view of 
the ICC, an order for security for costs can be a ‘useful weapon as well as a prudent practical 
safeguard, but the court will be keen to ensure that it is not used merely to hinder a genuine 
claim’.460    
Security for costs gets into particularly controversial territory in investment arbitration, 
where it has been estimated that 40 percent of investment treaty arbitrations are funded.461  The 
typical example is of a respondent State seeking security for defending a claim with which it has 
in effect almost limitless (i.e. taxpayers’) resources.  Its opponent may well be a claimant who 
risks being denied access to justice because of being financially unable to put up security for 
costs.  The unclear standards as to when an award for the security of costs is appropriate further 
complicates matters.  Having a TPF added to the mix compounds the challenges a tribunal faces.  
To a respondent, the existence of a TPF supported claimant may give rise to several concerns, 
such as the creation of an imbalance in the arbitration equation because of the possibility of an 
‘arbitral hit and run’462 or the risk that the claimant’s poor financial situation might impact its 
ability to pay an award for costs.  That presupposes that only the financially weak look to TPF to 
fund an arbitration, a perception that is not always valid.  As highlighted in this chapter’s  
introduction, the potentially high costs of international arbitration may attract companies to seek 
financing of a perfectly meritorious claim through a TPF so as to maintain cash flow to continue 
normal business activities during the arbitral proceedings.  A corporation may simply aim to share 
the inherent risk of arbitration with a third party: ‘For the most part, the industry [of TPF] 
currently serves financially distressed holders of meritorious claims . . . But is also steadily 
growing to serve claimants that can afford the prosecution but prefer to offload the risk and cash 
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TPF may well affect orders and awards made by the tribunal in respect of costs.  In deciding 
on an application for security for costs, the tribunal will have to consider whether the existence 
of TPF should be taken into account e.g., whether the funding amounts to a change of 
circumstance. Where the tribunal is requested by the funded party to make an award of costs 
against the other party and it becomes apparent that a TPF has paid all of that party’s costs, an 
issue may arise as to who has incurred the costs - the party or the funder.  Although the tribunal 
has a discretion, the Arbitration Act 1996 provides a basis for assessing what costs are 
recoverable, which involves determining the costs reasonably incurred. 
Anukaran puts forward two arguments as to why tribunals should more readily award security 
for costs in TPF cases.  One is that the respondent is better protected from frivolous claims on the 
grounds that if the claimant or its funder is asked to put up security for costs, the odds of a funder 
still supporting a worthless claim are reduced.464  I am unpersuaded that this analysis is correct.  
TPF’s are profit-centred businesses: investors aiming to obtain the highest returns on their capital 
investment.  A reputable prospective funder would normally be expected to carry out a full and 
rigorous due diligence analysis of the facts and merits of the claim: that takes time and resources.  
Such factors would include the value of and probability of success in pursing the claim, the law 
and jurisdiction of the dispute and the rules or terms of the applicable institute or association 
involved.   
Frignati expands this to include ten key factors analysed by a TPF in determining whether to 
fund litigation.465  Put simply, if a TPF is unconvinced of the merits of a case it will decline to 
fund it.  Sherer, Goldsmith and Flechet suggest that funders do not fund low value cases i.e., 
below $1 million.  And TPF’s are prudent, typically only investing in cases where they assess that 
there is a greater than 70 percent probability of success and an expected duration of the dispute 
of less than two and a half years.466   
In summary, TPF’s analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the claim in order to assess the 
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attractiveness of the investment.  Ultimately (in theory) they only fund strong cases.  Since ‘no 
serious corporation would finance a claim without being convinced…that it has a good chance of 
success’.467  Far from being a sign of having a weak claim, the presence of a TPF can be 
considered as a weeding mechanism that eliminates weaker claims as Nieuwveld and Shannon 
argue.468 
The second argument Anukarn puts forward is more persuasive and relevant, namely, to 
avoid the situation where a respondent suffers when an impecunious claimant cannot meet an 
adverse costs award and is funded by a TPF who has no liability to meet such costs.  Rather than 
a blanket requirement for a claimant being funded to put up security for costs, a more nuanced 
approach would be to require the funded party to disclose whether or not the TPF agreement 
includes a contingency to meet any adverse costs order.  Such knowledge would enable the 
tribunal to make an informed decision on the necessity or appropriateness to order security for 
costs.  This approach is taken by the SIAC investment arbitration rules at Art.24(l).  Probably the 
gold standard with respect to TPF disclosure, they confer on the tribunal the power to order the 
disclosure of the existence and identity of a party’s TPF arrangement, and where appropriate, 
details of the TPF’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings and liability for any adverse costs 
order.469 
Chapter 6 Summary 
At the time of the Jackson Report into litigation costs was published in 2009 the general, 
although not universal view, was that there should be some form of restriction upon the activities 
of third-party funders: ‘The central issue which emerged was whether a voluntary code would 
suffice or whether there should be statutory regulation’.  The Report recorded the Law Society’s 
view that whilst TPF could assist access to justice, proper regulation was required and highlighted 
two concerns.  Firstly, in a situation where the litigation funding agreement allowed the funder to 
withdraw funding contrary to the client’s interests or was unreasonable.  Secondly, the potential 
negative impact where a funder became insolvent.470  No statutory legislation was introduced, the 
Report contemplating that: ‘In the future … if the use of third party funding expands, then full 
statutory regulation may well be required’.471  Industry sentiments appear to have moved in the 
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direction of regulation: QMU’s 2015 International Arbitration Survey reported that a significant 
majority of respondents (71 percent) thought that TPF required regulation.472  
The 2014 ICCA - Queen Mary Task Force Report contains the principles regarding disclosure 
and conflict of interest; privilege and professional secrecy; and final award allocation of costs.473  
The disclosure principle at A.1 is the most pertinent.  It requires that a party should disclose the 
existence and identity of a TPF to the tribunal/arbitral institution or appointing authority (if any), 
at an early stage of the arbitral proceedings e.g., at the first appearance or submission or as soon 
as practicable after funding has been agreed.  This addresses one of the two key issues, namely 
the voluntary disclosure to the opposing party and tribunal that a TPF is involved.  To my mind 
however it does not go far enough.  ‘Should’ is not the same as ‘must’.  Nor is the second key 
issue covered, i.e., the TPF’s liability for any adverse costs award. 
TPF has still not been addressed under English law (despite having one of the largest funding 
markets alongside the USA, Australia and Germany) overseas, in international conventions or in 
the rules of most arbitration institutions.  Whilst the TPF market has so far operated adequately 
within voluntary guidelines, the globalisation of the industry, the increasing number of funders 
and funded cases all point towards the need for legislation.  The question then becomes to what 
extent should TPF be regulated.  Only two jurisdictions having positively addressed TPF and a 
review of their approach is therefore helpful. 
Hong Kong adopted its Arbitration Ordinance with respect to Third Party Funding in 2017, 
summarising proposals by the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission that steps should be taken 
to amend the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance to permit and regulate TPF of arbitrations.  
Article 44 of the HKIAC (Administered Arbitration Rules 2018) requires that if a funding 
agreement is made, the funded party shall inform HKIAC, the parties and the arbitrators in writing 
the fact that a funding agreement exists and the name of the TPF.  If the funding agreement is in 
place on or before the commencement of the arbitration, this information must be provided in the 
initial communications i.e., to HKIAC, the Notice of Arbitration, or Answer to the Notice of 
Arbitration.  Where the funding agreement was made after the commencement of the arbitration, 
the information should be provided as soon as practicable thereafter.  It is an ongoing obligation 
that requires any changes to the funding arrangements to be disclosed. 
Singapore’s passing of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act (CLA) and the Civil Law (Third-
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Party Funding) Regulations 2017 (CLA Regulations) facilitates third party funding of Singapore 
seated international arbitrations (in addition to related court or mediation proceedings) by 
eliminating the common law torts of maintenance and champerty.474  In response, the Singapore 
Institute of Arbitrators (the SIArb.) published TPF guidelines and related guidance notes for 
TPF’s the same year with the aim of promoting best practices among funders who provide funding 
to parties in Singapore-seated international arbitrations.  The guidelines include a requirement 
that the funder authorises the disclosure of the funder’s identity, its address and ‘the existence of 
the funding to the other parties, legal practitioners and court or arbitral tribunal in the funded 
proceedings’.475  The funder is also required to cooperate with the funded party and its legal 
practitioner regarding the disclosure to an arbitral tribunal or court of any information concerning 
the funding if any applicable rules or order of arbitral tribunal or court so require.476  A key issue 
not specifically addressed is the requirement for the funder to disclose whether the funding 
agreement includes a provision to fund as adverse costs award.  At the time of writing 12 litigation 
funders had signed up to the code of practice.477  
A combination of the first principle identified in the ICCA-QMU appendix, the ICSID 
Working Paper and the SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules would appear to provide a good 
working solution to a TPF provision in the Arbitration Act.  I therefore propose the following 
new provision to address TPF disclosure. 
Third Party Funding: Disclosure 
(a) A party being funded is required to disclose the existence of a third party funding 
arrangement and the identity of the funder to the opposing party in the arbitration, the 
arbitrators and the arbitral institution or appointing authority (if any), either as part of a 
first appearance or submission, or as soon as practicable after funding is provided or an 
arrangement to provide funding for the arbitration is entered into. 
(b) A party being funded is required to disclose details of the third‐party funder’s interest 
in the outcome of the proceedings, and/or whether or not the third‐party funder has 
committed to undertake adverse costs liability. 
There are two conflicting, yet legitimate interests, uneasily coexistent: the right of access to 
arbitral justice and the right to recover awarded costs.  Someone though must bear the risk of the 
impecunious claimant.  I view it as necessary that although the identity of the funder should be 
disclosed, the content of the funding agreement would be disclosed only if the normal evidentiary 
burden has been fulfilled.  Arbitral tribunals should consider all the relevant circumstances of the 
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dispute when considering applications for security for costs.  The mere existence of funding 
relationship should not lead to an automatic order for security for costs.   
The Arbitration Act 1996 s.38(3) currently provides that a tribunal may order a claimant to 
provide security for the costs of the arbitration, but that power should not be exercised on the 
grounds that the claimant resides (or if a company) is based outside the UK.  I propose a third sub 
section to s.38(3) with the aim of clarifying but also discouraging spurious security for costs 
applications i.e., 
38(3) The tribunal may order a claimant to provide security for the costs of the arbitration. 
This power shall not be exercised on the ground that the claimant is— 
… 





Chapter 7: The Public Interest Exception 
‘“When I use a word”, Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to 
mean – neither more nor less”.  “The question is”, said Alice, “whether you can make words mean 
different things – that’s all”.  “The question is”, said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master - that’s 
all.”’478 
- Lewis Carroll 
Introduction 
The subtext to Humpty Dumpty’s question was ‘profound and complex’ according to 
Westacott,479in essence asking are we to master language or is language to master us?  Similarly, 
the concept of what is ‘in the public interest’ rather depends on which side of the argument you 
find yourself.  Counsel are equally adept in arguing either side of the debate: such are the 
strategies of legal practitioners.  What this Chapter fundamentally argues however is that there is 
a public interest exception to arbitral confidentiality and that it should be codified.  If that premise 
is correct, the corollary questions are: can it be described with the precision necessary in order to 
draft an amendment?  If so, in what form?   
If in English law the concept of what constitutes a public interest is at best hazy, with respect 
to arbitral confidentiality it is a proverbial ‘pea-souper,’ despite the clarity of objectives of the 
Arbitration Act 1996 being set out.  Section 1(b) provides that: ‘the parties should be free to agree 
how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public 
interest’.  Nowhere else however is ‘public interest’ referred to.  Nor is it defined.  It has thus 
been left to the courts to determine both its nature and scope.  Public interest is sometimes used 
interchangeably with ‘in the interests of justice’ i.e., in the sense of the importance of reaching a 
judicial decision on the basis of truthful and accurate evidence from witnesses.  Is it a political 
concept?  The phrase appears regularly in the media, typically juxtaposed with such other 
eminently desirable democratic principles such as transparency and accountability.  And as with 
them, the challenge is to provide a meaningfully precise interpretation.  There is a reasonable 
argument that, far from being a deficiency in the law, that lack of specificity demonstrates an 
underlying strength: namely the ability of the law to adapt and change in step with society.  In a 
discussion on what constituted public interest arising out of the Leveson Enquiry,480 Elliot quoted 
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Andrew Sparrow, a Guardian Newspaper blogger: 
50 years ago it was assumed that there was a public interest in knowing that an MP was 
gay, but little or no public interest in whether he drove home drunk, hit his wife or 
furnished his house using wood from non-sustainable sources.  Now … it's the other way 
round.481 
Elliott argued that we should therefore perhaps be wary about attempts to define or pin down 
the concept of ‘in the public interest’, on the grounds that it could end up being restrictive and 
because what the public interest entails changes over time.  It is a persuasive viewpoint.  But so 
was the counterpoint, eloquently enunciated by Lord Hoffman some 25 years earlier in the CA 
decision of R (Mrs) v Central Independent Television plc.482  The claimant argued that a television 
report into a criminal investigation should not include images of a man convicted of child sex 
offences some years earlier, on the grounds that the offender’s identification would cause distress 
to his ex-wife and child.  Rejecting the argument, the court held that it had no power to restrain 
publication.  The opening to Hoffmann LJ’s judgment is a powerful restatement of the principles 
of free speech in England that still resonate: 
Freedom means the right to publish things which government and Judges, however well 
motivated, think should not be published.  It means the right to say things which ‘right-
thinking people’ regard as dangerous or irresponsible.  This freedom is subject only to 
clearly defined exceptions laid down by common law or statute.483  
Both arguments are valid.  How to resolve the dilemma, what might constitute a public 
interest exception?  Thoma considered the legal nature of the duty of confidentiality in English 
Law by assessing whether confidentiality is or should be an implied term in fact, in law or by 
custom, contending that it was a determination to maintain England as a seat of arbitration that 
drove public policy on confidentiality.484  That even if confidentiality was not the most ‘decisive 
reason’ for choosing arbitration, the threat of competition from for example, France and 
Switzerland could severely threaten London if England took a more progressive approach towards 
arbitral confidentiality.  That concern has come to the fore following the United Kingdom’s 
departure from the European Union on 31st January 2020.  The multitude of seminars, webinars, 
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talks, and discussions focusing on the impact - or rather lack of it from many UK user’s 
perspective - of Brexit on London’s place in international commercial arbitration testify to its 
perceived importance.  Dessemontet discussed the methodology to define the requirement of 
confidentiality versus the public interest and the scope and limits of the information to be 
protected by that confidentiality, recognising that: 
Even the proponents of a strict confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings accept that the 
courts can put it aside in appropriate circumstances.  Although the public interest may 
sometimes dictate a higher confidentiality, it may in some other instances preclude 
confidentiality.485   
Thus allowing for the prospect that it is perhaps a remit best left to the courts to determine. 
An understandable, though commercially centric standpoint.  But does that adequately balance or 
take into account the wider needs of society as a whole?  Arguably not.  Surely there must be a 
higher foundation for our system of laws than mercantile convenience? 
Commentaries regarding transparency and the public interest debate in arbitration have 
resurfaced.  Jaconelli explored an essential feature of most democratic societies i.e., the 
administration of justice in the full view of the public,486 describing the privacy and confidentiality 
arrangement of arbitration, but drawing back from enunciating his own opinion as to its 
desirability.487  Commentators have also considered the situation of arbitrations between states, 
arguing that whilst confidentiality remained important, it could be dispensed with in certain 
situations: that a public interest exception could be equally applicable to arbitrations between non-
state actors as it could to arbitrations involving public entities.  What then can be garnered from 
the English court’s attitudes to what constitutes a public interest exception? 
As Misra and Jordans noted, the Courts are now formulating several exceptions to that 
principle.488  Not just exceptions.  Some overseas jurisdictions have distanced themselves from 
the position under English law, some treating privacy and confidentiality as distinct and separate; 
others completely rejecting the notion of confidentiality.  
A Very English Approach: Pragmatic & Piecemeal 
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Various English cases over the last quarter century or so have touched on arbitral 
confidentiality and what might constitute a public interest exception.  London & Leeds Estates 
Ltd v Paribas Ltd (No 2)489 involved a dispute between a landlord and tenant.  In arbitration 
proceedings, the claimant landlord’s expert witness gave testimony which allegedly contradicted 
expert evidence provided in two other cases.  The respondent subpoenaed the evidence given in 
the other proceedings, which the claimant sought to set aside.  The Court found that disclosure 
was not only in the interest of the litigants, but importantly it was also in the public interest: where 
a witness denies a prior inconsistent statement, evidence of such previous expression can be used 
in evidence.  
Potter LJ noted in Ali Shipping Corporation v Shipyard Trogir (“Ali Shipping”)490 that the 
concept of reasonable necessity was flexible and the court ought not to require the party seeking 
disclosure ‘to prove necessity regardless of difficulty or expense’.491  Instead, the court was to 
take a rounded view.  The judge also considered that there was no need to deal with the wider 
implications of public interest.  Referring to Esso/BHP v Plowman, Potter LJ considered that only 
the dissenting judgment of Toohey J appeared to treat the law of privacy and confidentiality in 
relation to arbitration proceedings in accordance with English law and that:  
While it may well fall to the English court at a future time to consider some further 
exception to the general rule of confidentiality based on wider considerations of public 
interest, it is not necessary to do so in this case.492 
By recognising the exception under a heading of ‘interests of justice’ rather than one of 
‘public interest’ it avoided the suggestion that it extended to the public interest aspects of 
Esso/BHP v Plowman.  This effectively made this category of exception quite narrow, stressing 
the importance of judicial decisions being based upon truthful and accurate evidence of witnesses, 
thus following the rationale in London and Leeds Estates Ltd v Paribas Ltd (No 2).  In Westacre 
Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd [2000] QB 288 (Westacre Investments) 
involving consultancy services for the sale of military equipment to Kuwait, the Court of Appeal 
enforced an award of an ICC tribunal, rejecting an argument that such a contract was contrary to 
public policy.  The Court noted that the tribunal had considered the position and as the object of 
the contract was not contrary to English public policy the award would be enforced. 
Judgement publication was the core issue in Department of Economics, Policy and 
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Development of the City of Moscow v Bankers Trust Co. (“City of Moscow”).493 Bankers Trust 
succeeded in an arbitration claim against International Investment Bank, but not against two other 
parties, the government and a department of the City of Moscow.  Bankers Trust and the 
International Investment Bank challenged the arbitration award on the ground of serious 
irregularity under s.68 of the Arbitration Act.  At the end of the hearing, the question over 
publication of the award being adjourned for further argument.  Lawtel in good faith summarized 
the judgment on its website.  City of Moscow sought publication of the judgment or Lawtel’s 
summary in order to demonstrate to the international financial community that the arbitration 
award holding that it had not committed any financial default had been upheld by the court.   
Cooke J considered that in an arbitration dispute where the material is both politically and 
commercially highly sensitive, the fact that all of the hearing involved confidential information 
is a dominant factor.  The judge held that the earlier judgment should remain private and that 
neither it nor Lawtel’s summary should be available for publication.   
Everything raised in relation to it was confidential.  If publicity would damage that 
confidentiality, then the court may rightly consider privacy both for the hearing and for 
the judgment to be necessary in the interests of justice.494   
The City of Moscow appealed the ruling.  The leading speech in the Court of Appeal was 
given by Mance LJ who viewed the courts supervisory role as: 
[a]cting in the public interest to facilitate the fairness and well-being of a consensual 
method of dispute resolution, and both the Rule Committee and the courts can still take 
into account the parties' expectations regarding privacy and confidentiality when agreeing 
to arbitrate.495   
Mance LJ held that there could not be a blanket rule of non-publication in all cases.  The 
Court of Appeal upheld the first instance judge’s decision not to permit full publication of the 
judgment.  Publication of a summary was however permitted, it already being in the public 
domain having been published by the legal research website was unobjectionable.  Carnwath LJ 
elaborated, referring to the spectrum analogy previously used by Mance LJ regarding the 
strictness of the test for confidentiality: ‘Plainly not all the arbitration claims … need to be treated 
as confidential.  And those that do will vary in the extent to which they should be so treated and 
the method by which to do so’.496  It is clear from City of Moscow that confidentiality may have 
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to give way to the public interest demand for transparency, as a result of which there will still be 
cases where the details of an arbitral dispute may become public.  These include where 
enforcement of an award is resisted on grounds of public policy as in Westacre Investments; 
where a court deals with a challenge to an award for serious irregularity such as Lesotho 
Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo SpA and Others497 or where a party seeks an 
injunction to restrain court proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement as in West 
Tankers Inc v RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA (The Front Comor).498  
Finch was critical of Cooke J in the City of Moscow on the grounds that the identities of the 
parties involved in arbitration is often common knowledge within an industry ‘… the degree to 
which confidentiality in fact exists is overrated’. 499  The point that Finch was making was that 
confidentiality can be preserved by the use of ‘private hearings’ on appeals to the court or by 
reporting of cases in a manner similar to that used in Lloyd's Maritime Law Newsletter i.e., report 
arbitrations using a number, redacting the names of parties and ships.  I would treat that criticism 
with caution.  Whilst it is accurate to say that what could be described as a “knowledge leak” 
concerning the outcomes of arbitrations exists unofficially, including the names of the parties - 
there is after all only a limited pool of specialist arbitrators, P&I Clubs and law firms, even in an 
arbitration centre such as London - that cannot be used as a justification for weakening the basis 
of confidentiality. 
The scope of the fourth exception discussed in Ali Shipping with respect to ‘disclosure when, 
and to the extent to which, it is reasonably necessary for the protection of legitimate interest of an 
arbitrating party’ was also explored in Dadourian Group International Inc v Simms 
(“Dadourian”).500  Dadourian Group International (“DGI”) entered into an agreement with 
Charlton whereby it granted Charlton an option (which it subsequently exercised) to acquire 
various assets and know-how.  The agreement required Charlton to open a letter of credit, which 
it did not do.  DGI treated the contract as having been repudiated.  Charlton initially commenced 
proceedings in New York which were stayed in favour of a London arbitration clause.  DGI 
counterclaimed for breach of contract and misrepresentation.  DGI was successful in the 
arbitration and was awarded $5 million.  Charlton's claim was dismissed.  The award was not 
honoured.  DGI applied for and obtained worldwide freezing orders.  Simms challenged the 
injunction on the basis that the judge was not entitled to have regard to the arbitrator's award 
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because (a) it was inadmissible in the current proceedings and (b) the award was not binding on 
him and the other respondents in the instant case as the arbitration was confidential to the parties.  
Simms argued that not being a party to the arbitration, the arbitration award and all the documents 
in the arbitration could not be used against him.  Dyson LJ rejected the arguments: ‘[b]eing 
satisfied that the judge was correct in saying that there is a good arguable case that Mr Simms, in 
the very unusual circumstances of this case, together with the other three defendants, was privy 
to the arbitration’.501 
The Court posed, almost as an aside, a penetrating question that goes to the heart of the 
arbitral confidentiality debate: ‘[w]hat amounts to being “privy to an arbitration” if one is not an 
actual party to the arbitration, it seems to me, is one of some considerable difficulty…It seems to 
me that this is a difficult area of the law in which there is some uncertainty’.502  This concept was 
not expanded upon, leaving open the possibility that it could be explored further in the future. 
The ‘public interest’ exception in arbitration considered in Emmott v Michael Wilson & 
Partners503 highlights one of the possible exceptions that have yet to be fully addressed by the 
English courts, Collins LJ considering that it was an ‘uncontroversial starting point’ that the 
parties’ wish for confidentiality and privacy outweighs the public interest in a public hearing.504  
As per Carnwath LJ: ‘I prefer to treat this case as falling under ‘interests of justice’ exception, 
clearly recognized in Ali Shipping, and to leave for another occasion exploration of the 
boundaries of a possible ‘public interest’ criterion’.505  Noting that some of the authorities draw a 
distinction between privacy and confidentiality, and quoting Potter LJ in Ali Shipping: ‘the 
obligation of confidentiality… arises as an essential corollary of the privacy of arbitration 
proceedings’.506  In applying Ali Shipping the court accepted that the confidentiality of material 
was subject to two possibly relevant exceptions, one of which being that of public interest.  The 
court held that the interests of justice required that the English court should, so far as possible, 
ensure that parties to London arbitrations should not seek to use the cloak of confidentiality with 
a view to misleading or potentially misleading foreign courts.   
In Symbion Power LLC v Venco Imtiaz Construction Company507 the English courts returned 
to the issue.  Having lost an arbitration Symbion Power LLC challenged an ICC award under 
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s.68(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996, alleging serious irregularity.  Rejecting Symbion’s request 
for the judgment to be anonymised, drawing a distinction between a private hearing and the 
publication of a judgment, the Court considered the factors to consider when determining whether 
to maintain the confidentiality of arbitration claims and related judgments.  Of importance was 
the strong public interest in the publication of judgments and so ensuring appropriate standards 
in the conduct of arbitrations.  That was however to be weighed against the parties’ legitimate 
expectation that arbitral proceedings and awards will be kept confidential.  The court went on to 
review the principles regarding the confidentiality of judgments, considering primarily the 
interest of the parties in the litigation.  The judge was clearly aware of (and unmoved by) the 
implied adverse commercial implications to English arbitration when the judge said that there can 
be: ‘[no] question of withholding publication of reasoned judgments on a blanket basis of a 
generalised, and in my view unfounded, concern that their publication would upset the confidence 
of the business community in English arbitration.’508  
The court gave greater weight to the public interest in having access to judgments on 
arbitration matters, concluding that anonymising the judgment was unjustified.  The case 
reinforces the view that applicants must demonstrate strong, justifiable grounds in order to 
persuade a court not to publish arbitration related judgements.  This approach was partially 
successfully in Teekay Tankers Ltd v STX Offshore and Shipbuilding Co Ltd.509  The case 
concerned an allegation that a party made reference to arbitral awards and arbitrators’ reasons in 
its Defence and Counter Claim that breached the confidentiality provisions of the contract and 
which should have remained confidential.  The court was somewhat critical at the parties attempt 
for the hearings to be held in private and for having failed to take the necessary steps themselves 
to protect the confidentiality of materials prior to the matter coming to court: ‘[p]roceedings in 
this court are, in the absence of good reason to the contrary, conducted in public. …The 
appropriate course was not to propose a default provision that the trial would be in private’.510  
The court subsequently permitted closing submissions to be heard in private and for non-parties 
to obtain only redacted versions of the materials. 
What the English authorities reveal is a pragmatic but piecemeal approach to what constitutes 
a public interest exception, effectively having declined - when the opportunities so arose - to 
formulate coherent exceptions.  Perhaps that is as it should be.  There is a strongly held (though 
far from universal) view that it is not for the courts to create the law, its function being interpretive 
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of the intentions of the legislature.  And the legislature, having declined to set out guidelines or 
principles of what might constitute a pubic interest exception itself, has therefore left a void which 
the courts appear disinclined to fill.  Understandable perhaps, but Lord Hoffman’s words still 
linger: ‘… a freedom which is restricted to what Judges think to be responsible or in the public 
interest is no freedom’.  An appropriate point therefore to consider how modern, democratic 
jurisdictions overseas address the conundrum. 
Lines in the Sand: Overseas Approaches 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States offer the most developed 
jurisprudence with respect to what constitutes public interest in connection with arbitration. The 
most significant case dealing with confidentiality in Australia was Esso Australia Resources Ltd 
v The Hon Sydney James Plowman & Others (“Esso/BHP v Plowman”)511 an appeal that 
concerned the important issue as to whether an arbitrating party was under an obligation of 
confidence in relation to documents and information disclosed in, and for the purposes of, a 
private arbitration.  The case was politically sensitive and attracted significant media attention.  It 
would merit study on those grounds alone.  Of particular relevance however, is that it is probably 
the most important case in modern times dealing with the public interest exception. 
Esso and BHP (“Esso/BHP”) supplied natural gas to two utility companies in Victoria, 
Australia, namely GFC and SEC.  SEC was fully State owned, GFC largely so i.e., they were both 
partially or fully state-owned utility companies.  The pricing mechanisms took into account 
royalties and taxes, any changes to which the sellers were obliged to provide details of to the 
buyers.  A new federal tax, the “Petroleum Resource Rent Tax” was imposed.  Esso/BHP sought 
to pass on the cost increases to GFC and SEC, although they omitted to pass on details of the tax 
changes.  GFC and SEC refused to accept the increased rates and the matter was referred to 
arbitration.  The responsible Victoria State minister concerned (Mr Plowman) brought an action 
against Esso, BHP, GFC and SEC seeking a declaration that the information concerning royalties 
and tax changes was not confidential and could be disclosed to the Minister and third parties.  
Esso/BHP refused on grounds of commercially sensitivity, unless GFC and SEC entered into 
confidentiality agreements prohibiting disclosure, including to the Minister or the State 
Government.   The State of Victoria demanded access to the information, considering that if such 
information was provided to GFC and SEC, the two State owned utilities were under a statutory 
 





duty to pass it on.   
The court of first instance ordered that Esso/BHP furnish the details of the increases sought 
to GFC and SEC.  Turning its attention to the privacy and confidentiality of arbitration, the Court 
asked three questions: whether strangers could attend the arbitration hearings without the consent 
of the parties; whether a party was at liberty to disclose information imparted to it in the course 
of the arbitration; and whether GFC and SEC were at liberty to disclose information provided 
pursuant to the sale agreements.  The Court held that there was no general legal or equitable 
obligation precluding a party from using information obtained in the course of an arbitration.  
Esso/BHP’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Victoria failed.   The matter went to the High Court 
of Australia. 
The leading judgment was given by Mason CJ.  Whilst noting that the authorities referred to 
privacy as an implied term, the court considered that an arbitration held pursuant to the agreement 
was private in the sense that it was not open to the public: i.e., the private character of the hearing 
was inherent in the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration.512  Mason CJ  rejected the view 
however that there was a duty of confidentiality imposed upon the parties as an implied term of 
the arbitration agreement: it was not an ‘essential characteristic’ of a private arbitration.  That 
there might exist various circumstances in which both third parties and the public had a legitimate 
interest in the outcome of an arbitration that would give rise to a ‘public interest’ exception: the 
precise scope of such an exception was however unclear.513  Whilst recognising the privacy of the 
arbitration process and accepting that documents produced under compulsion were subject to a 
duty to be used solely for the purposes of the arbitration,514 all other aspects of confidentiality 
were rejected.  The interest to be defended need not be strictly a legal one.  It may embrace a 
moral, political or strongly held philosophical viewpoint, such as freedom of information and the 
right to have access to materials and documents of legitimate public interest.515 
The Court’s findings that there were no legal grounds to support confidentiality in 
commercial arbitration was contrary to the view in most other jurisdictions.  Nevertheless, 
Esso/BHP v Plowman makes a rare and valuable contribution to the authorities in its dealing of 
an arbitration appeal containing a significant public interest element.  Some commentators were 
persuaded that as a result of Esso/BHP v Plowman, codification of the relevant English legal 
principles in the draft Arbitration Bill was increasingly necessary.  The implied term as the 
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contractual basis for such principles was not in doubt under English law, and the English Courts 
were not being shy to uphold those principles.  But the Esso/BHP v Plowman decision had the 
effect of making this contractual approach as regards confidentiality unsustainable so far as 
Australian law was concerned.  The DAC would note Sir Patrick Neill QC’s subsequent 1995 
Bernstein Lecture in the wake of Esso/BHP v Plowman when he said: ‘it would be difficult to 
conceive of any greater threat to the success of English arbitration than the removal of the general 
principles of confidentiality and privacy’. 
The pubic interest issue again came before the court the following year in Commonwealth of 
Australia v Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd (Cockatoo Dockyard)516 where as per Kirby J: ‘Can it be 
seriously suggested that the parties private agreement can, endorsed by a procedural direction of 
an arbitrator, exclude from the public domain matters of legitimate concern’.517  Thus emphasising 
that the public interest may also demand transparency as an exception to confidentiality.  The 
Court of Appeal of New South Wales decided by a majority that an arbitrator had no power to 
impose an obligation of confidentiality which would have had the effect of preventing the 
government (a party to the arbitration) from disclosing to a state agency, or to the public, 
information and documents generated in the course of the arbitration which ought to be made 
known to that authority or to the public, because public health and environmental issues were 
involved. 
In Telesat Canada v Boeing Satellite Systems International Inc518 the Ontario court was of 
the view that there was a general public interest in preserving the confidentiality of materials filed 
in court in pending arbitration.  The difficulties of doing so when the arbitrators are functus and 
the arbitration is over were highlighted in 2249492 Ontario Inc. v Donato.519  Donato was the 
unsuccessful party in an arbitration and served notice of appeal from the arbitral award and said 
it would seek confidentiality of the award from the court.  As Ontario Inc. intended to file a motion 
to enforce the award, Donato made an urgent application to the arbitrator, obtaining a declaration 
that the arbitration award was confidential. 
The court rejected Donato’s application to seal the arbitral award so that it would not form 
part of the public record.  The grounds given were that applications for confidentiality should be 
decided on a case-by-case basis: indiscriminately granting confidentiality to all arbitration-related 
cases would diminish public confidence in the administration of justice.  Donato were hampered 
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by the fact that the arbitration was no longer on-going: the arbitrator was functus having issued 
his award; and that Donato were neither able to point to any specifically confidential information 
nor explain why the public interest favoured confidentiality over publication.  Whilst the Ontario 
court’s approach in the Donato case tilts against the spirit of Lord Hoffman, it was a pragmatic 
and ultimately workable solution. 
In New Zealand, Court proceedings relating to an arbitration must be conducted in public 
under s.14F subject to certain exceptions, such as if the court is satisfied that the interests of a 
party to have the proceedings held in private outweigh the public interest in having them 
conducted in public.  The factors that a court would consider in such an application must include 
all of the following: the open justice principle; the privacy and confidentiality of the arbitral 
proceedings; other public interest considerations; the terms of any arbitration agreement; and the 
applicant’s reasons for holding them in private.  The ‘open justice principle’ set out at s.14F(2) is 
an example of New Zealand’s approach to judicial transparency.  An example is ‘Media Guide 
for Reporting the Courts and Tribunals’520 which provides that open justice is a fundamental 
principle of the New Zealand justice system and court proceedings are generally open to the 
public.  However, control over conduct in the court room, including decisions relating to in-court 
media coverage remains at the discretion of the judge.521 
Rule 26 and Rule 27 of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 detail confidentiality and privacy.  
There are a number of exceptions to the general rule on confidentiality, including the ‘public 
interest’ and ‘necessary in the interest of justice’.  There is no definition provided of what 
constitutes either exception however.  In United States v Panhandle E Corp.522 the Federal 
Government viewed disclosure was in the public interest.  A Group Federal District Court ruled 
in American Central Eastern Texas Gas Co. v Union Pacific Resources Group523 that the principle 
of confidentiality is inferior to the public interest: ‘the public has a strong countervailing interest 
in knowing the results of arbitration proceedings that involve allegations of anti-competitive and 
monopolistic conduct’. 
The overseas jurisdictions discussed in this chapter, particularly with respect to Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand, have demonstrated a greater willingness to address the philosophical 
concerns of a public interest exception to confidentiality in arbitration and to embrace more 
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transparent approaches.  These are approaches and solutions from which English law could 
usefully apply Lee Kuan Yew’s dictum: ‘I do not work on a theory.  Instead I ask: what will make 
this work?’’524 
Is Confidentiality in Arbitration a Human Rights Issue? 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) into UK law.  The impact on arbitration of the Human Rights Act does not feature 
significantly in the literature.  Ambrose considered the effect of the HRA on commercial 
arbitration, arguing that arbitrators applying English law will have to interpret legislation 
compatibly with European Convention rights.525  McBride & Bagshaw considered the 
development of confidentiality in the context of the right to privacy contained in Art.8 of the 
ECHR, it is unclear from limited body of case law that it is an area of concern.526  Periodic 
attempts to invoke Art.6 of the HRA within the area of arbitration have not generally faired well.  
In Premium Nafta Products Limited (20th Defendant) and others v Fili Shipping Company 
Limited (14th Claimant) and others,527 an appeal concerning the scope and effect of arbitration 
clauses various charter parties where it was alleged by the owners that the charters were procured 
by the bribery, the House of Lords despatched with suitable firmness an argument by the 
shipowners that the CA’s approach infringed the owners’ right of access to a court for the 
resolution of their civil disputes, contrary to Art.6 of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
The European Convention was not intended to destroy arbitration. Arbitration is based 
upon agreement and the parties can by agreement waive the right to a court.  If it appears 
upon a fair construction of the charter that they have agreed to the arbitration of a 
particular dispute, there is no infringement of their Convention right.528 
It is unlikely that the HRA would affect confidentiality and procedural flexibility in 
arbitration as by electing to arbitrate, the parties have waived procedural rights under Art.6 of the 
ECHR.529  This view would appear to be confirmed by Cooke J, in rejecting the argument that 
Art.6 ECHR required public pronouncements of judgment in arbitration claims.530  That view is 
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broadly shared by the ECJ, although it has noted that is not an unfettered right, and there may be 
occasions - not currently brought before it - where the ECHR could impact on arbitration 
proceedings.  The ECHR’s ‘Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
makes clear that there is a distinction to be made between voluntary and compulsory arbitration.  
‘In principle, no issue is raised under Article 6 in the case of voluntary arbitration since it is 
entered into freely’.531  Whilst arbitrators applying English law will have to interpret legislation 
compatibly with European Convention rights, it would appear unlikely that the HRA will affect 
confidentiality and procedural flexibility in arbitration. 
Chapter 7 Summary 
That balancing of evolving public policy, mercantile will and the increasing demands of 
transparency in jurisprudence, reflect the ebb and flow of intellectual debate in the English legal 
system.  England has not yet had its Esso/BHP v Plowman, and no English arbitration has had to 
contend with the full glare of publicity and political interference as experienced in that Australian 
High Court case where disclosure was considered as being in the public interest.  There is a view 
however (see Derrington et al) that the distinctions between the Australian and English positions 
are illusory, that Esso/BHP v Plowman was a one-off case involving public interest and political 
considerations that are unlikely to be repeated in England.  One of the difficulties that may arise 
is if a tribunal is asked to consider a public interest exception to the obligation of confidentiality, 
not only because of the residual uncertainty about the exception’s existence, but also because it 
is doubtful whether a tribunal would be properly equipped or mandated to assess what is or is not 
within the public interest.  Or in respect of the narrower and acknowledged exception for the 
interests of justice, particularly when, as in Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners, disclosure of 
confidential information is sought by a party essentially for the benefit of a non-party.  Should 
the tribunal really be trusted to get it right?  If it is wrong, there are limited avenues for recourse 
against its decision.   
And yet the issues are not new.  They have echoes in Scott v Scott,532a rare English case to 
consider confidentiality, where the House of Lords contained a staunch defender of judicial 
transparency in Lord Shaw.  Borrowing freely from Jeremy Bentham, the recognised founder of 
Utilitarianism, a judicial philosophy whose adherents believe that law must be made to conform 
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to its most socially useful purpose:  
Publicity is the very soul of justice ... It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.  
To remit the maintenance of a constitutional right to the region of judicial discretion is to 
shift the foundations of freedom from the rock to the sand.533 
These mid nineteenth century sentiments reveal a long-standing English suspicion of justice 
hidden from public view, echoing what Professor Meiklejohn considered as being the ‘lingering 
historical resentment of the Stuart Kings’ use of the Court of the Star Chamber to try political 
dissenters in secret.534  By the time when the Star Chambers were abolished by an Act of 
Parliament in 1641, arbitration awards were generally public.535  Somewhere in the past three 
centuries since, the law arguably took a wrong turn.  But there is optimistic evidence to suggest 
that the judiciary, praised by Osborne for their ‘robustness and attachment to principle’ may adopt 
an open and flexible approach.536  These sentiments appear to dwell undiminished in the hearts of 
the modern judiciary.  As Lord Bingham explained in a Guardian Newspaper interview: ‘I regard 
liberty, which is one of the important values protected by the convention [on human rights], as of 
immense importance’.537 
In international arbitration, the confidentiality of arbitration awards is being slowly eroded 
by the public law aspect of many proceedings.  The reporting of ICSID, NCAA and Nafta awards 
for example, and the decisions of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal illustrate cases which have 
recognised that the interest in the arbitration lies in the public, rather than the private domain.  In 
those contexts at least, where arbitration becomes recognised increasingly as a matter of public 
law, the public interest exception will be further developed.  It therefore becomes necessary to 
evaluate and balance the protection of the public interest in the transparency and accountability 
of public administration against legitimate commercial interests, confidentiality and the privacy 
of their commercial dealings. 
Kirby J’s decision in Cockatoo Shipyard was not well received by the DAC, being viewed 
with concern, particularly as it related to government or statutory corporations: ‘…it would be 
extremely harmful to English arbitration if any statutory statement of general principles in this 
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area impeded the commercial good-sense of current practices in English arbitration.538‘  But to 
my mind the philosophical basis for the decisions contained within both Esso/BHP v Plowman 
and Cockatoo Dockyard are all square with the fundamental tenets found in the English authorities 
relating to the transparency of justice and the openness of the courts in a free, democratic society.  
If there was to be any one exception to arbitral confidentiality, that relating to the public interest 
and involving government entities, organisations, statutory or regulatory bodies would surely take 
precedence.  And not far behind that would be the cases involving a genuine public interest, a 
citizen’s ‘right to know’. 
How should courts approach appeals to arbitrations which contain confidential information, 
whether on commercially sensitive grounds or for other reasons?  The English authorities point 
towards the adoption of an ad hoc approach by the courts i.e., they are matters best determined 
by the relevant court on the facts and merits of each individual case.  That may well be the most 
effective approach and the following is proposed: 
Court proceedings under the Act being conducted in public 
(a) A court must conduct proceedings under this Act in public unless the court orders that 
the whole or any part of the proceedings are to be conducted in private. 
(b) A court may make an order under subsection (1) above - 
 (i) on the application of one of the parties to the proceedings; and 
 (ii) only where the court is satisfied that the interests of the party in having the 
whole or any part of the proceedings conducted in private outweigh the public interest in 
having those proceedings conducted in public. 
Unanimity of approach on how to deal with confidentiality in a public interest context is 
absent.  It remains unclear as to the court’s approach if faced with public interest issues such as 
those addressed in overseas jurisdictions such as Esso/BHP v Plowman, or the American 
Methanex or Panhandle cases. 
The Australian position, both from statute and from their authorities, have set the clearest 
unequivocal example on how to approach a public interest exception.  The complexity of 
formulating a precise definition should not be underestimated.  Therefore, whilst recognising such 
an exception should be recognised in law, its precise ambit could practically be devolved to the 
courts on a case-by-case basis.  For this reason, the following wording is proposed: 
Public Interest Exception 
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions with respect to arbitral confidentiality and 
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confidential material as provided for in this Act, a court may order disclosure of any 
confidential materials, including an award, if it determines that to do so is in the public 
interest or if the interests of justice so require. 
(b) No central or local government department, authority, agency, or statutory body shall 





Chapter 8: Development of the Law 
‘For English Arbitration, the exceptions to confidentiality are manifestly legion and unsettled in part: and 
equally, there are important exceptions to privacy’.539 
- DAC Report 1996 
Introduction 
The effectiveness and fairness of the law preoccupied the minds of medieval politicians, to a 
greater extent perhaps than it does their modern counterparts.  Concerns over legal reforms 
occupied the early part of Edward I’s reign.  Robert Burnell, the King’s friend and confident and 
Chancellor from 1272 until his death in 1292, was a member of the commission appointed to 
enquire into the various complaints into abuses of the administration of justice in the Kingdom 
that resulted in the wholesale purge of the bench: draining the swamp, thirteenth century style.540  
Burnell was a famed arbitrator in a period when disputes were routinely and voluntarily referred 
to arbitration, the results of which were quite public.  Given that Burnell was active in the 
arbitration between the claimants to the Scotch throne, this could by definition have been 
described as a matter that fell within the public interest.541   
Has international commercial arbitration stifled the development of the common law?  So 
Lord Thomas, the then Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, argued in 2016 when presenting 
a paper at the 4th Bailii Lecture.542  Noting the prevalence of arbitration as a dispute resolution 
mechanism in international commercial disputes, Lord Thomas considered the resulting transfer 
of the development of commercial and legal norms from national courts to private tribunals.  This 
was in Lord Thomas’s opinion a grave, negative influence on the development of the common 
law: views reflective of a judicial philosophy of which Edmund Burke, one of England’s most 
prolific writers, philosopher and arguably greatest jurists, would have approved.  In summarising 
his enquiry into the House of Lords impeachment of Warren Hastings, Burke reported to the 
House of Commons in 1794: ‘To give judgment privately is to put an end to reports; and to put 
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an end to reports is to put an end to the law of England’.543 Burke was very firmly in the judicial 
transparency camp.  
Lord Thomas’s speech raised important, interrelated issues concerning the confidentiality of 
the arbitral process.  The most important was the view that the general non-publication of 
commercial arbitral awards risks leading to ossification of the law.  The English legal system 
maintains a connection with the law courts more closely than any other: a long and uninterrupted 
development shaped by the decisions of the courts.  The Courts of Admiralty, Courts of the 
Merchants and the King's Council, Courts of Common Law and Equity and Ecclesiastical Courts 
may no longer exist.  But their contribution to the law’s development; and the application of the 
principles upon which those decisions were based by the courts that succeeded them, is 
recognised.  The contemporary arguments over the desirability of award publication can be 
encapsulated no better perhaps than by turning again to Burke, whose sentiments from more than 
two centuries ago retain a powerful and persuasive resonance:  
The English jurisprudence hath not any other sure foundation … but in the maxims, rules 
and principles, and judicial traditionary line of decisions contained in the notes taken, and 
from time to time published (mostly under the sanction of the judges) called Reports.544 
What is the benefit to publishing arbitral awards?  Who benefits and are there losers?  Can 
an analytic jurisprudential view that publication is beneficial to the development of the law be 
weighed against a purely commercial stance of its potential impact on London as an arbitration 
centre?  It is well recognised that arbitral institutions are reluctant to require greater publication 
of awards due to a concern that a high degree of transparency could drive users away as parties 
take their business elsewhere.  Beyond this commercial approach there are practical issues to 
consider.  To what extent should published awards be redacted i.e., should identifying information 
such as the names of parties, owners, charterers, ships or arbitrators be removed?  On whom 
would fall the time and cost of redaction?  If a poorly redacted award allowed one of the 
aforementioned category of users being identified, would it create a tort of breach of 
confidentiality? And if so, how would damages be quantified?  And not least, who would publish 
the awards?  
 
543 Edmund Burke, Report from the Committee of the House of Commons Appointed To Inspect The Lords’ Journals 
In Relation To Their Proceedings on The Trial of Warren Hastings, Esquire on 30th April 1794 The Works of the 
Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. XI.  http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18218/18218-h/18218-
h.htm#FNanchor_30_30 accessed 31 March 2020. 





In Lawal (Appellant) v Northern Spirit Limited545 Lord Steyn expressed the view that the 
arcane practices of the Tribunals (e.g., Employment Appeals Tribunals) were coming under the 
spotlight of increasing public sensitivity and scrutiny, that the days of opaque practices and 
secrecy in a legal context were perhaps numbered, beginning, perhaps inevitably, to look 
inadequate:  
What the public was content to accept many years ago is not necessarily acceptable in the 
world today.  The indispensable requirement of public confidence in the administration 
of justice requires higher standards today than was the case even a decade or two ago.546 
This chapter will address two interlinked issues: (a) the limited rights of appeals of an 
arbitration award to the courts; and (b) the non-publication of arbitration awards.  Whether and to 
what extent do these features of arbitration hinder the development of the common law? 
Arrested Development: Arbitration Appeals 
Has the Arbitration Act 1996 adversely affected the development of English commercial 
law?  More than 20 years after the Act came into force this subject remains controversial, actively 
debated amongst commentators.  The arguments generally focus on two points: the restricted 
ability to appeal an award to the courts and the lack of publication of awards.  The appeal of 
awards can and does impact indirectly on the confidentiality of the arbitral process as we have 
seen in English cases such as City of Moscow.  Did the framers of the Arbitration Act find the 
right balance with respect to the appeal of arbitration awards?  As Lord Mance noted: 
‘…arbitration awards have become even less likely to be scrutinised in court or publicly known 
since the Arbitration Act 1996’. 547  Touching on insurance and reinsurance arbitration, he 
recognised - somewhat apologetically the problems that: ‘…the lack of binding authority on 
important principles or standard wording’ caused the market in general.548 
In the two years covering 2018 and 2019 there were just 54 applications for permission to 
appeal under s.69 of the Arbitration Act.549  These statistics suggest the hurdles involved are a 
strong deterrent.  Are these numbers unacceptable or do they reflect a reasonable balance between 
user expectations and the needs of the law?  Was Lord Thomas correct?  In most national 
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arbitration systems awards cannot be appealed either on the merits, or by reference to findings of 
fact or points of law.  English law however is different.  Whilst the scope remains limited, there 
are nonetheless three ways in which such an appeal can be brought under the Arbitration Act. 
Under s.67: a challenge to the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction.   
Section 67 deals with the consequences of lack of jurisdiction.  It was new to English 
legislation in 1996 having been derived from Art.34(2) of the Model Law.  It permits a challenge 
to an award which is allegedly made without jurisdiction.  
Under s.68: a challenge on the ground of serious irregularity. 
The Arbitration Act 1996 removed the word ‘misconduct’ and replaced it with the phrase 
‘serious irregularity’.  The word ‘misconduct’ was introduced by the Arbitration Act 1889, 
replacing the original formulation ‘undue means’.  Its meaning was meant no more than to 
indicate that something had gone seriously wrong with the procedure.  However, despite the best 
efforts of the courts, the word ‘misconduct’ came to be regarded by arbitrators as implying 
impropriety.  Under the Arbitration Act 1950, where the arbitrator had misconducted himself or 
the proceedings, the court had power to set aside or remit the award and also to remove the 
arbitrators.  The term ‘serious irregularity’ was an implementation of a recommendation of the 
DAC 1978 Report, then chaired by Lord Donaldson. 
Under s.69: an appeal on a point of law. 
Appeals under s.69 go to the heart of the issue concerning the law’s development: should the 
right to appeal from an arbitral award on a point of law be made broader and more flexible?  The 
principal part of s.69(1) reads as follows:   
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice 
to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising out 
of an award made in the proceedings.  
The main effect of the change to the Arbitration Act 1979 was to abolish the wide-ranging 
judicial review by an error of law on the face of the award.  By the 1979 Act and as interpreted 
by the House of Lords in Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) (No 2) [1982] AC 
724, the effect was to limit the review by means of an appeal on a point of law only.  This radical 





the desirability to promote party autonomy and the finality in awards, balanced against the need 
to preserve and develop English commercial law. 
When the Courts were called upon to determine these issues it was frequently emphasised 
that the question must be a question of law, not fact, and the question must be a question of 
English law and must arise out of an award.  An analysis of how to tackle the question of whether 
an award is wrong in law was set down by Mustill J in Finelvet A.g. v Vinava Shipping Co Ltd 
(The Chrysalis)550 who considered the answer lay in dividing the arbitrator's process of reasoning 
into three stages: (a) the arbitrator ascertains the facts.  This includes the making of findings on 
any facts that are in dispute; (b) the arbitrator ascertains the law.  This process comprises the 
identification of all material rules of statute and common law; the identification and interpretation 
of the relevant parts of the contract; and the identification of those facts which are relevant and 
must be taken into account in reaching the decision. (c) having ascertained the facts and the law 
the arbitrator reaches his decision.551 
In Guangzhou Dockyards Co Ltd v E.N.E. Aegiali I552 there was an appeal to the court against 
the arbitrators’ findings of fact.  This was not an attempt to dress up questions of fact as 
questions of law: ‘These are questions of fact dressed up as questions of fact’ described by the 
court as a novel appeal ‘unknown in modern times’. 553  Blair J considered it was ‘very doubtful’ 
whether the courts had any inherent jurisdiction to hear an appeal from arbitrators on questions 
of fact.554  Likewise the Courts have criticised attempts to dress up questions of fact as questions 
of law.555  Arbitral decisions concerning the application of the law to the facts are not ‘questions 
of law’ with respect to s.69.556  And if the tribunal has reached a conclusion of mixed fact and 
law, the Court will not interfere with that conclusion just because it would not have reached the 
same conclusion itself.557  A s.69 appeal can only be brought if the parties agree to do so i.e., a 
‘consensual appeal’ or if the court grants leave to appeal under s.69(2).  Under s.69(3) the 
applicant has to satisfy the court that: (a) that the determination of the question of law ‘will’ 
substantially affect the rights of one or more parties; (b) that the question of law is one which the 
tribunal was asked to determine; and (c) that, on the basis of the findings of fact in the award the 
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decision of the tribunal on the question of law is obviously wrong or the question is one of general 
public importance and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt. 
The greatest difficulties tend to arise with respect to what constitutes both ‘general public 
importance’ and ‘open to serious doubt’.  If the question is one of general public importance, the 
threshold for leave to appeal is lower: the tribunal's decision only requires to be ‘open to serious 
doubt’.  If there is no public importance then the higher hurdle of ‘obviously wrong’ applies.  But 
what does ‘obviously wrong’ mean?  Is it - as Colman J memorably described it:  
Is the obviousness something which one arrives at, as I say, on the first reading over a 
good bottle of Chablis and some pleasant smoked salmon or is ‘obviously wrong’ the 
conclusion one reaches at the twelfth reading of the clauses and with great difficulty 
where it is finely balanced.   
Whilst Colman J thought it obviously not the latter, it highlights that there still exists a 
significantly wide scope for interpretation amongst even the most experienced of commercial 
judges.558  It is not clear what defines a question of general public importance.  Colman J, 
highlighting that the key words of ‘general’ and ‘public’ in ‘general public importance’ 
considered that they had to have a wider application than the confines of a relatively small trade 
sector or association.  
When it came to considering whether the right of appeal on a point of law should be abolished 
entirely, the DAC rejected the approach, taking the view that a limited right of appeal was not 
inconsistent with an agreement to arbitrate.  But not all commentators agree.  Knull and Robins 
discussed the implied duty of confidentiality and proposed widening the scope for appeal.559  They 
made the point that although the extent of an implied duty of confidentiality in arbitration varies 
significantly from country to country and is rarely absolute, under normal circumstances 
information disclosed in arbitration is less likely to find a public outlet than in litigation.  Closer 
to home, the Lord Mayor of London, Alderman Robert Finch echoed the views of Knull and 
Rubins, when he stated that there should be more appeals from arbitrations to the court, not less: 
that the present restrictions on appeals under the Arbitration Act 1996 is ‘stultifying …and 
unhealthy’ and asked whether the ‘pendulum’ in relation to appeals from London arbitration had 
swung too far.560 
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Not long after that 2004 Cedric Barclay Lecture, came the Report of the Commercial Court 
and Admiralty Court for 2004 - 2005.561  In response to concerns as to whether the strict 
requirements imposed under the Arbitration Act for leave to appeal to the Commercial Court was 
impeding the development of the law (particularly in the field of shipping, insurance and 
reinsurance) the Committee set up a working group.  Chaired by Mr Bruce Harris, it was tasked 
with considering how the Arbitration Act 1996 had worked in practice since being introduced.  It 
carried out a detailed survey of arbitration users, reporting that more than 500 respondents 
answered the questionnaire in full with over 700 individual contributions.  As the working group’s 
final report relates, it had gone into the exercise with the prior expectation that there would be 
pressure for change: ‘that the mesh of the net was too small… [that] there was no longer a 
satisfactory flow of cases which would enable the courts to continue developing commercial law 
as they have done in the past’, particularly with regards to the tests for obtaining leave to appeal 
under s.69.562  
In fact, the report shewed that overall 60 percent of respondents considered that the basis for 
appeals under s.69 should be unchanged, whilst 15 percent thought that it should be abolished 
and 20 percent that the basis for appealing on a point of law should be changed.  Of interest are 
some of the suggestions that the 20 percent who wanted to see change proposed.  These included: 
the wording ‘obviously wrong’ in subsection (3)(c)(i) should become ‘open to serious doubt’ and 
so aligning the test with that in subsection (3)(c)(ii); that the court should be more ready to grant 
leave when there is no case law on the point in question or where a tribunal specifically seeks 
guidance or says that the matter is one of general importance to the industry concerned; and that 
it should be easier for the court to hear cases which are in the common interest to help 
development of the law.  
When asked about whether the tests for obtaining leave should be changed, 57 percent of 
respondents thought there should be none.  The report concluded however on the issue of s.69 
appeals that the existing tests were working satisfactorily.  Any need for a ‘slightly more liberal 
approach’ could be met by ‘pragmatism on the part of the court’.563  The committee concluded 
that changes to the Arbitration Act 1996 were neither necessary nor desirable.  However, it was 
not the unanimous view of the committee.  The report in its conclusions included a footnote with 
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the following dissenting opinion:  
The quality of the Common Law underpins the success of this jurisdiction… the Act is 
too restrictive of the timely development of the Common Law… Some updating of the 
Act therefore continues to be of paramount importance.564   
Cohen was critical of the Committee’s recommendation against a change in the law solely 
because it saw a ‘virtual impossibility of legislating satisfactorily’ in the absence of a consensus 
about what the statute should provide.565 
The Overseas Perspective 
In the USA s.10 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that the federal district court may 
only vacate an arbitral award in four very limited circumstances which the Supreme Court has 
described as ‘egregious departures from the parties' agreed-upon arbitration’.566  These are: (1) 
where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) where there was evident 
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct or 
misbehaviour that prejudiced the rights of any party; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers.567  Professor Davies made the point that as a consequence of almost all charter party 
disputes going to arbitration rather than litigation through the courts, the development of US 
maritime law had almost completely atrophied due to the narrowness of the grounds for setting 
aside of an arbitral award.568   
Davies however was not being critical of this restriction, considering the difficulty in getting 
judicial review of arbitral awards in the United States as an advantage, ‘because there is less law 
to argue about and fewer opportunities for post-award legal argument’.569  Concerns have been 
expressed by senior members of the English judiciary.  Sir Bernard Rix stated that: ‘as more and 
more international commercial cases go to arbitration rather than the courts, we are more and 
more losing sight of the basic feedstock of our commercial law’.570  Lord Thomas’s 2016 speech 
where he expressed his concern that as a consequence of arbitration’s rise in popularity, the 
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prevalence of private, confidential and final arbitrations was stifling the development of the 
commercial common law.  There was a risk of the common law being transformed ‘from a living 
instrument into … an ‘ossuary’’.  That as a consequence, there was a real danger of the 
frameworks underpinning international markets, trade and commerce being eroded.  Are those 
views valid?   
Menon CJ571 reflected on whether in the Singapore context parties to an arbitration should 
have a limited right of appeal on a point of law.  Singapore legislation, like many jurisdictions 
(but unlike England) provides no such right of appeal.  Menon CJ was of the view that a case 
could be made for Singapore to provide a limited right of appeal and so facilitate the development 
of ‘a robust body of maritime jurisprudence’.  That authoritative court rulings on specific points 
of law arising from arbitral disputes would constitute a ‘legal commodity’ that would benefit the 
commercial markets as a whole.  The CJ noted with approval Lord Diplock’s judicial 
interpretation of the Arbitration Act 1979 in The Nema in formulating guidelines for the statutory 
appeal mechanism,  (guidelines which were later enshrined in s.69 of the Arbitration Act 1996) 
and quoted Lord Diplock: ‘it is only if parties to commercial contracts can rely upon a uniform 
construction being given to standard terms that they can prudently incorporate them in their 
contracts without the need for detailed negotiation or discussion’.572 
The Singapore courts treat an arbitrating party’s rights to privacy and confidentiality more 
strictly than most jurisdictions.  A review of Singapore arbitration award appeals573 indicates that 
it is not only the party’s names that are anonymised.  Vinodh Coomaraswamy J in BRQ v BRS574 
created a fictitious country ‘Lemuria’575 to assist in disguising the identities of the litigants, a 
singularly creative approach.  There is certainly a strong argument for cracking open the door a 
little in the Lion State to let in a little more light, as the Chief Justice’s speech alludes.  That there 
are Model Law jurisdictions rethinking the lack of appeals incorporated into their statutes shows 
a growing international awareness that s.69 type appeals on a point of law may indeed confer a 
benefit on the development of the law.  Confidentiality has its downside too.  The key question 
therefore is whether English law has found the right balance, the proper degree of flexibility in 
allowing arbitration appeals. 
In his Bar Conference speech in November 2013, Lord Thomas, the then Lord Chief Justice 
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of England & Wales, in a forerunner to his 2016 Bailii Lecture criticised the way English law had 
developed with respect to arbitration over the preceding 40 years.576  The 2016 speech argued that 
there was a need to address the deficiencies and so restore the means whereby the courts can 
continue to develop the law that underpins the United Kingdom’s trade, financial system and 
prosperity: the threat of ossification of the law as a consequence of the limited right of appeal 
concerned him greatly.577  That by statute in 1979 and through judicial interpretation of that statute 
in 1981 - the blame being directed squarely at Lords Denning and Diplock in that regard - the 
relationship between the courts and arbitration was changed on the perceived basis that it was 
damaging the attractiveness of London as a centre for dispute resolution through arbitration.  
What some commentators saw as a pragmatic compromise was condemned for the unintended 
consequence that fewer developments of the law are taking place in areas where the dispute began 
in arbitration: ‘there has been a serious impediment to the development of the common law by 
the courts in the UK’.578  Was this just a reactionary response to the ascendency of the views of 
Lords Denning, Saville and others or is there an underlying case to be made for reform?  Whilst 
not the first to draw attention to these issues, Lord Thomas was perhaps the most senior member 
of the English judiciary to develop this theme in such a public forum. 
The speech attracted strong criticism from other members of the judiciary.  Lord Saville, who 
was largely responsible for the introduction of the Arbitration Act 1996 strongly disagreed in a 
Times interview, expressing the view that the suggestion that English courts be permitted to 
interfere in the arbitral process by: ‘substituting their decisions for those of the tribunal chosen 
by the parties is regarded with little short of astonishment’ on the grounds that parties had 
expressly agreed to use arbitration as their method of resolving the dispute: ‘What the English 
court would have decided is irrelevant’  Lord Saville considered that reviewing the expansion of 
the right of appeal to be backwards step: ‘…people use arbitration to resolve their disputes, not 
to add to the body of English commercial law’.579  That rather than helping to develop English 
law, it would drive international commercial arbitration away from London.  Sir Bernard Eder 
made a similar point: that it was not for private litigants to be forced to finance the development 
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of the common law by pursuing appeals to the courts.580   
Blair J struck a more conciliatory tone at a speech to the Commercial Litigation and 
Arbitration Forum at the end of 2016.  He was at pains to point out that in his view it was neither 
accurate nor sensible to see arbitration and litigation as ‘in some kind of arms race’.  That it should 
be recognized that they were ‘mutually supportive parts’ of a developing system of international 
commercial dispute resolution.581  It is nonetheless clear that there is a fundamental tension 
between the views of the users of arbitration and those of the Bench.  With Lord Thomas’s 
retirement as Lord Chief Justice in October 2017, it is unclear to what extent his successor, Lord 
Burnett of Maldon, shares the same enthusiasm for arbitral reform.582  
Is there a need for more s.69 appeals to go before the courts?  I would conclude that on 
balance, probably not.  To a large extent it is in the hands of the judiciary.   Taking a more flexible 
and liberal interpretation of the provisions and meanings of the Arbitration Act 1996 with respect 
to ‘general public importance’, ‘open to serious doubt’ and ‘obviously wrong’ could go a long 
way to setting the balance right, restoring that perceived ‘pendulum’.  When Singapore’s most 
senior judicial office holder, Menon CJ proposed583 that their arbitration statutes should provide 
for a greater degree of judicial intervention in line with the English position, it is a good indicator 
that the Arbitration Act 1996, with respect to appeals at least, has weathered well and does indeed 
possess that appropriate balance.584 
Publish and be Damned 
The Publication of Awards 
The English legal system is generally looked at from overseas with admiration for its 
independence and professionalism.  To that might be added that it has been the essential 
underpinning of a democratic way of life and general prosperity for centuries.  It was such eminent 
judges as the Earl of Mansfield and Lord Blackburn who were in a large part responsible for the 
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creation of English mercantile law.  The system they helped create evolved and adapted to serve 
the needs of industry and commerce, overwhelmingly viewed as an essentiality to the 
maintenance of the Kingdom’s economy and prosperity.  Burke was of the fervent opinion that 
‘…nothing better could be devised by human wisdom than argued judgments publicly delivered 
for preserving unbroken the great traditionary body of the law’.585  
Does that confidentiality that arbitration awards currently possess, the tightly controlled 
distribution and highly limited audience - the ‘private judgement’ Burke so strongly objected to - 
risk undermining English law?  For those on the outside, knowledge of what happens in arbitration 
proceedings is restricted to the occasional reported court case, sporadically published arbitral 
awards and attorney ‘war stories’’.  Drahozal was clearly not a fan of the secrecy inherent in 
modern-day arbitration, going on to note that the problem with anecdotes is working out whether 
the events described are ‘typical or atypical, frequent or infrequent, ordinary or extreme’.586  It 
was not always thus.  Actions for Slander and Arbitrements, written by John March and published 
in 1674, was a seventeenth century text book for law students.  It discussed the merits of 
arbitration awards dealing with land and debt.  It is one of the world’s earliest compilations of 
arbitral awards ‘…Being a Collection, …Shewing what Arbitrements are Good in Law, and what 
Not, … Very Useful for All Students in the Law’.  That a modern counterpart, a volume of English 
arbitration awards could not exist today because of the strict laws of confidentiality surrounding 
arbitration awards is arguably a sad indictment of the direction in which English law has 
developed over the intervening centuries.  I would argue that as with the informal dissemination 
of awards, current publication practices do not adequately serve the needs of the modern legal, 
commercial nor arbitral communities. 
Although the Commercial Court’s 2005 Report Committee recommended that no attempt be 
made to change the law in respect of confidentiality, most users who completed the questionnaire 
were in favour of releasing at least some part of the award to the public.  Recognising this, Cohen 
considered that the publication of awards was in the public interest.  Expressing disappointment 
in the CCC, noting that in addition to its failure to address consolidation, there were: ‘residual 
pockets of belief about the development of English contract law being stunted because so few 
awards can be appealed on the merits under the 1996 Act’.587  The benefits of making more 
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decisions available and publishing awards from ‘lawyers and lay experts familiar with those 
issues’ and thereby providing guidance about how technical issues should be resolved was 
inescapably obvious.  Cohen was overall critical of the CCC’s report, viewing the CCC’s 
conclusions following its investigation into the workings of the Arbitration Act 1996 
disappointing: ‘There were over 500 responses to the questionnaire.  In the end the Report 
represents a missed opportunity’.  Cohen’s analysis is cogent.  The CCC’s report did indeed show 
a majority of commercial (especially shipping) users in support of progressive change, even if 
only to the extent of partial award publication.  
If the argument that arbitral awards should be more widely distributed and the emphasis on 
publication rather than confidentiality, how best might this be achieved?  Various practitioners 
and academics have put forward proposals.  Karton’s criticism of the current system stemmed 
from the fact that inherent conflict of interests explains why the confidentiality of international 
arbitral party interests in keeping awards confidential was likely to override any academic or 
philosophical interests in publishing them.588  He considered how the different party and systemic 
interests would be affected by greater publication of awards and set out his proposals on a new 
method for publishing awards that would avoid compromising party interests.  Towers noted the 
desirability of amending the Arbitration Act 1996 to allow the publication of anonymised 
arbitration awards by default, subject to an opt-out provision.589 
Who Publishes Awards? 
The extent and scope or published arbitral awards remains small and selective.  The 
AAA/ICDR’s ‘Awards and Commentaries’ is a compilation of eight ICDR arbitration awards as 
well as summaries of court decisions concerning ICDR cases in the United States and enforcement 
of ICDR awards outside the United States.590  The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) 
publishes selected awards or decisions with the parties’ consent.  The redacted awards do not 
include the names of the parties, arbitrators or the solicitors involved.  
When the ICC started publishing a number of their awards in extract form in the Journal du 
droit international in 1974 (and in a set of bound volumes entitled Collection of ICC Arbitral 
Awards/Recueil des sentences arbitrales de la CCI) it became increasingly common in 
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international arbitrations for parties to cite published ICC awards.  The ICC’s traditional position 
was that they would not publish if either party objected.  Publication was obviously thought 
sufficiently important that in December 2018 the ICC published an updated “Note to Parties and 
Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration”.  Amongst the most significant of the 
changes was a new opt-out approach:  ICC awards made from 1st January 2019 may be published.  
Although publication is the default position, this new approach provides parties with an opt-out 
mechanism.  Where any party objects to publication, the award will simply not be published – or 
anonymised if preferred.  The ICC Digital library currently contains 800 awards.591 
It was Nicholas and Partasides’ article favouring publication that started the LCIA down that 
path, with respect to challenges to arbitrators at least.592  In the light of increasing challenge to 
arbitrators, Nicholas and Partasides identified a concern amongst the arbitral community that 
users had no access to jurisprudence on arbitrator conflicts of interest and challenges to 
arbitrators.  They gave a number of reasons for user dissatisfaction: the increasing number of 
challenges of arbitrators in international arbitration; its impact on the legitimacy and efficacy of 
the arbitral process; the increasing number and cultural variety of participants in the arbitral 
process had heightened demands for independence, impartiality, predictability and transparency 
in the manner of their application; and the increasingly complex conflicts of interest situations 
that have arisen for parties, arbitrators, institutions and courts. 
As the authors explained: ‘The traditional ambiguity in the meaning and application of these 
standards that handed to the arbitral elite a broad discretion… is increasingly viewed as 
inadequate’.593  The authors argued for the LCIA to publish the LCIA Court's challenge decisions.  
Drawing on cases, the ‘IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration,’ other 
institutional approaches and not least the basic relationship between fairness and the 
communication of reasons and the underpinning of the principles that lay behind them.  Quoting 
Sir Patrick Neil:  
The interests of fairness will very generally be found to require that a person affected by 
a decision should both be aware of the material in the hands of the decision-maker which 
may be used as a basis for the decision and, secondly, that he should know the reasons 
underlying the ultimate decision.594 
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Following the presentation of Nicholas and Pastasides’ report to a joint meeting of the LCIA 
Court and Board at Tylney Hall in 2006, the LCIA voted to publish in the form of abstracts all 
the LCIA Court's decisions on challenges to arbitrators. 
Brice on Salvage595 is relevant in the narrow area of confidentiality applicable to salvage 
awards under an LOF arbitration.  It analyses the St John,596 where the court held that promoting 
uniformity and consistency within the LOF system of arbitration overrode the duty of 
confidentiality.   
The Society of Maritime Arbitrators (the SMA) publishes all awards unredacted.  Has this 
contributed to a drop off in the number of SMA maritime arbitrations?  Between the mid 1980’s 
to mid 1990’s there were on average 108 arbitrations a year.597  It now takes two to three years to 
generate that number of published awards.  In 2017 the SMA published 84 awards, the following 
year 57.  In 2019 that had fallen to 27.598  There is however an alternative view, namely that the 
fall off in SMA arbitrations was caused by an exodus of foreign shipowners away from New 
York.599  The SMA is not alone amongst maritime arbitral centres in publishing.  The SCMA’s 
position that publication of summaries of awards is important for the development of arbitration 
law and practice (and arbitration in Singapore as an arbitral centre in general) was echoed by 
Chong J.  Noting that the scope of publication under Rule 35.9 is limited, being dependant on the 
SCMA’s assessment of the merits of the particular decision, Chong J suggested that the SCMA: 
‘…go one step further and institute a default rule that all awards are subject to publication unless 
the parties object’.600   
Currently both the LMAA and SCMA allow selected awards - with parties consent - to be 
published in Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter (LMLN).  It has been noted that these are 
periodically referenced in submissions to arbitration.  The Association of Maritime Arbitrators of 
Canada also publishes.  The Japan Shipping Exchange (TOMAC) does; and (in a different 
industry) the Court of Arbitration for Sport make most awards available through Kluwer.  Unless 
commercial parties can be reassured that the publication of awards will not effect their interests, 
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it is doubtful that the systematic publication of awards can be achieved.  
Other publications independent of arbitral institutions that publish awards include the 
International Council for Commercial Arbitration’s (ICCA) ‘Yearbook Commercial Arbitration’.  
The Yearbook provides an annual update on developments with respect to institutional and ad 
hoc arbitral awards, developments in arbitration law and practice and investment treaty awards.  
Mealey's ‘International Arbitration Report’, ‘World Arbitration Reporter’, ‘World Trade and 
Arbitration Materials’, the ‘Journal du Droit International (Clunet)’, ‘Revue de I'Arbitrage’ also 
publish summaries.  Trade journals such as the LCIA’s ‘Arbitration International’ and the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrator’s ‘Journal of Arbitration’ publish summaries of some awards, 
but do not publish the actual awards.  A similar situation exists with the ‘Global Arbitration 
Review’ and the annual ‘Arbitration Scorecard’ published by The American Lawyer.  Awards 
and other information from state/state and investor/state disputes administered by the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration are available on the PCA's website, subject to the parties' consent. 
Leading arbitral institutions such as HKIAC continue to maintain that awards should not be 
published in any form.  The Swiss Arbitration Association's bulletin publishes some awards.  
Investor-state arbitral awards are somewhat easier to access as ICSID maintains an on-line 
database containing names of the parties, the decision, names of the arbitrators and the awards.  
Parties will often consent to publication, but even without such permission it is not uncommon to 
see one party releases the award to publications such as ‘International Legal Materials or the 
Journal du Droit International’.   
Compared to the number of arbitration proceedings wordwide - the LMAA alone estimates 
that more than 500 awards are handed down under the LMAA’s Terms each year of which about 
10 percent appear in LMLN in a redacted form - the extent to which awards are published is small. 
Erosion of Judge Made Commercial Law? 
An early commentator to address this issue, Buys remarked:  
When the [arbitration] process has consistency and predictability, its legitimacy is 
enhanced because parties know what to expect.  They have a greater understanding of the 
process, leading to greater satisfaction with it, and are therefore more likely to use it 
again.601   
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Weidenmaier’s raised the point that widespread arbitration could gradually erode judge-
created law.  He reflected on common concerns that arbitrators neither follow nor make precedent 
and the potential negative consequences that could arise as a result.  These include the possibility 
that, ‘over time, widespread use of arbitration will result in the decay or destruction of the law 
itself’.  He was also conducting a tentative comparison between the citation practices of judges 
and arbitrators.   
Not an easy task, and Weidenmaier was at pains to point out the problem is a fundamental 
one: process differences between arbitration and litigation make any comparison imperfect at 
best.602  In his view the evidence suggested that there was little difference in the approaches 
arbitrators and judges made in decision-making or opinion-writing.  Why arbitrators use 
somewhat less precedent than judges and that they appear to use precedent in in slightly different 
ways was unclear from his analysis.  But even if there was a difference, ultimately it wasn’t an 
important one.  Of particular concern was that: ‘widespread arbitration would gradually erode 
government-created law.  If arbitration awards have no value as precedent, but most disputes in a 
particular area are arbitrated, then the law may ossify’.  His solution was that this pointed to an 
increasing need for meaningful dialogue between courts and arbitrators. 
Raymond took a different perspective, evaluating the benefits to business and society, 
viewing the typical aspects of confidentiality in arbitration implied by the English courts as being 
counterproductive, contending that confidential awards erode the fundamental concepts of 
international commercial law.603  In effect Raymond was arguing that it was in the public interest 
to publish awards.  In a similar vein, Chong J outlined the potential virtues of publishing awards 
as a means of fulfilling the wider public interest in the transparency of arbitral proceedings, 
considering that the gradual accretion of published awards would serve as an educational bank 
for the training of aspiring arbitrators.  It would also encourage future arbitrators to achieve 
consistency in the reasoning of their awards and place legal practitioners in a more informed 
position to advise their clients on the principles applied and approaches adopted by arbitrators. 
Not least - in what appeared to be no more than a casual throw away afterthought - it would serve 
as a vehicle to promote the SCMA and Singapore as a centre for maritime arbitration disputes. 
Chong J’s thoughtful speech was however at odds with Singapore’s traditional view of strict 
arbitral privacy and confidentiality.  The view that publication of awards is necessarily an 
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important vehicle in the world of arbitration, is a significant development.  The speech clearly 
served as a restatement of the Singapore government’s aim of promoting Singapore arbitration. 
The Need for Trust and Transparency 
Glover highlighted the three-fold impact and threat of arbitral privacy and confidentiality, by 
diminishing public law and the transparency and mechanisms of law-making.604  Disputes 
resolved by court litigation provided a check against potential unfairness that might exist behind 
closed doors, citing the potential risks of corrupt attorneys, judicial officers, and litigants.  Private 
dispute resolution risked undermining judicial institutions by decreasing public and private 
investment in the court system.  Lastly that privatisation undermines public awareness and 
understanding of the law, how particular laws are interpreted, and how claims are pursued.  
Viewed perhaps from an American perspective these arguments may carry weight: in the English 
context less so.  The Courts in England and Wales are perennially under financial pressure from 
a perceived lack of government funding: the judiciary generally welcome all forms of ADR, 
including arbitration, as a means to reduce the work load of the courts.  The doors may be closed 
and the hearings private, but there is a sufficiently large number of actors involved - the tribunals, 
institutions, lawyers and the parties - in the arbitral process to guarantee its overall transparency. 
Karton seeks to remedy current inadequacies by the universal publication of awards whilst 
the power of veto over publication should be removed from the parties armoury.605  To protect 
legitimate concerns over confidentiality the published awards should include only those parts 
necessary to serve what he described as ‘systemic interests’.  Whilst ‘systemic interests’ are not 
defined, it appears to mean the larger mosaic of arbitral users – practitioners, lawyers, arbitrators, 
as well as the wider public as a whole.  That awards should be edited to remove the parts where 
party interests in confidentiality must be protected but sufficiently that the reader can determine 
the bases on which tribunals arrived at their decisions.  The suggestion that there should be 
standardised award sanitisation away from the arbitral institutions concerned has merit that I will 
return too.  
The further suggestion that awards be drafted in confidential and publishable parts is not 
entirely new.  Although how exactly instructing (or demanding) arbitrators’ should write their 
awards, in such a way that aspects of the decision that deal with evidence or that would enable 
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identification of the parties be separated from (say) legal issues may be more of a challenge.  
Karton proposed a rigid formula whereby the award begin with a recitation of the evidence and 
the facts; a separate section dealing with applicable legal and procedural matters; a third section 
dealing with the application of the law to the facts and the allocation of costs.  With respect to 
publication, Karton considered that the first section would remain confidential whilst the second 
section would be published: the third section would require redaction to preserve  anonymity and 
proprietary information.606  The idea has merit.  But I have strong doubts that it is either practical 
or desirable to expect that a large community of arbitrators from so many different fields of human 
activity, varied cultures and differing backgrounds could be corralled into writing awards in such 
a single, regimented fashion.   
A further weakness in this approach is the mistaken view that institutional arbitration 
accounts for approximately 85 percent of all international commercial arbitrations, ‘…so 
publication of institutional awards would mean publication of a significant majority of all 
awards’.  This is not a supported statistic as any active practitioner in (say) the maritime sector 
can attest and as demonstrated by the statistics compiled in Table 1.  In 2019 the LMAA estimated 
receiving 1756 new references, and issued 529 awards, far exceeding the number of any other 
international arbitral institution.607  Karton is on stronger ground by suggesting that initial change 
is more likely to occur through amendments to the rules of the arbitral institutions.  Publication 
could not be imposed on parties to ad hoc arbitrations without legislative intervention and the 
difficulties the imposition of transparency on the parties through amendments to national laws 
with the resulting infringement on party autonomy that would entail are evident.  It would be 
exceedingly difficult - if not impossible - to achieve an international consensus on publication 
rules, whether in the form of a treaty or an amendment to the Model Law.  That does not rule out 
however a reform of the law in England, where a large majority of international commercial 
arbitrations are currently held. 
Pislevik raises the questions of transparency and asks whether confidentiality should be the 
default expectation in arbitration.  In his view, the increasing tendency to automatically associate 
confidentiality with arbitration is an unfavourable development: and whether international 
commercial arbitration is the right vehicle for the development of commercial law is open to 
question.  One of his concerns is that the ‘substantial shift’ of commercial disputes from court to 
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private arbitration has provided convenience and efficiency at the expense of transparency’.608  
Whilst Pislevik views a greater balance is needed between confidentiality and transparency, one 
that could be attained through greater publication, he recognises that widespread award 
publication is dependant on an uncertain and doubtful level of political support for reform.  In 
that regard is probably correct: the likelihood of a greater consensus in international trade has 
diminished in recent years. 
Do Awards have Precedential Value? 
A principal argument for publication is the view that publishing awards would provide 
greater certainty and predictability for international businesses as parties may be able to predict 
more accurately the outcomes in future arbitrations based on similar scenarios in previously 
published awards.  It is a tempting view and on the surface the argument is plausible.  Consider 
the many disputed shipbuilding contract cancellations since the economic crisis of 2008.  The 
collapse in asset values and chartering revenues forced buyers to reassess their order books whilst 
shipyards sought to hold reluctant buyers to their contracts.  But because many of the arbitration 
clauses called for English arbitration (typically under LMAA Terms) the details of the disputes 
remained largely confidential.  Huge amounts of management time, energy and money could have 
been saved, so runs the argument, if the numerous awards arising out of (it is assumed) similar 
sets of facts had been publicly available.  Perhaps: but there is no way of knowing whether all the 
contracts were indeed identical and the subject matter in the range of disputes was in any case a 
very narrow one.  A similar situation occurred with the collapse of OW Bunkers in 2014 where 
the court’s had to consider an essential problem arising from the insolvency of the OW Bunker 
Group: would vessel owners be exposed to paying twice over, once to their insolvent immediate 
bunker supply group and again to the ultimate source of the bunkers under a maritime lien?  It 
resulted in hundreds of maritime arbitrations under the LMAA Terms and significant English and 
international litigation.  Lord Mance introduced it memorably thus in the Supreme Court’s 
judgement in PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC and another v O W Bunker Malta Limited and 
another609:  
Despite the significance of her name in Cartesian philosophy, the vessel “Res Cogitans” 
depends on bunkers.  The parties' submissions have in compensation lent a degree of 
metaphysical complexity to commonplace facts.  We are told that many similar cases 
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worldwide await our decision with interest.610 
The absence of an arbitral stare decisis i.e., the legal principle of determining points in 
litigation according to precedent, is typically a criticism that emanates from the legal profession 
used to relying on court judgements, rather than the men and women who are involved in the 
everyday business of commerce.  Without precedent to guide them, where multiple approaches 
on any given point of law may simultaneously exist, parties may be uncertain as to how best to 
proceed or argue their case.  The resolution of legal ambiguities might be dependant on the 
constitution of the specific tribunal.  One line of reasoning therefore is that publication will make 
available a greater range of claims or defences that a party or its council might otherwise not have 
been familiar with.  Another is that arbitrators may find other arbitrators reasoning or findings 
persuasive when confronted by the same or a similar issue.  Paulsson and Rawding warned that 
publication of an award risked further litigation or result in significant commercial prejudice.611   
There is however a key difference between court judgements which have the status of binding 
precedents and arbitral awards which do not.  Whilst a compilation of awards may be helpful, it 
is unclear to what extent awards would contribute to the development of common law.  And if 
arbitral awards and decisions have no precedential value, either as to procedural decisions or 
interpretations of law, it is relevant to ask what impact or benefit will increased publication 
provide?  The individual factual matrix of any given arbitration notwithstanding, if experienced 
and respected arbitrators hold a specific view or lean towards a particular analysis on matters 
pertaining to a given technical or specialist field, there is a widespread view that knowledge would 
be of benefit to those within the industry as a whole.  But it is not an approach universally 
accepted.  One American perspective is that some parties and arbitrators are concerned that 
publication of awards will create a ‘precedent system’ which will constrain arbitrators.  Then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist of the US Supreme Court argued that a ‘less frequently realised 
advantage of arbitration . . . is that its process usually need not produce a body of decisional law 
which will guide lawyers and clients as to what their future conduct ought to be’.612  
It is not easy to state with any certainty to what extent practitioners and arbitrators are citing 
and making use of prior decisions and whether that will accelerate with greater publication.613  
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One of the few studies into this specific area concerned domestic arbitration practice in the United 
States, rather than international or commercial arbitration.  Weidenmaier analysed the published 
arbitration awards from four U.S. regimes.614  His findings suggested that: 
…outside of securities and (to some extent) labor arbitration, the arbitrators in the sample 
routinely wrote lengthy awards that were substantially devoted to legal analysis and that 
made extensive use of precedent.  The vast majority of cited precedent, moreover, came 
from published judicial opinions.   
In other words, arbitrators in general tended to primarily cite legal precedent.  In those 
instances where they did fall back on past arbitration awards, it was to fill in the gaps in the law 
where no jurisprudence was available.615 
Level Playing Field 
Solicitors or companies with large international arbitration practices are in a position to 
develop inside knowledge about the arbitrators and institutions that may not be available to those 
at smaller organisations or those with less exposure to commercial or international arbitration.  
Knowledge of prior awards of specific arbitrators can give a competitive edge when it comes to 
both arbitral appointments and the framing of submissions for example.  The increased 
publication of arbitral decisions decreases the potential advantage that may lie with a relatively 
small group of firms and lawyers and so level the playing field by providing useful information 
about an arbitrator’s or potential arbitrator’s views on particular issues likely to arise in an 
arbitration.  That could of course also be a disadvantage: it opens up the possibility of more 
challenges to arbitrators on the grounds of potential bias by virtue of prior published views on 
similar issues.  Such challenges are becoming increasingly commonplace in investment treaty 
arbitrations: with increased publication of awards with arbitrators’ names it would be likely that 
such trends would spill over into commercial arbitrations. 
Making that information publicly available however may not be straightforward and in part 
will depend on the cost of access to publications and the degree to which published decisions are 
redacted.  Sole practitioners and small law firms may not have the economies of scale to justify 
the potentially high subscription rates charged by arbitration institutions, or those of the specialist 
news services.  It does not address of course who pays for the additional time and expense of 
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redaction.  Nor of the bigger issue perhaps, that ad hoc arbitrations far exceed in numbers those 
of the administered institutional arbitration centres. 
Should Users Have to Pay to Develop the Law? 
The most singular objection to publication comes from the perspective of why commercial 
parties, who chose a private mechanism to resolve their disputes, should be involved at all in the 
law’s development. 616  Whilst it may well be true that: ‘the development, uniformity and certainty 
of the commercial law is promoted if the courts can retain an ultimate supervision of decisions … 
and promulgate the result’.  As Cook J in the New Zealand case of CBI NZ Ltd v Badger 
Chiyoda,617 remarked: ‘[i]t does not explain why parties freely contracting should be obliged by 
public policy to make a compulsory contribution to the worthy cause of the coherent evolution of 
commercial law’.  Lord Saville’s very point in his Times Newspaper interview article: it is 
probably the most difficult one to reconcile.  Considering the widely reported financial constraints 
facing the English court system, would they welcome part of their budget being set aside to collate 
and redact arbitral awards - how many: 2000, 3000 or more a year?  It is unlikely.  
But the ‘why should I pay approach?’ strikes me as being a little too mercenary.  At a more 
philosophical level, society needs to grow, adapt and develop.  At some point we all – whether 
individuals, corporations, or nations – must accept that there are costs involved in progress and 
each in our own way take a share of that burden.  Would insurance law have developed if Lord 
Mansfield’s weaving together of legal analysis and principle with a commercial understanding 
gained from experts and close connections with the City had come with the proviso: ‘whose 
footing the bill’?618 
Chapter 8 Summary 
It should be uncontroversial that the Courts contribute to the development of commercial 
trade law: directly in decided cases and indirectly through review of arbitration awards that go to 
appeal.  As enacted, the Arbitration Act 1996 provides a strictly limited right of appeal from an 
arbitral award on points of law.  Whilst the arguments overall support the view that the current 
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regime lacks balance, that there is a perceived advantage in facilitating to a greater degree at least 
the development of a body of commercial law, it is less obvious that this needs to be done through 
statutory reform.  Encouraging judicial flexibility in determining matters of ‘general public 
importance’ may prove a more effective approach.  Colman J’s proposal with respect to ‘open to 
serious doubt’, namely that the test should apply to ‘…any non one-off issue of law which is 
likely to be encountered in future disputes affecting a particular trade, industry or profession’ is 
certainly worthy of consideration.   
Whilst there has been a move to increase the publication of arbitral awards, the proportion of 
international commercial arbitration awards that do become available is very small and typically 
only available as a summary.  The choice of whether to publish primarily rests with the parties, 
who usually oppose, or at least have no incentive, to agree to publication.  As business and 
commercial practices continually evolve, two key – almost diametrically opposed - arguments 
that awards should be published are that as the majority of arbitral awards unpublished, it remains 
unclear that (a) arbitrators and arbitration practice has kept abreast of those developments and (b) 
those users less experienced in arbitration and dispute resolution may not be familiar with current 
views or findings on the matters that are in contention (Galanter’s ‘one-shotters’). 
Would publication make an arbitrator draft an award differently?  Perhaps is the only 
available answer at present.  There is no empiric evidence one way or another, although it is 
reasonable to assume that an arbitrator who knows that his or her decision is likely to be placed 
in the public domain may err towards caution.  It could be that publication may result in longer, 
more legalistic awards; alternatively that the knowledge that their awards will be published will 
impose greater self-discipline on arbitrators in terms of accuracy, content and legal reasoning.  
The importance of articulate, coherent legal and factual bases for their findings cannot be denied.  
When the Norwegian government underwent the lengthy consultation process that finally led 
to the 2004 Arbitration Act, it was argued that arbitration practice needed more openness; that 
there would be a benefit from publishing and making available for reference more awards.  The 
arguments have by now become familiar: greater transparency would equate to an increase in 
knowledge and understanding of the arbitral process; as more awards were published, the easier 
it would be for parties to predict the how tribunals would approach similar matters and so the 
likely result proceedings.  And lastly, the enhanced public scrutiny should help to ensure that 
arbitrators reached objective, reasoned and fair decisions.  However, in practice what happened 





contracts, such as the Norwegian offshore construction contracts.619  In practice it was the market 
that dictated the extent of change. 
Comrie-Thomson noted the movement towards greater transparency and the increasingly 
loud calls for arbitral institutions to publish sanitized awards, goes further, proposing that national 
laws should require arbitral awards be published.  Whilst the argument that there is significant 
public interest is not disputed, the suggestion for a ‘statement of arbitral jurisprudence – an annual 
publication by a state of the purely legal elements of decisions of arbitral tribunals seated in that 
state’ is interesting if not idealistic.620  I would favour the publication of most awards, but consider 
the extraction of legal elements and principles be best delegated to the private sector.  On balance 
the benefits of allowing greater access to arbitral awards outweighs the potential negatives.  In 
my view publication is in the public interest and favour the Norwegian approach of requiring 
every arbitration award to be deposited with the courts. 
The least intrusive and simplest expedient would be to reverse the existing presumption in 
favour of confidentiality unless all parties agreed to public disclosure.  Instead, substitute it with 
a presumption in favour of publication of awards unless all parties required confidentiality i.e., 
an opt-out regime such as operates in the USA and elsewhere.  Publication would provide 
numerous benefits.  Whilst the creation of a body of arbitral knowledge through a comprehensive 
library or arbitral awards would not have the effect of binding precedent, its contribution to the 
state of knowledge would be invaluable: the publication of decisions would provide important 
guidance on the resolution of legal and technical matters, from the commercial men and lawyers 
familiar with those issues.  It would finally allow for accurate and detailed statistics to be complied 
on the extent of arbitration in England.  There would likely be an improvement in the quality of 
arbitration awards and ultimately the enhancement of the reputation of England as an arbitral seat.  
The following amendment of the Arbitration Act 1996 is proposed: 
The Publication of Awards 
(a) A copy of each arbitration award shall be deposited with the High Court within 90 days 
after it has been published.   
… 
(c) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the award may be published in a redacted form 
so as to preserve the anonymity of the parties, their representatives, witnesses of fact and 
expert and the members of the tribunal, subject to – 
(i) The Award is not subject to an appeal before the Courts; 
(ii) The costs of the arbitration have been paid;  
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(iii) Neither party has objected in writing to the publication of the Award within 90 days  
       of it being published. 
The courts could take responsibility for collating and publishing on an annual basis a 
summary of statistics of all arbitrations in England and Wales which will contain the names of 
the parties and arbitrators. 
The publication of the awards should be the easiest matter to address.  Redaction of awards 
can be time consuming and difficult if the aim is to effectively shield the names of the parties 
involved.  Proposals have included standardising award formats, placing the onus on, variously, 
the arbitral institution, the tribunal or even the parties themselves.  It is not obvious however that 
any of these redaction suggestions would be easy to implement in practice.  The global nature of 
arbitration with its choices of seat, law, rules, terms, ad hoc or institutional - make a single 
proscribed solution difficult to envisage.  A more commercial approach might be in order.  
Various specialist organisations that already cater to the legal services market - Informa, Westlaw, 
LexisNexis and Kluwer to name some of the better known - promulgate cases and case 
commentaries as part of a subscription service.  Granting such organisations access to arbitral 
awards on the undertaking to comply with the necessary degree of redaction as may be required 
by law, would allow for the widespread publication of awards whilst allowing the market to 
determine the price of access.  A further significant benefit of award publication is the 
enhancement of ethical transparency: the nature and extent of the obligations of disclosure i.e., 
the extent to which the protection of confidentiality applies to arbitrators is discussed in the 






Chapter 9: Follow the Money 
Kerana nila setitik rosak susu sebelanga621 
- a drop of ink taints the whole pot of milk (Malay proverb) 
Introduction 
The chapter title may not at first blush be one that sits in easy juxtaposition when 
contemplating the abstract, philosophical nature of arbitration law. 622  It points however to what 
should be one of the first questions in any discussion concerning ethics and transparency: who 
appoints and pays for arbitrators?  Solicitors and commercial entities such as traders and 
charterers of course.  Less obviously perhaps, it also includes P&I and FD&D Clubs, H&M 
underwriters, TPF’s, trade associations, liquidators, banks, guilds and the courts.  To what extent 
should the protection of confidentiality apply to the disclosure obligations incumbent on an 
arbitrator?  Should an arbitrator’s prior appointments be disclosed?  If so, by whom?  The 
appointing parties?  Shipping disputes routinely involve a ship owner (typically of a single ship) 
and a charterer.  Many ships may go through their entire operational lives without being involved 
in a commercial dispute.  But the beneficial owner of a ship (and thus the corporate entity 
ultimately deciding on the appointment of an arbitrator) may in reality control a substantial fleet, 
and thus the potential for many arbitral appointments.  That information is seldom apparent.  
Perhaps the identifies of the appointing solicitors is the relevant metric?  Or both?  How far the 
protection of confidentiality extends in these circumstances is, relatively speaking, unexplored 
territory.   
The necessity for an arbitrator to be independent, honest and free from bias is something 
most observers would consider to be self evident.  These are hardly just modern concepts of 
fairness.  The desire to ensure arbitrators were not corrupt or otherwise influenced was provided 
for in first English arbitration statute of 1698:  
II. Arbitration unduly procured, void.  
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…That any Arbitration or Umpirage procured by Corruption or undue Means shall be 
judged and esteemed void and of none Effect and accordingly be sett aside by any Court 
of Law or Equity… 
One of the principal arguments in Chapter 8 in support of the publication of awards was to 
promote transparency.  There is a perception that solicitors and parties have a tendency to 
frequently use the same small group of arbitrators.  If the names of arbitrators are disclosed in 
published decisions, that notion could be dispelled if it were shewn not to be the case, i.e. that 
there was sufficient diversity in the arbitration pool.  Conversely, if the selection of arbitrators 
was considered too concentrated, parties would see this fact and be in a better position so as to 
make more informed decisions.  This raises two immediate considerations (a) apparent or real 
biases among specific arbitrators would be quickly revealed and (b) close correlations between 
appointing parties and specific arbitrators would give greater scope for a party to appeal their 
opponent’s appointment of arbitrator.   
Whilst the former might well be welcomed, the latter could lead to a significant increase in 
appeals to remove arbitrators under s.24.  A party may challenge an arbitrator in the courts if 
circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts as to his/her impartiality under s.24(1)(a).  The test 
applied by the courts is whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there 
was a real possibility of bias and to the extent that arbitrators’ names are published, the publication 
of awards may lead to more challenges to arbitrators on the basis of partiality.623  Conversely, 
might publishing awards have the opposite effect, by increasing the visibility of an arbitrators’ 
work to existing and potential users?  In which case the result might be to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the arbitration system and demonstrate its effectiveness in dispute resolution. 
As Lord Woolfe viewed it in Taylor and Another v Lawrence and Another (Taylor v 
Lawrence),624 ‘While before the Pinochet litigation an allegation of bias in the court was a rare 
event, such complaints are now becoming increasingly prevalent’.  Whilst Taylor v Lawrence 
dealt with an appeal concerning alleged judicial bias, the general principles of transparency are 
very applicable to this discussion: ‘[i]f the situation is one where a fair-minded and informed 
person might regard the judge as biased, it is important that disclosure should be made. If the 
position is borderline, disclosure should be made’.625  
Almost three centuries on, the courts in England and Wales have yet to fully settle the nature 
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and extent of the obligation of arbitrators not to be ‘corrupt … or otherwise influenced’.  This 
chapter addresses the ethical transparency of arbitrators.  It traces how the concept of impartiality 
has been shaped by statute and case law, developed against the backdrop of traditional industry 
practices and institutional rules.  It questions the existing adequacy the law provides to users of 
arbitration and argues that change is not only justified, but essential to maintain the integrity of 
the arbitral process. 
Impartiality, Independence and Bias 
The court considered that ‘Impartiality [be] the watchword of all tribunals, including 
arbitrators’ in Amec Civil Engineering Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport.626  So why is the 
law unsettled as to what constitutes independence and freedom from bias?  English law focuses 
on the importance of impartiality, addressing these requirements in the Arbitration Act 1996.  
Section 24 provides that the court may on application remove an arbitrator when there are 
circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts as to impartiality.  Section 33 requires a tribunal 
to act fairly and impartially. 
Kendall highlighted the difficulties that can arise when English barristers from the same 
chambers adopt the roles of arbitrator and advocate in the same arbitration.627 How barristers’ 
chambers work is not considered to be an issue in England, although:  ‘[f]oreign parties…may 
not understand as well as an indigenous party the way the legal professions in England are 
organised or their conventions and rules of conduct’.628  This writer has sat on more than one 
arbitration panel where the tribunal chairman and both claimant and respondent QC’s all practiced 
from the same Fleet Street address.  
The language of s.24(1)(a) is not derived from the common law test for apparent bias, but 
based upon Art.12 of the UNCITRAL Model Law i.e. ‘When a person is approached in 
connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose any circumstances 
likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence’.  And certainly, 
there is no provision for disclosure under English law (as opposed to arbitration rules) equivalent 
to the first paragraph of Art.12.  The DAC’s 1996 Report however makes it clear that this 
distinction was deliberate: ‘no-one has persuaded us that, in consensual arbitrations, this is either 
required or desirable’.629  The DAC considered the matter and took the view that the lack of 
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independence, unless it gave rise to justifiable doubts about the impartiality of the arbitrator, was 
of no significance.  That if lack of independence were to be included, it could only be justified if 
there were cases where the lack on independence did not give rise to justifiable doubts about 
impartiality.  For, by logical extension, there would otherwise be no point including lack of 
independence as a separate ground.  The inclusion on independence would, in the DAC’s view, 
give rise to endless arguments.  The Report used Sweden and the United States as examples 
whereby almost any connection (however remote) had been used as grounds to challenge an 
arbitrator’s independence:  
It is often the case that one member of a barristers’ Chambers appears as counsel before 
an arbitrator who comes from the same Chambers.  Is that to be regarded, without more, 
as a lack of independence justifying the removal of the arbitrator?  We are quite certain 
that this would not be the case in English law.630   
The DAC noted that even the oath taken by those appointed to the High Court and the 
International Court of Justice referred only to impartiality.  The greater importance that parties 
attach to having arbitrators familiar with specific fields or industry (rather than being entirely 
independent) was also noted.  In summary, the DAC considered that there was no intention to 
lose anything of significance by omitting reference to independence: ‘Lack of this quality may 
well give rise to justifiable doubts about impartiality, which is covered, but if it does not, then we 
cannot at present see anything of significance that we have omitted by not using this term’.631 
What are justifiable doubts as to impartiality?  The test under s.24 of the Arbitration Act 1996 
is an objective one.  Circumstances must exist, and those circumstances must justify doubts as to 
impartiality.  In Laker Airways Incorporated v FLS Aerospace Limited632 the issue concerned 
arbitrators being appointed from the same set of barrister’s chambers.  The court identified three 
principles: (a) actual bias always disqualifies; (b) the importance of public confidence is such that 
even the appearance of bias will disqualify; and (c) disqualification will follow if there is a real 
danger of bias.  The judge considered that whilst s.24 of the Arbitration Act 1996 reflected the 
previous case law, in his view all three principles applied to arbitration.633 
What is the test for apparent bias?  Determination of bias is rarely straightforward.  A person 
may in good faith believe that he was acting impartially, but his mind may unconsciously be 
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affected by a bias: ‘Bias is or may be an unconscious thing’ according to Delvin LJ in Regina v 
Barnsley Licensing Justices, Ex parte Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers’ Association.634  
The common law test as formulated in R v Gough635 is to look at the matter through the eyes of a 
reasonable man; the test being in terms of real danger (rather than likelihood) to ensure: ‘[t]hat 
the court is thinking in terms of possibility rather than probability of bias’.636  The court in Porter 
v Magill637 proposed a minor change, substituting ‘a real possibility’ for ‘real danger’.  The CA 
in Locabail (UK) v Bayfield Properties638 held that the common law test for apparent bias is 
reflected in s.24 of the Arbitration Act 1996.  
In A & Ors v B & Anor639 Flaux J emphasised three points regarding that common law test.  
Firstly, that it is neither necessary nor appropriate to draw a distinction as to whether a foreign 
party is involved.640  The second aspect is that the test assumes that the impartial observer is ‘fair-
minded’ and ‘informed’, i.e., in possession of all the facts which bear on the question.  Citing 
Lord Hope in Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Helow)641 as to what 
constituted ‘fair-minded’ and ‘informed:’ 
The fair-minded and informed observer is a relative newcomer among the select group of 
personalities who inhabit our legal village … Like the reasonable man … the fair-minded 
observer is a creature of fiction.  The observer who is fair-minded is the sort of person 
who always reserves judgment on every point until she has seen and fully understood 
both sides of the argument.642  
The court considered that a fair-minded and informed observer is ‘neither complacent nor 
unduly sensitive or suspicious’ in Johnson v Johnson643 an approach approved in Gillies v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions644  To be informed involves taking the trouble to be 
informed on all matters that are relevant.645  Although the fair-minded and informed observer does 
not need to be a lawyer, they are expected to be aware of the way in which the English legal 
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profession operates in practice, Flaux J’s third aspect of the common law test.646 
Some commentators have suggested that the test for apparent bias in arbitration should be 
different from that in the litigation, arguing that arbitration differs in a number of important 
respects different from litigation; that the position of an arbitrator is very different from that of a 
judge.  Rogers for example argued that the differences between arbitration and litigation require 
‘a new understanding of the term ‘impartiality’, defined specifically for the international 
arbitration context and independent from national judicial standards’.647   
One line of reasoning is that as arbitrators are typically appointed by a party who has an 
interest (obviously not expressed in direct terms) in appointing an arbitrator who it believes is 
likely to be inclined to find in its favour.  In the context of the shipping market there are some 
arbitrators who have a reputation for being “pro-charterer”, and indeed others who have the 
opposite reputation, considered to be “pro-owner”.  Judges by contrast are typically allocated to 
cases without any reference to the preferences of the parties.  Arbitrators have a direct financial 
interest in being nominated by parties and so an incentive to conduct themselves in a way which 
will attract more appointments, including by reaching decisions which are favourable to a 
particular party i.e. they have an incentive not to bite the hand that feeds them.   
Paulsson noted that there was no link between a judge’s remuneration and the decisions 
reached.  He also referred to the fact that dissenting opinions are invariably written by the 
arbitrator nominated by the losing party in some SMA arbitrations.648  Even if correct, that should 
not be considered however as being a detraction from the SMA as an institution.  The practice of 
arbitrators arguing their party’s cases in certain circumstances is an old one within, for example, 
commodity trade associations.  FOSFA for example, notwithstanding the provisions of the 
Arbitration Act 1996, allowed as late as its 2005 Rules that where the party appointed arbitrators 
could not agree, they would appoint an umpire.  Once an umpire was appointed, then the process 
changed, the umpire taking over the whole of the case: 
whereupon the arbitrators cease to have the power to act as arbitrators… they may then 
assume the role of advocate/agent for their respective parties within the 
evidence/argument supplied and in that capacity make written submissions to the umpire 
or argue their cases before him…649.  
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Those provisions were dropped in the 2015 version of FOSFA’s Rules and they no longer 
make mention of the arbitrators acting as advocates in front of an umpire. 
Other concerns expressed relate to arbitration being conducted in private and that the awards 
are generally confidential: arbitrators often remain anonymous even when their decisions are 
challenged.  By contrast litigation is generally conducted in public and precisely because of that 
transparency, the risk of problems such as bias are diminished.  The safeguards that flow from 
the public scrutiny built into the system of litigation does not apply in arbitration.  As per Toulson 
LJ in a nod to Jeremy Bentham: ‘Open justice lets in the light and allows the public to scrutinise 
the workings of the law, for better or worse’.650  Arbitration awards are subject to much more 
limited powers of review than are judgments of Courts.  The Arbitration Act 1996 permits appeals 
under limited circumstance as per s.67, s.68 and s.69 i.e., in cases where arbitrators have exceeded 
their jurisdiction, committed a serious procedural irregularity, or in certain limited circumstances 
have made an error of law.  Being a non-mandatory provision however, the parties to an 
arbitration can (and do) contract out of the right of appeal on a point of law.  Finally, arbitrators 
come from a wide variety of legal and cultural backgrounds.   
The view has been expressed (including in arguments before the Supreme Court in 
Halliburton) that as many arbitrators have no legal training, they may possess quite different 
attitudes to questions of impartiality than a judge would have.  That to my mind however reveals 
a troubling hint of xenophobia with its implied suggestion that foreign non-lawyers acting as 
arbitrators, not steeped in English traditions, would somehow struggle with the concepts of 
impartiality and independence.  Born was on firmer ground when he alluded to the: ‘fundamental 
analytical difficulty in equating the impartiality standards applicable to national court judges and 
international arbitrators’.651 
Conflict of Interest  
Does the fact of (or potential for) multiple overlapping appointments with only one or some 
common parties concerning the same or overlapping subject matter, depending on the 
circumstances, give rise to reasonable doubts as to an arbitrator’s impartiality?  And if so, what 
is the duty of disclosure, and the consequences of a failure to fulfil it?  In one of the earliest 
published studies from 1972, Galanter put forward his legal theories based upon party access to 
the judicial system, dividing judicial actors into two categories, repeat players and ‘one-
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shotters’.652  Galanter considered that confidentiality conferred upon repeat players who regularly 
litigate or arbitrate a distinct advantage over those who do not.  It was not specifically expressed, 
but by implication that view would suggest that parties might use that knowledge of how 
arbitrators might decide or view certain issues and regularly appoint those arbitrators more likely 
to find for them.653 
The concern is that the arbitrator should not be the sole judge of his own appearance of 
impartiality in circumstances where there is an inequality arising from multiple appointments.  
Park considered that: ‘It has long been common coin of conflicts analysis that arbitrators must 
disclose significant relationships that might call into question their independence’.654  
Commentator attitudes have recently turned more negative in relation to perceptions of 
arbitrators’ independence and integrity.  Paulsson wrote: ‘Many persons serving as arbitrator 
seem to have no compunction about quietly assisting ‘their’ party; they apparently view the 
modern international consensus that all arbitrators own a duty to maintain an equal distance to 
both sides as little more than pretty words…’655  Or as McKendrick described it: ‘No longer can 
arbitrators be described as a ‘small cluster of professionals’ who have ‘shared understandings’ 
about what it means ‘to act honourably and behave ethically’’.656 
Impartiality and Independence 
Any concern regarding impartiality, whether perceived, wrongful or otherwise, can be 
addressed and eliminated at an early stage of the proceedings.  As per Lord Davidson, referring 
to preventing arbitral challenges in Scott Davidson v Scottish Ministers (No. 2):657 
The best safeguard … lies in the opportunity of making a disclosure before the hearing 
starts.  That is the proper time for testing the tribunal's impartiality.  Fairness requires that 
the quality of impartiality is there from the beginning, and a proper disclosure at the 
beginning is in itself a badge of impartiality. 
Craig, Park and Paulsson considered that the first, if not primary, duty of an arbitrator to the 
parties is that of disclosure.  Noting that the majority of international arbitral centres contemplate 
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the duty of disclosure is an essential obligation falling on an arbitrator.658  The arbitrator’s duty 
to inform the parties and as appropriate the appointing authority or arbitral institution of all 
circumstances which might be liable to affect his or her independence or impartiality is one 
‘universally recognized’659 according to Gaillard and Savage: ‘The international arbitrator’s duty 
to disclose is entirely undisputed.  Irrespective of the applicable procedural rules, it is an 
obligation which constitutes a general principle of international arbitration’.660  Poudret and 
Besson take a similar view: ‘The duty to disclose all facts which might lead to challenge as 
provided by several laws and arbitration rules is an undisputed principle of international 
arbitration’661 
The Views of Commodity Arbitrators 
Commodity arbitrators and their associations tend to take a more pragmatic approach to these 
issues.  In some sectors it is common for arbitrators to be appointed in overlapping references 
with only one common party, e.g., in shipping, trade and commodities arbitrations.  There are a 
number of reasons for this.  It is a feature of these disputes that a single set of facts often gives 
rise to a number of related claims which are the subject of different arbitrations e.g., parallel 
claims brought under head and sub-charterparties, or under a string of sale contracts.  There also 
tends to be a relatively small pool of potential arbitrators to choose from, such that it is inherently 
more likely that a single arbitrator will be appointed in multiple arbitrations involving the same 
or similar subject matter.  Whilst the principal reason for this is that such arbitrations tend to 
require specialised knowledge and experience which only a small number of arbitrators have, in 
some ways that is a rather circuitous argument: it suggests that those organisations have 
insufficiently encouraged, developed and promoted a greater number of suitably qualified 
arbitrators from within their industry.  Another argument assumes that parties themselves often 
want and expect related arbitrations to be dealt with by common arbitrators, in order to reduce 
costs and increase efficiency.  Such situations being specifically provided for in the relevant rules, 
expressly giving powers to arbitrators to order that related arbitrations be heard concurrently; for 
documents disclosed in one arbitration to be made available in the other. e.g., the LMAA Terms 
and GAFTA Rules.  The relatively lower value of the disputes in commodity and ad hoc maritime 
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arbitrations (compared say to those of the institutional arbitration centres discussed earlier) place 
greater emphasis on the speed and efficiency of the arbitral process. 
Practical Considerations 
The mere fact that an arbitrator has accepted an appointment in multiple related arbitrations 
with only one common party is unlikely to give rise to an inference of bias in favour of that 
common party.  To the extent that there is a power to order concurrency of the hearings and the 
sharing of documents, the acceptance of the appointment may not give the common party any 
procedural advantage.  The relevant information would be accessible to both parties, such that 
there would be no issue of ‘inside knowledge’, a point sometimes raised in objection.  In such 
cases, therefore, there would be no grounds for concluding that the acceptance of the overlapping 
appointment gave rise to an inference of bias in favour of the common party. 
Even assuming that the acceptance of an overlapping appointment gave rise to some 
procedural advantage, the parties would be aware of the factors highlighted and would take them 
into account in assessing the question of apparent bias.  In such circumstances, it is more likely 
to be assumed that it was an inevitable feature of such arbitrations rather than giving rise to an 
inference of bias.  As per Moore-Bick J in Rustal Trading Ltd. v Gill & Duffus S.A.662 ‘[w]hen 
judging a matter of this kind one has to take into account the complainant’s knowledge and 
experience of the trade in question and the manner in which disputes are habitually resolved’.663 
It should also be noted that shipping and commodity arbitrations probably do justify special 
treatment.  The IBA Guidelines specifically refer to the practice in maritime, sports or 
commodities arbitrations, to draw arbitrators from a specialist pool: ‘If … it is the custom and 
practice for parties to frequently appoint the same arbitrators on different cases, no disclosure of 
this fact is required, where all parties in the arbitration should be familiar with such custom and 
practice’.664  It is always open to particular arbitral associations to make express provision for this 
point in their rules, e.g., by making it clear that the fact that an arbitrator has been appointed in 
an overlapping reference involving one common party will not be a matter giving rise to any 
concern about the impartiality of the arbitrator. 
Does Self-Policing Work? 
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The duty of disclosure is, by definition, self-policing.  Accordingly, any arbitrator or 
prospective appointee will almost always be the only gatekeeper to his or her candour.  It is 
commonly accepted that there will be matters which are unquestionably to be disclosed (e.g., a 
financial relationship with one of the parties), matters which are unquestionably not required to 
be disclosed (e.g., a single lunch with counsel for one of the parties 10 years ago), and (the vast 
majority, almost certainly) matters which fall into the grey area of doubt where a judgment call 
has to be made by the arbitrator.  Into this last category must fall innumerable circumstances 
covering an unlimited variety of relationships that the arbitrator may have with the parties, their 
counsel, their witnesses, the subject matter of the dispute or the issues in the case.  At a very 
minimum, it must be the arbitrator’s duty to embark upon that enquiry and form a view as to 
whether the circumstances should or should not be disclosed.  Whether that test is by reference to 
‘might’ or are ‘likely’ to give rise to justifiable doubts is still a matter before the courts.  And so 
therefore, also unresolved, as to the moment an arbitrator or prospective appointee should 
disclose. 
A common supporting argument for greater disclosure is that such a position will reinforce 
the imperative of disclosure and will not result in any undue prejudice for the users of arbitration 
e.g., the users of specialist arbitral institutions, such as the LMAA or FOSFA.  That the only 
burden created would be the obligation on arbitrators to keep track of their past and present 
appointments so as to be able to make such disclosures where warranted.  Most would view this 
as neither a substantial nor unreasonable burden.  I would suggest that it is good practice.  In any 
event, any perceived burden is outweighed by the benefits of disclosure, namely reinforcing 
confidence in the integrity of the arbitral process and appointing an independent and impartial 
arbitrator. 
This writer had on two occasions to deal with apparent conflict in the proceeding 12 months.  
In one, having given an expert opinion to one party in a chemical tanker tank over-pressurisation 
dispute665 it was rather straight forward matter to decline the position of 3rd arbitrator when invited 
by the party’s appointed arbitrators the following year.  The objection - and there surely would 
have been - would have come from the party who would have considered that having given an 
expert opinion, the prospective tribunal chairman would have suffered from bias, having 
prejudged the dispute at an early stage of the proceedings.  The second instance was a challenge 
on the grounds of having communicated with one of the party’s witnesses during [the witnesses’s] 
previous employment.  As the ‘communication’ amounted to no more than a single courtesy email 
 






20 years previously, it was rejected as a somewhat frivolous argument for declining the 
appointment.  The examples highlight not only the need for thoroughness and transparency by 
arbitrators in accepting appointments, but also of the potential for unwarranted and time wasting 
challenges. 
Arbitral Challenges 
The risk of failing to adequately declare a conflict of interest or ignoring the issue altogether 
is that of a challenge either of the award or of the impartiality of the arbitrator, discussed for 
example by del Rosa Carmona:  ‘It is generally accepted that arbitrators have a duty to disclose 
any potential conflict of interest’.666  In Croatia v MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas PLC the Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court dealt with the impartiality of an arbitrator.667  Croatia privatized the state-
owned energy company Industrija Nafte (“INA”) in 1990, the government remaining a major 
shareholder.  In 2003, the oil company MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas PLC (“MOL”) became a 
shareholder.  Croatia subsequently reduced its own shareholding.  MOL increased its stake and 
became the largest shareholder in INA in 2008.  A new government took power, and in 2011 
following an investigation alleged that MOL obtained the approval of Croatia for the contracts 
only by bribing the former Prime Minister.  Croatia’s initiated arbitration proceedings under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules against MOL.  The seat of the arbitration was Geneva.   
The arbitral tribunal dismissed Croatia’s claim on the grounds that the bribery allegations 
had not been established.  Croatia applied to set aside the arbitral award: alternatively, that the 
award be revised, alleging partiality of its own appointed arbitrator.  Croatia argued that in 
January 2017 it discovered that its proposed arbitrator (“JB”) had been already appointed as 
arbitrator in 2013 by INA (already under the control of MOL) in another UNCITRAL arbitration 
and that therefore there was a conflict of interest.  Croatia’s ground for appeal was that JB neither 
disclosed this information to the parties, nor recused himself from the proceedings; that there 
were reasonable doubts as to his independence and impartiality as an arbitrator.  MOL argued that 
Croatia´s petition was groundless.  Annulment should not be granted and the request for revision 
should be dismissed since the parties had waived all rights to appeal in accordance with Art.192 
of the Swiss PILA: ‘Awards rendered in any arbitration hereunder shall be final and conclusive 
…There shall be no appeal to any court from awards rendered hereunder’. 
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The Supreme Court agreed with MOL, held that the parties had waived the right to challenge 
the award in advance and dismissed Croatia’s application, thus highlighting that contractually 
limiting or excluding judicial review can come with a cost where new facts come to light that 
might render the arbitral award invalid or unenforceable.  The question as to whether a party can 
obtain a revision due to discovery of possible lack of independence and impartiality of an 
arbitrator was not explored by the court and so left unanswered.  
In Brescia Calcio SpA v West Ham United Plc48668 the International Court of Arbitration for 
Sport tribunal disqualified an arbitrator because he was in the same chambers as one of the 
advocates.  Coates J, the Australian president of ICAS, held that there were ‘legitimate doubts’ 
over the arbitrator’s independence within the meaning of CAS Rule 34, applying the Swiss 
Federal Code. As noted earlier, the DAC specifically opposed disqualification on such grounds 
and it is unlikely that an English court would have made the same finding. 
Institutional Approaches to Transparency 
Most institutional rules provide that arbitrators must be impartial and independent.  For the 
HKIAC it is at Article 11.4.  The LMAA provides advice based on the IBA’s ‘Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration’.669  An arbitrator’s duty of disclosure is 
undoubtedly regarded by most of the world’s jurisdictions as a fundamental tenet of arbitration, 
a duty recognised virtually everywhere.  Indeed, the IBA Guidelines assume rather than impose 
a duty of disclosure; they simply attempt to circumscribe its scope.  There are of course potentially 
different approaches as to the extent of the duty, i.e., whether it is to disclose such facts and 
matters as ‘could’ or ‘might’ give rise to justifiable doubts, or such as would be ‘likely’ to do so.  
The following examples reflect the different approaches of arbitral institutions. 
Swiss Arbitration Association (ASA) 
Around a third of the Swiss Arbitration Association (ASA) 1200 plus members are involved 
in arbitration, either as practitioners or academics.  The ASA publishes Position Papers, one of 
which in 2017 commented on the draft amendments to Switzerland’s arbitration law.670  The ASA 
welcomed the incorporation of a provision on the duty of disclosure, noting that it was almost 
universally recognised in arbitration, not least having being addressed in the UNCITRAL Model 
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Law (at Art.12(1))  and the IBA Guidelines (at Art.3(a))’.671  It was also of the view that it would 
help to avoid situations in which potential grounds for challenge of which the arbitrator is aware 
only come to light during the proceedings or after their conclusion.  The formulation for the duty 
of disclosure suggested in Art.179 para. 4 of the PILA preliminary draft draws from the wording 
in Art.363 CCP.  The latter is based on the wording in Art.12(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law: 
‘When a person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he 
shall disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or 
independence’. 
The ICC Approach 
The ICC’s public position as to transparency was characterised in a speech given by the ICC 
Court’s President, Alexis Mourre, promoting the view that disclosure is to be favoured so that 
parties are put in a position to determine for themselves whether or not to raise a challenge: ‘This 
is their decision and the parties cannot be deprived of that decision.  The arbitrator is not the judge 
of his or her own independence and impartiality’.672  The ICC’s revised guidance extended the 
existing disclosure obligations of arbitrators and prospective arbitrators to ‘non-parties having an 
interest in the outcome of the arbitration’.  Therefore, arbitrators now must consider relationships 
with interested non-parties which may give rise to doubts as to impartiality.   
The ICC Court also decides on challenges made against arbitrators based on allegations of a 
lack of independence and impartiality.  Article 11 emphasises the obligations of independence 
required by an arbitrator, including signing a statement of impartiality and independence before 
appointment or confirmation and the disclosure of any facts or circumstances that call into 
question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes of the parties.  In assessing whether disclosure 
should be made, prospective or appointed arbitrators are instructed by the ICC to ‘consider 
all potentially relevant circumstances’ including, but not limited to, the following 
circumstances: (a) the arbitrator or prospective arbitrator acts or has acted as arbitrator in a case 
involving one of the parties, or one of its affiliates; (b) the arbitrator or prospective arbitrator has 
in the past been appointed as arbitrator by one of the parties or one of its affiliates; and (c) the 
arbitrator or prospective arbitrator acts or has acted as arbitrator in a related case.673  In their ICC 
commentary, Craig, Park and Paulsson expressed the view that the failure of an arbitrator to 
disclose relevant and material facts about a relationship to a party was sufficient grounds for 
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challenge, regardless of whether the ICC Court would itself have found those facts justification 
for qualification: ‘Such failure of disclosure may be said to constitute evidence of partiality’.674 
The IBA Conflict Guidelines 
The Arbitration Committee of the American Bar Association’s Section of International Law 
produced a special 54-page publication in 2013 dedicated to the subject of the appointment of 
arbitrators expressing the full range of views on ‘The Debate: Unilateral Party Appointment of 
Arbitrators’.675  
The General Standards (GS) contained in the IBA’s Conflict Guidelines (2014) provide that 
any doubt as to whether an arbitrator should disclose certain facts or circumstances should be 
resolved in favour of disclosure: ‘Every arbitrator shall be impartial and independent’ (GS1).  If 
the arbitrator has doubts as to their ability to be impartial and independent, they are required to 
decline the appointment (GS2) or if there are facts or circumstances which may give rise to doubts 
as to an arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, they must be disclosed (GS3).  Despite their 
undoubted value, the IBA Guidelines are nevertheless a voluntary code with no force of law.  In 
the majority of arbitrations held in England and Wales their provisions are not mandatory.676 
In W Ltd v M Sdn Bhd677 the court examined the Conflict Guidelines para.1.4 and the non-
waivable conflict of interest provisions.  Whilst recognising the commendable objective of the 
guidelines678 the court found that in ‘treating compendiously the arbitrator and … firm’ was a 
weaknesses in the Guidelines, as was doing so without reference to the particular facts: ‘There 
was a tension between some of the ‘general standards’ dealing with independence and 
impartiality, and inconsistency between the situations included or not included in the non-
waivable list’.679 
ICSID 
The ICSID arbitration rules apply a materially different and higher test for removal of an 
arbitrator than that under s.24 of the Arbitration Act 1996: a challenger must show that an 
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arbitrator has a ‘manifest lack’ of ‘independent judgment’.680  Such challenges are decided in the 
first instance by the other members of the tribunal.681  In Caratube International Oil Company 
LLP & Mr Devincci Salah Hourani v Republic of Kazakhstan (Caratube)682 an arbitrator was 
successfully challenged for previously sitting in an arbitration that arose from ‘broadly the same 
factual context’ and in which the claimants made essentially the same factual allegations on the 
basis of the same evidence, and which were also potentially relevant to determining the legal 
issues in the Caratube arbitration.  Having considered the particular circumstances of the degree 
of actual and legal overlap, the challenge was upheld on the basis that ‘in this situation, the 
arbitrator cannot reasonably be asked to maintain a ‘Chinese wall’ in his own mind: his 
understanding of the situation may well be affected by information acquired in the other 
arbitration’.  This is another case which on the facts would appear likely to have been decided 
differently under English law.  Compare with Popplewell J’s decision in H v L and others,683 the 
Commercial Court expressing a very different view to arbitrator’s abilities not to be distracted by 
matters raised in different but related arbitrations.  ‘In such cases it is common for those with 
relevant expertise as arbitrators to sit in different arbitrations arising out of the same factual 
circumstances or subject matter ... It is desirable that they should be able to do so’.684 
Overseas Philosophy 
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Canada made it clear in Ridout & Maybee LLP v 
Johnston685 that the ‘inquiry to determine whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias is 
‘highly fact specific’’.  In France, an arbitrator appointed in concurrent arbitrations concerning 
the same construction project by the common party, Creighton, survived a challenge in 
Gouvernement de l'etat du Qatar v Creighton Ltd, Cour d’appel de Paris686 because the disputes 
in the related arbitrations raised distinct issues.  The first arbitration concerned a dispute between 
Creighton and its sub-contractor over the termination of the subcontractor’s agreement, whereas 
the second arbitration concerned a distinct dispute over the termination of the construction 
agreement between Creighton and the Government of Qatar.  In Switzerland, the Federal Supreme 
Court of Switzerland rejected such a challenge in Decision in 4A_458/2009, where the related 
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arbitrations engaged the same parties on both sides, and therefore did not give rise to any issue of 
information inequality.687 
The English Courts Approach to Impartiality 
In light of the pending Supreme Court decision on this issue, for brevity only the most recent 
English cases are described here as an indication of the current (and evolving) status of the debate. 
The potential implications of conflicts on the appointment of an arbitrator was considered in 
Eurocom v Siemens.688  Eurocom had applied to the RICS to nominate an adjudicator, but 
Eurocom's advisor listed a large number of individuals who were said to be conflicted from 
deciding the dispute.  The adjudicator who was ultimately appointed found in favour of Eurocom. 
Eurocom's advisor later admitted at the enforcement stage that none of the individuals listed were 
conflicted: Eurocom simply did not want them determining the dispute.  The judge held that there 
had been a fraudulent misrepresentation and nullified the award. 
Popplewell J in Sierra Fishing Co v Farran (Sierra Fishing)689 provided a restatement of the 
duty of disclosure by an arbitrator.  Sierra Fishing was an ad hoc arbitration seated in London, 
where the sole arbitrator’s duty to disclose his connections with one of the parties was under the 
spotlight.  The court held: ‘…it was [the sole arbitrator’s] duty to make voluntary disclosure to 
the parties of connections which were known to him which might justify doubts as to his 
impartiality, a duty recognised in…the IBA Guidelines’.690  In Cofely Ltd v Bingham691 Hamblen 
J directed that an arbitrator be removed for apparent bias on five grounds.  One of those was that 
the arbitrator had received 25 appointments from the same person in the preceding three years: 
statistically 18 percent of his appointments and 25 percent of his income deriving from that one 
source.  It was immaterial that most of those appointments were made through a claim’s 
consultant, nor that the appointments were formally made by the arbitral body rather than the 
same actual party.  
Concerns over an arbitrator being influenced by prior knowledge in a related arbitration arose 
in Beumer Group UK Ltd v Vinci Construction UK Ltd692 where the CA considered the potential 
unfairness that might ensue, either (a) by reason of information and knowledge that could be 
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acquired by the common party, or (b) by reason of its ability to test submissions or arguments or 
indeed put forward evidence before one tribunal containing the common arbitrator without the 
party in the other reference having any knowledge that one arbitrator might already have formed 
a view from what he had heard or seen in the first reference.  In the Malaysian case of MMC 
Engineering Group Bhd & Anor v Wayss & Freytag (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor693 the High Court held 
that circumstances which will raise issues as to impartiality and independence include a personal, 
business or professional relationship with one party to a dispute or an interest in the outcome of 
the dispute.  The duty to disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to 
impartiality being an on-going one under s.14(1) of the Act. 
The distinction between (apparently purely subjective) ‘legitimate concerns’ and (objective) 
‘justifiable doubts’ was drawn by the Court of Appeal following its analysis of the decision in 
Guidant LLC v Swiss Re International SE. 694  Leggatt J declined to endorse one party’s choice as 
third arbitrator of an individual who had already been appointed to three arbitrations linked by a 
common party.  The appointment of a common arbitrator might reduce costs, delay and the risk 
of inconsistent decisions: had the court been considering litigation rather than arbitration it would 
almost certainly have ordered the claims to be managed and tried together.  Nevertheless, the 
court considered that there was a legitimate concern that the arguments and evidence in the first 
arbitration might prejudice the arbitrator’s decision-making in the subsequent tribunals, 
highlighting the difficulty of an arbitrator putting entirely out of his or her mind in one reference 
submissions or evidence received in another related reference.  The court considered that there 
was no inconsistency with the decision in Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co v Eastern Bechtel 
Corp695 and raised the interesting point that the safeguards against the possibility of prejudice 
such as a common pre-trial hearing to decide whether certain issues should be decided separately, 
were not available in the post-1996 Act era. 
The Court found in Chartered Institute of Arbitrators v B, C, D696 that it was in the interests 
of justice for the CIArb. to be granted access to documents in relation to the appointment of an 
arbitrator, a hearing within the arbitration to consider as to whether he had a conflict of interest, 
and subsequent court proceedings seeking his removal as arbitrator.  Whilst this was for the 
purpose of disciplinary proceedings against the arbitrator, the court considered that arbitral 
confidentiality can be overridden where disclosure is in the public interest. 
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Which brings us to the most important case to have reached the Supreme Court in relation to 
an arbitrator’s duty of disclosure, Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2018] 
EWCA Civ 817 (Halliburton v Chubb).  
Halliburton v Chubb 
The factual backdrop is the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  Transocean was the owner of 
the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.  Halliburton was engaged to provide cementing and other services 
in relation to the abandonment of the well.  Both settled claims against it arising from the oil spill. 
Halliburton made a claim on its insurance policy with Chubb, who refused to pay.  Halliburton 
commenced an arbitration against Chubb in London under the insurance policy.  Both parties 
appointed an arbitrator but, unable to agree on the chairman, the English High Court appointed 
‘M’ as chairman.  Subsequent to his appointment, M accepted appointments as an arbitrator in 
two other references arising out of the oil spill.  First, a claim by Transocean against Chubb in 
relation to the settlement of its claims; secondly, a claim by Transocean against another insurer.  
In the first reference, M was appointed by Chubb.  In the second reference, M was appointed as 
chairman by agreement of the parties.  M failed to disclose these appointments to Halliburton. 
When Halliburton learned of the appointments and challenged M’s impartiality, M said that 
it had not occurred to him that he had a duty to disclose the appointments but offered to resign if 
Chubb agreed.  Chubb did not agree so Halliburton sought to have M removed as an arbitrator 
under s.24(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1996 which provides that a party may apply to the court 
to remove an arbitrator if ‘circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality’.  The application was founded on a submission that M’s conduct (in accepting and 
not disclosing the appointments, and then not resigning) gave rise to an appearance of bias. 
In the Commercial Court, Popplewell J said that whether circumstances exist which give rise 
to justifiable doubts as to an arbitrator’s impartiality is determined by applying the common law 
test for ‘apparent bias’.  The test is whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having 
considered the facts, would conclude that there was a ‘real possibility’ that the tribunal was 
biased.  Popplewell J concluded that there was nothing in M’s acceptance of the appointments 
which gave rise to an appearance of bias.  Popplewell J considered that experienced arbitrators 
should be able to sit in different arbitrations which arise out of the same factual circumstances or 
subject matter.  Party autonomy, which underpins arbitration, dictates that parties should be free 
to appoint their chosen arbitrator and, as part of that freedom, parties want their tribunal to have 





[i]t is undesirable that parties should be unnecessarily constrained in their ability to draw 
on this pool [of talent] if there are multiple arbitrations arising out of a single event or 
overlapping circumstances.697  
Popplewell J reasoned that arbitrators are able to put out of their minds material they may 
have encountered in another reference if it is not introduced as material in the case they are 
deciding.  He concluded that the informed and fair-minded observer would not regard M as being 
unable to act impartially because ‘his experience and reputation for integrity’ would enable him 
to approach the evidence and argument with an open mind.  Having found that M’s acceptance 
of the appointments did not give rise to any justifiable concerns over his independence, it 
followed, Popplewell J said, that he was under no obligation to disclose the appointments.  One 
of the defences raised in Haliburton v Chubb was that the test for impartiality under s.24 of the 
Act is identical to the common law standard of bias in a judicial or quasi-judicial context.  The 
majority of cases in which the common law test of bias as applied to judges has been defined have 
involved alleged non-disclosure, including the decisions of the House of Lords in R v Gough698  
(juror not disclosing that she lived next door to the brother of one of the defendants); R v Bow 
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) (Pinochet)699 (judge not 
disclosing wife’s connection with Amnesty International) and, more recently, the Privy Council’s 
decision in Almazeedi v Penner700 (judge not disclosing a connection to one party in the court 
proceedings). 
The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment.  The Court agreed that the mere fact that an 
arbitrator accepts appointments in multiple references concerning the overlapping subject matter 
with only one common party does not, of itself, give rise to an appearance of bias.  As to whether 
M should have made the disclosure to Halliburton of the appointments, the Court concluded that, 
as a matter of good practice and as a matter of law, the arbitrator ought to have made disclosure.  
The Court referred to the ‘IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration 
2014’, Orange List 3.1.5, which calls for disclosure where an arbitrator serves in an arbitration 
on a related issue involving one of the parties.  
Under English law, disclosure is required of facts and circumstances known to the arbitrator 
which might give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality (i.e., facts or circumstances which 
might lead the fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility the 
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arbitrator was biased).  Whether disclosure should be made depends on the prevailing 
circumstances at that time.  Notwithstanding that M ought to have made the disclosure, the Court 
concluded the non-disclosure alone would not have led the fair-minded and informed observer to 
conclude that there was a real possibility that M was biased.  The non-disclosed appointment was 
not deliberate and did not justify an inference of apparent bias.  There was in any case a limited 
degree of overlap between the arbitrations.  The Court stressed that although in the eyes of a party 
an appointment in related references may be a cause for concern, it did not signify a lack of 
impartiality.  The arbitrator should be trusted to decide the case solely on the evidence or other 
material produced in the proceedings.  As Haliburton v Chubb currently stands, arbitrators can 
accept more than one appointment in arbitrations with overlapping subject matters, without 
necessarily giving rise to doubts about their impartiality.   
Whilst the court held that the arbitrator ought to have made disclosure at the time of his 
appointments, both as a matter of good practice in international commercial arbitration and as a 
matter of law, a fair-minded and informed observer would not conclude that there was a real 
possibility that he was biased: that the omission to disclose was accidental rather than deliberate.   
Appeal to the Supreme Court 
In November 2019 the UK Supreme Court heard the appeal from Halliburton v Chubb701 on 
whether an arbitrator may accept appointments in multiple references concerning the overlapping 
subject matter with only one common party, without giving rise to an appearance of bias and 
without disclosure.  The Supreme Court will have to decide the following two agreed issues taken 
to appeal: (a) whether and to what extent an arbitrator may accept appointments in multiple 
references concerning the same or overlapping subject matter with only one common party 
without thereby giving rise to an appearance of bias; and (b) whether and to what extent he may 
do so without disclosure.  
The case has attracted significant attention.  Five parties, in accordance with the Supreme 
Court’s amended Order of 21 August 2019, submitted written submissions in support of 
intervention.702  Arbitral institutions clearly considered that their interests lay in greater 
transparency and the submissions made on behalf of the ICC, LCIA and CIArb supported the 
view that the SC should find for expanding the current rules on disclosure.  Practitioners leant 
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towards a more conservative approach, opposing further disclosure beyond that already required 
by law: the submissions on behalf of the LMAA and GAFTA were in opposition to any changes 
and in support of the CA’s findings.  The London maritime arbitration sector in particular is a 
relatively small group in terms of numbers of insurers, practitioners and specialised law firms.  
Their concern is that the court may hand down limits on the number of appointments that an 
arbitrator can accept at any one time - along the lines imposed by arbitral associations for example 
– thus stifling (in their view) party autonomy and the freedom of parties to choose their own 
arbitrator.   
The decision - expected to be handed down in late 2020 - may have a significant impact on 
the disclosure requirements with respect to arbitral appointments and indirectly on arbitral 
confidentiality.  It has provoked intense debate over an arbitrator’s duty of disclosure with the 
potential to seriously impact London’s place in the arbitration world.  As Sir Rupert Jackson 
noted: ‘the Supreme Court’s decision may have a massive impact on London as a centre for 
international arbitration’.703  Regardless of whether the Supreme Court agrees with its lower 
courts and finds that, on the facts, the circumstances do not give rise to justifiable doubts as to 
M’s impartiality justifying removal, it provides an opportunity to provide guidance on the duties 
and obligations of disclosure applicable to arbitrators in general. 
Whilst the CA decision is to be welcomed, the Supreme Court should nevertheless take the 
opportunity to clarify disclosure obligations, particularly disclosure of related arbitrator 
appointments, irrespective of the extent of factual overlap between the cases.  It may then fall to 
arbitral institutions to pick up and incorporate this extension into their rules.  It is important that 
the Supreme Court provides this guidance since it is not currently obvious whether such disclosure 
must be made.  Notwithstanding the IBA Guidelines Orange List 3.1.5, M, an experienced 
arbitrator, said that ‘it had not occurred to him’ to disclose the appointments.  The Court of Appeal 
said M ought to have disclosed the appointments as a matter of good practice and as a matter of 
law.  Yet, Popplewell J said M was under no such obligation.  And it is equally important that the 
Supreme Court offers guidance because where arbitrators fail to abide by the requisite standards, 
often unintentionally, it can potentially impose significant costs on the parties.  Proceedings on 
challenging arbitrator appointments or on the annulment of arbitral awards can leave the parties 
with the prospect of having to start proceedings afresh.  A failure to abide by requisite standards 
also undermines public confidence in arbitration.  To maintain its legitimacy, international 
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arbitration must ensure that its decision makers are and are perceived to be impartial. 
The outcome of the appeal will impact the elements critical to preserving the legitimacy and 
integrity of the arbitral process – arbitrators’ trustworthiness and reliability.  Ideally, the Supreme 
Court should confirm that arbitrators are required to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, 
related arbitrator appointments, irrespective of the extent of the relation.  
Chapter 9 Summary 
The French arbitration scholar Clay summarised it well: ‘Ultimately, it appears that the 
obligation of disclosure must be precise, exhaustive, and impervious to anything that can diminish 
it (reputation, seniority, commonality)’.704  The extent of the duty of disclosure encumbant on an 
arbitrator should be limited in the following key respect so as to avoid an undue burden on 
prospective appointees.  The limitation may best be described in terms of a duty to take reasonable 
steps to enquire into such matters as are readily accessible to the arbitrator or prospective 
appointee.  For example, while a full conflict search will normally be conducted prior to receiving 
the appointment, later conflict searches may only be required in circumstances where e.g., the 
arbitrator learns of a new party or receives material indicating a prior connection with a witness. 
If an arbitrator takes an appointment in one reference, and later takes further appointments in 
one or more related references, without making full disclosure of such later appointments (or 
insisting that its appointing party or its counsel make full disclosure) to the parties in the earlier 
reference(s) are there justifiable doubts as to impartiality might thereby arise, particularly where 
there is a common party?  I don’t believe so in most commodity or shipping arbitrations, but can 
see how such doubts may exist where a common counsel is able to exploit any tactical advantage 
caused by the common appointment in the overlapping references.  This danger is particularly 
apparent in large value arbitrations, where the private and confidential aspects of the process may 
well serve to shield the errant party from any criticism arising out of its unfair exploitation of a 
non-level playing field.   
The current approach to ethics and transparency in arbitration is a befuddled confusion in 
almost every institution and jurisdiction that has had to consider the issue.  The limited resources 
available to courts and institutions that have been devoted to grappling with the problem is 
wasteful to an incalculable degree.  The only group that has probably benefited are the legal 
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professionals employed to argue cases in front of tribunals and the courts, including the Supreme 
Court itself. 
Fundamentally however, what is the real issue?  A party to an arbitration requires complete 
confidence that the process is transparent.  That the private judges (the tribunal) to whom he has 
agreed be appointed in a dispute shall be impartial and fair.  With the limited degree of disclosure 
that currently exists and the current approach of self regulation being of dubious protection in the 
eyes of many, that is an imperfect and ultimately unsustainable approach.  But as the submissions 
in Halliburton v Chubb have clearly shewn, there is a complete absence of consensus amongst 
practitioners, institutions and jurisdictions.  Finding a path towards arbitral transparency and 
ethics that satisfies all the vested interests is likely to prove as impossible as the task set by ancient 
geometers to square a circle.  It took mathematicians two millennia to demonstrate that 
impossibility of that challenge.705  The answer in my view however, is not to identify a set of rules 
acceptable to all stakeholders.  It is radically different.  And simpler. 
In Chapter 8, I proposed that a copy of all arbitral awards be deposited with the High Court 
as part of a move towards the default publication of awards.  As part of that process, information 
regarding the parties and arbitrators should be provided in the following manner: 
The Publication of Awards 
b) When an award is lodged with the court the following information must be furnished: 
(i) The names of the parties; 
(ii) The names of each party appointed arbitrator; 
(iii) When appointed, the name and manner of appointment of the third arbitrator or 
umpire. 
Making available summary details of every arbitration in England and Wales a matter of 
public record, will in the main obviate the need for the courts to deal with appeals as to 
impartiality.  Any party to a dispute will be able to search on a government website database a 
potential or prospective arbitrator’s past connections with any party.  Any concerns as to conflicts 
of interest will be a matter of public record and can be addressed at an early stage of proceedings.  
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Chapter 10: Summary & Conclusions 
‘Lawsuits generally originate with the obstinate and the ignorant, but they do not end with them; and that 
lawyer was right who left all his money to the support of an asylum for fools and lunatics, saying that from 
such he got it, and to such he would bequeath it’.706 
- Jeremy Bentham  
Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 1 Summary 
Confidentiality in arbitration can be approached from various perspectives: commercial and 
business needs; public policy; legal efficacy; natural justice and not least, the development of 
mercantile and commercial law.  It is argued that the principal tensions result where the needs of 
the commercial world come up against those of public policy.  Ultimately these contradictory 
positions prompt the question:  is there a case for reform of the Arbitration Act 1996?  Some 
commentators have proposed that the default position should be publication of an award i.e. an 
opt-out regime such as operates in the USA and elsewhere.707  The areas for which reform is 
required include: awards and their publication; consolidation; materials; privacy; its application 
to parties, witnesses, legal counsel & tribunals; third party funding; potential exceptions, such as 
protecting a legal right or the public interest and finally ethics and transparency.  When 
formulating confidentiality, the drafters of the Arbitration Act 1996 found the challenge 
‘controversial and difficult’.  The ‘myriad of exceptions’ and ‘qualifications that had to follow’ 
proved in their mind’s insurmountable obstacles.  Support for change is identifiable within the 
1996 DAC Report itself, which concluded the confidentiality section: ‘In due course, if the whole 
matter were ever to become judicially resolved, it would remain possible to add a statutory 
provision by way of amendment to the Bill’.708  The law is sufficiently resolved to permit the 
codification of statutory provisions for the less uncontroversial areas of the Arbitration Act 1996.   
Chapter 2 Summary 
As a means of dispute resolution, arbitration is global.  That interconnectedness compels an 
understanding of how the issues of privacy and confidentiality are addressed in different 
jurisdictions.  The varied approaches towards arbitral confidentiality within and between common 
 
706 Jeremy Bentham (1843). 
707 ‘A Missed Opportunity to Revise the Arbitration Act 1996’, Arbitration International, 2007, Volume 23, Issue No 
3, Pages 461 – 465. 





and civil law jurisdictions is significant.  There are countries whose statutes have no 
confidentiality provisions.  Others such as Australia and New Zealand have detailed, prescriptive 
requirements.  England primarily relies upon case law.  The unsurprising result is that 
international law does not lend itself to clarity of legal interpretation.  Whilst the U.S., 
Scandinavia and Australia, have weakened or diminished the concept of confidentiality in 
arbitration, England, New Zealand and Singapore by contrast, have further entrenched it.  
Confidentiality in arbitration has developed outside England with different statutory approaches 
and judicial interpretations.  A comparative analysis suggests that there are practical lessons to be 
learnt, particularly from the commonwealth countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
Singapore, and from the civil law jurisdictions of Norway and Sweden.  The following Chapter 
looks at how the absence or otherwise of statutory regimes dealing with confidentiality has 
encouraged institutions to step in and provide a parallel framework of ‘soft law’. 
Chapter 3 Summary 
Arbitral institutions account for a significant proportion of international commercial and 
maritime arbitrations conducted globally.  The preservation of confidentiality of documents 
produced, materials created and the award itself is confined to just four arbitral institutions: LCIA, 
SIAC, WIPO and CIETAC.  Some important arbitral rules are silent on confidentiality, such as 
the UNCITRAL Rules and those of the ICC.  The rules of the AAA and UNCITRAL provide for 
confidentiality of the award.  This incomplete and contradictory patchwork of rules addressing 
confidentiality mirrors the divided sentiments that exist in both common and civil law 
jurisdictions.  The most useful of the institutional rules from the perspective of any potential 
English reform are those of the HKIAC and SIAC, between them addressing not just 
confidentiality provisions, but also a sanction mechanism for their breach.  Whilst many 
institutions have addressed the need to disclose circumstance that are likely to, or might give rise 
to justifiable doubts as to an arbitrators impartiality or independence, none provide (the IBA Rules 
excepting) a definition or examples of what constitutes ‘justifiable doubts’.   
Chapter 4 Summary 
This chapter addressed the confidentiality of arbitral materials and awards and the extent to 
which they can be used, both in relation to the arbitration proceedings for which they were handed 
down and externally, in non-related proceedings e.g., a different arbitration.  The examples from 
overseas jurisdictions on the use of materials and awards is sparser than that for the arbitral 





prepared for or used in an arbitration and awards after the arbitration is concluded is well 
developed and articulate, receiving support in both the High Court and Court of Appeal.  The 
views of the Privy Council as to the distinction between the confidentiality attached to materials 
and awards and their disagreement as to whether confidentiality should be considered an implied 
term is a judicial tension between the courts that is yet to be resolved.  Nonetheless, there is 
sufficient support within the decided cases to provide a firm foundation on which to craft a 
suitable amendment of the Arbitration Act 1996.   
Chapter 5 Summary 
Objections to changes to the Arbitration Act 1996 do exist: ‘…there is always a group that 
favours maintaining the status quo.  As with all policy changes, there will be winners and 
losers’.709  It is now 30 years since the LMAA put forward proposals to the DTI Departmental 
Committee on Arbitration law in June 1990.710  The LMAA did not suggest new legislation for 
the Courts to be given power to order the consolidation of two or more arbitrations, but instead 
the exercise of a discretion that would allow for the limited relaxation of the rules of arbitral 
confidentiality, where, and only where, such relaxation was necessary in order to avoid the risk 
of inconsistent decisions.  These proposals were not taken up, but nevertheless form a useful basis 
for a statutory codification.  Reform is strongly suggested on the grounds of practicality, cost, 
time and not least by being supported by an overwhelmingly majority of the judiciary who have 
considered the matter.  One solution could simply be the reversal of the existing default rule 
prohibiting consolidation, replacing it with a rule authorising consolidation.  This would be 
subject to s.4(2), under which the parties have the option to prevent consolidation by positively 
excluding as a contractual term in the arbitration clause.   
Chapter 6 Summary 
At the time of the Jackson Report into litigation costs was published in 2009 the general, 
although not universal view, was that there should be some form of restriction upon the activities 
of third party funders: ‘The central issue which emerged was whether a voluntary code would 
suffice or whether there should be statutory regulation’.  The Report recorded the Law Society’s 
view that whilst TPF could assist access to justice, proper regulation was required.   No statutory 
legislation was introduced, the Report contemplating that: ‘In the future … if the use of third party 
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funding expands, then full statutory regulation may well be required’.711  Industry sentiments 
appear to have moved in the direction of regulation: QMU’s 2015 International Arbitration 
Survey reported that a significant majority of respondents (71 percent) thought that TPF required 
regulation.712  TPF has still not been addressed under English law (despite having one of the 
largest funding markets alongside the USA, Australia and Germany) overseas, in international 
conventions or in the rules of most arbitration institutions.  Whilst the TPF market has so far 
operated adequately within voluntary guidelines, the globalisation of the industry, the increasing 
number of funders and funded cases all point towards the need for legislation.  A combination of 
the first principle identified in the ICCA-QMU appendix, the ICSID Working Paper and the SIAC 
Investment Arbitration Rules provide a good working solution to a TPF provision in the 
Arbitration Act 1996.   
Chapter 7 Summary 
That balancing of evolving public policy, mercantile will and the increasing demands of 
transparency in jurisprudence, reflect the ebb and flow of intellectual debate in the English legal 
system.  England has not yet had its Esso/BHP v Plowman, and no English arbitration has had to 
contend with the full glare of publicity and political interference as experienced in that Australian 
High Court case where disclosure was viewed to be in the public interest.  There is a view however 
(see Derrington et al) that the distinctions between the Australian and English positions are 
illusory, that Esso/BHP v Plowman was a one-off case involving public interest and political 
considerations that are unlikely to be repeated in England.  One of the difficulties that may arise 
is if a tribunal is asked to consider a public interest exception to the obligation of confidentiality, 
not only because of the residual uncertainty about the exception’s existence, but also because it 
is doubtful whether a tribunal would be properly equipped or mandated to assess what is or is not 
within the public interest.  In international arbitration, the confidentiality of arbitration awards is 
being slowly eroded by the public law aspect of many proceedings.  The reporting of ICSID, 
NCAA and Nafta awards for example, and the decisions of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal illustrate 
cases which have recognised that the interest in the arbitration lies in the public, rather than the 
private domain.  If there was to be any one exception to arbitral confidentiality, that relating to 
the public interest and involving government entities, organisations, statutory or regulatory bodies 
would surely take precedence.  And not far behind that would be the cases involving a genuine 
public interest, a citizen’s ‘right to know’.   
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Chapter 8 Summary 
It should be uncontroversial that the courts contribute to the development of commercial 
trade law: directly by means of decided cases and indirectly through review of arbitration awards 
that go to appeal.  As enacted, the Arbitration Act 1996 provides a strictly limited right of appeal 
from an arbitral award on points of law.  Whilst the arguments overall support the view that the 
current regime lacks balance, that there is a perceived advantage in facilitating to a greater degree 
at least the development of a body of commercial law, it is less obvious that this needs to be done 
through statutory reform.  Encouraging judicial flexibility in determining matters of ‘general 
public importance’ may prove a more effective approach.   Colman J’s proposal with respect to 
‘open to serious doubt,’ namely that the test should apply to ‘any non one-off issue of law which 
is likely to be encountered in future disputes affecting a particular trade, industry or profession’ 
is worthy of serious consideration.  Whilst there has been a move to increase the publication of 
arbitral awards, the proportion of international commercial arbitration awards that do become 
available is very small and typically only available as a summary.   
On balance the benefits of allowing greater access to arbitral awards outweighs the potential 
negatives.  Publication is in the public interest.   Requiring arbitration awards to be deposited with 
the courts is a practical means of achieving that aim, whilst delegating the extraction of legal 
elements and principles to the private sector.  The least intrusive and simplest expedient would 
be to reverse the existing presumption in favour of confidentiality unless all parties agreed to 
public disclosure.  Instead, substitute it with a presumption in favour of publication of awards 
unless all parties required confidentiality i.e. an opt-out regime such as operates in the USA and 
elsewhere.   It would finally allow for accurate and detailed statistics to be complied on the extent 
of arbitration in England.  The courts could take responsibility for collating and publishing on an 
annual basis a summary of statistics of all arbitrations in England and Wales which will contain 
the names of the parties and arbitrators. 
Chapter 9 Summary 
The extent of the duty of disclosure incumbent on an arbitrator may best be described in 
terms of a duty to take reasonable steps to enquire into such matters as are readily accessible to 
the arbitrator or prospective appointee.  The current approach to ethics and transparency in 
arbitration is however a befuddled confusion in almost every institution and jurisdiction that has 
had to consider the issue.  A party to an arbitration requires complete confidence that the process 





dispute shall be impartial and fair.  With the limited degree of disclosure that currently exists and 
the current approach of self-regulation being of dubious protection in the eyes of many, that is an 
imperfect and unsustainable approach.  But as the submissions in Halliburton v Chubb shewed, 
there is a complete absence of consensus amongst practitioners, institutions and jurisdictions.   
The answer in this writer’s view is not to identify a set of rules acceptable to all stakeholders.  
Simpler and more effective in approach would be to make details of the parties and arbitrators a 
matter of public record for every published arbitration award in England and Wales.  One benefit 
of such transparency would be the likely obviation for the courts to hear appeals as to an 
arbitrator’s impartiality.  A prospective arbitrator’s past connections with any one party would be 
quickly revealed by a search on a government website database, allowing any concerns as to a 
potential conflict of interest to be addressed at an early stage of the proceedings. 
Conclusions 
We see in cases such as Ali Shipping, Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners and Halliburton 
v Chubb the judiciary making and developing the law.  It is more than a generation ago that 
English law regularly saw significant judicial activism in the form of Lord Denning.  But the 
black letter law attitudes still linger on in places.  Scalia J, giving the last of the series of public 
lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 2007, commemorating the 300th anniversary of the 
creation of the Professorship of Law at that academic institution, criticized the proponents of a 
‘living constitution’ and the negative consequences of judges pursuing a policy of ‘updating’ the 
law to fit the needs of society.713   
So how and in which direction will English law develop?  Those areas of the Arbitration Act 
1996 most closely identified as being in need of potential reform have been identified and 
discussed in the light of the historical narrative and the criticisms levelled against them.  Taking 
into account the needs of the users of arbitration, those of society and with the benefit of 
comparisons from other jurisdictions and institutional systems, I have set out proposed revisions 
to the Arbitration Act 1996, taking what I trust will be viewed as a pragmatic approach to the 
issues.  Borrowing as a philosophy of problem solving from that great statesman, Lee Kuan Yew, 
who was prepared to look at the problem and say, ‘all right, what is the best way to solve it that 
will produce the maximum happiness and well-being for the maximum number of people’.714  
 
713 Scalia J, ‘Justice Scalia Tercentenary Lecture’ (Edinburgh. Edinburgh Law School 4 November 2008). 
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Lee’s view was straight forward: when a system need fixing, look at solutions that had been 
developed elsewhere.  It didn’t matter from where on the political spectrum they came: only 
whether they worked.  
There is also certainly scope for change at an arbitral institutional level.  It is undoubtedly 
correct that practising associations of arbitrators such as the LMAA are well experienced in 
adapting to the needs of commercial users.  Nevertheless, change however is ultimately more 
likely to be effective with amendments to the Arbitration Act 1996.  There is an increasing trend 
for the privacy of arbitrations to be protected.  This is illustrated by the rules in CPR Part 62 and 
the Practice Direction allowing arbitration claims to be heard in private and restricting (but not 
prohibiting) access to the court file by strangers to the arbitration.  It is implicit in the agreement 
to arbitrate that the conduct of arbitrations is private.  But it does not mean that the arbitration is 
private for all purposes.  
Case law over the last 20 years has established that there is an obligation, implied by law and 
arising out of the nature of arbitration, on both parties not to disclose or use for any other purpose 
any documents prepared for and used in the arbitration, or disclosed or produced in the course of 
the arbitration, or transcripts or notes of the evidence in the arbitration or the award, and not to 
disclose in any other way what evidence has been given by any witness in the arbitration.  In 
Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Thomas LJ and Collins LJ viewed the difficulties that have 
arisen in approaching the issue of confidentiality may in part be due to an over-reliance on the 
analogy with banking principles in Tournier and because the obligations of privacy and 
confidentiality may differ.715  Thomas LJ stated: [t]he law relating to arbitrations may need to 
parallel the distinction in the general law where the law relating to privacy and confidentiality are 
distinct’. That the court’s judgment: ‘[m]ay ultimately turn on balancing the obligations of privacy 
and confidentiality between the parties to the arbitration as against the public interest of disclosure 
of documents in litigation’.716 
An unintended consequence of confidentiality is that for frequent users, the experience, 
relationship-building and database profiling can provide significant advantages.  The knowledge 
previously available in an open judicial process is lost to those excluded by the private nature of 
arbitration.  The costs and benefits of confidentiality need to be carefully assessed against the 
needs of transparency.  The advantages to be gained by taking a more nuanced approach to 
confidentiality and allowing a greater degree of transparency where appropriate are considerable.  
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Publishing the arbitration award – an approach already adopted by a number of institutions - 
would benefit the international arbitration community as a whole.  
Has confidentiality in arbitration been undermined as some commentators contend?  
Probably not in England: the extent and exceptions to confidentiality are generally well defined.  
For arbitrations that fall outside the reach of the Arbitration Act 1996, it will depend on the law 
of the seat of the arbitration and (where applicable) that of the arbitral institution.  If 
confidentiality is a desired quality, then it will be in the interests of those institutions to develop 
and promote their own confidentiality rules, to restore the status quo back to before Esso/BHP v 
Plowman and Bulbank.  Arbitration cannot however be viewed in isolation from the larger legal 
framework within which it operates. 
There is a growing backlash against litigants claims to ‘confidentiality’ within the court 
system.  Holman J recently expressed the view that public, open court hearings and the freedom 
of the press: ‘[a]re the absolute underpinning of the democratic freedom of us all…The public are 
entitled to know what goes on in the family courts, whether we are dealing with the very rich, or 
the very poor, or the people in between’.717  Similarly, the BBC won a challenge to identify a 
London mansion at the centre of an Unexplained Wealth Order (UWO).718  These are but two 
skirmishes in a wider philosophical battle between openness and confidentiality. They are 
indicative perhaps of the court’s current sentiments, reflecting the overall societal view of greater 
judicial transparency. 
Despite the varied approaches and nuances, the literature is generally united in its view that 
change to confidentiality provisions are called for, not just in English arbitration law but globally.  
There is also a sense that many commentators recognise the uphill battle they face to see those 
changes realised.  Entrenched positions, diverse laws, conflicting legal sentiments and competing 
arbitral institutions combine to create what might appear as an impenetrable morass, resistant to 
all attempts to change.  Nevertheless, reform has been accomplished in some jurisdictions and 
highlights that a way forward is accessible.   
One aspect of the reforms proposed that would make the English position on registering 
awards more effective globally would be a new international convention or an amendment to the 
New York Convention 1958.  There are countries that would probably support such a position - 
 
717 Holman J, ‘Judge condemns 'abomination' of secrecy surrounding family courts,’ The Daily Telegraph (London 
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Sweden, Norway and Australia probably amongst them - although it has to be recognised that 
internationally trade is becoming more subject to tariffs (e.g., between USA and China), 
embargoes (e.g., between USA/Europe with Iran and North Korea) and consumer/state boycotts 
(e.g., between Japan and South Korea & Chinese consumers against US manufacturers).  Overall, 
there is probably a shortage of the collective goodwill necessary in the international arena that 
greater legal harmonisation on trade and dispute resolution rules would require. 
Quoting Henry Hallam in Scott v Scott719 Lord Shaw of Dunfirmline said: 
Civil liberty in this kingdom has two direct guarantees; the open administration of justice 
according to known laws truly interpreted, and fair constructions of evidence; and the 
right of Parliament, without let or interruption, to inquire into, and obtain redress of, 
public grievances… he ranks the publicity of judicial proceedings even higher than the 
rights of Parliament as a guarantee of public security.720 
Are there signs of a fundamental shift in policy, one that may see a major reappraisal of the 
current law on arbitration?  The Lord Chief Justice’s recent speeches not only highlight perceived 
drawbacks to the current arbitration regime but are also strongly in favour of the development of 
international commercial courts such as in Dubai and Singapore.  In the current domestic political 
climate, with the focus of law makers on the exigencies of Brexit and the global pandemic 
involving Covid-19, substantial changes to the law of arbitration are unlikely to receive any 
serious parliamentary time or scrutiny soon.  Longer term however, and on the assumption that 
the UK fully withdraws from Europe’s legal structures at the end of the transitional arrangements, 
the desire for judicial reform of arbitration law is foreseeable.  If so, and depending on the 
determination of those who drive the reforms, English arbitration could be fundamentally altered, 
not just with respect to its provisions on confidentiality. 
In the second reading of the Arbitration Bill in the House of Lord Roskill was moved to 
comment that the Bill contained an extremely serious omission i.e., the issue of confidentiality 
with respect to the arbitration and awards, urging that it would be better to add to the statements 
of general principle, ‘a general statement of principle that, unless the parties otherwise agree, the 
principles of confidentiality as long understood in English arbitration, should apply to all 
arbitrations to which this Act applies’. 721  Lord Denning, long retired and a week shy of his 97th 
birthday at the time of that debate, was recognised in his active judicial career as having nailed 
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his banner to the mast of legal reform.  One cannot imagine him staying silent.  As a manifest 
legal reformer, one of his older cases resonates:   
What is the argument on the other side?  On this, that no case has been found in which it 
has ever been done before.  That argument does not appeal to me in the least.  If we never 
do anything that has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere.  The law will 
stand still while the rest of the world goes on; and that would be bad for both.722 
This writer believes, and has argued, whilst recognising that case law deservedly has a central 
role in the context of the English constitution, there are certain facets of the law that require the 
active intervention of parliament in order to protect, maintain and allow commercial practice to 
thrive and develop.  The protection of confidentiality in arbitration is one of those areas. 
  
 





Summary of Proposed Amendments to the Arbitration Act 1996 
New definitions 
Arbitral Tribunal 
An arbitral tribunal means a sole arbitrator, a panel of arbitrators, or an arbitral institution. 
 
Materials 
For the purposes of this Act, materials are defined as all documents generated in the 
course of an arbitration, whether generated e.g., by the tribunal, an arbitral institution, the 
parties or third parties, or legal representation, including but not limited to affidavits, 
pleadings, submissions, witness statements of fact or expert, transcripts of evidence, 
directions or other documents ancillary to the arbitral process. 
 
Third Party Funding 
Third party funding is the provision of funds for the purposes of making or defending a 
claim in an arbitration by a person or entity that is not a party to the dispute in return for 




An arbitration award encompasses any award issued by a tribunal, including interim, 
partial and final awards,  as well any Reasons thereto.  
 
Confidential Information 
Confidential information includes materials and awards. 
New provisions: 
Privacy 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, all meetings and hearings shall be in private.  
 
Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on the confidentiality of documents  
In consultation with the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on the issue of 
confidentiality of any materials pertaining to the arbitration.   
 
Prohibition of disclosure of confidential information 
Every arbitration agreement to which this section applies is deemed to provide that the 
arbitral tribunal, parties, legal counsel and witness must not disclose confidential 
information, except:- 
(a) to a professional adviser; or 
(b) to the extent necessary for the establishment or protection of a party’s legal rights; or 
(c) for the making and prosecution of an application to a court under this Act; or 
(d) if the disclosure is in accordance with a court order; or 
(e) the disclosure is authorised or required by law; or 
(f) for the purposes of obtaining litigation funding. 
 
Court proceedings under the Act being conducted in public 





the whole or any part of the proceedings are to be conducted in private. 
(b) A court may make an order under subsection (1) above - 
 (i) on the application of one of the parties to the proceedings; and 
 (ii) only where the court is satisfied that the interests of the party in having the 
whole or any part of the proceedings conducted in private outweigh the public interest in 
having those proceedings conducted in public. 
 
Consolidation 
(a) The court may on an application by one of the parties order either consolidation or 
concurrency of related arbitral proceedings under multiple arbitration agreements which 
are substantially similar, provided no party is deprived of its right to appoint its own 
nominee as an arbitrator. 
(b) The court shall not order consolidation where an arbitration is being conducted under 
the supervision of an arbitral institution. 
(c) Where consolidation or concurrency is ordered under this section, the Court may order 
that documents disclosable in one arbitration be disclosed to one or more parties to the 
other arbitration(s). 
(d) The court shall balance the risk of any loss of confidentiality against the risks of 
inconsistent findings inherent in refusing to make the order. 
 
Third Party Funding 
(a) A party being funded is required to disclose the existence of a third party funding 
arrangement and the identity of the funder to the opposing party in the arbitration, the 
arbitrators and the arbitral institution or appointing authority (if any), either as part of a 
first appearance or submission, or as soon as practicable after funding is provided or an 
arrangement to provide funding for the arbitration is entered into. 
(b) A party being funded is required to disclose details of the third‐party funder’s interest 
in the outcome of the proceedings, and/or whether or not the third‐party funder has 
committed to undertake adverse costs liability. 
 
Public Interest Exception 
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions with respect to arbitral confidentiality and 
confidential material as provided for in this Act, a court may order disclosure of any 
confidential materials, including an award, if it determines that to do so is in the public 
interest or if the interests of justice so require. 
(b) No central or local government department, authority, agency, or statutory body shall 
be bound by any provisions of confidentiality required by this Act 
 
The Publication of Awards 
(a) A copy of each arbitration award shall be deposited with the High Court within 90 days 
after it has been published.   
(b) When an award is lodged with the court the following information must also be 
furnished: 
(i) The names of the parties; 
(ii) The names of each party appointed arbitrator; 
(iii) When appointed, the name and manner of appointment of the third arbitrator 
or umpire. 
(c) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties,  the award may be published in a redacted 
form so as to preserve the anonymity of the parties, their representatives, witnesses of 
fact and expert and the members of the tribunal, subject to - 
 (i) The Award is not subject to an appeal before the Courts; 





(iii) Neither party has objected in writing to the publication of the Award within 
90 days of it being published. 
 
Breach of Confidentiality 
The Tribunal has the power to take appropriate measures, including issuing an order or 
Award for sanctions or costs, if a Party breaches any of the confidentiality provisions of 
this Act.  
Amendments to existing Sections 
38(3) The tribunal may order a claimant to provide security for the costs of the arbitration. 
This power shall not be exercised on the ground that the claimant is - 
… 
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